

59.

A SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

1976

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RELATIONS

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE WHITE POPULATION GROUP

THE NATIONAL PARTY

1976 has been one of the most eventful years in South Africa's history.

Events on and beyond the country's borders have been of ever-increasing significance. Civil war was raging in Angola at the beginning of the year. South African troops had crossed the border from bases in South West Africa in support of the Unita/FNLA alliance. Very little information was released to the public; but the South African troops clearly penetrated to areas at least 900 km north of the border, where they encountered and fought against Marxist MPLA forces backed by Cubans and armed with highly sophisticated weapons. Mainly as a result of international pressure and lack of support a partial SA withdrawal from the fighting zone began on 21 January. By mid-February the MPLA and Cubans controlled most of the territory, and announced the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola.

For a time the South Africans remained in south Angola to guard the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme, the dam feeding this, and refugee camps in the area; but after the MPLA had agreed to protect the scheme and most of the refugees had been evacuated all the South Africans left Angola, their departure concluding on 27 March. At the request of the peoples concerned, the SA troops were stationed in the northern areas of South West Africa to repulse Swapo attacks from across the border.

South Africa took care of many thousands of Angolan refugees, at temporary camps in south Angola, in South West Africa, and, for a time, in the Transvaal. A minority who could satisfy immigration requirements were allowed to remain in the Republic, but most of the refugees were sent to Portugal or elected to go to Brazil. At the time of writing, however, there were still numbers of more recently-arrived refugees at camps in Owambo and Kavango.

At the end of March, the Security Council branded South Africa as an aggressor.

Guerrilla war escalated sharply in Rhodesia during the year under review. During March, Mozambique closed the joint border. Negotiations between Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo broke down. Thereafter, President Kaunda came to the conclusion that

peaceful means to solve the problems of Southern Africa had failed and that the only option left was to fight. Both Mozambique and Zambia allowed guerrillas to operate against Rhodesia from their territories.

Mr. Vorster continued his policy of refusing to participate in boycotts or sanctions, or to prescribe to Rhodesia what its policy should be. In a Press statement made in September he said that what he was prepared to do was to help create a climate in which negotiations could take place. He had been prepared to advise and to point out alternatives and to use persuasion. Mr. Vorster told a National Party congress on 13 September that he had reminded Mr. Smith that majority rule remained the goal in Rhodesia with the proviso that it was evolutionary and responsible.

The Rhodesian situation was one of the topics discussed during Mr. Vorster's talks with the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, mention of which is made below. The repeatedly-stated American policy for Southern Africa had been independence, majority rule, internationally-backed guarantees for minorities, and economic assistance. In a speech made in August the SA Minister of Foreign Affairs said that his government welcomed the American initiative and was prepared to comply with the request that it should give its full support for a peaceful solution.

A complicating factor in the achievement of such a solution was a split of the Rhodesian ANC into several factions.

At the end of January, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a South African declaration of intent to accept free elections under UN control for the whole of South West Africa (Namibia) as one political entity. It was demanded that, pending a transfer of power, SA should release political prisoners, and abolish all discriminatory laws and practices. The Council would meet again by 31 August to review SA's compliance with these demands.

The constitutional conference held in the Turnhalle at Windhoek continued during 1976. Committees set up by the conference made recommendations in regard to education, social upliftment, economic development, and social practices. A further committee, appointed to study constitutional matters, made recommendations which were adopted by the conference on 18 August. It was agreed that the territorial integrity of South West Africa should be accepted. A multi-racial interim government would be set up as soon as possible, and full independence granted from 31 December 1978, preceded by national elections which could be watched by international observers. The National Party in SWA accepted these decisions.

A proposal that talks should be held with Swapo provided that it ceased its guerrilla attacks was acceptable to most of

the members of the conference. However, Swapo laid down a number of preconditions, including the release of political prisoners, and the withdrawal of SA and its police and armed forces from the territory. It wanted to have direct discussions with the SA Government, instead of negotiations through the Turnhalle conference. Most of these preconditions were unacceptable to Mr. Vorster.

Various UN members stated that the Turnhalle decisions did not go nearly far enough. The Security Council meeting was postponed from 31 August to 22 September to enable representatives of African states to be present. In the meanwhile, the issues outlined above were among those discussed by Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster.

Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster met for several rounds of discussions: in a Bavarian forest resort during June, in Zurich early in September, and in Pretoria later that month. Besides the Rhodesian and the South West African questions, internal events in South Africa were discussed.

In the interval between the Zurich and Pretoria meetings Mr. Vorster said at a NP meeting that in recent months he had had cause to think deeply over his party's policy and how it would affect the future of South Africa. He was convinced that it was the only way of governing the country. He would never give way on the question of one-man-one-vote. Nor would he call a multi-racial national convention.

Internally in South Africa, 1976 was a year of recession and a high rate of inflation, causing a marked increase in the cost of living. There was a sharp rise in Black unemployment, one of the causes being a move in industry towards labour-saving technology.

Further drastic security measures were introduced, including the Parliamentary Internal Security Commission Act and the Internal Security Amendment Act (which replaced the Suppression of Communism Act).

The Status of the Transkei Act was passed, providing for sovereign independence for the Transkei from a date to be determined by the State President. The date decided upon was 26 October. The definition of Transkeian citizenship was a very wide one, and all those so classified lost their South African citizenship. There was much opposition in the country to these provisions. BophuthaTswana, too, asked for independence, but complications may arise over the definition of citizenship: the decision made in the case of the Transkei was rejected by BophuthaTswana leaders. The leaders of the other six self-governing homelands said in a joint statement that they had no intention of "opting for so-called independence", as they did not want to abdicate their birthright as South Africans, nor to

forfeit their share "of the economy and wealth we have jointly built".

A start made in 1975 with the elimination of certain race discriminatory measures in the "common area" of SA (i.e. outside the African homelands) was described on page 3 of last year's *Survey*. This process has been continued in 1976, (although certain Black leaders have described the changes as being merely of a "cosmetic" nature). They include the following measures.

- (a) Apartheid notices in post offices are being eliminated as buildings are erected or altered, but certain separate counters will remain for "practical reasons".¹
- (b) According to the Minister of the Interior,² the wage gap in government service is to be narrowed from time to time as circumstances permit. If parity in wages is introduced, it will start at the highest levels where equal qualifications for a post are required.
- (c) Recommendations by the Theron Commission for improvements in matters affecting the Coloured people are summarised on page 11. The Government rejected direct representation of Coloured people in Parliament and the repeal of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and racially-discriminating clauses of the Immorality Act. It stated that many of the other recommendations were acceptable and some were being implemented, e.g. a speeding up of the provision of housing.
- (d) The planned elimination of certain discriminatory measures affecting Coloured people is described on page 17.
- (e) The Government has rescinded a decision made in 1975 that Africans who buy or build houses in urban areas (on leasehold stands) must have applied for citizenship of a homeland. Widows and divorcees will be able to own houses. Another decision that was rescinded was that African professional men and traders who are allowed to own consulting rooms, shops, or offices in urban areas must be citizens of a homeland. However, these provisions do not apply in the Cape west of the "Eiselen line" (which runs from the coast a little to the west of Port Elizabeth to the Free State border near Colesburg).
- (f) After the grave rioting that began in Soweto in June, sparked off by the language medium issue in post-primary schools, it was decided that the use of both official languages as media would not be enforced.
- (g) Most of the African teams walked out of the Olympic Games held in Montreal because of New Zealand's presence at a time when an All Black rugby team was touring SA.

¹ *Star*, 9 September.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 March.

It appeared that SA's sporting isolation would become complete unless the official policy of allowing only "multi-national" events was drastically changed. During September, National Party congresses agreed that the question of mixed sport should be left to individual clubs and sports administrators to decide, with a minimum of Government interference.

The decision of the congresses in regard to mixed sport appeared to bear out assertions in the Nationalist Press earlier in the year that most of the electorate was ready to accept a much faster pace in bringing about necessary changes than the Government had been adopting.

The Minister of the Interior, Dr. C. P. Mulder, suggested at the Transvaal Party congress that the term "plural democracy" should be substituted for "separate development". In a speech at the Cape congress the Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, announced that a special Cabinet committee had been appointed to investigate possible changes to South Africa's constitutional system. The Westminster model had never really worked in Africa, he maintained.

The serious and tragic rioting that took place throughout the Republic from June onward is described in a subsequent chapter. There had been protests by African school boards and sporadic strikes by African pupils in Soweto, Johannesburg, since February against the enforced use in most of the post-primary schools there of both Afrikaans and English (as well as an African language for certain subjects) as media of instruction from the Standard V level. Nearly all of those concerned wanted English-medium instruction, with Afrikaans taught as a subject. Large-scale rioting by students began in Soweto on 16 June, and, by August had spread throughout the country, involving Coloured and Indians as well as Africans, and homeland areas as well as cities and towns in the "common area". It became clear that others besides actual students were instigating disturbances, and that the causes of Black frustration and anger went very far beyond merely the language-medium question.

Nevertheless, Black "student-power" became a real factor in the South African situation. It was brought forcibly home to White people who had disregarded many warnings that young Blacks were far more impatient, militant, and anti-White than their parents ever were, and that there was an increasing degree of solidarity between young Black people of the various racial and ethnic groups. The youths were able to enforce "stay-at-homes" by adult Black workers.

About 700 people were detained by the police under the previous and new security laws, a high proportion of them being members of Black consciousness groups (described later). Hundreds more were held in connection with alleged criminal offences.

The implications of these events for the future of South Africa are incalculable at the time of writing.

At a meeting in October the Potchefstroom-based Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Beweging (an influential group of Afrikaans religious leaders and academics) resolved that the homelands policy was acceptable to it only if the homelands were meaningfully consolidated and were developed materially and spiritually as reasonable (leefbare) fatherlands. It was decided to send a deputation to the Government to plead for an ending of injustices created by the policy of separate development.

Calls for radical change were made during the year by the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, and by prominent individual Afrikaans and English-speaking newspaper editors, businessmen and academics.

UNITED PARTY

The widespread resignations from the UP that took place during 1975, and the formation of the Progressive Reform Party, were reported on pages 5 *et seq* of last year's *Survey*.

In a Parliamentary by-election early in May in the formerly safe UP seat of Durban North a PRP candidate defeated the UP by 324 votes, reducing the UP membership of the Assembly to 36 — the smallest number in its parliamentary history of 42 years. Later that month a Cape MPC resigned from the UP to become an independent, while another defected to the NP. The UP caucus and its central head committee both met to discuss the situation. The caucus passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the leadership of the party and its policies.

Nevertheless, numerous Press reports indicated that there were still considerable divisions within the party, some of the right-wing MPs having much in common with the NP. A political commentator had observed earlier¹ that the UP was originally created as a heterogenous party to help the country overcome the depression of the 1930's, and then later to fight the war. But it could no longer contain its heterogenous elements.

There had been rumours of a bipartisan NP-UP approach to certain matters pertaining to internal security, as had been the case in 1972 when the UP agreed to serve on the Select Committee which subsequently became the Schlebusch/Le Grange Commission.² However, during 1976 the UP Members of Parliament solidly opposed, in the strongest possible terms, the introduction of legislation to increase the Government's powers to ban persons and organisations, and to set up a commission consisting of MPs which would, *inter alia*, have authority to investigate the affairs of organisations. The Party's attitude to these and

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 December 1975.

² See 1972 *Survey*, page 53, and subsequent issues.

other legislative measures is described in the pages that follow.

In his speech at the end of the Budget debate³ (shortly after the end of SA's intervention in Angola), Sir De Villiers Graaff declared strongly that the Government's policy of separate development offered no secure future for SA. He urged the creation of a multi-racial consultative Council of State to advise on a solution of the problems facing the country. Unless the Government faced up to the fact that race discrimination would have to be eased out and dismantled, chaos would result. By continuing with these discriminatory measures the Government was playing into the hands of communists. "If we fail to get it across to Black people that a free enterprise economy offers more than the communist and socialist regimes across our borders", he said, "then we have already lost the battle for survival here in Southern Africa."

(The UP's policy for the political future of SA was outlined on page 2 of the 1974 *Survey*.)

When opening the Cape provincial congress of the UP in August, Sir De Villiers said⁴ that he had recently met Mr. Vorster to discuss the unrest in the country and measures that were necessary to avert the possibility of violence, sporadic or continuous, becoming a permanent state of affairs in SA. He had not gained the impression that the Prime Minister proposed any fundamental adaptations of policy. But without rapid and fundamental change, the outlook was bleak. The old order had gone, and things would never be the same again. There should be immediate consultation with all communities on a meaningful and representative basis.

Sir De Villiers described minimum requirements for policy changes which, it was reported, had been decided upon by the UP's constitutional committee. These were:

- (a) the removal of statutory discrimination based on race and colour;
- (b) acceptance of the principle of the participation of all races at all levels of government through a constitutional system that shared power and responsibility with all races and protected minority groups;
- (c) direct representation of racial groups other than Whites on all bodies affecting their lives and welfare;
- (d) freedom of choice of citizenship for Blacks permanently domiciled outside homelands that became independent;
- (e) full local government for Blacks in metropolitan township areas;
- (f) a positive programme of urban renewal in these townships, to enable the people to lead full family lives, including freehold title and home ownership, better transport, the

³ 21 April, Hansard 12 cols. 5067-76.

⁴ *Star*, 18 August; *Sunday Times*, 22 August.

removal of restrictions on operating businesses, an effective say in education;

- (g) elimination of forced social segregation;
- (h) equal economic opportunities for all.

Sir De Villiers called for a united opposition to launch a "Save South Africa" campaign. In a Press interview after the meeting he said he believed that the UP could provide a broad enough base for an alternative, moderate, government, but its appeal should be widened if the NP Government were to be dislodged. A broad-based alliance was necessary, cutting across old party lines. The campaign should aim at attracting support, for example, from people who previously voted NP but had become disenchanted, realising that the Government's race relations, economic, and foreign policies were failing.

People whom he had in mind were those who were prepared to accept the minimum requirements for change which he had outlined, and to agree with the concept of federalism — not necessarily according to the pattern proposed earlier by the UP.

For the campaign to be feasible it might be necessary to form a new political party, Sir De Villiers said. He was prepared to bring his supporters into such a party under the leadership of someone else, if this were necessary.

He added⁵ that Black support for the "Save South Africa" campaign would be sought, but it would have to be within the limits permitted by the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968.⁶

PROGRESSIVE REFORM PARTY

An account was given on page 9 of last year's *Survey* of the meeting that was held during September 1975 between leading representatives of the PRP, the homeland governments of KwaZulu, Gazankulu, Lebowa, and Qwaqwa, the (Coloured) Labour Party, and the SA Indian Council. In a declaration signed by all the leaders who were present they called, *inter alia*, for the holding of a national convention as representative as possible of all South Africans to work out a framework for the future of the country.

A letter was sent to the Prime Minister urging him to call such a convention.

The leaders mentioned met again on subsequent occasions. On 4 April the PRP leader, Mr. Colin Eglin, MP, announced that they had decided to take the initiative themselves, and would arrange for a national conference to be held within the next year.

The PRP success at the Durban North Parliamentary by-election is mentioned on page 6. Its strength in the House of Assembly was thereby increased to twelve members.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 August.

⁶ See 1968 *Survey*, page 5.

Asked by the Press to comment on the suggestion for a "Save South Africa" campaign,¹ Mr. Eglin welcomed Sir De Villiers Graaff's statement that he wanted a realignment of opposition forces, but considered that an alliance of verligtes and conservatives would be an "exercise in futility". Mr. Harry Schwarz, MP, said that it would be contrary to the national interests if conservatism were to be the basis of realignment. More was needed than cosmetic change. The PRP was not prepared to relinquish the principles for which it went into the wilderness.

A few weeks later, Mr. Eglin told a Press conference² he sensed that White South Africans of all parties were prepared to support a bold verligte lead. He had extended an open invitation to Sir De Villiers to discuss a realignment of the Opposition, but he made it clear that this could not come from the negative basis of anti-Nationalism, but from the heart, on the positive basis of people getting together who felt that they belonged together.

Mr. Eglin added subsequently³ that his proposed alliance was one between "enlightened citizens" who shared a commitment to rid South Africa of race discrimination; a willingness to share effective power with all South Africans at all levels of government; and a preparedness to meet with Black South Africans to thrash out and agree upon a pattern of peaceful co-existence for the future.

PROPOSALS FOR A UNITED OPPOSITION

On 5 October an informal meeting of leading businessmen and academics was held behind closed doors in Johannesburg. On their behalf, Dr. Frans Cronje issued a Press statement reading, "The meeting decided that in view of the seriousness of the times and the urgent necessity of bringing pressure to bear on the Government to accept more realistic and enlightened policies, an appeal would be made to the leaders of the United Party, the Progressive Reform Party, and the Democratic Party to co-operate to establish a steering committee to examine the feasibility of creating a new (political) party which will be a real alternative government."

Following discussions with and between the three party leaders and others, a steering committee was set up later in October, under the chairmanship of a retired judge, Mr. J. F. "Kowie" Marais, and composed of prominent men who had played no leading part in party politics: Dr. Frank Bradlow, Mr. Max Borrum, Dr. Frans Cronje, Professor J. Danie Kriek, Dr. Frank Robb, Mr. Peter Soal, Dr. Jan Steyn, and Professor S. A. Strauss.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 August; *Star*, 24 August.

² *Star*, 9 September.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 September.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

INDIANS

POWERS OF THE SA INDIAN COUNCIL

In terms of Government Notice R7 of 2 January, the Minister of Indian Affairs delegated to the SA Indian Council all powers previously vested in him in regard to education and social welfare.

At its meeting later that month the Council created portfolios for these matters, and, in preparation for the assumption of further powers, shadow portfolios of health, housing and community development, group areas and planning, local government, finance and economic affairs, agriculture, labour, and culture, sports and recreation.¹

PARTICIPATION IN AN INTER-CABINET COUNCIL

The Prime Minister's proposal for the establishment of a White, Coloured, and Indian inter-Cabinet council has been mentioned earlier.

This proposal was hotly debated at a meeting of the SA Indian Council in February. It was decided in principle to participate in such a council provided that further details of the suggested functioning of the body were supplied and were acceptable to the SAIC.²

The matter was discussed with the Prime Minister when he met the Executive of the SAIC during June. Mr. Vorster is reported³ to have said that he intended going ahead with the establishment of the council, whether or not the Labour Party majority in the Coloured Representative Council decided to participate. He envisaged four meetings a year.

There was a further debate on this question at an SAIC meeting later in June.⁴ It was finally decided, by 21 votes to 5, to give the inter-Cabinet council a twelve-month trial. The view of the dissenters was that a decision should be deferred until a more representative and democratically-elected SAIC came into being.

The chairman of the SAIC's Executive, Mr. J. N. Reddy, said during the debate that it was in the interests of the Indian community to take part in the meetings so that answers could be found to the many problems on which representations had been made without satisfactory results. These included hardships arising from

¹ *Star*, 27 January.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 February.

³ *Ibid.*, 6 June.

⁴ *Star*, 18 June, and Minister of Indian Affairs, Assembly 22 June, Hansard 21 col. 10169.

the implementation of the Group Areas Act, including the plight of Indian traders, the removal of restrictions placed by White trade unions on the training of Indian youths, and the ban on the immigration of foreign-born Indian wives.

Mr. Amichand Rajbansi, a member of the Executive, resigned from office in protest against the Council's decision to participate in the inter-Cabinet council.⁵

FORMATION OF POLITICAL GROUPS WITHIN THE SAIC

The five members of the Council who had opposed this decision came together after the meeting to launch a Reform Group, initially led by Mr. Y. S. Chinsamy.⁶

Another more conservative group of Indians, represented in the Council only by Dr. I. A. Kajee, decided to form a People's Party.⁷

MEETING OF THE INTER-CABINET COUNCIL

The Inter-Cabinet Council met on 24 September. Those present were the Prime Minister, seven White Cabinet Ministers, the Coloured leaders who had indicated their willingness to participate, and six representatives from the SA Indian Council. Several of the White Ministers gave a résumé of certain policy matters.

The Prime Minister explained that the Inter-Cabinet Council would operate like all Cabinets—on a consensus basis after incisive discussion. It would have no legislative authority; but the decisions of a Cabinet ultimately became legislation. Consultations with Africans would continue to take place at a different level. The Council would be consulted later in regard to possible changes in South Africa's constitutional system.

The next meeting of the Council would be held on 26 November.⁸

A further debate on participation in the inter-Cabinet council took place at a meeting of the SA Indian Council early in November. The Reform Group insisted that Indians should boycott the council because urban Africans had been denied representation on it. Mr. Reddy stated that the council would be given a trial of "exactly one year".

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 August.

⁶ *Star*, 20 August.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10 September.

⁸ *Star*, 25 September.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AFRICANS

BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENTS

SA Students' Organisation

As described in past issues of this *Survey*, in the late 1960's Black students (Africans, Indians, and Coloured) began to feel that the time had come for Blacks to do things for themselves, no longer relying on the altruism of a minority of White liberals. These liberals, they considered, enjoyed the privileges of "the system", and could not properly identify with Blacks. In any case, their efforts had been ineffective.

The (Black) SA Students' Organisation (Saso) was, in consequence, formed at a conference held in July 1969, with the object of fostering Black community awareness, capabilities, achievement, and pride. This, it was stated, was an essential preliminary if the Whites and Blacks were eventually to come together on a basis of equality.

There was, at first, communication with the White student body Nusas; but over the next few years many Saso members came to feel that they no longer needed or wanted the cooperation of Whites. In the speeches and writings of leaders there was increasing mention of the "White racist regime".

From 1972 on, periodic confrontations took place with the authorities at Black universities and colleges, arising, in the main, from the students' opposition to the system of Bantu education. A number of the leaders were banned, and Saso was barred from most of the campuses.

Saso was largely responsible for formulating the concept of Black consciousness in South Africa. Its leaders stated that this could not be equated with "Black Power" movements overseas; the circumstances were different.

SA Students' Movement

The SA Students' Movement (SASM) was formed later, as the younger wing of Saso.

Black consciousness

Black consciousness has been described by its advocates as an attempt by Black people to create something positive out of a negative situation. Instead of passivity resulting from a sense of psychological inferiority induced by "the system", a

sense of pride in being Black would be fostered. Blacks would affirm themselves, and work towards an open plural society with equal opportunity for all. Black supporters of this concept rejected Government-created bodies such as homeland governments, the CRC, the SA Indian Council, and urban Bantu councils.

Black People's Convention

During 1972, a congress of Africans held at Edendale near Pietermaritzburg decided to promote Black solidarity and to foster the philosophy of Black consciousness.

A first national congress of a newly-formed Black People's Convention was held at Hammanskraal during December of that year, and was attended by some 200 African, Indian, and Coloured delegates and observers. The main theme was that Blacks were becoming ever more determined to chart their own future and find solutions to their own problems. A series of resolutions was passed: *inter alia*, opposition was expressed to foreign investment which supported the economic system of White South Africa and exploited Black workers, and to multinational sport as then advocated by the Government.

During 1973 all the office-bearers except one were served with banning orders.

In 1974, when Portugal granted independence to Mozambique, the BPC and Saso planned pro-Frelimo rallies to be held at the end of September. The Minister of Justice prohibited any meetings to be held anywhere in the country by or on behalf of these organisations during the period 24 September to 20 October. Members of the organisations in Durban and at the University of the North defied the ban and did attempt to convene meetings. Numbers of them were arrested and detained under the security laws. The trial of some of them, still in progress at the time of writing, is described in a subsequent chapter.

More than a hundred delegates attended an annual conference of the BPC which was held in King William's Town in December 1975. Among resolutions passed were the following.¹

- (a) Mr. Vorster's détente was rejected as a move designed to split the OAU and to buy time for the entrenchment of the position of White oppressors in SA.
- (b) The MPLA was recognised as the legitimate government of Angola.
- (c) The Muzorewa wing of the Rhodesian ANC was recognised, and Mr. Nkomo was urged to stop dividing the people.
- (d) Transkeian independence was dismissed as a manoeuvre to give credibility to apartheid.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 December 1975.

Black Women's Federation

More than 200 African, Indian, and Coloured women from all parts of the country attended a conference held in Durban during December 1975, at which a Black Women's Federation was established to work for solidarity and co-operation among Black women and their organisations. Mrs. Fatima Meer was elected president. Members decided that for the time being they would reject affiliation with purely White women's organisations. As a first step, they would build up their own strength and become independent and self-reliant.²

Institute of Black Studies

A number of Black academics decided to set up an Institute of Black Studies to discuss the role of the Black man in "the South Africa of today and tomorrow". The inaugural meeting was to have been held in Soweto during July, but rioting was in progress there at the time. The Chief Magistrate of Johannesburg banned the proposed gathering there as likely to disturb the peace.

Instead, the delegates met at the Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre on the West Rand. The Press reported that the message emerging from all the papers presented was, "The Black man walks tall into the future. His potential must be realised. His voice must be heard".³

An allied organisation was the **Institute of Black Research** in Durban.

Azanian Liberation Army

According to the *Sunday Times* of 14 November, the Minister of Justice said in an interview that a new movement called the Azanian (i.e. South African) Liberation Army had been responsible for the form of organisation during the unrest. It was Marxist-based and operated along ANC lines.

GROUPS RESULTING FROM THE DISTURBANCES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Student power

The grave disturbances that began in Soweto in June and spread throughout the country are described in a subsequent chapter. The grievance that sparked off disturbances was the enforced use of Afrikaans as well as English as a medium of instruction in most of the African post-primary schools in Soweto. Those who led the earlier demonstrations were, consequently, students. It became clear later that others (including delinquents) were involved, as well, in initiating disturbances, that outside

² *Star*, 11 December 1975.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 10 and 13 July; *Sunday Times*, 18 July.

agitators were possibly taking a hand, and that the causes of unrest went far beyond merely the language-medium question. Nevertheless, the leaders were commonly referred to as students, and student-power emerged as a very real factor in the South African scene, in the homelands as well as in towns and cities.

The authentic student leaders appeared to be dedicated, intelligent, militant young activists; fearless people with no family responsibilities; owning no property, thus with nothing material to lose. They had come to despise their elders for submitting too long to the entrenched system of White domination, and for continuing with policies of reasoned argument, which had achieved small if any result. Parents and teachers were shown little respect, and lost their authority over the militant youth. An older African observer commented, "While we used to believe that we would see freedom in our lifetime, the youth wants it now. Right now." Clashes led to a deep hatred of the police (Black as well as White), and of White authority. Blacks who collaborated with "the system" were despised. During the disturbances, people in or near the African townships who failed to give the clenched fist Black power salute were attacked.

A Students' Representative Council, with anonymous membership, was formed at Soweto, and directed the actions of the less bright and the younger people, as well as of many of those of the older generation. "Stay at homes" were ordered, which adult men and women workers were afraid of disobeying because otherwise reprisals followed.

Student power first became evident among the urban Africans; but from early August disturbances were initiated, too, by young Coloured and Indian people. Prime targets for attack were symbols of White domination and of apartheid.

The only publicly identified African leader in the early stages was Tsietsi Mashinini, president of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, head prefect at his school, and a reported member of Saso. The police offered R500 for information leading to his arrest; but, after operating underground for a while, he escaped from SA. He was reported⁴ to have said, in a television interview with a team from London "Even if the White man's regime would give concessions to our people they are no longer interested in that. All they want is to hit at the system and to hit very hard".

As described later, many hundreds of students were arrested, but any leaders amongst them were, apparently, immediately replaced by others.

Black Parents' Association

As the rioting in Soweto became increasingly serious per-

⁴ *Star*, 3 September.

turbed African adults from a variety of organisations formed an umbrella body called the Black Parents' Association to help the victims of rioting and their families, and to try to substitute dialogue for violence and persuade pupils to return to their classes. The organisations concerned were as diverse as, on the one hand, the YMCA, YWCA, and Housewives' League, and, on the other, political bodies including Saso, the SASM, and the BPC. A prominent churchman, Dr. Manus Buthelezi, was appointed chairman.

Student leaders submitted to the Association a list of their grievances, asking it to negotiate with the authorities on their behalf. The Association requested an interview with the Minister of Justice and Police. He replied that if the members proved, by stopping the rioting, that they were in fact leaders in Soweto, he would accept a memorandum from them, after receipt of which he would consider meeting them.

Such a meeting did not eventuate because the disturbances continued, and because most of the leaders of the Black consciousness movements were arrested and detained by the police.

Committee of Thirty

Another temporary organisation formed to try to help restore order was the "Committee of 30", drawn from officially recognized bodies such as the urban Bantu councils (UBCs) and school boards on the Witwatersrand. This organisation was acceptable to the Minister, but was impotent in the situation because the bodies it represented were spurned by the young people. The UBCs had possessed advisory powers only, and their advice was seldom taken by the authorities. A member told the Press that derisive names applied to them were "Useless Boys' Clubs" or "United Black Crooks".

HOMELAND LEADERS

At the height of the disturbances, in August, the leaders or representatives of all the homeland governments except the Transkei gathered at the Holiday Inn near Jan Smuts Airport to discuss the situation. After the meeting the convener, Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, issued a joint statement to the Press.¹

The homeland leaders said that they deeply regretted differences within the leadership of Black people. This was a time during which Blacks must speak with one voice, whatever their differences on strategy might be. If the central Government had heeded warnings given by the homeland leaders at joint meetings in March 1974 and January 1975, the existing confrontation in the country could have been avoided. The Government's failure

¹ *Sunday Times*, 22 August; *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 August.

to do so had given credibility to accusations that "institutions foisted on Blacks" were no use.

While understanding the impatience of youth, it was stated, the homeland leaders could not condone wanton destruction of property. But they deplored the violence unleashed by the police in response to legitimate demonstrations. Urgently needed changes included recognition of the permanency of urban Africans, the abolition of influx control, and free and compulsory education.

Full human rights were demanded for Blacks. Concessions could no longer satisfy the aspirations of the Black man.

With the exception of the BophuthaTswana representatives, the homeland leaders rejected independence as a solution to the country's problems. (However, Dr. Phatudi is reported to have said early in November that Lebowa might ask for independence after the land question had been settled.)

They jointly pleaded urgently for a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the unrest, and also the need for a national conference at which detained African leaders would be represented.

It was announced later that the Prime Minister would meet the homeland leaders on 8 October.

On that day a seven-hour meeting took place of the leaders of all the homelands (other than the Transkei) and the Prime Minister, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education, his three Deputy Ministers, and the Secretaries of the Departments.

According to a joint communique issued after the meeting,² the Prime Minister was not prepared to discuss the unrest in the country because this matter was the subject of a judicial inquiry, but promised a full discussion after the commission had submitted its report.

He rejected calls for a national convention or conference because he "saw no merit in the idea at all". On the plea for the release of recently detained leaders to enable them to participate in discussions, Mr. Vorster said that he "could not and would not interfere with the law" because "machinery existed whereby the detention of the individuals concerned would be reviewed".

The Prime Minister rejected a call for the abolition of Bantu Affairs Administration Boards, which were viewed by Africans as "instruments of oppression", but indicated that increased powers were to be given to Urban Bantu Councils.

The leaders had hoped to discuss the official policy of regarding Africans as citizens of the various homelands rather than of South Africa; but consideration of this question was deferred for the next meeting with the Prime Minister. The Africans present

² From account in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 October.

were invited to formulate specific proposals for changes to the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act. Discussion of influx control was postponed, too. No new steps on homeland consolidation emerged.

The leaders were informed that it was the policy of the Government to eliminate race discrimination in the public service, and to narrow the wage gap between White and Black as far as possible, eventually eliminating it. It was also Government policy to work towards compulsory education and free school books for Africans.

BLACK UNITY FRONT

Immediately after the meeting with the Prime Minister, Chief Buthelezi (KwaZulu), Professor Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu) and Dr. Phatudi (Lebowa) met about fifty leading African politicians, civic leaders, trade unionists, professional men and women, student leaders, and representatives of the Black Consciousness movement. Chief Buthelezi told the Press that "in the face of persistent White intransigence and the determination of Mr. Vorster, shown at the meeting with homeland leaders, to maintain White domination and apartheid", they had no alternative but to close their ranks.

A steering committee was elected, under the chairmanship of Dr. S. M. Nyembezi of Soweto, with the following aims:

- (a) to bring together a wide cross-section of the Black community to discuss ways and means of resolving the problems faced by Blacks;
- (b) to bridge the "dangerous and increasingly widening gap" between rural and urban Blacks;
- (c) to establish a disciplined Black community and to work for the emergence of a true Black leadership.³

³ Star, 9 October; Sunday Times, 10 October; Rand Daily Mail, 9 November.

SA INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

The 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Race Relations was held in Johannesburg during January. An opening address by Professor H. W. E. Ntsanwisi¹ preceded Dr. Bernard Friedman's presidential address, which was entitled *From Isolation to Détente*.²

The theme of the conference that followed was "South Africa in Africa: an Evaluation of Détente". The main papers presented were:

- Détente in Perspective* (RR 2/1976), by Professor Gerrit Olivier.
- Détente: a Global View* (RR 6/1976 A), by Professor R. Ballinger.
- Détente, as seen from the Homelands* (RR 4/1976), by Dr. C. N. Phatudi.
- Détent. An External View* (RR 15/1976), by Mr. A. M. Chambati.
- South West Africa/Namibia and Détente* (RR 26/1976), by Professor C. J. R. Dugard.
- Détente: as seen from the Common Area* (RR 1/1976), by Mr. L. Mlonzi.
- Summing Up* (RR 27/1976), by Dr. Roger J. Southall.

During the proceedings an Alfred and Winifred Hoernlé Memorial Lecture was given by Professor M. W. Murphree, entitled *Educational Development and Change in Africa*.

Activities of the Institute during the year are mentioned in appropriate sections of the chapters that follow.

¹ RR 7/1976.

² Published by the Institute of Race Relations.

WOMEN FOR PEACE

Mainly at the initiative of Mrs. Bridget Oppenheimer a non-political, multi-racial organisation called Women for Peace was launched during September. Firm support was given by Ms. Deborah Mabiletsa, president of the Black Women's Federation. Its establishment was motivated by the crisis situation that prevailed in the country following the Soweto riots. The aims of the organisation were stated to be:

- (a) to become aware of the needs and problems of all the people of South Africa;
- (b) to promote communication between and better understanding of the country's many races and cultures;
- (c) to work towards equal opportunity for all racial groups and to foster harmony between the different peoples of South Africa;
- (d) to use the power of women; to make such representations as were necessary; to explore all avenues in seeking peaceful change; to move with crisis; and, above all, to ACT.

More than 1 000 women of all racial groups attended a first public meeting, held in Johannesburg early in November. In an opening speech Mrs. Oppenheimer said that a delegation had already been sent to the Minister of Police to urge that the police should inform parents immediately when, where, and why their children were being detained.³ Various projects were to be undertaken, she said, including investigations of the Black education system, Black unemployment, bus services, and the reasons for differences in the prices being charged for staple foodstuffs between shops in the townships and in supermarkets in the cities.

Branches of Women for Peace were formed in other centres during the weeks that followed. The National Council of Women of S.A. pledged its support. Similar organisations were launched in Cape Town, Durban, and Grahamstown.

³ It transpired later that more than 600 children, thought by their parents to have been arrested, had fled to neighbouring countries, Botswana in particular.

POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE POPULATION

According to a Department of Statistics news release, the estimated size of South Africa's population in mid-1975 was:

Whites	4 240 000
Coloured	2 368 000
Asians	727 000
Africans	18 136 000
				25 471 000

A break-down of the African group was:

Zulu	4 890 000
Xhosa	4 762 000
Tswana	2 045 000
Pedi	1 955 000
Shoeshoe	1 651 000
Shangaan	791 000
Swazi	574 000
Venda	437 000
Other	598 000
Foreign Africans	433 000
				18 136 000

In other news releases, the Department of Statistics stated that during 1975, SA had 50 464 immigrants and 10 255 emigrants.

If the observed trends of mortality and fertility continued for all the population groups, the Department stated, and net migration for Whites remained at its level over recent years, the population might be expected to increase as shown in the table that follows. (It was not explained why the 1975 figures for Whites, Coloured, and Asians differed from those given above. The figures for Africans excluded foreign Africans.)

registration card for all Africans. The child's homeland citizenship has to be entered on these cards (irrespective of where he was born in South Africa).

The question of citizenship is dealt with in the chapter of this *Survey* on the African homelands.

IMMORALITY

In reply to a question in the Assembly,⁷ the Minister of Justice indicated that during 1975, 309 cases under Section 16 of the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950 were referred to Attorneys-General. (This Section prohibits sexual intercourse between Whites and Blacks.) As a result, 325 persons were prosecuted. Of these, 199 were convicted and 98 were awaiting trial.

USE OF THE TERM "KAFFIR"

On 3 June, the Judge President of Natal ruled that use of the term "kaffir" was an insult, and awarded an African R150 damages in an action he had instituted against the Minister of Police and a former police constable who had used this term in addressing him.

⁷ Hansard 2 col. 109.

MEASURES FOR SECURITY AND THE CONTROL OF PERSONS

EXPENDITURE ON SECURITY, DEFENCE, POLICE, AND PRISONS

The State Budget for 1976-7¹ was drawn up in a new way. In previous years it had been divided into a Consolidated Revenue Account and a Loan Account. These accounts will in future be combined in a State Revenue Account. Items of anticipated expenditure for 1976-7 and thereafter will, in consequence, not be strictly comparable with Budget figures for previous years.

The estimates of expenditure from the State Revenue Account for 1976-7 on the services indicated, and the percentages these constituted of the grand total for all State Departments, were:²

	Total Budget R	Percentage of grand total for all Departments
Prime Minister's Department:		
Contribution to Security		
Services Special Account	11 830 000	0,15
Defence	1 350 000 000	16,74
Police	176 900 000	2,19
Prisons	70 900 000	0,88
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	1 609 630 000	19,96

The grand total for all Departments was R8 066 137 400.³

DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL

The training of Coloured, Indian, and African personnel for the Defence Force was described on pages 42-3 of the 1975 issue of this *Survey*, and page 56 of the issue for 1974.

Battalions of Defence Force trained African volunteers have been formed in the Transkei, Owambo, and Kavango.

White women are increasingly being enlisted in commando and certain other units to serve in telecommunications and as drivers, store-keepers, and clerks.⁴

¹ RP 2/1976.

² Votes 3, 4, 32 and 33.

³ Page XXVI.

⁴ *Sunday Times*, 29 February.

DEFENCE AMENDMENT ACT, No. 1 OF 1976

The Defence Act of 1957, as amended in 1973 and 1974, specified the types of service on which the SA Defence Force may be employed. These were:

- (a) service in time of war;
- (b) service in connection with the discharge of the obligations of the Republic arising from any agreement between the Republic and any other state;
- (c) service for the prevention or suppression of terrorism. The 1976 Amendment Act added:
- (d) service for the prevention or suppression of any armed conflict outside the Republic which, in the opinion of the State President, is or may be a threat to the security of the Republic.

In terms of the principal Act, a member of the Defence Force could not be required to serve outside South Africa in time of war unless he gave his written consent. The original draft of the Amendment Bill defined "South Africa" as "Africa south of the Sahara"; but during the Second Reading debate a number of Members of Parliament expressed dissatisfaction with this definition.

At the Committee stage the Minister of Defence moved⁵ that the Section concerned should read:

- (1) "A member of the South African Defence Force may in time of war be required to perform service against an enemy at any place outside the Republic.
- (2) "For the purposes of subsection (1), service for the prevention or suppression of terrorism or any armed conflict" (outside the Republic) "shall be deemed to be service in time of war against an enemy."

This amendment was accepted.

On behalf of the UP, Mr. W. V. Raw moved a further amendment,⁶ adding to the Section quoted above, "Provided that the employment, for a period exceeding one month, beyond the borders of the Republic of members of the South African Defence Force for the prevention or suppression of any armed conflict outside the Republic, shall be deemed to be mobilisation"

(The Act already provided that when mobilisation is ordered and if Parliament is in session, the reason will be communicated to it forthwith. If Parliament is not then sitting, it must be reconvened within thirty days.)

This amendment, too, was accepted.

A new Section was inserted providing for indemnity from civil or criminal proceedings for members of the SA Defence Force and other persons in the service of the state in respect

⁵ Assembly, 5 February, Hansard 2 cols. 628-9.

⁶ Col. 685.

of acts ordered or done in good faith in connection with the prevention or suppression of terrorism in any operational area. Compensation may be awarded to persons who suffer damage or loss as result of such acts.

The Moratorium Act was amended to extend its benefits to members of the Citizen Force or Commandos who are rendering periods of continuous service.

The provisions of the principal Act relating to service in time of war and to the prevention or suppression of terrorism were deemed to have come into operation on 9 August 1975. The Minister indicated⁷ that the object was to obviate any possible doubt in regard to the legality of action taken in Angola.

EXTENDED PERIOD OF MILITARY SERVICE

The Minister of Defence announced on 18 December 1975 that the period of service of a limited number of national servicemen who were serving in the operational area would be extended for a month. During 1976, he said, a number of Citizen Force units would serve in the operational area (the border area between South West Africa and Angola and, for a time, within Angola). Members of units called up for annual training camps would serve for twelve weeks beyond the previous period of 19 days. This would be necessary because of the long distances to be travelled and the time this would take, and would facilitate the relieving and replacements of troops in the operational area.

MILITARY PENSIONS ACT, No. 84 OF 1976

A Military Pensions Bill was introduced in the Assembly on 1 June. The Deputy Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions explained⁸ that its main objects were to ensure the continuation and improvement of the pensions of the veterans of previous wars; to create a new dispensation for members of the Defence Force who were injured on military duty; and to make provision for the dependants of those who were killed. The Bill affected members of the Citizen Force, the Commandos, and the Reserve who were not members of the Permanent Force or the Police Force and who were not public servants. Persons in these latter categories were covered by other legislation.

The pensions payable would vary according to various factors, including the racial groups of the recipients and their previous potential incomes.

The new dispensation would be applied to all new cases which had arisen since 1 July 1974, therefore all those who had been affected by incidents in the operational area since that time would be covered.

⁷ Col. 401.

⁸ Hansard 18 cols. 7788-92.

Speaking for the UP, Mr. G. N. Oldfield said⁷ that his party fully supported the Second Reading of the Bill as far as the principle of granting better recognition of the magnificent service rendered by young men was concerned, this recognition being on a more equitable basis than in the past. But the UP would move certain amendments at the Committee stage, including the elimination of discrimination on a racial basis in regard to benefits payable. In terms of the Bill the previous ratio of about 4:2:1 as between Whites, Coloured and Indians, and Africans was being narrowed to approximately 6:4:3, which was to be welcomed; but it would be preferable for benefits to be calculated to a greater extent according to previous potential earning capacity, leaving race out of consideration.

Dr. A. L. Boraine, representing the PRP,¹⁰ adopted a similar attitude, and also pleaded for improved compensation for elderly war veterans.

The amendments proposed by Mr. Oldfield at the Committee stage,¹¹ designed to eliminate reference to population groups, were outvoted.

PARLIAMENTARY INTERNAL SECURITY COMMISSION ACT, No. 67 OF 1976

The Background

As described on page 25 of the 1973 *Survey*, during that year the Schlebusch Commission (which at that time consisted of six Members of Parliament from the National Party and four from the United Party) tabled a unanimous first interim report in which it was recommended that a permanent, bi-party, statutory Parliamentary Commission be established on Internal Security, to continue the work done by the existing commission in respect of "organisations which exist already and which may from time to time come to light". The proposed constitution and functions of such a Parliamentary Commission were set out.

At the time, the Prime Minister stated that legislation to establish a commission would be introduced during the session then in progress. In the event, it was held over until 1976.

It was mentioned on page 33 of the 1974 *Survey* that the United Party members of the Schlebusch Commission, who then numbered three, submitted a minority report that was embodied in the Commission's fourth interim report. They pointed out that immediate executive action had been taken against certain persons referred to in the second interim report, prior to any decision by Parliament as to the nature of the action, if any to be taken. The executive action taken was not subject to

⁷ Cols. 7792-7.
¹⁰ Cols. 7808-12.
¹¹ Col. 7932.

any independent form of review.

The three commissioners recommended the appointment of a Judicial Tribunal to consider recommendations for executive action for the benefit of the Minister of Justice; to review executive action that had been taken; and to review any existing restrictions imposed on persons, making recommendations thereon to the Minister.

Terms of the Act

The Bill was introduced at its Second Reading in the Assembly by the Prime Minister on 23 February. The measure made provision for the establishment of a Parliamentary Internal Security Commission, to consist of such number of members of Parliament, not being more than ten, as the State President may appoint. Members of the Commission will hold office for such period, not exceeding five years, as the State President may determine, but at the end of this period may be re-appointed. The State President will designate the chairman and the vice-chairman.

The Commission will investigate matters which, in the opinion of the State President, affect internal security, and which are referred to it by the State President, and will report on such matters to the State President. The State President may also refer to the Commission for investigation and report any matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation, and existing and contemplated administrative procedure, affecting internal security.

Normally, after the Commission has submitted a report to the State President, the Prime Minister will lay copies of the report on the Tables of both Houses of Parliament. However, if the Prime Minister, in consultation¹ with the Leader of the Opposition, considers that he is acting in the public interest, he will not table a particular report, or portions of a report.

Committees of the Commission may be appointed.

The Commission or a committee will have powers similar to those of the Supreme Court to summon witnesses, administer the oath or affirmation to them, examine them, and call for the production of books, documents and other objects.² A person who, without sufficient cause (the onus of proof of which rests on him), fails to obey a summons to appear as a witness, or refuses to take the oath or make an affirmation, or fails to answer satisfactorily any question lawfully put to him or to produce documents or objects for which the Commission has called, will be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to

¹ The first draft of the Bill read "after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition". During the Parliamentary debate the Prime Minister moved that the word "in" be substituted for "after". (Assembly Hansard 9 col. 3989.)

² No provision was made for the legal representation of witnesses.

maximum penalties of R600 or six months' imprisonment. Notwithstanding any penalty imposed he may again be dealt with in this manner with regard to any further refusal or failure by him.³

Any person who, after having been sworn or having made affirmation, gives false evidence knowing it to be false or not knowing or not believing it to be true, will be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to maximum penalties of R1 200 or twelve months' imprisonment.

Any person who wilfully interrupts the proceedings of the Commission or a committee, or wilfully hinders or obstructs the Commission or a committee in the performance of its functions, will be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to maximum penalties of R600 or six months' imprisonment.

The State President may make regulations assigning additional duties and powers to the Commission, or laying down procedure to be followed by it, or generally, as to any matter which he considers it necessary or expedient to prescribe in order that the achievement of the purposes of the Act may be promoted or facilitated. Such regulations may prescribe penalties for contravention of them or failure to comply with them, such penalties not to exceed R600 or six months' imprisonment.

Debate in the House of Assembly

When the Bill was first published, the United Party announced⁴ that it would refuse to serve on the proposed Parliamentary Internal Security Commission if this measure were passed in its existing form. *Inter alia*, the United Party repeated its submission, first made in 1972 when the appointment of a Parliamentary Select Committee to report on certain organisations was being debated,⁵ that a Judicial Commission of Inquiry would be preferable if the Government was determined that the affairs of the organisations concerned should be investigated.

In the course of his Second Reading speech on the Bill, the Prime Minister maintained that it was the task of courts of law to punish offenders as and when an illegal deed had been perpetrated, and as and when sufficient evidence had been placed before it to prove that the accused in fact committed this deed. But the courts had no function or power to take preventive action against any individual or organisation. The object of the proposed legislation, he said, was to establish a commission which

³ These maximum penalties were very considerably higher than the penalties that were in fact imposed by courts of law in 1974 and 1975 on persons who refused to testify before the Schibusch/Le Grange Commission. See 1974 *Survey* page 39, and 1975 *Survey*, page 32.

⁴ e.g. *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 February.

⁵ See 1972 *Survey*, page 52. The Select Committee appointed was converted into a Commission of Inquiry and became known as the Schibusch (and, subsequently, Schibusch/Le Grange) Commission.

⁶ Assembly, 23 February, Hansard 5 cols. 1717-8.

would gather information to be placed before Parliament. If it deemed it necessary, Parliament would then instruct the Government to take executive action.

The leader of the Opposition, Sir De Villiers Graaff, said⁷ it was very clear that a bipartisan approach to security matters was extremely desirable. However, if the Bill became law in its existing form he would refuse to serve on the proposed commission.

The main point at issue, he continued, was what the function of a Member of Parliament should be in security matters. There were two alternatives. The first was that the role of MPs should be to keep in constant review all existing and future legislation to do with security matters and all associated administrative procedures, and to ensure that Parliament was informed intelligently in order that it might legislate in respect of these matters. If this were the object of the Bill, the Prime Minister could be assured of the full support of the UP.

The second alternative was that MPs should act as investigators at the behest of the executive. This is what was proposed in the Bill, and the United Party opposed such a step. In terms of the Bill, the investigators might even be prevented from reporting to Parliament on matters that they had discovered.

Sir De Villiers moved an amendment to omit all the words of the Prime Minister's motion after "That", and to substitute, "this House, while accepting the need for effective measures to safeguard the internal security of the Republic, and the desire for bipartisan agreement on such measures, declines to pass the Second Reading of the . . . Bill because, *inter alia*, it establishes a committee consisting of Members of Parliament, but fails—

- (1) to provide that its functions will be confined to the investigation and report of matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation and associated administrative procedures; and
 - (2) to prevent the implied or possible extension of Parliamentary action into areas which are more properly areas of police action and the jurisdiction of judicial officers".
- On behalf of the PRP, Mrs. Helen Suzman maintained⁸ that the real objects behind the proposed commission were:
- (a) to divert attention from the ground swell of dissatisfaction with the Government's policies;
 - (b) to attempt to intimidate critics of the Government into a submissive silence; and
 - (c) to produce a climate in which protest was equated with subversion.

⁷ Cols. 1728-43.

⁸ Cols. 1780-2.

She moved as an amendment to omit "now" from the Prime Minister's motion that the Bill be read, and to add at the end "this day six months".

Both amendments were later defeated.

Replying to the debate, the Prime Minister⁹ summed up differences between the Government and the Opposition in regard to the Bill. Firstly, whenever security matters had been debated over the past 26 years, the Government had maintained that the executive should have the right to prohibit organisations and to take action against persons by restricting their freedom of movement and by other means. The Opposition had disagreed.

A second difference was that he (the Prime Minister) wanted an organ of Parliament—be it a Select Committee or a Commission—to be given the right to investigate organisations in a fact-finding capacity. A suspect organisation should be investigated before it resorted to deeds. Once it did perform illegal deeds, then the matter became one for the police. A Parliamentary Committee or Commission had an advantage which the police did not possess: the police could not make a person give evidence under oath or question him. There was the additional advantage that Parliament was informed of the findings of a Parliamentary body.

If the Leader of the Opposition would concede the right of a Committee or Commission to investigate organisations, the Prime Minister said, the Government would be able to co-operate. "I would then go out of my way to accommodate him in order to obtain his co-operation".

A third difference that had emerged was that there were members on the opposite side of the House (apparently the members of the PRP), who did not, in any circumstances, want either a Select Committee or a Commission. "We have nothing to say to one another".

Returning to the second difference, the Prime Minister said that if it were practical, he was prepared to accept a Select Committee rather than a Commission. A difficulty was that, in terms of the standing orders, a Select Committee could not continue its work during the Parliamentary recess. But the standing orders could be amended. A further difficulty would remain: that something might arise to cause the Committee to consider that the affairs of an organisation should be investigated without delay, but during a recess the Committee would not be able to ask Parliamentary authority to do so.

During the Committee stage, Clause 4 of the Bill was debated first at the request of Sir De Villiers. This Clause read:

(1) "The Commission shall investigate matters which, in the

⁹ 26 February, cols. 2024-45.

opinion of the State President, affect internal security and which are referred to it by the State President, and shall report thereon to the State President.

(2) "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the State President may also refer to the Commission for investigation and report any matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation and existing and contemplated administrative procedure affecting internal security".

Sir De Villiers moved¹⁰ that sub-section (1) and the first part of sub-section (2) be deleted, the Clause to read:

"The State President may refer to the Commission for investigation and report any matters concerning existing and contemplated legislation and existing and contemplated administrative procedure affecting internal security".

When this amendment was rejected, Sir De Villiers announced that the UP had no more interest in the Bill. It took virtually no further part in the committee stage debate. Members of the PRP proposed various amendments, which were all rejected, and called for a division on every clause. The UP voted with the PRP in rejecting all 13 of the Clauses.

At the Third Reading, on 29 March, Sir De Villiers said¹¹ that in view of the fact that the Bill had emerged from the Committee stage without any material change, notably to Clause 4, the passage of the Bill would put an end to any chance of a bipartisan approach to a certain portion of the field of internal security. It would not be possible for the Opposition to be accused of bearing any responsibility whatever for executive action arising from reports or findings of the proposed Commission. He moved that the Bill be read that day six months.

The Third Reading was passed by 104 votes to 37.

Some criticism of the Bill outside Parliament

The Institute of Race Relations issued a Press Statement on the Bill¹² in which it pointed out, *inter alia*, that the Internal Security Commission was to be empowered to investigate matters which "in the opinion of the State President, affect internal security and are referred to it by the State President". "There is nothing" the Institute said, "to indicate how the State President (that is the State President acting on the advice of the Cabinet) is to form such an opinion, which in effect means that any matter may be investigated by the simple device of labelling it as a matter affecting 'internal security'. We have already experienced the wide meaning attached to words such as 'communism' and there is nothing to suggest that 'internal

¹⁰ 25 March, Hansard 9 cols. 3918-9, col. 3989.

¹¹ Hansard 10 cols. 4085-90.

¹² IR 28/1976.

security' will not receive the same generous interpretation. In effect therefore the Commission will be able to investigate any matter it pleases, provided it has been designated a matter affecting 'internal security'. The Institute therefore fears, on the basis of past experience, that this could open the way to indiscriminate persecution."

The Black Sash organised a silent demonstration against the Bill, and distributed thousands of leaflets in which it was stated, *inter alia*, that the Bill provided for "secret judgment . . . arbitrated by untrained party politicians".

A number of other organisations protested against the measure.

INTERNAL SECURITY AMENDMENT ACT No. 79 OF 1976

This legislation made amendments to five other Acts dealing with matters affecting security, including the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 as amended. The terms of this Act, as further amended, were embodied in the new legislation and its title was, accordingly, repealed.

Amendments to the Legislation Previously Entitled "Suppression Of Communism" (Hereinafter termed the "principal Act".)

(a) Organisations that may be declared unlawful

The principal Act defined "communism" very widely. It declared the Communism Party of SA to be an unlawful organisation. It empowered the State President to declare any other organisation to be unlawful if he was satisfied that it was in any way promoting the spread of communism or furthering the achievements of any of the objects of communism, or if it was controlled by such an organisation, or if it was carrying on, directly or indirectly, any of the activities of an unlawful organisation.

The new Act enabled the State President also to declare an organisation to be unlawful if he is satisfied that it engages in activities which endanger, or are calculated to endanger, the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or if it is controlled by such an organisation.

(b) Prohibition of publications

The principal Act empowered the State President to prohibit the printing, publication, or dissemination of any periodical or other publication if he was satisfied that it was promoting the spread of communism, or was published or disseminated by an organisation declared to be unlawful, or was expressing views

propagated by such an organisation.

The new Act enabled the State President also to prohibit the printing, publication, or dissemination of any periodical or other publication if he is satisfied that it serves, *inter alia*, as a means for expressing views or conveying information the publication of which is calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.

(c) Prohibition of attendance at gatherings

The principal Act empowered the Minister of Justice to prohibit any person from attending any gathering, or any particular gathering, or any gathering of a particular nature, class, or kind, if he was satisfied that the person concerned was engaging in activities that were furthering the achievement of any of the objects of communism.

In terms of the new Act, such prohibition orders may be served, too, on persons who in the Minister's opinion are endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.

(d) Prohibition of persons from being within or leaving defined areas

The principal Act empowered the Minister to prohibit any person from being within or from leaving defined areas if he was satisfied that the person concerned was in any way furthering the achievement of any of the objects of communism. Such prohibition orders may now be served, too, on any person deemed to be endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of public order.

(e) Detention of persons in custody

The so-called "Sobukwe clause" of the principal Act provided that if the Minister was satisfied that any person serving a sentence of imprisonment imposed under any of the security laws was likely, if released on completion of his sentence, to promote any of the objects of communism in any way, the Minister might direct that this person should be detained in custody in a prison area for a stated period. This provision lapsed as from 30 June 1969, but could be revived by resolution of both Houses of Parliament for periods not exceeding a year at a time.

The new Act deleted these provisions. Instead, it provided that if the Minister is satisfied that any person is engaging in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, the Minister may direct that this person be detained in custody in a prison area for a specified period.

This provision will be in force only during such period not exceeding twelve months at a time, and in such part of the Republic, as the State President may from time to time determine.

(As described later, the provision was, subsequently, brought into force.)

(f) Review committee

A new sub-Section was included in the Act. If the provision described in the previous paragraphs is brought into effect, the State President will appoint a review committee consisting of a chairman and two other members. The chairman must be a judge of the Supreme Court, or a magistrate, or a person who has held office as a judge or a magistrate.

If a person is detained in custody in terms of the provisions described above, the review committee will as soon may be, but not later than two months after the commencement of the custody, investigate the Minister's action. Thereafter, the review committee will investigate the person's custody at intervals of not more than six months.

The committee will consider all facts and written representations submitted to it, and may in its discretion also hear oral evidence or representations from any person. Persons desiring to make written representations must deliver these to the Secretary for Justice. Persons desiring to submit oral representations must notify the Secretary.

After an investigation, the review committee will make such recommendation as it may think fit to the Minister, who must as soon as possible notify the person concerned of the contents of such recommendation. The Minister need not give effect to any recommendation by the review committee. If, however, he does not give effect to a recommendation that a detention order be withdrawn, he must table in Parliament a report stating the recommendation made and the name of the person who is detained.

Meetings of a review committee will not be open to the public, and its deliberations and recommendations will not be disclosed to the public. No court of law will have jurisdiction to pronounce upon its functions or recommendations.

(g) Prohibition of release on bail or otherwise

A new sub-Section provides that whenever any person has been arrested on a charge of having committed any offence referred to in a Schedule to the Act, an attorney-general may, if he considers it necessary in the interest of the safety of the State or the maintenance of public order, issue an instruction that such person may not be released on bail or otherwise before sentence has been passed or he has been discharged.

The offences referred to in the Schedule are sedition, treason, contraventions of certain provisions of the new Act here described or of the Terrorism Act of 1967, or contraventions of Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 (sabotage), or any conspiracy, incitement, or attempt to commit any of these offences.

(h) Detention of Witnesses

A further provision is that whenever, in the opinion of an attorney-general, there is any danger of tampering with or intimidation of any person likely to give material evidence for the State in any criminal proceedings in connection with facts which may serve as a basis for a charge relating to an offence referred to in the Schedule, or that any such person may abscond, or whenever he deems it to be in the interests of such person or of the administration of justice, the attorney-general may order the arrest and detention of such person.

Unless the attorney-general orders that a person so detained be released earlier, such person will be detained until the criminal proceedings concerned are concluded, or for a period of six months, whichever period is shorter.

Unless special permission is granted by the attorney-general or a State official to whom he has delegated this power, no-one will have access to a detained person except a State official acting in the performance of his duties and a magistrate, who will visit the person in private at least once a week.

No court will have power to order the release of a detained person or to allow other persons to visit him.

(These provisions are the same as those of the "180 day detention clause" of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1965. The Minister of Justice said in the Assembly¹ that they had been included in the new measure because the Criminal Procedure Act was to be amended in 1977, and it might be decided to omit the relevant Section. It dealt with security matters and should be included, rather, in the Act dealing with Internal Security.)

(i) Application of the Act to South West Africa

The principal Act provided that it would apply in South West Africa as well as in the Republic.

(j) Amendments to other Acts

Certain consequential amendments were made to other Acts. It was stipulated that the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956, will apply in South West Africa as well as in the Republic. The

¹ Hansard 15 col. 6686.

Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance of 1930 of SWA was repealed.

The Public Safety Act, 1953, laid down maximum penalties of R1 000 or five years for contraventions of regulations made by the State President during a period while a state of emergency has been proclaimed and continues to exist. This limitation on the penal provision was removed in terms of the new Act.

Parliamentary debate

The Bill was originally entitled the "Promotion of State Security Bill"; but during the committee stage in the Senate a NP Senator proposed, and the Minister of Justice agreed,² that the title be changed to the "Internal Security Amendment Bill" in order that opponents of the measure would not be able to continue calling it the "SS Bill".

Earlier, when the measure had been introduced at the second reading in the Assembly, on behalf of the UP Mr. R. M. Cadman moved³ "To omit all the words after 'That' and to substitute 'the order for the second reading of the Promotion of State Security Bill be discharged and the subject of the Bill be referred to a Select Committee for inquiry and report, the Committee to be instructed to bring up a more comprehensive and effective Bill, which, *inter alia*—

- (i) clearly and properly defines the activities and organisations by which the security of the State is threatened;
- (ii) creates such new offences and penalties as are necessary to meet that threat, so that miscreants will be dealt with through the courts and not by arbitrary executive action;
- (iii) provides that, in so far as executive action in terms of the Bill may be necessary, it be subject to the scrutiny of a judicial review committee and exercisable, in so far as the freedom of individuals is concerned, only in time of war or national emergency;
- (iv) provides for the protection of witnesses without the need for their arbitrary detention."

The PRP rejected the measure more emphatically. On their behalf Mrs. Helen Suzman moved⁴ that it be read that day six months.

Some 31 amendments (including five by the NP) were placed on the Assembly's order paper for the committee stage debate. Only those moved by the NP were accepted by the Minister. A division was called on every clause. The PRP opposed all of them. The UP opposed all but two: it voted with the Government on the deletion of the clause limiting the penal provision of the Public Safety Act, and on the clause extending the Riotous

² Senate, 26 May, Hansard 11 cols. 2869-70.

³ Assembly, 11 May, Hansard 15 col. 6441.

⁴ Col. 6459.

Assemblies Act to South West Africa.

During the third reading debate in the Assembly the Minister of Justice said⁵ that he would continue to flush out communists, but that the legislation was aimed at people other than communists. There were the young Black Power leaders who were being polarised and were allowing themselves to be misled by the Christian Institute. There were people who in spirit were trying to besmirch South Africa's name. There were Nusas wages commissions that were trying to organise Africans into trade unions so as to use them for revolution.

The third reading was passed in the Assembly by 90 to 44 votes.

The UP changed its approach during the Senate debate. Senator J. L. Horak moved⁶ that the Bill be read that day six months.

Opposition by extra-Parliamentary organisations

A Press statement was issued on behalf of the Johannesburg Bar Council⁷ in which it was said that the Bill contained provisions which were contrary to the fundamental principles of South Africa's legal system and should be condemned by all lawyers. It negated the basic principle which had for many years been implicit in the legal systems of all civilised countries that no man should be punished or otherwise made to suffer by the State except for a distinct breach of the law proved in the ordinary manner before the courts of the land.

On the same day, the Cape Bar Council issued a statement⁸ to the effect that it was important that judges of the Supreme Court, and not members of the executive, should be entrusted with the responsibility of deciding whether a person was guilty of taking part in activities which placed the security of the State or the maintenance of public order in danger, and whether such people should be deprived of their freedom.

The Orange Free State division of the Society of Advocates stated⁹ that the provisions of the Bill relating to detention represented a drastic inroad on the accepted principle that a person should lose his freedom only through the administration of justice. Even if exceptional conditions existed in regard to State security, the division could not accept as sufficient the revision procedure provided for in the Bill.

During the Assembly debate the Minister referred to the statements by the two Bar Councils.¹⁰ While he had a great deal of respect for Bar Councils, the Minister said, he wanted to tell

⁵ 18 May, Hansard 16 cols. 7021-2.

⁶ 20 May, Senate Hansard 10 col. 2658.

⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 May.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, 14 May.

¹⁰ Hansard 15 col. 6709.

them publicly that in his opinion it was not the function of these bodies to become involved in polemical legislation which was still being debated in the House, thus venturing into the political arena. If the two Bar Councils concerned wished to make representations, they should have sent delegates to see him.

The Institute of Race Relations issued a Press statement¹¹ in which it said, *inter alia*, that it believed that the Government already had enough security measures at its disposal to maintain peace in South Africa. It believed that the new Bill, which conferred wide discretionary powers on the executive, was unnecessary and would be seen as further evidence of the determination on the part of the Government not to permit peaceful social change within South Africa.

The Civil Rights League stated¹² that it wholeheartedly supported the stand of the two Bar Councils and of the Free State division of the Society of Advocates. The Black Sash organised a public meeting in Johannesburg to protest against the Bill. Among others who voiced their objections were eight academics at the University of Cape Town.¹³

Application of the provisions relating to preventive detention

The serious disturbances that took place in South Africa from June onward are described elsewhere in this *Survey*.

In terms of Proclamation R133 of 16 July, the provisions of the new Act relating to preventive detention, outlined on page 45, were brought into force in the Transvaal for one year. Then, by means of Proclamation R159 of 11 August, they were brought into force in the whole of the Republic for a period of one year from the date of the proclamation.

As reported later in this booklet, large numbers of persons were detained in terms of this new measure, while others were detained under the "180-day detention clause" and other security legislation.

¹¹ RR 62/76.

¹² *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 May.

¹³ *Ibid*, 18 May.

THE SOWETO RIOTS AND SUBSEQUENT UNREST

June 16, 1976 saw the outbreak of race riots on a larger scale than has ever been experienced in South Africa. Although it was the "language issue" which proved to be the flashpoint, the general consensus of opinion amongst most Black and White leaders is that violence on such a vast scale could not have resulted from this issue alone. It seems evident that the underlying causes of the initial riots and the continuing unrest are the poor socio-economic conditions in the townships and the lack of security and deep-seated resentment felt by urban Africans.

BACKGROUND TO THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

Since 1955 it has been policy in Bantu Education that the two official languages should be used on a 50-50 basis as media of instruction in secondary schools. In 1968 it was stated in the Department of Bantu Education's Annual Report that this policy could not be fully implemented because of a shortage of teachers who were thoroughly proficient in both official languages; in fact the policy was, in 1968, carried out fully in only 26 per cent of schools.

On 6 March 1974 homeland leaders, in discussions with the Prime Minister and other Ministers, proposed that the medium used in schools in the homelands should be adopted in African schools in White areas. In most cases this was English. Despite the Prime Minister's suggestion that this possibility should be investigated and despite the almost unanimous view of African leaders and educationists that this would be preferable, official policy remained unaltered.

On 29 August 1974 Mr. W. C. Ackerman, Southern Transvaal Regional Director of Education, issued Regional Circular No. 2, in which it was stated that in Std. 5, Forms I and II, General Science and Practical subjects must be taught through the medium of English, "Wiskunde/rekenkunde en Sosiale Studie" through the medium of Afrikaans.

In a subsequent circular (No. 1 of 1975) it was stated that application could be made for exemption from the ruling. Many applications were turned down. It should be borne in mind that with only one exception, all teachers' training colleges for Africans use English as medium of instruction. African teachers have no language endorsement on their certificates, stating their competency to teach through the medium of Afrikaans, and according to

Soweto principals it is common practice for inspectors to assess this competence by merely exchanging a few words in Afrikaans with the teacher concerned.

Further evidence of official attitudes on this matter is found in the minutes of a meeting of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board held on 20 January 1976, which reads as follows:

"The circuit inspector told the board that the Secretary for Bantu Education has stated that all direct taxes paid by the Black population of South Africa are being sent to the various homelands for education purposes there.

"In urban areas the education of a Black child is being paid for by the White population, that is English- and Afrikaans-speaking groups. Therefore, the Secretary for Bantu Education has the responsibility towards satisfying the English- and Afrikaans-speaking people.

"Consequently, the only way of satisfying both groups, (is that) the medium of instruction in all schools shall be on a 50-50 basis.

"The circuit inspector further stated that where there was difficulty in instructing through the medium of Afrikaans an application for exemption can be made. He stated that if such an exemption is granted by the Department of Bantu Education, it shall be applicable for one year only.

"In future, if schools teach through the medium not prescribed by the department for a particular subject, examination question papers will only be set in the prescribed medium with no option of the other language. The circuit inspector stated that social studies (history and geography) and mathematics shall be taught through the medium of Afrikaans, physical science and the rest through the medium of English.

"Asked whether the circuit inspector should not be speaking at the meeting in an advisory capacity, the inspector stated that he was representing the Department of Bantu Education directly.

"The Board stated that they were not opposed to the 50-50 basis medium of instruction but that they wanted to be given the chance of choosing the language for each subject.

"The circuit inspector stated that the board has no right to choose for itself, but should do what the department wants. He suggested that the board could write to the department via himself and the Regional Director on this matter. At this juncture the circuit inspector excused himself and left the meeting.

"The board was not happy about the statements of the circuit inspector and felt that to write a letter would not offer any favourable reply.

"The board unanimously accepted a motion moved by Mr. K. Nkamela, and seconded by Mr. S. G. Thwane, that the

medium of instruction in schools under the jurisdiction of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board from Standards 3 to 8 should be in English. The meeting further resolved that the principals be informed about the decision."¹

EVENTS LEADING UP TO JUNE 16

Early in February two members of the Meadowlands Tswana School Board, Mr. Letlape and Mr. Peele, were dismissed. The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education said in reply to a question in the Assembly on 27 February² that they were dismissed in terms of regulation 41 (1) of Government Notice R429 dated 18 March 1966, which states that the regional director may "if he is of the opinion that the continued existence of any school board or the membership of any member of any school board is, for whatever reason, not in the interest of the Bantu Community or the education of the Bantu, at any time dissolve such school board and order the constitution of a new school board or terminate the membership of such member of any school board". The regional director gave no reasons for the dismissals, but it was believed that they were due to the board's refusal to use Afrikaans as medium of instruction in their schools. On 6 February the remaining seven members of the board resigned in protest at the dismissal of Messrs. Peele and Letlape.

Mr. M. C. Ackerman, regional director of Bantu Education for the Southern Transvaal, refused to comment on the matter. Mr. M. A. N. Engelbrecht, chief inspector of schools, stated³ the Black schools were entitled to choose between English and Afrikaans as a medium of instruction depending on proficiency, that the choice was made through an application by the principal of the school, which was considered by the Department, and that it was a professional matter that fell outside the jurisdiction of the school boards.

Chief Lucas Mangope took up the matter with the Central Government and subsequently reported⁴ that school boards were free to choose the medium of instruction to be used in their schools.

In the Assembly on 27 February the Deputy Minister of Bantu Education said⁵ that applications for exemption from the language ruling had been received from school principals, but that no statistics were kept of such applications. He went on to say, "The change-over to the twelve-year structure has entailed that the principle in respect of the medium of instruction applicable in the case of secondary schools also becomes applicable in the case of Standard 5. Applications to deviate in these cases are considered in the light of: the availability of teachers proficient to

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 April.

² *Hansard* 5 col. 401.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 February.

⁴ *Star*, 27 February.

⁵ *Hansard* 5 col. 401.

teach through the medium of one of the official languages; the fact that textbooks in a certain language have already been supplied to the senior classes or the school which the pupils will eventually attend."

It was reported during March⁶ that members of the Meadows-Tswana School Board said that they had been informed that they would only be reinstated if they withdrew a circular saying that schools under them should be instructed in English.

On 14 March parents at Donaldson Higher Primary School unanimously rejected the use of Afrikaans as medium of instruction. (Just over two weeks prior to this, on 24 February, junior certificate students at Thomas Mofolo Secondary School had clashed verbally with their principal over the medium of instruction.)

A delegation from the African Teachers' Association of South Africa met the Secretary for Bantu Education on 26 April. They presented him with a memorandum concerning the medium of instruction. The Secretary promised to make new approaches to the Minister, but nothing further was heard about the matter.

Opposition speakers in the House of Assembly called on the government to allow Black pupils to choose the official language in which they wished to be educated.⁷

On 17 May students at Orlando West Junior Secondary School went on strike in protest against the enforced use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. They demanded to see Mr. De Beer, the circuit inspector, but he refused to meet the students. Two days later they presented to their principal, Mr Mpulo, a 5-point memorandum protesting against the use of Afrikaans as medium of instruction. After several meetings with the principal and staff the students drafted a letter stating their grievances, addressed to the regional director of Bantu Education. On the same day, 19 May, pupils at Belle Higher Primary School also went on strike.

The following day, 20 May, Emthonjeni Higher Primary and Thulasizwe Higher Primary Schools joined the strike, bringing the number of pupils on strike to about 1 600. As yet there was no reaction from the Department of Bantu Education; Mr. M. C. de Beer was quoted as saying that the department was "doing nothing about the matter".⁸

At a meeting of parents, school board members from various areas, and Inkatha Yesizwe members, it was decided that students should be requested to return to school while the matter received attention.⁹ The pupils ignored the request, however, and on 24 May Pimville Higher Primary and Khulangolwazi Higher Primary Schools also came out on strike.

⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 March.

⁷ *Star and Rand Daily Mail*, 30 April.

⁸ *Star*, 21 May.

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 May. For "Inkatha" see 1975 Survey, page 131.

On 25 May the Director of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations sent the following telegram to Mr. Rene de Villiers, M.P., a member of the Executive Committee of the Institute: "Deeply concerned Afrikaans medium controversy Black schools x Position Soweto very serious x Could you discuss matter with the Minister concerned". Mr. De Villiers conveyed the contents of the telegram to the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, who said he was not aware of any real problem, but would enquire about the matter. A day or so later Dr. Treurnicht sent a note to Mr. De Villiers in which he stated that the matter was still being handled at a lower level and that no final conclusion had yet been reached. He said that apparently children were striking because their teachers, according to them, were not qualified to teach them through the medium of Afrikaans. Perhaps, he added, it was not as simple as this.

On the following day, 26 May, members of the SAIRR staff spoke to the principal of a Soweto high school who said that there was no doubt that principals and teachers at the striking schools were being intimidated by inspectors. Apparently teachers, having been asked whether they could speak Afrikaans, to which they generally answered "yes" for fear of losing their jobs, were then told that they could therefore teach through the medium of this language.

The first overt violence occurred on 27 May: Mrs. K. Tshabalala, a teacher of Afrikaans at Pimville Higher Primary, was stabbed with a screwdriver by a student. Students stoned police who came to make an arrest in connection with the stabbing.¹⁰

In the *Sunday Express* of 30 May Mr. De Beer, circuit inspector for the striking schools, was quoted as saying that his solution would be to have any child who was away from school for longer than 10 days expelled, to close the schools or to transfer the teachers. Despite these hard-line statements, on 1 June pupils at Senaoane Junior Secondary School went on strike.

In the next few days the strikes seemed to be abating; pupils at Emthonjeni, Belle, Thulasizwe and Pimville started returning to classes. Apparently pupils had been told that lessons in mathematics and social studies—the subjects taught in Afrikaans—would be suspended for the time being.¹¹ On 5 June, however, pupils at Belle Higher Primary School stoned the school buildings and other children who had returned to classes during the lull in the strike, and two pupils were subsequently arrested on 7 June in connection with this incident.

Also on 7 June a five-man deputation from the Urban Bantu

¹⁰ *Rand Daily Mail Extra*, 28 May.

¹¹ *World*, 3 June.

Council, accompanied by Mr. N. P. Wilsenach, the West Rand Administration Board director for housing, met Mr. M. C. Ackerman to discuss the school strikes. Mr. Makhaya, chairman of the UBC, said the deputation had requested Mr. Wilsenach to accompany them in order to speed up the appointment with Mr. Ackerman. At the meeting Mr. Ackerman said there was nothing he could do about the issue.¹²

On 8 June police went to Naledi High School to "make some enquiries about some matter", according to Major C. J. Viljoen, commander of Jabulani Police Station.¹³ Students stoned the police and burnt their car. On the same day, 15 pupils from Thulasizwe Higher Primary were detained and released after questioning. On 9 June pupils at Naledi High School again stoned policemen who had come to investigate the previous day's disturbance.

On 10 June pupils at Emthonjeni refused to write their social studies exam in Afrikaans and the following day students at Orlando West Junior Secondary refused to write their June exams. Pupils at Morris Isaacson High School posted a placard at the main gate reading "No S.B.'s allowed. Enter at risk of your skin". According to a teacher, antagonism towards police was running high at the school. It was also reported that students at Senaoane Junior Secondary were said to have been beaten for "allegedly betraying others in the fight against the use of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction".¹⁴

The Director of the SAIRR sent an urgent telegram to Mr. R. de Villiers on 11 June, stating that the situation in Soweto schools was deteriorating rapidly, that violent incidents had already occurred, and asking that Dr. Treurnicht should be approached. Dr. Treurnicht, on being informed of the contents of the telegram, said that he did not think there had been an escalation of the dispute, but would make further inquiries. Later he told Mr. De Villiers that he had spoken to his officials and had reason to believe that the matter would be amicably settled.

On the same day, the following questions were asked in the Assembly by Dr. E. L. Fisher:

1. Whether there had recently been a protest demonstration by pupils of Naledi High School in Soweto; if so, what was the reason for the demonstration.
2. Whether police had to be brought in to end the demonstration; if so, what methods were used to end the demonstration.
3. Whether (a) any persons were injured and (b) any damage was caused as a result of the incident.

The Deputy Minister of Bantu Education, Dr. A. Treurnicht,

¹² *Rand Daily Mail Extra*, 10 June.

¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 June.

¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail Extra*, 12 June. "S.B."—Special Branch (of the police).

replied, "My Department has no knowledge of any such incident".¹⁵

In reply to a second question, Dr. Treurnicht stated that the principals of six of the striking schools had applied for permission to deviate from the 50-50 language medium requirement. Permission, however, was not granted because "after inspection it was found that all teachers concerned were competent to give instruction through the medium of both official languages".¹⁶

In the Urban Bantu Council on 14 June, Councillor Leonard Mosala warned that the enforcing of Afrikaans in schools could result in another Sharpeville. Speaking of the children, he said, "They won't take anything we say because they think we have neglected them. We have failed to help them in their struggle for change in schools. They are now angry and prepared to fight and we are afraid the situation may become chaotic at any time." He also said that police interference in the schools should be avoided at all costs, as the children might become aggressive at the sight of the police.¹⁷

THE JUNE RIOTS

On 16 June a march in protest against the use of Afrikaans as medium of instruction was initiated by pupils of Naledi and Thomas Mofolo High Schools. The marchers moved through Soweto, apparently with the object of holding a mass meeting at Orlando Stadium in order to voice their grievances. About 10 000 marchers converged on Orlando West High School. There was an incident where police tried to remove placards from one group of marchers, but on the whole the march proceeded peacefully until the children were confronted by the police as they gathered in front of the school. Tension was already running high, and when the police fired tear-gas canisters into the crowd, the children retaliated by throwing stones at the police. The police opened fire, apparently first firing warning shots, and then into the crowd of advancing children, killing at least one—thirteen-year-old Hector Petersen.¹⁸

After the first shootings, fierce rioting broke out and spread throughout Soweto. There were several deaths, including those of two White men, Dr. M. Edelstein and Mr. N. Esterhuizen, who were beaten to death. Police reinforcements were brought into Soweto and army troops were placed on standby as the violence escalated and buildings and vehicles were burnt.

All schools were closed at the order of Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. However, on 17 June many pupils, apparently unaware of the suspension of

¹⁵ Hansard 19 col. 1185.

¹⁶ Hansard 19 col. 1185.

¹⁷ *World*, 15 June.

¹⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 and 18 June; *Star*, 16 June; *World*, 16 June.

classes, returned to school, only to be sent home as rioting continued. According to newspaper reports, the continuing violence was led mainly by tsotsis and gangsters who had taken advantage of the previous day's trouble and had started looting. Putco suspended bus services and all clinics were closed.

On 17 and 18 June pupils in other townships demonstrated in sympathy with Soweto schools, as did students at the Universities of the North, the Witwatersrand and Zululand. At Zululand the library and administration buildings were razed by fire. At the University of Natal Medical Faculty 87 black students were arrested following a sympathy march.

On 18 June Mr. John Rees of the South African Council of Churches and Dr. Beyers Naudé of the Christian Institute were served with orders warning them to dissociate themselves completely from the "situation of unrest", and public gatherings were prohibited until 29 June in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The following day a similar order was served on Dr. Selma Browde, Progressive Reform member of the Johannesburg City Council and the Transvaal Provincial Council.

By 19 June rioting in the townships of the Rand had died down, except for sporadic outbursts. However, on 21 June there were fresh outbreaks of rioting at Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Hammanskraal and Mabopane near Pretoria, at Kwa Thema, Daveyton, Duduza and Wattville on the East Rand and also near Pietersburg and Potgietersrus, and at Sibasa and Witzieshoek.¹⁹ The following day, 22 June, the unrest spread to Garankuwa (near Pretoria), where high school students demonstrated "in sympathy with those killed in the struggle".²⁰

By 23 June the trouble seemed to be abating. All remained quiet in the main trouble spots, although there were cases of arson in Kwa Thema and near Nelspruit. There was a minor outbreak of rioting involving school children at Jouberton, near Klerksdorp. The following day two buses were stoned at Jouberton, and in Langa, Cape Town, police were called in after a crowd surrounded the vehicle of two Bantu board officials.

The official death toll on 24 June was 140, with well over a thousand people injured, 908 arrested and numerous buildings and vehicles damaged or destroyed, including 67 beerhalls and bottlestores and 53 Bantu Administration buildings.¹ By the end of June, with the death toll at 176, the worst of the trouble appeared to have subsided.

REACTION TO THE JUNE RIOTS

The day after the outbreak of the Soweto riots a snap debate was called in the House of Assembly,² during which opposition

¹⁹ *Star*, 21 June.

²⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 June.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 June.

² *Hansard* 20, cols. 9631-9642.

members called for the resignations of the Minister and Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration on account of their inept handling of the language issue.

Mr. Kruger, Minister of Police, said that the Government had not expected the riots in Soweto to result from the school strikes against Afrikaans as medium of instruction, and that the language question was not really the cause of the riots. The Minister also announced the appointment of Mr. Justice Cillie as one-man commission of enquiry into the causes of the riots.

Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, stated that at seven of the senior secondary schools involved in the demonstrations, subjects were taught in English only, and that at only one high school one subject was offered in Afrikaans. (It should be borne in mind that although not directly affected by the ruling at that time, senior secondary and high schools would eventually be affected as the children then at primary schools progressed. In addition, many high school pupils had brothers or sisters in the lower classes who were affected by the ruling, and they sympathised with and wished to support them over this issue.)

On the same day, in a statement in *Die Beeld*, Dr. A. Treurnicht said that in the White areas of South Africa the Government should have the right to decide the medium of instruction in African schools, as the Government supplied the buildings and subsidised the schools.

On 18 June Mr. Manie Mulder, chairman of WRAB, met a group of church, civic and school leaders from Soweto to try and persuade them to co-operate with the Board in the reconstruction process. According to press reports³ the meeting did not end on a very amicable note, and the Black leaders laid down the following conditions to be fulfilled before they would co-operate:

1. the immediate abolition of Afrikaans as medium of instruction;
2. the withdrawal of police from schools;
3. the appointment of Black members to the commission of inquiry into the riots;
4. the presence of Mr. Willem Cruywagen, Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs responsible for Administration Boards in urban areas, at any reconstruction talks.

Mr. Vorster, on the eve of his departure for West Germany, where he was to have talks with Dr. Kissinger, stated that order was to be maintained at all costs and that "where Black people destroy their own educational institutions, such institutions will remain closed for an indeterminate period".⁴

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 June; *Star*, 19 June.

⁴ *Hansard* 20, col. 9695.

Homeland leaders called for calm and an end to the rioting, and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi suggested that a conference of leaders be held to resolve the crisis.

Eleven Black leaders met a seven-man team headed by the Minister for Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, for talks on 19 June. In a joint statement issued after the talks it was said that the tragedies in Soweto were caused by misunderstanding and confusion over the application of the 50-50 principle and that schools could apply to deviate from the principle.

Mr. M. C. Botha said in a statement on 21 June, against a background of renewed rioting, that there would be continuous consultation in future between Black urban leaders and White authorities, and that future consultations would include discussion of grievances other than the language issue.⁵ On the same day a meeting of Soweto headmasters issued a statement placing the blame for the outbreak of violence on the shoulders of the Bantu Education Department, which had refused to heed numerous pleas and warnings in connection with Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.⁶

The next day, in reply to questions in the Assembly, Mr. M. C. Botha stated that the Government intended to make a final decision regarding the language ruling before the re-opening of schools.⁷ In a speech in the House the Minister of Police praised police action in the riots and attacked the Progressive Reform Party, accusing them of becoming identified with Black Power movements and fomenting unrest.

The "Committee of 30" urban African leaders, drawn from officially recognised bodies, met Mr. G. J. Rousseau, Secretary for Bantu Education, on 25 June to discuss the language issue. A memorandum on the matter, originally drawn up by the African Teachers' Association of South African (ATASA), was presented to the Secretary. Subsequently the view was expressed that the Government was expected to soften its attitude on the enforcement of Afrikaans as medium of instruction.

On 29 June the "Committee of 30" met Mr. I. P. van Onselen, Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, to whom a further memorandum concerning the rights of urban Africans was presented. Mr. T. J. Makhaya, chairman of the UBC, reported that he was confident that the Government would act on the recommendations which had been made. Mr. Van Onselen stated that he would submit some of the suggestions and proposals to the departments concerned, while others he would submit to Mr. M. C. Botha, together with his own recommenda-

⁵ *Star*, 21 June.

⁶ *World*, 21 June.

⁷ *Hansard* 21 col. 1276.

tions. Two days later, on 1 July, a further meeting was held between three African leaders and Mr. M. C. Botha, after which the latter stated that they had discussed "my decisions in connection with the language medium question and full agreement was reached". On 6 July the Minister announced that instead of having to teach through the mediums of English and Afrikaans on a 50-50 basis, principals would now be free to choose the medium of instruction in their schools, with the proviso that the language not used would be given extra attention as a subject. In an interview on SATV that night, he said that there had always been a choice between the three possibilities offered, namely (a) 50-50 English and Afrikaans, (b) English only, or (c) Afrikaans only as medium of instruction, and it was simply confusion over interpretation that had led to problems.

The following day Mr. H. H. Dlamlense, secretary-general of ATASA, issued a statement in which he totally dismissed the Minister's previous statements that Africans had always had a choice with regard to medium of instruction and that there had been confusion and misunderstanding over the matter. There had been no "confusion", said Mr. Dlamlense; the matter had been forced, and he referred to the departmental circulars of 1974 which stated, quite categorically, that social studies and arithmetic *must* be taught through the medium of Afrikaans.⁸ Although schools could apply for exemption from the ruling, at the schools which originally went on strike these applications had been refused. (In a subsequent meeting with members of the Institute of Race Relations staff, Mr. Dlamlense said that at the meeting with Mr. Rousseau on 25 June the following requests had also been made: (1) that all five circuit inspectors in the Southern Transvaal and Mr. Ackerman, regional director, should be removed, and (2) that elected members of school boards who had been dismissed should be reinstated.)

In the meantime, Mr. J. Kruger decided to ban the mass funeral which the recently formed Black Parents' Association had been planning for victims of the riots. Soweto leaders and churchmen reacted angrily, saying that the Minister had not taken into consideration the fact that the occasion was "one of deep mourning for the whole Black nation".⁹ On 3 July several riot victims, including 13-year-old Hector Petersen, were buried without incident. Roadblocks had been set up around Soweto and police helicopters hovered over the townships as the burials took place.

It was reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* of 9 July that all bodies of unidentified riot victims had been cleared from the Government mortuary and some had been given paupers' funerals. This followed a warning in regard to this matter which

⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 July.

⁹ *World*, 1 July.

had been published the previous day. Mrs. Sheena Duncan, national president of the Black Sash, said, "It is incredible that the police should not have been able to identify at least people over the age of 16, as the pass law system ensures that fingerprints of all Africans over 16 are stored in the Bantu Reference Bureau in Pretoria".¹⁰

In reply to reports of dozens of children being held in cells at John Vorster Square police station,¹¹ General Gert Prinsloo, Commissioner of Police, said that "The children are probably better looked after in a police cell than they would be in a place of safety. It is not unusual to keep juveniles in cells for long periods before trials". Professor John Dugard, professor of law at the University of the Witwatersrand, commented on this matter: "It is deplorable that such young children should be held without being released on bail. It is difficult to understand why Section 108 has not been invoked."¹² (In terms of Section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 56 of 1955, children may be placed in a place of safety or released without bail, or into the custody of their parents, with a warning to appear in court on a fixed date, instead of being detained in prison.)

On 15 July Mr. Jimmy Kruger, Minister of Police, announced the postponement of the reopening of African schools following rumours that there would be further trouble when schools opened on 20 July. He also prohibited all meetings as from the 16th July and brought into operation in the Transvaal the preventive detention section of the new Internal Security Act. In addition, he announced that a further 14 juveniles detained at John Vorster Square had been released into parental custody when their cases were postponed.¹³ Black leaders expressed concern over the continued closure of schools; they were perturbed by the extended break in the educative process, and also by the fact that the children of Soweto would remain idle for a lengthy period of time.

In the *Sunday Times* of 18 July it was reported that Mr. Joseph Peele and Mr. Abner Letlape, who had been sacked from the Meadowlands Tswana School Board, had been reinstated by the Department of Bantu Education, and that Mr. W. C. Ackerman, regional director, and Mr. Thys de Beer, circuit inspector, were to be transferred. With regard to the latter item, Dr. A. B. Fourie, director of control of the department, said their positions were being reviewed.

CONTINUATION OF UNREST

On July 16 Mr. Jimmy Kruger announced that schools would remain closed until such time as "agitation" in Soweto and other

¹⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 July.

¹¹ *Star*, 8 July.

¹² *Star*, 9 July.

¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 July.

townships ceased, that all gatherings would be banned and that the preventive detention section of the new Internal Security Act would go into immediate operation in the Transvaal. These measures followed rumours that there would be further outbreaks of trouble once schools opened as scholars were demanding the release of children who were still being held in prison after the riots of the previous month.

Trouble now started breaking out in other parts of the country. Students at Fort Hare held a mass meeting on 17 July to discuss a day of prayer for Soweto. This meeting developed into a riot, and in the next two days there were several arson attempts at the University which was eventually closed on 19 July. That day Lovedale Teachers' Training College was extensively damaged by fires.

All had remained relatively quiet on the Reef, with isolated cases of arson. However, on 30 July rioting broke out at Lynnville Township near Witbank, at Mhluzi near Middelburg and at Khutsong near Carletonville. At least two people, including one schoolboy, were shot dead in the rioting, which coincided with the opening of schools in the affected townships. (The closure ordered by Mr. Kruger only applied to schools on the Rand.)

Trouble was also reported from schools at Ladysmith in Natal, and Hartebeesfontein near Klerksdorp, and the boys' hostel at Amanzimtoti Zulu Training College was target of an arson attempt.

Following a meeting between the Committee of 30 and Mr. Jimmy Kruger and Mr. Cruywagen on 21 July, Mr. Kruger announced the reopening of schools the following day. Three days later he made a statement in which he said that he would welcome greater administrative powers for urban Africans.¹⁴

When schools in Soweto and on the Reef reopened on 22 July, very few children returned to school. There were isolated outbreaks of arson, and in an incident at Boipatong township police used dogs and teargas to disperse a crowd, comprising mainly schoolchildren, who stoned a police vehicle.

On 23 July there was still extremely low attendance at schools. According to Brigadier Le Roux, Soweto district police commander, police were keeping a watch on schools. Headmasters were reported to be puzzled by the stay-away, but were hopeful that the situation would return to normal on the following Monday.¹⁵

On Monday, 26 July many children returned to school only to drift away as classes failed to start. Children congregated in the streets, taunting police standing by, and cases of arson at schools throughout the country were reported.

¹⁴ *Sunday Times*, 25 July.

¹⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 July.

At a meeting attended by nearly 400 Soweto principals, the school heads called for the removal of police "hippo" vehicles from the vicinity of schools because they were frightening off pupils who wished to return to school. They also called once again for the removal of the regional director and various school inspectors.¹⁶

It was announced on 26 July that the University of Zululand would not reopen for the rest of the year except for the Institute of Public Service Training and the Theological College at Witsieshoek. The University of the North was to reopen on 11 August, and the University of Fort Hare was to reopen conditionally on 16 August.

In the days that followed there were numerous cases of arson throughout the country. Attendance at schools continued to be low, but was improving slightly. On 27 July police were stoned by pupils at Kwa Mahlobo Secondary School in Meadowlands and petrol bomb attacks were made on Mamelodi High School in Pretoria and the farm school at Irene. Riots and demonstrations occurred at schools in Empangeni and Kokstad.

Mr. G. J. Rousseau, Secretary for Bantu Education, confirmed that Mr. M. C. de Beer, Circuit Inspector for the schools which had originally gone on strike, had been transferred to Kimberley as from 1 September. He denied that the transfer was related to demands made by the principals of Soweto schools.¹⁷

Parents, teachers and police appeared to be helpless in the face of the continued refusal of children to go to school. There were reports of children being intimidated by thugs and tsotsis and that they were also being frightened off by continued police presence and by numerous arson attempts. Tsietsi Mashinini, a student leader, called upon pupils to return to school,¹⁸ but to little avail.

The Soweto Urban Bantu Council, expressing concern over growing tension in the townships, and also in an attempt to establish themselves as "true representatives of people" (their credibility amongst the urban African community is generally very low), called on the Minister of Justice to lift the ban on public meetings to enable them to address a meeting of parents and students.¹⁹ Mr. Kruger granted permission for the mass meeting to be held. On Sunday 1 August 3 000 people were addressed by members of the UBC and school boards and by school principals. An appeal was made for the widespread burning of schools to cease. In addition the UBC reported back on the requests which had been presented to Mr. Kruger the previous

¹⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 July.

¹⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 July.

¹⁸ *Star*, 29 July.

¹⁹ *World*, 30 July.

Friday, namely that police should be kept away from schools, that there should be equal pay for teachers, regardless of colour, that blacks should be allowed to have trade unions and that homeland citizenship should be scrapped. Mr. Kruger in reply said he was prepared to keep police away from school premises during school hours.²⁰

During the days that followed senior schools remained virtually empty, despite appeals to students to return to school made by both the Black Parents' Association and Tsietsi Mashinini, regional president of SASM (the South African Students' Movement) and president of the Soweto Students' Representative Council.¹ There were numerous cases of arson, particularly in schools, throughout the country. The Black Parents' Association put forward a request to the Bantu Education Department that the ordeal of African school children in Soweto should be taken into account by (1) adjusting the exam marks if they differed significantly from previous years; (2) revising the exam time-table if necessary; (3) extending the deadline for registration for examinations. A month later it was announced that the registration deadline would be extended, but the examination time-table could not be altered as results had to be out early enough for applications for entrance to universities and colleges to be dealt with.

Student representatives from Soweto schools drew up a memorandum to be handed to the BPA to pass on to the Government, demanding the abolition of Bantu Education and the immediate release of all students still being held by the police.² On 4 August the students planned a march in protest against student detentions. Their plan was to march from Baragwanath Hospital to John Vorster Square in Johannesburg. Colonel J. P. Visser, chief of the Soweto CID, said that police would "take the necessary steps against such an illegal procession".³

The march was initially a peaceful one. However, when the demonstrators—a crowd of some 10 000 students and other supporters—attempted to break through a police blockade, police opened fire, killing at least 3 people. Fierce rioting broke out and students tried to prevent workers from leaving Soweto. Police also opened fire on students in Tembisa township who had marched to the police station demanding the release of a detained student.

Mr. J. Kruger restored the ban on open air meetings, blaming the ANC and PAC for the disturbances. It was reported that on 4 August approximately 60 per cent of Johannesburg's Black

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 August.

² *World*, 2 August.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 August.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 August.

workers had stayed away from work following intimidation by students, who wished to prevent them from going to work, and disruption of transport services.

The following day students attempted to set up road blocks to prevent workers from getting into town (but were stopped by the police) and apparently warned workers not to go to work, threatening them with reprisals. In the afternoon a large crowd of demonstrators gathered outside Morris Isaacson School, but were dispersed by police using teargas. Minister Kruger, in reply to a request from the BPA for a meeting with him in order to present the demands of the students, said he would only meet them if they demonstrated their ability to curb the unrest (thus proving themselves to be the true representatives of the people).

On 6 August further shooting incidents took place in Soweto as the unrest continued. General Gert Prinsloo, Commissioner of Police, issued a statement saying "the disturbances show no signs of ending and it seems that the responsible people of Soweto cannot or will not do anything about it".⁴ He rejected completely students' demands for the release of students in custody.

All was quiet in the townships of the Reef the following day, with the official death toll after the preceding 3 days of violence standing at 6. Trouble, however, flared up in other parts of the country: rioting broke out in Port Elizabeth when 2 000 people were unable to get into a hall to watch a boxing match, and two days later, on 9 August, a mob of students burnt down the Legislative Assembly in the BophuthaTswana homeland.

On 9 August there was further trouble in Alexandra township and two people were shot dead, as were another two near Randfontein. There were sporadic outbursts of violence in the Transvaal during the next two days. Workers in Wynberg, near Alexandra, were reported to be retaliating against intimidators who were attempting to stop them from going to work. Police gave the assurance that workers would be protected, and on 10 August they were instructed that workers should be allowed to carry knobkerries and sticks to resist attempts to prevent them from going to work.

Extension of the application of the Internal Security Act to the whole of the country was announced by the Minister of Justice. It was reported in the *Rand Daily Mail* of 10 August that the Prime Minister, after weeks of silence, had said in an interview with the magazine *To the Point* that the Government was coping with the unrest and would not be "rail-roaded into panic".

The University of Durban-Westville, on 10 August, called a strike in sympathy with the students of Soweto, which carried on

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 August.
⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 August.

for a week. All was quiet at the University of the North as students returned, but there was further trouble at the University of the Western Cape and on 11 August fierce rioting broke out in Cape Town, which had remained fairly quiet until then (see later section of Unrest in the Western Cape).

An urgent application was made on 15 August by Mrs. Winnie Mandela and Dr. H. Motlana, of the BPA, to have a member of the UBC, Mr. Lucas Shabangu, restrained from interfering with their lives and those of their children, and their property. The application was granted, but was ultimately dismissed following an appeal made by Mr. Shabangu to the Supreme Court. In an affidavit read to the court it was stated that Mr. Shabangu had made it clear at a meeting held at the home of Mr. T. J. Makhaya that the homes of the two BPA executives were to be attacked should further trouble arise. The affidavit also stated that those present had supported a decision taken at a previous meeting that children who stopped workers from going to work "should be killed".⁶ Following this Mr. T. Makhaya, chairman of the UBC, and Mr. Shabangu went into hiding for some time, and it seemed that the faith of Africans in the UBC was even further diminished.

By 16 August at least sixty Black leaders were being held by the police following a nation-wide security crackdown which had started 3 days previously (see section on Detentions). On the same day Dr. A. Treurnicht said at a National Party meeting that the Government, though prepared to accede to a number of demands made by Black leaders with whom it had met, would not bow to violence and give in to unrealistic demands.

On 18 August, following days of continuing unrest throughout the country, there was a further serious outbreak of rioting in Port Elizabeth and by 20 August the death toll there stood at 33. In the meantime, on 19 August, schools in Mdantsane township in the Ciskei were closed following a week of violence, arson and serious damage to property. Mr. Kruger made a speech in which he blamed the unrest on the importation of Black Power ideology from America, "but" he said, "the White man will overcome it".⁷ The following day Mr. M. C. Botha said in a speech in Port Elizabeth that the basis on which Blacks were present in White areas was "to sell their labour and for nothing else".⁸ He also promised "greater privileges and preference in White areas" to Africans acknowledging their homeland citizenship.⁹

FURTHER WORK STOPPAGES IN THE JOHANNESBURG AREA

Following several days of rumour, an attempt was made to

⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 August.
⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 August.
⁸ *Star*, 20 August.
⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 August.

bring about a work stoppage on 23 August. Pamphlets were distributed in Soweto threatening those workers who did not stay away from work. (These were purportedly distributed by ANC supporters.) Absenteeism of up to 75 per cent was reported by businesses in Johannesburg—many employers told those workers who did come in to go home early, in order to prevent their being victimised. At least one person was killed in an incident when police opened fire on intimidators.

The next day attendance at work increased greatly, despite widespread intimidation of workers returning home the previous night. That afternoon, 24 August, hundreds of Zulu hostel dwellers banded together to form an impi, following severe damage by arson at Mzimhlophe hostel. Armed with sticks, assegais and pangas, these men went on the rampage through Soweto, breaking into homes and attacking residents. There were reports, vehemently denied by the police, of policemen not only standing by as the hostel men attacked people, but actually inciting them to violence. Police were also blamed for having given workers the go-ahead to arm themselves. (In a report in the *World* of 24 August, Mr. M. Mzoke, leader of Dube hostel, had said that this would give rise to further violence.)

Violent fighting continued throughout the next two days and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi flew up to Johannesburg on 26 August in an attempt to stop the rioting. He was warned by Mr. J. Kruger to keep out of Soweto. However, the following day he made a speech in Soweto in which he called on hostel dwellers and Soweto residents to unite in the face of oppression and not to fight one another. At a press conference on 28 August he called for the withdrawal of police from Soweto, accusing them of inciting hostel dwellers to violence.¹⁰

The Minister of Police, Mr. Kruger, rejected all allegations of police incitement. In the meantime, on 27 August, the Prime Minister had made a speech in which he stated that, although South Africa had problems, there was no crisis in the country.¹¹

By Monday 30 August the worst of the latest violence had abated, leaving 40 dead since the previous Monday. Following this outbreak of rioting, Mr. Kruger had stated his willingness to hold a third round of talks with Black leaders; commenting on this, Mrs. Helen Suzman said, "The fact that Mr. Kruger has detained almost every African regarded as a representative by the Black community makes a mockery of the prospective talks".¹² Mr. T. Makhaya, chairman of the UBC, urged that representatives of the Black Parents' Association should be included in any further talks with the authorities.

For a week things remained relatively quiet. Mr. Connie

¹⁰ *Sunday Times*, 29 August.
¹¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August.
¹² *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 August.

Mulder, Minister for the Interior, warned that the Government would not be pushed by violence into making radical changes. Mr. Kruger met a number of unnamed representatives from Soweto, including the leaders of the makgotlas, who were negotiating with him for legal recognition by the police. This was a matter for concern amongst certain people who do not believe that the makgotla (vigilante) system is a good one, and felt that the makgotlas, given such powers, could well abuse them.¹³

In the *Sunday Times* of 5 September, Mr. J. Strydom, newly appointed Regional Director of Bantu Education for Johannesburg, was reported to be investigating the great unpopularity of the Bantu Education Department amongst Africans. Apparently he was also going into the possibility of eventually setting up a new national education body, excluding the word "Bantu" from its title. He stated that he felt a target date should be set for compulsory education for Africans.

On 8 September there was a further outbreak of fighting between hostel dwellers and Soweto residents, who had attacked the Mzimhlophe hostel. At least four people were reported dead. Rioting also took place in Kimberley following a protest march by high school pupils. The Prime Minister issued another warning, threatening rioters with tough action, and Mr. Kruger suggested in a speech that businessmen should form their own organisations to protect their premises against rioters.¹⁴ Three days later on 11 September violence flared up in Atteridgeville township when students attacked a police station with petrol bombs and stones following the funeral of a riot victim.

On 13 September another work stoppage took place. Pamphlets had been distributed in the name of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, asking that workers should remain at home, that people should keep off the streets and that the stay-away campaign should be as peaceful as possible.¹⁵ Although in Pretoria the call was virtually ignored, in Johannesburg high rates of absenteeism—up to 70 per cent—were reported. There were no reports of violence, although police had been placed on standby.

In Alexandra hundreds of people were arrested in a police swoop on the township. According to Major-General Kriel, head of the Riot Squad, it was a clean-up operation aimed at protecting those who wished to work and rounding up agitators.¹⁶ However, there were reports of innocent people being arrested. Mrs. Helen Suzman, commenting on the raids, said she found it hard to believe that police could distinguish between law-abiding people

¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 September, 4 September.
¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 9 September.
¹⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 September.
¹⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 September.

and the others. "I believe this is not the time for mass raids which inevitably include hundreds of innocent people. Colonel Swane-poel told me such people would be released after 'screening', but I have no doubt the trauma of the arrest can only exacerbate the present feeling of hostility", she said.¹⁷

The stay-away was kept up for a further two days, although more people did go to work on 14 and 15 September than on the first day. In Soweto a lot of stone-throwing took place on 15 September and two people were killed—one by police fire and one by rioters. There were reports of employers starting to take a hard line with people who stayed away from work, stating that salaries and wages would be docked.

Two fire-bomb attacks were made on buses in White areas of Johannesburg on 15 September, and on the same day there was a further flare-up of violence in Port Elizabeth. The previous day school children in Kwa Mashu, near Durban, had held a protest march, but there had been no outbreaks of violence.

In the *Rand Daily Mail Extra* of 15 September it was reported that there had been an exodus of students from the University of the North despite the Rector's announcement that all was well and classes were being attended. Apparently this followed several cases of arson and police raids.

On 16 September all was quiet in the Johannesburg area as workers returned to their jobs, except for a fire-bomb explosion in a Johannesburg department store. The following day students in Soweto demonstrated against the arrival of Dr. Henry Kissinger, American Secretary of State. In the ensuing confrontation with the police, 6 people were reportedly shot dead and 35 injured.¹⁸ In a subsequent report it was stated that the official figures were 1 dead and 6 injured.¹⁹ In addition to the trouble in Soweto, there were many fire and bomb hoaxes in central Johannesburg on 17 September, and one major fire, which caused extensive damage to an office block.

During the next few days things remained quiet, except for an incident on 19 September at the Modderfontein dynamite factory near Johannesburg, where police, who had been brought in to help fight a raging veld fire, were stoned by compound dwellers. The police opened fire, wounding five Africans. On 20 September a motion that the University of the Witwatersrand should go on strike in sympathy with the people of Soweto was defeated when put to the vote. It was announced that the University of Fort Hare would reopen once again on 4 October, and also that provision would be made for those students still in detention to write their exams while still in detention.

For the first time rioting broke out in "White" central

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 August.

¹⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 August.

Johannesburg on 23 September. Black youths staged a march down Eloff and Jeppe streets; petrol bombs and stones were thrown, and there were several shooting and stabbing incidents. Police dispersed the mob, arresting about 400 people in a giant mopping-up operation.²⁰ There were reports of police shooting in Soweto, where at least one person was killed, and in Alexandra.¹ In a speech given at the University of Pretoria, Mr. Jimmy Kruger said that he believed the unrest would continue for some time, but that it would not succeed and that violence would be met with violence.²

By 30 September things had remained quiet throughout the country for several days. Soweto schools, however, remained virtually empty. Principals expressed concern at the fact that many pupils would not be able to sit for their final exams following the long break in their schooling. The latest drop in school attendance was felt to be due to the general unrest and police shootings during the anti-Kissinger demonstrations.

On 2 October Dr. Manas Buthelezi, chairman of the Black Parents' Association, addressing the Transvaal Congress of the Progressive Reform Party, said that three steps were imperative in the interests of lasting peace:

- (1) arrests of students should stop and those already arrested should be released;
- (2) detained Black leaders should be released "to play their leadership role at this time of crisis";
- (3) there should be a general amnesty for all people in prison for political crimes.

He also said that until the school situation returned to normal there could be no peace; while students continued to be arrested they did not feel safe.³

UNREST IN THE WESTERN CAPE, AUGUST TO SEPTEMBER

When the Soweto riots broke out in June, all remained relatively quiet in the Western Cape, with only a few cases of arson and, on 24 June, the threatening of two Bantu Administration officials by a crowd in Langa. However, August saw the start of unrest which escalated steadily until fierce rioting broke out on 11 August.

On 2 August students at the University of the Western Cape decided to boycott lectures for a week. The Rector, Dr. Van der Ross, suspended lectures, which students apparently saw as a betrayal of their cause, and they were further angered the following day by a statement issued by the Personnelvereniging (a Whites-only staff association) dissociating itself from their

²⁰ *Star*, 23 September.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 September.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Star*, 2 October.

protest.¹ On 4 August a group of about 800 students blocked Modderdam road in front of the campus. Police were called in and their vehicles were stoned.

The Administration building at the University of the Western Cape was burnt down on 5 August, and the following day an attempt was made to burn down a prefabricated gymnasium at Hewat Training College in Athlone. On 9 August 300 students presented a memorandum to the Rector of the University of the Western Cape, demanding the resignation of the all-White Personeelvereniging; opening of the university to other race groups; a fair trial for Ben Palmer Louw, one of their leaders who had been detained under the Terrorism Act; and listing various other grievances. A police riot squad was moved on to the campus, but was requested to leave by the Rector. There were several cases of arson and attempted arson at various educational institutions in the Peninsula during the next two days.

On 11 August police were moved into the African townships of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, where schoolchildren had left their desks and marched through the streets. Following police attempts to disperse the marchers, fierce rioting broke out, spreading to Philippi. By midnight 16 people were reported dead, 51 seriously injured, and numerous buildings had been burnt down or looted. The following day General Gert Prinsloo, Commissioner of Police, announced that 33 people had been killed.² Rioting continued throughout the next day. Police clashed with students on the campus of the University of the Western Cape, arresting 17, and 76 University of Cape Town students were arrested as they marched through Mowbray.

During the next few weeks there were numerous cases of arson throughout the Western Cape, which caused great damage, particularly to schools and training colleges. On 16 August riot police broke up a crowd of nearly 1 000 which had gathered outside the Bellville Magistrate's Court following a march by University of the Western Cape students as 15 of their number appeared in court. Three days later, students at Gordons High School, Somerset West, refused to go to classes after permission to hold a prayer meeting in sympathy with Blacks who had died, had been refused. On 22 August police had to disperse with tear gas a crowd of pupils which gathered as one of the riot victims was buried.

The next day, 23 August, pupils at high schools in Bonteheuvel demonstrated in sympathy with the students of Soweto and police were brought in to disperse them. Renewed trouble broke out in Guguletu and Bonteheuvel where mobs went on the rampage, stoning ambulances and police vehicles and attempting

¹ *Sunday Times* (Cape edition), 8 August.

² *Star*, 12 August.

to set fire to buildings. The 25 and 26 August saw continued stoning, arson and violence, particularly in Bonteheuvel, where the trouble had started at Arcadia High School. Police used pistols and teargas in a confrontation with stone-throwing children, and at least one person was killed. Rioting spread through to Athlone and Settlers' Way, and Bonteheuvel itself was described as a "battlefield" by a police spokesman.³

Headmasters of Coloured high schools said that the unrest was due to "extreme dissatisfaction that goes very deep" and to "the whole apartheid system".⁴ In a letter to parents dated 27 August the principal of Bonteheuvel High School stated that the police riot squad had not been called in by the school during the previous week's demonstrations, and he appealed to police to keep out of schools. Once again classes were disrupted at the University of the Western Cape. Three days later, 30 August, an attempt was made to burn down the women's hostel at the University.

Students of three Bonteheuvel high schools issued a statement on 30 August in which the following grievances were listed:

- the system of apartheid and Coloured education;
- lack of compulsory education;
- lack of sports facilities;
- general behaviour of police during the unrest in Black areas;
- police interference with demonstrations in school grounds;
- the taking into custody of students;
- the attitude of White teachers;
- the "inconvenience allowance" paid to White teachers, which was seen as an insult.

The headmasters of the schools subsequently dissociated themselves from the statement, paying tribute to the White teachers, whom they denied were racialistic, and stating that there was no such thing as an "inconvenience allowance".

On 31 August petrol bomb attacks in Rondebosch East caused extensive damage to shops. There were demonstrations at several high schools in the Western Cape and schoolchildren marching in Klipfontein Road, Athlone, were dispersed by police using tear gas. The following day five people were wounded when police opened fire on rioters in Athlone.

On 2 September trouble spilled over into the heart of a White commercial area. Approximately 1 000 schoolchildren, mostly Coloured, marched down Adderley Street in central Cape Town. Police dispersed the children, using batons and teargas. Rioting broke out in the Coloured areas of Athlone and Hanover Park, and police opened fire on the mob at Hanover Park, killing at least one. Twelve petrol bombs were discovered by police,

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 August.

⁴ *Cape Times*, 11 September.

hidden in a ceiling at the University of the Western Cape.

Mr. Sonny Leon, leader of the Labour Party, said that violence in the Cape Peninsula was a result of a decision by the authorities to lock up the leaders of the people, and warned that the time would come when Coloured leaders would be unable to control their people. He appealed to the Government to hold talks with Coloured leaders, who could use their influence to calm the situation.⁵

During the next two days violent rioting continued in White, Coloured and African areas of Cape Town. Police opened fire with shotguns (using birdshot) on a large crowd in Adderley Street on 3 September. Teargas was eventually used to disperse mobs of people. Heavy stoning of cars and buildings and numerous cases of arson were reported and police took action against rioting pupils at many schools.

On 5 September a memorandum was drawn up and subsequently presented to the Bantu Education Department by the African scholars of Cape Town, in which they called for changes in the system of Bantu education, such as improvement in curricula, facilities and teaching conditions. They also requested that more bursaries should be made available; that further provision be made for technical, trade and vocational training; that African students should be permitted to attend the university of their choice; that scholars, students and teachers should be exempt from restrictions under the pass laws wherever they worked (endorsement in his reference book that he was employed in a rural area could, for example, jeopardise the right of a teacher to live in an urban area in future); and that greater work opportunities should be made available to school leavers by eliminating job reservation. The following day Coloured schools were closed for a week.

On 7 September fierce rioting continued in many areas of the Peninsula, and police once again used shotgun fire and teargas to disperse milling crowds in central Cape Town. Trouble broke out at many schools, training colleges and the University of the Western Cape. In the days that followed rioting spread to other parts of the Western Cape, such as Kuils River and Paarl. By 9 September at least 16 people had been killed. Several organisations issued statements condemning police action and calling for a separate judicial commission of inquiry into police riot measures in the Peninsula. (Amongst these organisations were the Trade Union Council of South Africa and the Labour Party.) This followed claims by school principals that police were taking indiscriminate and unnecessarily violent action in schools.⁶

Several White schools in the Claremont and Wynberg areas

⁵ *Cape Times*, 3 September
⁶ *Star*, 9 September.

were closed and at others parents formed vigilante groups to guard and patrol the schools.⁷ On 10 September police dispersed a crowd which gathered as a high school was burnt down at Wellington and students at the University of the Western Cape were sent home after a series of petrol bombings (which caused little damage). According to Professor Van der Ross, the Rector, students who wished to continue their studies were being intimidated to join in the violence.⁸

Over the week-end of 12 and 13 September things were much quieter in the Western Cape but nevertheless 7 people were killed, 3 of whom were shot by White civilians who opened fire after being threatened or attacked.

Coloured high schools in the Peninsula reopened on 14 September and all remained calm except for a few incidents of stone-throwing. Police opened fire on demonstrating pupils at Worcester and a number of children were admitted to hospital with bullet wounds. A work-stoppage had been planned for 15 and 16 September, and, despite distribution of a pamphlet postponing it until the following week, a large proportion of workers did not stay away on 15 September. Absenteeism of about 50% in industry and 30% in commerce was reported. There was noticeable rejection of the strike by African contract workers who, according to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Cape Town, were less likely to give in to intimidation.⁹ As the strike continued the next day all remained fairly quiet. However, on the night of 16 September trouble flared up in the Athlone area and at least 2 people were killed and 50 injured by bullets. Cars were looted and often stoned by crowds of Coloured youths, and rioting and arson attacks were widespread. The situation was exacerbated by a power failure in the Peninsula which led to increased looting. Commissioner of Police, General G. L. Prinsloo, refused to release a list of riot dead, saying that there was "no necessity for it".¹⁰

Sporadic violence continued the next day. In many towns in the Western Cape liquor outlets were closed under the Liquor Act as a precaution against further violence over the week-end. The *Sunday Times* of 19 September reported that hundreds of armed White vigilants were patrolling the streets of White residential areas in the Peninsula. Police, however, emphasised the fact that they would not condone people taking the law into their own hands, and a week later it was reported that many of these vigilante groups had suspended operations following police warnings discouraging civilian patrols.¹¹

⁷ *Daily Mail*, 11 September.
⁸ *ibid.*
⁹ *Daily Mail*, 16 September.
¹⁰ *Daily Mail*, 17 September.
¹¹ *Sunday Times*, 26 September.

On 28 September, at a meeting in Guguletu attended by about 3 000 pupils, a list of grievances and demands from the Peninsula's Black pupils was handed to Mr. D. H. Owens, regional director of Bantu Education for the Cape.

During the last days of September the violence in the Western Cape seemed to be on the wane, and the lull continued for nearly two weeks into October.

EVENTS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER

There had been rumours of a demonstration to be held in central Johannesburg on 4 October, and precautionary roadblocks were set up round Soweto; the demonstration did not materialise, however, and all remained quiet. On the same day Black traffic police were withdrawn from Soweto following threats against them by gangs of youths. Two days later they were returned to their posts following urgent pleas from the residents of Soweto.

On 4 October Tsietsi Mashinini, president of the Soweto Students' Representative Council, appeared at a Press conference in London together with Barney Makhathle and Selby Semela, secretary and treasurer of the SRC. The three had escaped to Botswana on 23 August, after operating "underground" in Soweto for a period of two months. During this time police had placed a price of R500 on Mashinini's head. They had proceeded to Britain because they feared that agents of the South African Bureau of State Security might attempt to kidnap them if they remained in Botswana. Mashinini (who was apparently wanted in connection with the killing of Dr. Melville Edelstein on 16 June) said that Semela had been caught by the police, beaten up, and forced to sign a statement saying that he was responsible for the murder of Dr. Edelstein—an allegation which was dismissed as a "pack of lies" by General Gert Prinsloo, Commissioner of Police.¹

In the *Rand Daily Mail* of 6 October, Colonel J. P. Visser, head of the Soweto CID, refuted Mashinini's claim that he had seen police in a hippo vehicle shoot an eight year old girl "to pieces" when she gave a Black Power salute on 16 June; according to Colonel Visser the hippos had only been brought into Soweto very late on the night of 16 June.

On 6 October attendance at Soweto schools was still extremely low. Mr. Kambule, principal of Orlando High School, was quoted in the *Star*: "I wouldn't say the situation is back to normal here. Deep down there is anxiety, and it's difficult for students to study under such conditions. Some students, I am afraid, have just decided to quit school". At the University of Fort Hare, which had reopened on 4 October, students were reported to be slowly returning. The Medical Officer of Health for Johannesburg warned that the danger of an epidemic in Soweto was growing rapidly.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 5 October; *Star*, 5 October.

cause attendance at clinics remained extremely low, despite the fact that the municipal immunisation programme was operating normally.

On 7 October, following a period of calm in the Cape, a bus bringing workers home to Guguletu was mobbed, stoned and hijacked by youths and bus services to all three African townships of Cape Town were suspended for the rest of the day. Despite the fact that things were still relatively quiet in the Cape, there were still reports of schools being patrolled during the holidays by senior pupils and teachers, and although many of the vigilante groups patrolling White residential areas had disbanded, some were organising themselves into a permanent Home Guard.² In the wake of the unrest Professor H. W. van der Merwe, director of the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town, launched a drive for the drawing up of a programme to eliminate racial discrimination. Leading citizens of Durban had previously started a similar drive.

On 11 October another wave of violence broke out in the townships of Cape Town following an attack on shebeens (illicit liquor outlets) by about 300 school children, who destroyed stocks of liquor. Students had previously threatened to take action against shebeens, which are considered by many Africans to be the "recourse of the Black man".³ The following day the violence continued and one person was shot dead as police tried to control rioting which had broken out following further raids on shebeens.

During October hundreds of pamphlets calling for violence against Whites on 15 and 24 October were distributed in the townships of the Reef. In the *Weekend World* of 10 October the Soweto Students' Representative Council made a statement strongly condemning the leaflet and calling on pupils to return to school. Many of the White community were in a state of near-panic at these rumours, and at least one White school in Johannesburg was closed on 15 October, while others had parents patrolling their premises. The threatened violence did not materialise, however.

There was a minor outbreak of rioting at the Lawson Secondary School near Fort Beaufort on 15 October, when police, who had gone to rescue teachers from students protesting against the expulsion of one of their number, were stoned by the pupils. The police opened fire on pupils, wounding three with birdshot.

Following a funeral in Soweto on 17 October, a crowd of nearly 700 attacked a municipal depot where they stoned buses and set fire to vehicles, causing damage which was estimated at about R90 000 to vehicles and R10 000 to buildings.⁴ The home of an African policeman was also attacked. The following day youths attacked and set fire to the Soweto home of a second

² *Weekend World*, 3 October.
³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 October.
⁴ *Star*, 18 October.

African policeman. It was reported in the *Star* of 20 October that, following a third attack on the home of a policeman, African policemen were living in fear of their lives and property. Apparently African policemen had as far as possible, been withdrawn from riot control so that they would not have to face their own people in confrontations.

Cases of arson continued to occur, particularly in Soweto, where Morris Isaacson High School was severely damaged by fire. Damage at a primary school in Manenburg, Cape Town, following a fire, was estimated at R30 000. There were also several stoning incidents throughout the country.

It was reported on 21 October that Mr. M. C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Education, had threatened to withdraw salary subsidies from African teachers who were not teaching due to the fact that pupils were boycotting schools. The proposed move met with criticism from many Black and White educationists. A delegation from the African Teachers' Association of South Africa met Mr. G. J. Rousseau, Secretary of Bantu Education on 22 October, to discuss this issue and other grievances.

On the same day police entered Morris Isaacson High School in Soweto and arrested all students and teachers on the premises (78 people in all). Colonel J. D. Visser, head of the CID in Soweto, said that this was a riot squad operation and he could not comment on it. According to the *Star* a senior police official said that the arrests were "purely precautionary".⁵ Early in November it was announced that the 13 teachers who had been held had been released.

During October Soweto students, like their Cape Town counterparts, had called for the closing of all shebeens in mourning for those who had died in the township unrest. Towards the end of October there were several incidents of arson in which shebeens were fired, and also cases of people carrying liquor in the streets being assaulted and their bottles broken.

On 24 October there was a further outbreak of violence following a funeral in Soweto. At least three people were killed and 51 wounded. Apparently there had been no stonethrowing prior to the shooting, but people had given Black Power salutes.⁶ The day before police had opened fire at another funeral, killing one person, and had also made 115 arrests.⁷ Following strong criticism of the shootings at Doornkop Cemetery, police officers stated that funerals in Soweto were being "manipulated by people who want to create chaos".⁸

Violence in the townships continued for several days after the week-end, with a petrol bomb attack on Jabulani Police Station

⁵ *Star*, 22 October.

⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 October.

⁷ *Sunday Express*, 24 October.

⁸ *World*, 25 October.

and many cases of arson. Violence flared up in Guguletu when police opened fire on a crowd of about 6 000 which had surrounded Guguletu Police Station, killing at least one person. On 26 October rumours spread through Soweto that police were picking up children in the streets, which resulted in residents panicking and most schools being shut.

School attendances in Cape Town and Soweto continued to be negligible, particularly following the mass arrest at Morris Isaacson. On 25 October it was announced that a group of African, Indian and Coloured pupils from schools in the Cape Peninsula had 3 months previously launched an organisation called the United Students' Front.⁹ The organisation, which aimed to "politically educate and unite" the country's "Black oppressed masses", had passed a resolution not to write examinations until the Government had taken some positive action to remedy Blacks' grievances, a list of which they had drawn up.

In Soweto, the Bantu Education Department went ahead with arrangements for examinations, despite rumours that they would be boycotted as a sign of solidarity with students in detention. It was also rumoured that those who wished to write examinations would be prevented from doing so. When matriculation examinations started on 29 October most examination centres in Soweto were deserted. During the last week of October police apparently arrested dozens of children in Soweto and other townships, and children stayed away from school, fearing that they might be arrested.

During the unrest many essential services, including refuse removal, had come to a halt in the townships. At the end of October the Soweto Students' Representative Council launched "Operation Clean-Up" in Soweto, and students and other residents of Soweto set about clearing away the refuse which had accumulated in the streets.

Following the Doornkop shootings and many reports of indiscriminate use of violence by police in the Western Cape, various organisations and newspapers called for a separate judicial enquiry into these allegations. The Prime Minister, reacting to the request from the Cape Town City Council for such an enquiry, said that he took exception to the suggestion and was not prepared to ask the Cillie Commission to examine this issue.¹⁰ Major General Kriel, Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of riot control, stated that under the Riotous Assemblies Act mourners were not precluded from attending a funeral, but if there was subversion police would not hesitate to intervene. He went on to say that political speeches, slogans or songs constituted subversion.¹¹

There was a serious outbreak of rioting in Dundee, Natal, on

⁹ *Cape Times*, 25 October.

¹⁰ *Star*, 29 October.

¹¹ *Weekend World*, 31 October.

29 October. Police opened fire on the rioters, killing two. There were reports of arson and petrol bomb attacks in Garankuwa and near Mafeking during the last two days of October, and on 31 October a Bantu Administration Board Inspector was attacked and seriously wounded in Guguletu.

Pamphlets calling for a 5-day work stoppage from 1 to 5 November had been distributed in the townships of the Reef and Cape Town. These called on all workers, except for nurses and doctors, to stay at home, all shebeens to close down, shops to be opened only from 8 a.m. to 12 noon, and no form of Christmas celebrations to be held, as a sign of mourning. In addition people were asked to keep off the streets and avoid violence. However, in both cities most workers ignored the call for a strike and absentee rates were very low.

In the meantime, on 1 November there was an almost 100 per cent boycott of the matriculation English examination by scholars in Soweto and Katlehong townships. In Mamelodi students wrote the exam without any hitches, but in Tembisa a group of about 400 scholars prevented a group of private candidates from sitting the examination. During the next few days there were reports of similar attacks on schools throughout the Transvaal, and all examinations in Soweto broke down completely. In Alexandra township, following several attacks, police guarded halls where examinations were being written. African scholars in the Cape Peninsula also boycotted the end of year examinations. Mr. J. Strydom, Regional Director of Bantu Education, announced on 5 November that pupils who had been unable to write their matriculation examinations at the end of 1976 could apply to write supplementary exams in March 1977. Detainees were to be allowed to write their exams while in detention.

A 21-year old Soweto girl, Miss Sikosi Msi, who had fled the country following the unrest, appeared before the United Nations General Assembly during the debate on apartheid and, weeping, begged for aid in the struggle for freedom in South Africa.

During November there were numerous reports of students from Soweto and other townships fleeing from South Africa to neighbouring Black countries—particularly Swaziland and Botswana. From there some proceeded to Tanzania and Europe. This stream of refugees was the result of continued police action in the townships where apparently they continued to raid homes and arrest students and scholars. It was reported that many parents were planning to remove their children from Soweto following police raids in the Mzinhlophe area in which large numbers of youths were taken from their homes and the streets.¹²

Brigadier Jan Visser, following his appointment as chief of police in Soweto, had called upon "responsible" Blacks to have

¹² *Star*, 9 November.

talks with him in order to improve relations between the people of the townships and the police. However, many leaders were sceptical of the Brigadier's good intentions following the latest police raids. A Soweto police spokesman denied that police were specifically arresting children, and said that the operation was aimed at getting people wanted on criminal charges.¹³ On 11 November Brigadier Visser assured a deputation of the Women for Peace movement that no Black child under the age of 16 was being held for ideological reasons.¹⁴ He went on to say that he would not tolerate any abuses of police power.

According to the Black Sash, who had been inundated with requests for help in tracing missing children, most of these children were probably not being held by the police, but had gone into hiding following the house-to-house raids. Following a meeting with Mrs. Helen Suzman, during which she made known to him the state of near-panic amongst Soweto parents, the Minister of Police gave a firm undertaking that a special police bureau would be set up to answer queries of Black parents about their missing children.¹⁵ However, Mr. Kruger would not undertake to stop police raids, saying that it was his job to "clean up" Soweto.

School children from Soweto continued to leave South Africa, and by the middle of November more than 630 were reported to have fled. A spokesman for the Botswana Government said that more than 500 school children had passed through Botswana since June. In a television interview on 15 November Mr. J. Kruger, Minister of Police, said that all students who had left South Africa without travel documents would not be prosecuted on these grounds if they returned within a week. He added that they would not be exempted from prosecution for any other charges.

Raids and arrests continued in Soweto and on the Reef and on 18 November Security Police detained a number of pupils from the Kwa Mashu area of Durban. A report in the *Sunday Express* of 21 November stated that many Black adults were joining the stream of student refugees, as police raids continued. Apparently very few of the refugees had accepted Mr. Kruger's amnesty offer. Mrs. Helen Suzman stated that not only was the amnesty period too short, but it was "unrealistic" to expect youths to return while widespread arrests continued.¹⁶ Mr. Kruger, however, refused to extend the amnesty period.

It was reported that in New York the United Nations' Apartheid Committee had called for an emergency assistance programme for student refugees from South Africa.¹⁷

On 27 November a group of about 150 African school children marched through the centre of Cape Town carrying placards pro-

¹³ *Star*, 10 November.

¹⁴ *World*, 12 November.

¹⁵ *Star*, 15 November.

¹⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 November.

¹⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 24 November.

testing against the education system. They were dispersed by baton-wielding policemen. Two days later youths set fire to five houses in Guguletu; the homes were apparently those of people who were believed to have given evidence to the Cillie Commission, which was sitting in Cape Town at the time.

It was announced in the *Sunday Express* on 28 November that an inquiry was to be held into allegations of indiscriminate shootings and arrests by police in Soweto. These had been published in the *Express* the week before.

On 29 November a meeting of about 300 Soweto educationists and school board members was held to discuss remedies for the breakdown of education in Soweto and Alexandra. It was revealed that the Bantu Education Department had worked out a system to enable scholars who had not written examinations at the end of 1976 to write them during the first three months of 1977. Schools would open very early in January 1977 to give pupils the opportunity to make up some of the time lost during the disturbances of 1976.¹⁵

THE CILLIE COMMISSION

The day after rioting first broke out in Soweto, Mr. J. Kruger, Minister of Justice, announced in Parliament the appointment of the Judge President of the Transvaal, Mr. Justice Cillie, as a one-man commission to investigate the disturbances in Soweto. Commenting on the announcement Mr. Colin Eglin, Leader of the Progressive Reform Party, said that a multi-racial commission would be far better than a one-man commission.¹ The Soweto Parents' Association demanded the inclusion of one or two Blacks, nominated by Soweto parents, in the commission.²

On 21 June Mr. Jimmy Kruger, speaking in the Assembly, said that there were disadvantages in appointing a bigger commission because its work would take longer. He felt that the commission should be small and have the right to "call in advisers, not assessors, so that it can have better insight and background". He also said that he felt the inquiry should be limited to the riots and not include an in-depth inquiry into socio-economic factors.⁴

The terms of reference of the commission were published on 2 July. In terms of Proclamation No. 123, *Government Gazette* 5207, the chairman was empowered to co-opt anyone whom he believed to have special knowledge which could assist the commission; it was stated that the name and address of any person giving evidence, or any evidence which might indicate the identity of such person, would not be published if the witness so requested;

¹⁵ *Star*, 30 November.

¹ Assembly, 17 June, Hansard 19 cols. 9639-40.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 19 June.

³ *Star*, 21 June.

⁴ Hansard 21 col. 10026.

that witnesses might only be assisted by an advocate or attorney "to the extent that the chairman permits" and that cross-examination might only be carried out if the chairman believed this to be in the interests of the commission; that the commission or any officer was empowered to enter and inspect premises "at all reasonable times" and to seize documents; and that no person "may insult or prejudice, influence or anticipate" the proceedings or findings of the commission. The retiring Attorney General of the Transvaal, Dr. Percy Yutar, was appointed to adduce evidence and arguments relating to the enquiry, the venue of which was to be the Old Synagogue in Pretoria.

The S.A. Institute of Race Relations called for an extension of the terms of reference and composition of the Commission of Inquiry (as did other individuals and organisations), suggesting that not only the immediate causes and consequences of these events, but also the general social, political and educational conditions in the townships which might have contributed to these events should be investigated and that at least two other independent persons, one of whom should be Black, should be included in the Commission.⁵ It was subsequently announced that Mr. Abel Sisengi Hlungwani, a Pietersburg Regional Court interpreter who had recently obtained a law diploma from the University of South Africa, had been appointed to assist the Commission. According to the *Rand Daily Mail* of 27 July, "some African leaders think the State should have appointed an urban African to assist the Commission".

On 27 July the first sitting of the Commission took place. Apparently numerous individuals and organisations had responded to the call for interested persons to submit evidence. In his opening address at the second sitting on 3 August, Mr. Justice Cillie said that it was the purpose of the inquiry to investigate the facts of the unrest and not to ferret out the culprits. He indicated that there would be a postponement of the activities of the commission to allow more time for the preparation of evidence.⁶ Dr. Percy Yutar had given an assurance that people giving evidence before the commission might remain anonymous if they so wished, and that they would be immune from prosecution.⁷ It was announced on 23 August that the scope of the Cillie Commission was to be extended to include all unrest in townships throughout the country.

Mr. Justice Cillie visited Soweto on 7 September to conduct an *in loco* inspection of damage caused during the riots. An informal meeting was held with Urban Bantu Councillors, who told the Commission that they had been labelled as stooges, and that he would have to listen to detained Black leaders, whom the

⁵ *Leader*, 9 July.

⁶ *Star*, 3 August.

⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 August.

Black people considered to be their true leaders.⁸ Judge Cillie stated that every effort would be made to contact these people so that they could give evidence. Two days later, on 9 September, Black leaders from Pretoria townships met the commission and named racial discrimination and the general discontent of the Black man as possible causes of the unrest.

Two weeks later, on 20 September, the commission visited Sharpeville, Evaton and Sebokeng. African leaders from the Vaal triangle area told the commission that the system of Bantu Education should be scrapped and that education should be made free and compulsory. They also demanded dissolution of Urban Bantu Councils and Advisory Boards which they said were "puppet institutions"; the institution of home ownership for Africans; equal pay for equal jobs; the provision of more recreational facilities and technical schools.⁹

On 13 September formal verbal evidence was led for the first time at the Old Synagogue. Much of the verbal evidence led comprised eye-witness accounts of incidents which occurred during rioting in the various trouble spots; many of these accounts appear to be conflicting. Major contributors of verbal evidence have been members of the police force who were involved, and Black and White journalists who were covering the unrest. The names of Black police officers and also of officials of the Bantu Education Department have not been revealed in order to protect them from reprisal attacks.

The house of Mr. Credo Mutwa was burnt down after he had given controversial evidence before the Commission on 22 and 23 August. Mr. Mutwa, witchdoctor, author and also employee of the West Rand Administration Board, had attacked Black Consciousness movements, stated that he felt the army should have been brought in to quell the unrest, and praised the late Dr. H. Verwoerd. Following the attack on Mr. Mutwa's house, Mr. Justice Cillie announced that witnesses might give evidence behind closed doors, with no other person except an interpreter present, if they so wished.

In the *Sunday Express* of 3 October Dr. Yutar was quoted as saying that the commission had not received requests from any detainees to give evidence. Dr. Yutar said that it was up to relatives or friends of detained people to tell them that they could give evidence.

Although some evidence has been led concerning casualties and damage to property, it is not yet possible to make a full countrywide assessment of damage. Figures given for Soweto by Colonel J. J. Gerber, Divisional Inspector of Police in Soweto are as follows:¹⁰

⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 September.

⁹ *World*, 21 September.

¹⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 September; *Star*, 16 September.

Rounds fired by police:	more than 16 000
Killed by police:	172 Blacks
Injured by police (bullet wounds and tear-gas poisoning)	1 439 Blacks
Killed by "other causes" (stabblings, shootings, stonings, fires)	2 Whites 120 Blacks
Injured by "other elements"	5 Whites 1 Chinese 1 001 Africans

Property damaged:

24 schools, 3 clinics, 9 post offices, 18 bottle stores, 18 beer halls, 14 private business premises, 3 libraries, 1 court building, 19 shops, 2 community halls, 19 houses, 42 West Rand Administration Board buildings, at least 114 vehicles.

Figures for the East Rand area were given by Brigadier J. Wise, District Commander for the East Rand:¹¹

Rounds fired by police:	more than 17 000
Killed by police shooting:	20
Killed by "other elements":	20
Injured by police:	53
Injured by "other elements":	38

Damage to property was estimated to be about R2 million.

Evidence by Professor J. J. F. Taljaard, the head State pathologist, and Dr. H. Bukhofze, District Surgeon for Johannesburg, on 13 October gave the following details of deaths in the Johannesburg-West Rand area:¹²

- (a) 229 post mortems were performed on victims who had died between 18 June and 18 August, and of these, approximately two-thirds had died of gunshot wounds, the others of stabbing, multiple injuries and carbon monoxide poisoning.
 - (b) In the Johannesburg area alone, of those shot dead, 68 were shot from behind, 33 from the front and 21 from the side.
 - (c) In Johannesburg and the West Rand, 80 were shot from behind, 42 from the front, 28 from the side.
 - (d) Of these victims, 224 were Black, 3 Coloured and 2 White; 210 were men and 20 women.
- The ages of victims were as follows: 1 under 10 years, 88 under 20 years, 69 between 20 and 30 years, and 46 over 30 years.

The following week the commission started a countrywide tour of riot areas, starting at Pietersburg.

¹¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 October.
¹² *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 October.

Despite appeals from various individuals, including Mr. Justice Cillie, students from the University of the North refused to give evidence before the Commission. Students told Mr. Abel Hlungwane that they would not testify because they feared the reaction of other students and of the police. They also said that they were unhappy about commissions whose reports had no effect.¹³ It was later reported that four students had given evidence in camera.

The Rector of the University, Professor J. L. Boshoff, told the Commission that the unrest on the campus should not be blamed on agitators, and that he believed that the trouble of 1976 was an extension of the 1974 riots which had been investigated by the Snyman Commission. The Snyman Commission had found that dissatisfaction with the political system in South Africa was one of the major causes of the earlier riots. Professor Boshoff stated that this dissatisfaction was also at the root of the 1976 riots, and went on to say that many students came from Soweto and Pretoria, and it was inevitable that they should be affected by what had happened in the urban areas.¹⁴

Following hearings in Witbank, the Commission heard evidence from various members of the West Rand Administration Board. Mr. J. C. de Villiers, chief director of the Board, requested that his evidence dealing with the role of the police in Soweto be heard in camera, saying that public discussion and speculation on this matter could do more harm than good.¹⁵ The request was granted, but this decision was subsequently reversed and the evidence was made public. In his evidence Mr. De Villiers said that peace would not be restored unless police action was "strong, systematic and ruthless where necessary". Speaking at a meeting in Nelspruit, Mr. Kruger, Minister of Police, reprimanded Mr. De Villiers for his criticism of police action, saying that it was police policy to treat uprisings with a minimum of violence.¹⁶

Following Mr. Kruger's statement, Mr. Justice Cillie said that in four possible cases of contempt of Commission, one of which involved Mr. Kruger, the decision whether to prosecute lay in the hands of the Attorney-General. The other three possible contempt cases were a report in the *Citizen* which quoted General van den Bergh of the Bureau for State Security as saying the Communist Party was the mastermind behind the riots; a report in the *Rand Daily Mail* quoting Mrs. Sheena Duncan, president of the Black Sash, as saying that the responsibility for the unrest lay on the shoulders of Mr. Vorster and his Cabinet; a report in the *Rand Daily Mail* which said that students at the University of the North were boycotting the Commission.

¹³ *Star*, 19 October.

¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 October.

¹⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 October.

¹⁶ *Star*, 25 October.

The Commission heard evidence in Klerksdorp, Mafeking and Bloemfontein before proceeding to Cape Town.

Colonel A. P. van Zyl, officer in charge of the anti-riot squad in the Western Cape gave the following numbers of deaths and injuries during unrest in the Peninsula:¹⁷

killed by police shooting:	92
killed by people other than police:	5
wounded by police:	387
wounded by people other than police:	25

No Whites lost their lives.

After hearing evidence from a *Cape Times* reporter, Mr. Justice Cillie asked that two incidents involving the police be investigated: one where police had allegedly ill-treated a child being held at Guguletu Police Station, the other a report of indiscriminate police action at a high school.¹⁸ He subsequently ordered further investigations into allegations of police brutality after hearing evidence from a number of African and Coloured witnesses.

Professor Van der Ross, Rector of the University of the Western Cape, in giving evidence to the Commission reiterated what had been said by the Rector of the University of the North: that one of the chief causes of unrest on the campuses was socio-political frustration.¹⁹

Professor H. W. van der Merwe, director of the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town, told the Commission that many Black people were reluctant to give evidence to the Commission because they were afraid of intimidation, both from the Security Police and from within their own communities, and also because they saw the Commission as part of the apartheid system.²⁰

¹⁷ *Cape Argus*, 17 November.

¹⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 November.

¹⁹ *Star*, 25 November.

²⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 27 November.

EMPLOYMENT

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

In its annual economic report for the year ended 30 June 1976 the SA Reserve Bank stated that the rate of increase in the gross domestic product at current prices increased by 12 per cent during the year, compared with rises of 15 per cent and 23½ per cent during 1974-75 and 1973-74, respectively. Although the rate of increase in the remuneration of employees declined from 21 per cent in the preceding year to 15 per cent in 1975-76, the lower rate of increase in gross domestic product at current prices was attributable mainly to an increase of only 6 per cent in the gross operating surplus compared with a rise of 9½ per cent during the preceding year. The very low rate of increase in the gross operating surplus was largely accounted for by sharp declines in the operating surpluses of gold mining and agriculture. The main contributions to the increase of 15 per cent in the remuneration of employees were made by manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and mining.

During the year under review SA's terms of trade deteriorated markedly because the prices of imported goods rose faster than the prices of SA export goods and gold, with the result that the real gross national product declined slightly, compared with the small but positive rate of growth in the real gross domestic product.

On the labour front, the Reserve Bank reported that the rate of increase in employment in the non-agricultural sectors declined from 3,6 per cent in 1973-74 to 2,2 per cent in 1974-75. For the three quarters that ended on 31 March 1976, compared with the same period of the preceding year, total employment increased by 2,3 per cent, and was the net result of a rise of 2,2 per cent in the number of Africans employed and an increase of 2,4 per cent in the numbers of the other racial groups employed. During the same period the number of people employed in the public sector rose sharply by 5,7 per cent, compared with an increase of 1,1 per cent for the private sector. The small rise in employment in the public sector was partly due to the levelling-off in the number of workers employed in construction and the decline in employment in the non-gold mining and private services sectors. However, the employment in gold mining increased substantially. After declining until the first quarter of 1975, the number of persons employed in gold mining increased until the second quarter of 1976 and for the year 1975-76 it was an average 3,4 per cent higher than for the preceding year. Employment in wholesale and retail trade rose by about 1 per cent during the three quarters

ended on 31 March 1976, compared with the same period of the preceding year.

There was a sharp increase in the number of registered unemployed White, Coloured and Asian people. The seasonally adjusted number of registered unemployed, excluding Africans, increased from 7 243 in August 1974 to 11 492 in December 1975 and further to 13 368 in June 1976. The number of Africans registered as unemployed by the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (which excluded unemployed people in the homelands as well as those who did not register) increased by 9,4 per cent between the first quarter of 1975 and the comparable quarter of 1976 and totalled 123 000 in March 1976.

The average remuneration of all employees in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy increased by 19,9 per cent in 1974-75 and then by 13,8 per cent during the nine months that ended on 31 March 1976. If the reduced purchasing power of the rand as a result of the increase in the cost of living was taken into account, the real average salaries and wages per worker rose by only 1,5 per cent during the nine months to March.

The deficit in the balance of payments on current accounts increased further from R1 592-million in 1974-75 to R1 953-million in 1975-76. One of the causes of the substantial increase in the deficit was the continued deterioration of SA's terms of trade. There has been a decline in the volume of international trade and a fall in international commodity prices. Furthermore, the dollar price of gold started to decline sharply from the beginning of 1975. Although the devaluation of the rand in terms of the US dollar in June and September 1975 increased the rand proceeds of exports, there was an adverse effect on import prices which, together with a further moderate rise in inflation rates abroad, contributed to a more rapid increase in import prices than in export prices. The continued high level of real gross domestic expenditure also contributed to the large deficit. Increased government expenditure, particularly on defence equipment, stock-piling of strategic materials, high initial outlays on television sets and further outlays on large capital projects of public authorities and public corporations, resulted in a level of imports well above normal.

In February the Reserve Bank imposed quantitative limits on bank credit to the private sector. Taking the end of December 1975 as a base, the discounts, loans and advances to the private sector of each banking institution were limited to an increase of 3½ per cent up to the end of March, and to ½ per cent per month thereafter. The Bank rate was raised once more from 8½ to 9 per cent, effective from 22 July, allowing the commercial banks to increase their prime overdraft rate to a maximum of 12½ per cent.

The recession worsened during the year. Among those particularly hard hit were the building industry and motor assembly

plants. From 22 October, petrol pumps were closed between 1 p.m. on Fridays and 6 a.m. on Mondays and motorists were forbidden to pour petrol into their tanks from containers.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY

General

The SA Reserve Bank published the second census of foreign transactions and liabilities which revealed¹ that foreign investment in SA totalled R10,4-bn at the end of 1973. The yield in terms of dividends, interest and branch profits remitted in 1974 was R705-m, or R619-m after withholding taxes. No information was published about investments by individual countries although Europe, including the United Kingdom, accounted for 73,7 per cent and the United States of America 17,1 per cent of the total.

The investment was concentrated in four sectors: manufacturing (R3,6-bn); finance, insurance, real estate and business services (R2,3-bn); mining (R1,3-bn); and wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation (R1-bn). In manufacturing, foreign investment was mostly accompanied by control while in mining portfolio investment without control was the rule. Foreigners owned R1,2-bn worth of mining shares of which R991-m was owned by Europeans and R139-m by Americans.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) said in April² that at least 23 major foreign companies in SA were creating an "explosive situation" by impeding efforts to form African trade unions. Mr. Otto Kersten, the ICFTU general secretary, said that smooth industrial relations depended on trade unions. Without these there would be stoppages, violence and the withdrawal of foreign investment.

Mr. John Rees of the South African Council of Churches warned in July³ that continued foreign investment in SA along existing lines was supporting apartheid. He said that continued investment where there was no adequate training of African personnel, no concession in regard to bargaining rights, no principle of equal pay for equal work and no possibility that Africans could take part in the management process with equal opportunity was an "outright support of the apartheid system" and was "contributing towards the obviously looming conflict in which Blacks will demand their liberation".

The Minister of Finance, Senator Horwood, said in January⁴ that despite the onslaught on gold the finances of the country were stable and sound in a hopeless economic world. He said, "Last year we received R1 800-m of capital in this country, and this at

¹ *Financial Mail*, 15 April.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 April.

³ *Star*, 27 July.

⁴ *Assembly*, 28 January, Hansard 1, cols. 188-9.

a time of great capital stringency in the whole world, where some countries have not been able to obtain their capital requirements by far, and this is one of the highest figures we have ever had. And in the fourth quarter we got the biggest capital inflow of any of the quarters of last year, and a big part of this capital has been private capital, a very substantial part of it. Sir, I say this is cause for great gratitude in a country like South Africa. Is this not a sign of international confidence in this country? Is it not one of the best indices of confidence in a country when people are prepared to invest their savings in that country?"

United Kingdom

During December 1975 the British Labour government released new "guidelines" for British companies operating in SA.⁵ It is assumed that, because of provisions of the South African Second General Law Amendment Act of 1974, they had been forced to alter or relax some of the requirements, for United Kingdom companies in SA, to disclose details of the employment conditions of Black workers and the wages they were paid. (See page 188 of the 1973 *Survey*, pages 224-225 of the 1974 *Survey*, and page 154 of the 1975 *Survey*). The main change in the requirements was that only British companies with more than a 50 per cent shareholding in a SA subsidiary would be asked to provide regular progress reports on what they were doing to improve the conditions of Black workers. Although the Second General Law Amendment Act did not specifically state that only SA companies which were more than 50 per cent foreign-owned might disclose information to foreign governments, courts, or individuals, it is assumed that the Act had been interpreted in this way.

A survey of 141 British companies with SA subsidiaries was conducted by Christian Concern for Southern Africa and published during the year.⁶ The majority of the companies approached replied that they were unable, unwilling or not prepared to give details.⁷ Some quoted difficulties posed by SA legislation, and others said they were not prepared to give the information to anyone but their own shareholders. Most of the companies appeared to be still unaware, despite the strictures of the parliamentary select committee which reported two years previously, of how their African workers were being paid and treated. An analysis of information provided by 26 companies showed that more than 2 000 African workers employed mainly by three companies were still being paid below subsistence levels in 1975. The median African minimum wage of the lowest grade of adult male worker was approximately R110 per month, with an average work-

⁵ *Financial Mail*, 26 December, 1975.

⁶ *Poverty and Wages in South Africa*, R. Stares, Christian Concern for Southern Africa, 1976.

⁷ *Star*, 26 April.

INTERNATIONAL MATTERS

UNITED NATIONS

Financial contributions by South Africa

In reply to questions in the Assembly on 10 February,¹ the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that South Africa was R2 625 825 in arrears in the payment of contributions to the United Nations. Since 1963, he explained, SA had deducted a certain percentage from its annual contribution to the regular budget of the UN as a result of the organisation's action in issuing bonds to finance operations undertaken in the Congo in 1960. SA regarded this action as unlawful.

Since 1967, SA had also deducted a certain percentage from its annual contribution because it was no longer prepared to help finance the smear campaign being waged against its country by various branches of the UN. Until the end of 1973, R449 831 had been withheld in respect of these two items.

Because of the General Assembly's suspension of SA's participation at the Assembly's 29th session,² deemed by SA to be illegal, SA made no contribution to the regular budget of the UN in 1974 and 1975, the Minister said.

In the official Estimates of Expenditure from the State Revenue Account,³ a sum of R500 was allocated towards the UN's 1976 budget, plus R500 as a contribution to voluntary UN funds.

General Assembly, December 1975

During December 1975 the General Assembly of the UN passed another resolution directed against SA, the voting being 101 to 15, with 16 abstentions. Those who opposed the motion included the United States, Britain, France, and most of the other Western European nations. SA did not attend.

It was resolved that "the racist regime of South Africa" was illegitimate and had no right to represent the people of that country. The resolution declared that "the national liberation movement" were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. Racial discrimination was condemned as "a crime against humanity". The Assembly again requested the Security Council to consider imposing mandatory sanctions to resolve "the grave situation in the area".⁴

¹ Hansard 3 cols. 145-6.

² See 1975 *Survey*, page 284.

³ RP 2/1976, Vote 5, Foreign Affairs.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail and Star*, 11 December 1975.

Security Council, January and March

As reported in appropriate chapters of this *Survey*, the SA Ambassador, Mr. "Pik" Botha, participated in a Security Council debate on South West Africa (Namibia) in January, and in a debate during March on the war in Angola.

Security Council, June

During June, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning apartheid as "a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind that seriously disturbs international peace and security". The Council recognized "the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people" to put an end to apartheid. South Africa was condemned for "massive violence" against the African demonstrators in Soweto and other townships.⁵

Security Council, July, September, and October

The Security Council debate in July on South Africa's alleged attack on a village in Zambia is described on page 401. Its debate during September and October on South West Africa is recorded in the chapter dealing with that territory.

General Assembly, November

On 9 November the General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions directed against South Africa.

1. Support was expressed for the United Nations trust fund providing humanitarian assistance to victims of apartheid (adopted by consensus).
2. Solidarity was proclaimed with political prisoners in South Africa (adopted by consensus).
3. The Assembly "reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, by all possible means, for the seizure of power" (108 to 11 with 22 abstentions).
4. A call was made for a mandatory arms embargo against SA; and past actions in contravention of an embargo taken by the United States, France, West Germany, Israel, and Britain were criticised (110 to 8 with 20 abstentions).
5. "Continuing and increasing collaboration" between Israel and SA was condemned (91 to 20 with 28 abstentions).
6. The Assembly called for the banishment of SA from all international sports competition and the drafting of an international treaty against apartheid in sports (128 to 0 with 12 abstentions).

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 June.

7. It urged the severing of all economic relations with SA (110 to 6 with 24 abstentions).
8. A programme of work for the United Nations special committee on apartheid was adopted (133 to 0 with 8 abstentions).
9. Also adopted was a programme of action against apartheid (105 to 8 with 27 abstentions).
10. A Scandinavian proposal to have the Security Council ban any new investments in SA was adopted (124 to 0 with 16 abstentions). This measure was proposed as an alternative to a stronger African call for economic and military sanctions.⁶

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The annual meeting of the OAU was held at Port Louis, Mauritius, in June and early July. The incoming chairman was the Mauritian Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. Only nine of the 47 heads of member-states attended. Deep divisions between certain of the states emerged, and few significant resolutions were passed.

The OAU did, however, agree to increase aid to Southern African guerrilla movements and "front-line" countries (Zambia, Tanzania, etc.). It was decided that recognition of an independent Transkei would be refused.¹

INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

A meeting of the ICFTU (the largest grouping of non-communist workers) was held in Brussels in September, at which thirty items of action against South Africa were decided upon, including:

- (a) a ban on the handling of goods to and from SA;
- (b) participation in international consumer boycotts of SA goods;
- (c) discouragement of emigration to SA and of tourism;
- (d) industrial action against multi-national companies with SA interests which did not recognize African trade unions in SA;
- (e) lobbying to bring about UN-imposed mandatory sanctions against SA;
- (f) working for SA's isolation in the sporting, social, and cultural fields.

A South African who was present told the Press that he had been surprised at the "superficiality" of the debate. In passing resolutions, delegates made no adequate analyses of the resulting consequences for Black workers.²

⁶ *Star*, 10 November.

¹ Various Press reports between 23 June and 6 July.

² *Star*, 22 and 24 September.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND CERTAIN OTHER AFRICAN STATES

Financial assistance given by South Africa

The Minister of Foreign Affairs said in the Assembly¹ that during the financial year 1974-5 his Department had disbursed R790 210 from funds allocated for assisting and co-operating with other countries in Africa. An amount of R1 015 000 had also been made available in the form of loans, not all of which was paid over. It was not in the national interest to divulge more detailed information, the Minister stated.

Zambia

(a) Attitude to the Rhodesian constitutional issue

As described in last year's *Survey*, during 1975 the Zambian President, Dr. Kaunda, worked in close co-operation with South Africa in trying to make possible a settlement of the Rhodesian constitutional issue. Dr. Kaunda and Mr. Vorster were jointly instrumental in arranging for talks to be held at the Victoria Falls in August 1975 between representatives of Mr. Ian Smith's government and of the ANC.

Not only did President Kaunda then have a deep desire for peace, but it was very much in the economic interests of Zambia that a settlement be achieved, leading to the calling off of sanctions against Rhodesia.

During 1976, President Kaunda's attitude changed completely. He was disillusioned by the failure of talks between Mr. Smith and Mr. Joshua Nkomo, and he came to the conclusion that the time for bringing about a peaceful settlement had passed: war had become inevitable. Zambia would give full support to "Zimbabwe nationalists" in their armed struggle.²

(b) Alleged South African attack on a Zambian village

In mid-July, President Kaunda accused South African forces of violating Zambian territory thirteen times (he apparently meant in "hot pursuit" of Swapo guerrillas); of firing on Zambians from across the border in Eastern Caprivi;³ and of attacking the Zambian village of Sialola on 11 July, using helicopters, jet aircraft, and troops, killing 22 people and wounding 45. The village was some 30 km from the Caprivi border, it was stated.

President Kaunda called for an urgent session of the UN

¹ Hansard 5 col. 318.

² Speeches quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail* and other papers, 26 April and 27 August.

³ According to *The Star* on 11 and 12 August, a senior SA Defence spokesman maintained that Zambian soldiers had begun the firing. There had been three such incidents recently. On the first occasion the South Africans did not return the fire, he stated.

Security Council to debate South Africa's "wanton and unprovoked attacks."⁴

When the Council met, the SA Ambassador, Mr. "Pik" Botha, told members that his government had no knowledge of the alleged attack on a village. He called on Zambia to agree to a joint investigation. The commander of the SA forces in East Caprivi subsequently firmly denied any suggestion that anyone under his command made such an attack.⁵

Liberia proposed that the Security Council should send a fact-finding mission to investigate Zambia's claims. The SA Government intimated that it would give its full co-operation in the matter. But certain African and other Third World states had meanwhile submitted an alternative resolution asking the Security Council to "strongly condemn" SA's "armed attack" on Zambia. Diplomats noted that any co-operation with the SA authorities could have been seen as tacit recognition of Pretoria's authority over South West Africa.

The British, French, and certain other Ambassadors stated they were satisfied that the raid had taken place. By a 14 to nil vote, with only the United States abstaining, the Security Council condemned South Africa for a flagrant violation of Zambian territory. The United States expressed regret that the Council had not, instead, accepted the Liberian proposal.⁶

Observers commented⁷ that a frequent argument during the debate had been that if South Africa could, earlier, have denied a wide-ranging invasion of Angola at a time when the foreign Press was publishing pictures of SA troops and armoured vehicles far in the interior of the country, could its denial of the attack on Sialola be taken seriously? SA's credibility had suffered badly.

(c) Alleged SA training for Zambian terrorists

A further charge publicly made by President Kaunda was that SA had deliberately trained Mr. Adamson Mushala and a gang of more than a hundred of his followers to spread terror and subversion in Zambia. It was reported⁸ that these men were operating in the north-west province, and had killed several people. Their activities had become so serious that the Zambian authorities had instituted a convoy system along roads in the area, put armed guards on buses, and discouraged motoring at night.

Mr. "Pik" Botha told the Security Council that Mr. Mushala and 67 followers, including women and children, had arrived in South West Africa on 17 November 1974, by air from Angola.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 and 27 July.

⁵ *Star*, 28 July and 4 August.

⁶ Various papers of 29, 30, and 31 July.

⁷ e.g. *Star*, 3 August.

⁸ *Star*, 28 July.

There had been no prior notification of their arrival. Mr. Mushala presented his group as refugees and asked for asylum. This was granted for humanitarian reasons, on strict condition that no member of the group would undertake, or be allowed to undertake, any subversive activities against Zambia. As it subsequently seemed doubtful whether Mr. Mushala would abide by his promises he was separated from his group for a time. Adults were offered work, but refused it. After raiding a storeroom on the night of 7 December 1975 they all absconded, and efforts to track them down failed because rain had obliterated their tracks. Mr. Botha categorically denied that SA had had contact with the group since, or was supporting their terrorist activities. He said that Mr. Mushala was a disreputable character who became known as a nuisance and an embarrassment.

(d) An end to détente with South Africa

In the course of a Press interview in August, President Kaunda was asked whether he and Mr. Vorster would meet again. He is reported⁹ to have replied, "No. Certainly never". There was no longer a basis for friendly relations. It was only SA that was standing between the Smith Government and defeat. The President blamed Mr. Vorster for attacking Zambia, for preventing the achievement of peace in Namibia, and for not putting an end to apartheid in South Africa.

Liberia

The friendly reception Mr. Vorster was accorded in Liberia in February 1975 was described on page 293 of last year's *Survey*. Relations between the two countries deteriorated during the year now under review.

In January, President Tolbert invited the banned South African leader, Mr. Robert Sobukwe, to attend a ceremony in Liberia. He expressed his disappointment when the SA Minister of Justice refused permission for Mr. Sobukwe to go.¹

Later that month President Tolbert told a visiting journalist, "We had hoped that by now the many suggestions and ideas exchanged with Mr. Vorster would have had some degree of implementation, but we regret this has not been the case."²

Ivory Coast

Mr. Vorster's visit to the Ivory Coast in September 1974 was reported on page 290 of last year's *Survey*.

During November 1975 a SA Airways Boeing aircraft was allowed, for the first time, to make a scheduled landing at Abidjan

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 August.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 January.

³ *Star*, 27 January.

on a flight from London. On board, on an official visit, were the SA Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary for Information.

While on an official visit to France, in May, President Houphouët-Boigny is reported³ to have said that he would continue his policy of dialogue with South Africa until it had been proved to him that war was preferable to peace.

Central African Republic

The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in the Assembly on 26 April⁴ that he had recently paid an official visit, by invitation, to the Central African Republic. The ties of friendship between South Africa and that country had been re-confirmed. He and his party had been very cordially welcomed by President Bokassa at a public function.

Mozambique

At the beginning of 1976, Lourenço Marques was renamed Maputo, and Beira became Sofala. President Machel has continued the nationalisation of privately-owned property in the country.

The closure of the Mozambique border with Rhodesia, and the consequences of this, are described in the chapter of this *Survey* dealing with Rhodesia.

Direct relations with South Africa have been without major incident. During March, seventeen Frelimo soldiers were captured just inside the Kruger National Park. They had, apparently, been pursuing some White Portuguese refugees who had cut the game fence at the border. After a few days, the soldiers were handed back to the Mozambican authorities.

The SA Minister of Foreign Affairs said in the Senate on 17 May⁵ that South Africa was making full use of the railway line to Maputo and the harbour there. The flow of labour from Mozambique to the SA mines was particularly satisfactory, the Minister added.

Power from the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme began to reach the Republic of SA on an experimental basis.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

During April, Mr. Vorster, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of his department, paid a four-day visit to Israel, in the course of which Mr. Vorster had wide-ranging talks with the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 May.

⁴ Hansard 13 col. 5426.

⁵ Senate, Hansard 10 col. 2360.

Subsequently, Mr. Vorster read out in the SA Assembly¹ a statement which he had made at a Press Conference in Jerusalem.

"We have decided (that is, the Government of Israel and the Government of South Africa) to establish a Ministerial Joint Committee comprising Ministers of South Africa and Israel. The committee will meet at least once a year and will make an overall review of the situation of the economic relations between the two countries, and will discuss ways and means to expand the economic co-operation and trade between the two countries, such as—

- (a) encouragement of investments;
- (b) development of trade;
- (c) scientific and industrial co-operation; and
- (d) utilization of South African raw materials and Israeli manpower in joint projects.

"A steering group will be established in order to regulate the exchange of information and ideas".

"I believe", Mr. Vorster added, "that this is an example of co-operation between middle-rank countries . . . which can be emulated by other middle-rank powers".

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Early in 1976, twenty-one American senators wrote to President Ford asking for a re-appraisal of the attitude of the United States towards South Africa. One of the President's aides wrote, in reply: "As you know, our South African policy, which includes the prohibition of the use of export-import bank direct loans, an arms embargo, and the restricted use of South African ports for United States naval vessels, has remained fundamentally unchanged for over a decade.

"The policy is based on our long standing support for the principle of self-determination for all the peoples of Africa, on the inherent opposition of the American people to the South African Government's policies of institutional racial discrimination, and our determination to encourage peaceful change in South Africa by supporting alternatives to the use of force.

"Despite the restrictive elements of our policies towards South Africa we maintain relations with its Government and a dialogue with all elements of South African society.

"This position is reflected in the United States veto in the Security Council last June over a resolution that would have imposed mandatory sanctions against South Africa.¹

"United States policy towards South Africa is reviewed on

¹ Hansard 12 cols. 5200-2.

¹ See 1975 *Survey*, page 347.

a continuing basis to assure it is in the best interest of the United States".²

NEGOTIATIONS BY DR. KISSINGER

Tour during April

During April the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, toured Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Ghana, Liberia, and Senegal. In a speech made in Lusaka¹ he is reported to have said that his visit was intended to usher in a new era in United States policy in regard to Africa.

Speaking of South Africa, he is reported to have stated that White South Africans were not colonialists: historically they were an African people. But they must recognise that the world would continue to insist that the institutionalised separation of the races must end.

Dr. Kissinger urged South Africa to announce a definite timetable for the achievement of self-determination by Namibia. He was concerned that all the people and political groupings had not been allowed to take part in determining the form of government they would have.

He urged South Africa to use its influence to promote a quick majority rule settlement in Rhodesia. (His statement of United States policy towards Rhodesia is reported in the chapter of this *Survey* dealing with Rhodesia.)

According to a Press report,² Dr. Kissinger said later that the African leaders had urged him to have discussions with Mr. Vorster, whose government held the key to a peaceful solution in Southern Africa.

Talks in West Germany

In June, Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster held two-day discussions at a Bavarian Forest resort in West Germany. Mr. Vorster was accompanied on this and subsequent occasions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand Fourie, the SA Ambassador to the United States, Mr. "Pik" Botha, and the head of the Bureau for State Security, General Hendrik van den Bergh. Some sessions of the talks, however, were conducted privately between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster.

Dr. Kissinger told the Press that he and Mr. Vorster had reviewed in great detail all the aspects of the situation in Southern Africa. A joint communiqué issued after the talks was couched in vague terms, merely stating that Mr. Vorster had agreed "to

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 March.

¹ *Star*, 27 April.

² *Star*, 6 September.

give further thought" to Dr. Kissinger's suggestions for avoiding a racial war in Southern Africa.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would send the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. William Schauffele, to report on the talks to the Black heads of state in Africa who were most concerned with the future of Southern Africa. He himself left for Britain for discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr. James Callaghan, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Crosland.

Prior to the talks, the West German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, had held discussions with Dr. Hilgard Muller. According to Press reports, he said he was speaking for the Common Market countries. He stated that South African race policies were considered to be a danger to peace. He called on South Africa to help find a way of achieving a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, and to set a date for independence in Namibia.

After meeting Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Vorster went to Bonn to meet Mr. Schmidt.³

Talks in Switzerland

A second round of talks between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Vorster was held in Zurich early in September. In a Press interview on leaving, Mr. Vorster described his mission as the most important any South African leader had ever undertaken.

At the conclusion of the three-day talks Dr. Kissinger is reported to have told the Press that these had been fruitful. He believed that progress had been made towards the objectives jointly developed by the United States, Britain, and the states of Black Africa, and that a basis for further negotiation existed. The objectives referred to were majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress for all the peoples of Southern Africa. The United States believed that these were attainable, given patience, goodwill, and dedication. The United States was prepared, together with the United Kingdom, to offer its good offices in the attainment of these objectives.

Work still remained to be done, Dr. Kissinger continued. It had to be kept in mind, in assessing prospects, that the negotiations were of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and the parties concerned.

Mr. Vorster invited Dr. Kissinger to South Africa for a third round of talks. Dr. Kissinger told a Press conference that he would accept the invitation provided he made further progress in prior talks with the leaders of Black Africa. He emphasized that a visit would not be a "protocol" one intended to confer an honour on South Africa, but only for the purpose of pursuing his negotiations.⁴

³ Summary of numerous Press reports between 20 and 25 June.

⁴ Press reports from 3 to 6 September.

Following the Zurich talks, Dr. Kissinger visited Britain, France, West Germany, Tanzania, and Zambia for discussions with the heads of state of these countries.

Mr. Ian Smith visited Pretoria for discussions with Mr. Vorster. According to various reports,⁵ Mr. Smith was anxious to meet Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger stated that he was prepared to have such a meeting only if prior assurances were given of positive development.

Talks in Pretoria

Dr. Kissinger visited Pretoria from 17 to 20 September. He is reported to have told the staff of the United States Embassy that if war did break out in Southern Africa it would have profound implications for international instability on a global scale. South Africa either held the key or could make a decisive contribution to peace. He hoped that progress was being made on subjects that had a long legacy and were extremely painful to deal with for all parties.

Most of Dr. Kissinger's time was spent with Mr. Vorster at the latter's official residence; but one afternoon was devoted to two rounds of talks held at the United States Embassy residence. Those invited to the first talks were all Blacks: they included the leaders of the Coloured Labour and Federal Parties, the Chief Ministers of various African homelands, the Rector-elect of the University of the North, leaders of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, the general secretary of the Union of Clothing Workers, and the chairman of the SA Indian Council.

Interviewed by the Press afterwards, those who had been present stated that the Blacks had been unanimous in asking Dr. Kissinger to try to persuade Mr. Vorster to summon a national multi-racial convention. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi said he had stated that the Black people wanted majority rule as a basic principle of a unitary South Africa. Mr. Sonny Leon said he had told Dr. Kissinger that those present represented the last generation of Black leaders who would be willing to meet Whites round a conference table. South Africa was a time-bomb and the fuse was burning short.

Dr. Manus Buthelezi of the Soweto Black Parents' Association⁶ was not among those who met Dr. Kissinger; but he accepted an invitation to have discussions with Mr. Schaefele, the US Assistant Secretary of State.

The second group to meet Dr. Kissinger included Sir De Villiers Graaff of the UP, Mr. Colin Eglin of the PRP, three businessmen (including an African), three newspaper editors (again including an African), and three Rectors of universities

⁵ e.g. *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 September.

⁶ See page 26.

(including a Coloured man). They were of varied shades of political thought. The nature of their discussions was not revealed.

Dr. Kissinger agreed to meet Mr. Ian Smith, doing so first privately and then in Mr. Vorster's presence at the American Ambassador's residence. Thereafter, the Americans left for Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya.⁷

Decisions and events following Dr. Kissinger's negotiations are described in appropriate chapters of this *Survey*.

⁷ Account compiled from various Press reports from 16 to 22 September.

ANGOLA

PRESENCE OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)

As reported in previous issues of this *Survey*, after the Portuguese coup in April 1974 the authorities in Lisbon attempted to set up a provisional government in Angola, representative of all sections of the population; but efforts to bring about stable government failed largely because of mounting tension between the MPLA,¹ led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, and the FNLA,² led by Mr. Holden Roberto. There were reports of fighting between members of these groups.

In the Assembly on 26 January,³ the SA Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, said that at the beginning of 1975 the governments of Owambo and Kavango in South West Africa repeatedly pointed out how essential it was that their northern borders with Angola should be safeguarded. They requested the presence of the SA Defence Force, and also intimated that they would like to participate in the protection of their territories. Similar requests were received from the Caprivi.

In consequence, the Minister continued, units of the SA Defence Force were deployed in these areas of South West Africa, and police protection was afforded where necessary. In co-operation with other government departments the Defence Department launched a civil action programme, selecting suitably qualified national servicemen to assist in local educational, health, and agricultural services.

CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA

From March 1975 on there were frequent reports of very serious fighting between MPLA and FNLA forces, in many parts of the country. The situation degenerated into civil war. Unita,⁴ led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, was drawn in later as an ally of FNLA.

In the speech quoted earlier,⁵ the Minister of Defence stated that according to the November 1975 issue of *Conflict Studies*, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in March 1975 the MPLA began receiving large-scale supplies of arms from Russian-controlled sources. Previous to this, smaller-scale supplies had been sent. In April 1975 alone, 100 tons of arms were delivered to the MPLA, he said.

¹ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

² Front for the Liberation of Angola.

³ Hansard 1 col. 44-5.

⁴ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

⁵ Col. 52.

THE CALUEQUE DAM AND RUACANA HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEME

The Minister of Defence stated⁶ that because chaos and confusion were increasing across the border, during April 1975 the South African Government requested the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of the workers at the Calueque Dam; but nothing of significance was done.

This dam, which is on the Cunene River about 20 km inside Angola, is being built by South Africa under an agreement made with Portugal in 1969, in terms of which SA would draw ten per cent of the water free of charge. A pipeline and some 260 km of canals have been constructed, along which water is pumped and conducted by gravity to feed water courses in Owambo, which are otherwise dry for about nine months of the year.

Further downstream, on the border, are the Ruacana Falls. SA agreed to pay the Portuguese about R400 000 a year in royalties for generating hydro-electric power here. A subterranean hydro-electric complex is being built on the SWA side of the border, water for the generators being taken in at a weir within Angola. It was planned that by April 1978, 320 MW of power would be passing into the SWA grid. Some 2 000 Black Angolans and 700 Whites and their families were employed on the projects early in 1976.⁷

The Minister of Economic Affairs said in the Assembly on 18 February⁸ that SA's total commitment in regard to these schemes, according to the latest estimates, would be R127 432 000. This excluded the cost of the water reticulation system, which would probably amount to about R3 265 834.

The Minister of Defence stated⁹ (also on 18 February) that in August 1975 the Government learned that workers at Calueque were being threatened by soldiers from Angola. Many of them fled. After further unsuccessful negotiations with the Portuguese authorities, a platoon of SA troops was sent to the dam site to try to restore order through negotiations with Angolans. They were fired upon, and retaliated, in the process occupying Calueque. The Portuguese authorities and other governments were notified of this by SA. Work was resumed on the dam, but both the Black and the White workers informed the Director of Water Affairs in South West Africa that they would refuse to continue work if the SA troops were withdrawn, the Minister said. (These developments, which took place early in August 1975, were not officially announced in South Africa until some months thereafter, although the presence of SA troops in Angola

⁶ Col. 46-7.

⁷ *South African Digest*, 5 March.

⁸ Hansard 4 col. 270.

⁹ Col. 47. According to *The Star* of 10 April, the first units of SA military forces crossed the border on August 9 or August 11.

had been widely reported overseas—e.g. in *The Economist* on 16 August and *Le Monde* on 20 August 1975.)

GUERRILLA ACTION

On 17 August 1975 Chief Filemon Elifas of Owambo was shot, near his home, and died of wounds. His assailants escaped. It was widely believed that they were members of Swapo, coming from a camp in South Angola.

During October 1975 Swapo guerrillas from across the border raided two villages in northern Owambo, murdering a deputy headman, his wife, and seven tribal policemen. Shortly thereafter, a SA national serviceman was killed and two others injured in a landmine explosion in the Caprivi Strip. The SA Defence Headquarters announced that SA troops had made a reprisal raid, destroying two Swapo camps in southern Angola, killing seven members of Swapo, and seizing military equipment. It was announced from Cape Town on 19 October that SA forces had adopted the practice of "hot pursuit" and had made incursions into Angola against Swapo.¹⁰

REFUGEES IN LATE 1975

Within Angola, FNLA in the north, and Unita and FNLA in the south, advanced against the MPLA troops, increasingly confining them to the central part of the country. Havoc was left in the trail of the fighting.

Refugees began streaming south, many of them crossing the border by road or arriving in South West Africa by sea. In the speech quoted earlier¹¹ the Minister of Defence said that by mid-September there were about 11 000 Angolan refugees in four camps in South Africa and South West Africa. Costs of maintaining them had mounted to almost R4 000 000. Two other refugee camps had been established by SA troops in southern Angola, at Chitado and Calai.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR, AND SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT

On 10 November the last of the Portuguese officials and army personnel left Angola. In a brief ceremony, the Portuguese High Commissioner handed over independence to "the people of Angola": there was no government to which power could be transferred.

In opening a new session of the SA Parliament early the following year, the State President said¹² that on 11 November South Africa had recognized the independence of Angola, but "like many other countries, including about half of Africa, we have not yet recognized any of the combatant groups as the

¹⁰ 1975 *Survey of Race Relations*, and summary of events in *The Star*, 10 April.

¹¹ Col. 48.

¹² Assembly, Hansard 1 col. 5.

government of that country".

At the time of independence, Unita and the FNLA were making rapid advances against the MPLA, and were threatening the capital, Luanda, to which area the MPLA had retreated. As recorded later, the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had been giving covert assistance to Unita, through Zaïre.

The Soviet Union continued to send large supplies of sophisticated arms to the MPLA. Apparently from mid-October 1975, it assisted in transporting Cuban troops to train members of the MPLA to use these armaments and to help in the fighting: a Press report¹³ on 24 October stated that more than 1 000 Cubans had arrived in Luanda, having come by sea.

On the following day, the *Washington Post* published a report based largely on information from a pro-communist Lisbon newspaper, which claimed that South Africans, with Unita forces, were advancing on certain towns in Southern Angola. On 2 November *The Observer* of London featured a report claiming that a motorised column of White soldiers coming from the south had taken Pereira de Eca near the border.¹⁴

SOUTH AFRICAN ADVANCE INTO ANGOLA

At the time, the South African authorities released no information about an advance into Angola, but a few reports dealing with specific actions were made public later. The most comprehensive account available at the time of writing was contained in a report published in May 1976 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.¹⁵ This Institute stated that an initial force of several hundred South Africans, rising later to about 2 000 men, was sent to reinforce the FNLA/Unita alliance, with maintenance, logistic, reconnaissance, and limited combat functions.

On 23 October 1975, it was stated, a FNLA unit spearheaded by SA armoured cars and helicopters captured Pereira de Eca, and subsequently Sa Da Bandeira to the north-west. It then divided, one section capturing the port of Mocamedes, while the other advanced north and, together with a Unita force coming from the east, seized the ports of Benguela and Lobito.

By 13 November the SA-sponsored column had advanced and driven the MPLA out of the port of Novo Redondo. Meanwhile, Unita and FNLA forces were threatening Gabela, nearby, and towns further east. At that point, however, the position became stabilized. China was stated to have ceased giving support to the FNLA; but further supplies of highly sophisticated Russian weapons had been received by the MPLA, and the

¹³ *Rand Daily Mail*.

¹⁴ From feature article in *The Star*, 10 April.

¹⁵ *Star*, 7 May.

Soviet Union had rushed in more Cuban troops by air: United States intelligence estimated that by about 24 November some 7 500 Cubans had arrived to help the MPLA.¹⁶

Meanwhile, there had, apparently, been further action to the south, in the border area. In mid-November two SA officers were killed by land-mine explosions, one man was fatally injured by a mortar bomb, and two others were killed in a Swapo attack. About ten of the attackers were killed in the fighting, and a number wounded. In further actions later that month, six South Africans were killed and guerrillas suffered a number of casualties.

It gradually became evident that South Africans were involved in the fighting in the Gabela-Quibala area inland from Novo Redondo. Again, no public announcement was made at the time. In a speech during January in the SA Assembly, Mr. Vorster merely said¹⁷ that the SA forces had gone into Angola "to chase Cuba and the MPLA away from the dam . . . It is rather difficult, Sir, when you chase a man to decide when to stop . . . I make no bones about the fact that we chased him a very long way, and I take full responsibility for that". The Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, is reported¹⁸ to have said that, at first, the SA troops "had so much success that we went in further than we wanted".

However, announcements of casualties provided an indication that South Africans had been involved in severe fighting. It was reported¹⁹ that nine SA servicemen were killed in the "operational area" during December, three of them on 16 December 1975 "in one of the biggest skirmishes yet involving South African troops". In this fight, 61 members of the opposing force were killed, it was stated.

It was announced by the Minister of Defence on 14 December²⁰ that four young SA national servicemen were missing, and believed to be prisoners of the MPLA. They had been sent to fetch an unserviceable vehicle, and had presumably become lost. The MPLA claimed²¹ that these men had been captured between the towns of Cela and Quibala, which are, respectively, near or on the road from Luanda to Huambo (previously called Nova Lisboa), roughly 300 km south-east of Luanda and 900 km by road north of the South West African border. The men, in handcuffs, were paraded before the Press and publicly interrogated by the MPLA.

On 7 January it was announced²² that three more SA service-

¹⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 January.

¹⁷ 30 January, Hansard 1 col. 369.

¹⁸ *Star*, 4 February.

¹⁹ *Star*, 30 December; *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 December 1975.

²⁰ *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 December 1975.

²¹ *Star*, 17 December; *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 December 1975.

²² *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 January; *Star*, 9 and 12 January.

men had been captured near Quibala by Cuban troops. These men, also in handcuffs, were paraded at a Press conference in Luanda, then at the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, and subsequently in Khartoum.

Considerably later, on 30 April, Defence Headquarters in Pretoria for the first time revealed information about one of the actions that had taken place during December: the "Battle for Bridge 14". The SA Broadcasting Corporation produced a TV documentary on this action. The locality was not mentioned. Apparently, during December 1975 a South African combat group came under heavy mortar and rocket fire from a considerably larger force of Cubans who were in a strong position on the other side of a river, having destroyed the only bridge. An artillery battle ensued, lasting some days. The South Africans succeeded in knocking out the mortar positions. Meanwhile, sappers repaired the bridge with tree trunks, suffering casualties in the process. The SA armoured cars then crossed and launched a final attack, causing the Cubans to flee. Between 150 and 200 Cubans, but only four South Africans, were killed. Vehicles, arms and ammunition, including a 40-barrel "Stalin Organ" rocket launcher, were captured, and some Cubans were taken prisoner.

During this period the MPLA received ever-increasing assistance. SA's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. "Pik" Botha, is reported²³ to have said at a Security Council meeting on 27 January that the Soviet Union had sent the MPLA armaments worth between R170 000 000 and R260 000 000. There were about 12 000 Cubans in Angola, he added, with more being flown in by Russian aircraft at the rate of some 200 a day. (These estimates were borne out, in various statements, by officials of the US State Department.)

On 15 February the newspaper *Rapport* told of a meeting between an American Senate Assistant, Mr. Bill Coughlin, and Dr. Savimbi of Unita. Dr. Savimbi was reported to have said that during December 1975 he had twice travelled to meet South African authorities to plead for military assistance. The latter had agreed that SA troops should for the time being remain in Angola in a defensive capacity, at any rate until after an OAU meeting in January, in spite of the fact that support requested from Western countries had not been forthcoming.

Mr. Vorster was quoted by the Press²⁴ as saying on 24 December 1975, "If it was just a question of the Angolans themselves the war would have been over already. The MPLA has inferior forces and controls only a quarter of Angola's territory and population. But the Russians send in sophisticated weapons: tanks, 122-mm rockets mounted in clusters of 50 on lorries,

²³ *Star*, 28 January.

²⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 December 1975.

infantry-borne SAM's. Only big powers can off-set this arsenal—above all the 122-mm rockets. It is certainly beyond our limits".

In his New Year message to the nation Mr. Vorster said that Russian and Cuban involvement in Angola faced Africa with an unavoidable choice—resist or submit to "the yoke of atheist communist enslavement". The communist bid to "force a Marxist state on a resisting and unwilling people" could not be stopped by Africa alone. Only bigger Western involvement could achieve that.

The Minister of Defence announced in December²⁵ that the period of service of a limited number of national servicemen who were serving in the operational area would be extended for a month. During 1976, he said, a number of Citizen Force units would serve in the operational area. Members of units called up for annual training camps would serve for twelve weeks beyond the previous period of 19 days. This would be necessary because of the long distances to be travelled and the time this would take, and would facilitate the relieving and replacement of troops in the operational area.

It was reported²⁶ that on 21 January a major fight took place in the "Bloody Triangle" to the south and west of Quibala, around Cela, between White troops and soldiers who were using sophisticated Soviet armaments. The reporter commented, "No-one said the White troops were South Africans—and no-one denied it." The Whites were stated to have been defeated.

In an interview with a representative of the *Washington Post*²⁷ the Minister of Defence was reported to have said that after the South Africans had made their swift advance the MPLA and their Cuban allies struck back with superior weapons, notably the 122 mm rocket launcher and the "Stalin Organ" with its salvo of 40 rockets. "We were not routed as some of your papers said", the Minister claimed, but he admitted that the South Africans did pull back. (This may have resulted from a policy decision rather than a military defeat.) The Chief of the SA Army, Lt. General Magnus Malan, said in a TV interview²⁸ that the South Africans had emerged as victors in every action they fought. In the Assembly on 6 May²⁹ the Minister of Defence repeated this statement. He divulged that Cuban prisoners had been taken. Healthy ones were handed over to the provisional government in South Angola. The wounded were treated in SA hospitals and had been visited by the International Red Cross.

The Minister said in the Assembly³⁰ that between July 1975 and 23 January 1976 South Africa lost 29 men killed in action

²⁵ *Ibid.* 18 December 1975 and 28 January.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 30 January.

²⁷ Report quoted in *The Star*, 4 February.

²⁸ *Star*, 30 April.

²⁹ Hansard 14, col. 6216.

³⁰ Hansard 1 col. 50

and another 14 who died as a result of accidents. Two more were killed in a rocket raid during February, and one died of wounds.³¹

On 19 February the Minister stated³² that "not as many as three dozen" servicemen had been seriously wounded since the beginning of 1975. Five had been permanently disabled, and six needed plastic surgery. Later,³³ in an address to the South African Legion, the Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant-General R. H. D. Rogers, stated that 28 men had been killed in action and about 100 wounded.

ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES

The US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, is reported¹ to have said, in a speech made in Brussels during December 1975 to the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members, that the United States regretted Soviet intervention in Angola and could not accept the establishment of a Soviet base there. President Ford called² for a cease-fire, an end to all foreign intervention, and a government of national unity.

As mentioned earlier, the US had been giving covert military aid to the anti-Soviet forces in Angola. This programme had been organised through the Central Intelligence Agency, which is reported³ to have contributed supplies worth about R25 500 000. During December 1975, however, Congress voted in favour of terminating this aid: President Ford denounced the vote as an "abdication of responsibility".⁴ He then tried, but failed, to obtain Congress approval of the granting of limited direct aid to the anti-Soviet factions in Angola. It was clear that many members of Congress feared that continued aid might lead the country into another Vietnam-type war. Furthermore, the CIA had been discredited, and presidential elections were shortly to take place.

According to a SABC broadcast on 9 March, the US Gulf Oil Corporation paid the MPLA about R100 000 000 in return for rights in respect of oil in the enclave of Cabinda. During December 1975 the US State Department forced suspension of these payments.

During January Dr. Kissinger visited the Soviet Union to discuss the Angolan situation, suggesting a phased withdrawal of foreign troops. He was stated to have informed the Nato foreign ministers, after his visit, that he had achieved nothing.

PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS

On 21 January the withdrawal of SA troops from the fighting

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 and 14 February.

² *Ibid.*, 20 February.

³ *Ibid.*, 2 April.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12 December 1975.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14 January.

⁶ *Star*, 11 February.

⁷ *Star*, 20 December 1975.

zone was ordered. It was reported that this movement was completed within two days. Estimates of the number of men involved ranged from 1 200 to 2 000.⁵

In interviews with the representative of the *Washington Post* and with SA Pressmen, the Minister of Defence said that SA troops were still guarding the Calueque area, and the refugee camps in Angola (described later). They were occupying a stretch of territory along the whole border, its width within Angola varying, reaching 50 km at some points. Between 4 000 and 5 000 troops were deployed in "the area for which we are responsible", which included Owambo, Kavango, and Caprivi, besides the strip of land within Angola.

LEGALISATION BY SA OF PRESENCE OF SA TROOPS IN ANGOLA

A Defence Amendment Bill was introduced in the Assembly on 2 February which (with some amendments) became law as Act 1 of 1976. It provided, *inter alia*, that a member of the SA Defence Force might in time of war be required to perform service against an enemy at any place outside the Republic. Service for the prevention or suppression of terrorism or of any armed conflict outside the Republic would be deemed to be service in time of war against an enemy. (Previously, a member of the SA Defence Force could not be sent outside the Republic to perform service against an enemy unless with his written consent.)

The employment for a period exceeding one month, beyond the borders of the Republic, of members of the Defence Force to perform service against an enemy would be deemed to be mobilisation. The principal Act already provided that when mobilisation is ordered and if Parliament is in session, the reason will be communicated to it forthwith. If Parliament is not in session at the time, it will be reconvened within 30 days.

The new provisions were made retrospective to 9 August 1975. (Some of the Citizen Force men who had served in Angola between then and the date of the legislation, having agreed in writing to do so, were minors in age.)

FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The MPLA reinforced by Cuban troops continued to advance on all fronts. By mid-February the FNLA in the north had been defeated, and all the towns of any size in the south had been overrun. Dr. Jorge Sangumba, Unita's Foreign Secretary, said, "We cannot match the tanks and rockets." Dr. Savimbi and a considerable number of his Unita troops retired into the bush and planned a guerrilla war against the MPLA.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 and 27 January.
⁶ *Star*, report, 12 February.

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON SA'S ROLE IN ANGOLA

SA's role in the Angolan war was debated in the Assembly at the end of January. Opposition spokesmen very strongly condemned the Government for not keeping the country informed about SA's involvement. It was stated, *inter alia*, that by becoming involved, SA had departed from its long-standing policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, said⁷ that a civil war was not an ordinary civil war if one of the parties was assisted by foreign troops, advisers, and equipment. It then constituted a serious threat to neighbouring states. No one could accuse a neighbouring state of intervention or aggression if it took steps it considered necessary to ward off that threat. The earlier presence of members of the South African Police on the banks of the Zambezi had not been considered to be intervention in the domestic affairs of Rhodesia or of states to the north.

South Africa had been one of the first states to recognize Angola as an independent country, Dr. Muller continued. It thereby accepted the principle that the people of Angola could and should elect their government. "We did not try, nor will we try, to prescribe what type of government the people of Angola should elect . . . However, it is an entirely different matter if a foreign power intervenes by force of arms and in that way tries to decide who should govern that country".

Dr. Muller said that SA had remained in constant contact with as many African leaders as possible, as well as with other governments. "They are all aware of our standpoint. Where possible and where necessary we held consultations, and we are still doing so."

What was happening in Angola, Dr. Muller maintained, was part of Russia's global strategy aimed at world domination. It represented "the unfolding of a terrible danger and threat not only to Southern Africa, but also to Africa as a whole as well as to the entire world".

The Prime Minister stated⁸ that by becoming involved, South Africa had brought to the notice of the free world the fact that an unwilling people was being driven forcibly into the communist fold. If this action had not been taken the MPLA, with Russian and Cuban help, would at the outset have taken over the whole of Angola, creating the impression in the outside world that the people of the entire country supported the MPLA. In fact, at the time, the MPLA had the support of only about a third of the population. South Africa's action had exposed the Russian-Cuban involvement, which was then not widely known.

⁷ Hansard 1 cols. 110-5.
⁸ Cols. 365-9.

Furthermore, it had prevented the flight of tens of thousands of Unita and FNLA supporters into South West Africa.

Sir De Villiers Graaff (United Party) drew up a list of "the pluses and minuses" of the Angolan venture.⁹ An important "minus," he said, was the likelihood that the hostility of other states towards SA's continued occupation of South West Africa would be increased.

Mr. C. W. Eglin (Progressive Reform Party) stated¹⁰ that his party believed that the Government's decision to become involved in the civil war had been a serious error of political judgment. The Government had overestimated Western European response to the Russian involvement; had evaluated incorrectly the degree of fragmentation which existed within the total American system of government and miscalculated the mood of the American people in the post-Vietnam era; and had mis-assessed the sophistication of the weapons which the Russians and Cubans would throw into the fray. And the Government had not resolved the Angolan issue.

ATTITUDES OF OAU AND OTHER STATES

Towards the end of 1975 and early in January, certain African states expressed their support for the MPLA: among them were Somalia, Guinea Bissau, and Congo-Brazzaville, where the Soviet Union had established a significant presence,¹ and Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya.

Others, notably Zambia, Kenya, Zaïre, Botswana, and Tunisia, called for an immediate cease-fire in Angola, the withdrawal of all foreign powers, the formation of an interim coalition government, and the establishment of an international observer force to supervise proper elections.²

These proposals were, in general, supported by the United States and by Britain. It was reported³ that Britain tried but failed to reach agreement with the other eight EEC countries on a joint policy: the Netherlands and Denmark expressed support for the MPLA.

Dr. Agostinho Neto of the MPLA, however, rejected the call for a coalition government pending national elections. It was alleged⁴ that he was aware that the MPLA might not command a majority of votes: the Ovimbundu tribe, for example, constituting about 36 per cent of the population, supported Unita.

A summit meeting of the then 46 member-states of the OAU met in Addis Ababa in mid-January, under the chairmanship of

⁹ Cols. 391-3.

¹⁰ Cols. 104-7.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 21 February.

² *Star*, 15 and 24 December 1975.

³ *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 January.

⁴ *Star*, 24 December 1975.

President Idi Amin of Uganda.⁵ Nigeria introduced a motion calling for the recognition of the MPLA as the legal and only government of Angola. President Samora Machel of Mozambique appealed for the acceptance of this motion and urged that the "South African racialists" be driven out. The socialist countries should not be asked to withdraw, he said, because they had always helped Africa to fight against colonialism.

President Leopold Senghor of Senegal maintained that those who condemned the alliance with South Africa would be honest only if they also condemned the alliance with Russia and Cuba. He moved a resolution calling for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, peace talks supervised by an OAU-appointed committee, and the establishment of a government of national unity comprising all three factions in Angola.

Each of the two resolutions gained 22 votes: Ethiopia and Uganda were uncommitted at that time. The meeting ended without agreement on the course to be pursued by the OAU.

After the meeting, President Kaunda of Zambia is reported to have told the Press that "our failure to find a solution confirms that the OAU has no power to shape the destiny of Africa. The power is in the hands of super-powers to whom we are handing over Africa by our failure".

During the weeks that followed, as it became clear that the MPLA had won the war, increasing numbers of states recognized this organisation as constituting the *de facto* government. President Idi Amin is reported to have said early in February⁶ that 26 African states, including Uganda, had by then done so, and this majority entitled the MPLA to full membership of the OAU. By mid-April all the OAU states except Kenya, Senegal, and the Central African Republic had recognized the MPLA.⁷

Among the Western European states that took similar action were Britain and the rest of the EEC countries.

The United States decided, however, that it would not recognize the MPLA until the Cuban troops were out of Angola.⁸

The establishment of the People's Republic of Angola was announced by the MPLA, with Dr. Agostinho Neto as President, Mr. Lopo Nascimento as Prime Minister, Mr. Jose Edouardo dos Santos as Foreign Minister, and Mr. Iko Carreira as Defence Minister. Mr. Dos Santos headed an Angolan delegation at a meeting of the OAU's ministerial council at the end of February.⁹

⁵ The account that follows is derived from various Press reports between 11 and 15 January.

⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 February.

⁷ Bulletin of the Africa Institute of SA, No. 3 of 1976.

⁸ *Star*, 24 February.

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 February; *Star*, 24 February.

REFUGEES, AND UNSUCCESSFUL REQUESTS FOR UNITED NATIONS' ASSISTANCE

The International Red Cross is reported¹ to have estimated early in February that there were at least 255 000 displaced, sick, and wounded people in Angola in dire need of help. Plans to fly in food and medical and other supplies were being discussed.

As described in last year's *Survey*, thousands of refugees escaped by road to South West Africa, the first of them arriving in June 1975. Transit camps were opened for them at Grootfontein, Oshakati, and Tsumeb. As their numbers mounted, many were flown to camps in South Africa at Cullinan, Magaliesoord, and Lyndhurst, in the Pretoria/Johannesburg areas. According to the Report of the Department of Immigration for 1975,² by the end of that year about 2 000 of them who could satisfy SA's immigration requirements had been allowed to remain, the breadwinners taking up temporary employment. The rest had gone, in the main, to Portugal. The Portuguese Government had agreed to refund the transportation costs. There had been 2 919 sent by ship from Walvis Bay, 7 172 sent by air from Windhoek or Jan Smuts Airport, and 750 who left SA at their own expense.

Besides this, the Portuguese Government is stated to have used its TAP airline to fly out some 200 000 refugees direct from Angola.

It became increasingly difficult for people to escape by road to South West Africa: petrol supplies along the route became exhausted, and convoys of cars and lorries were looted by members of guerrilla movements. Early in January, about 2 450 sailed to Walvis Bay in some 42 grossly overcrowded fishing vessels, coming mainly from the Angolan harbour of Mocamedes where, it was stated, fighting was in progress between Unita and FNLA troops. For some days the vessels were required to anchor outside the Walvis Bay harbour, the SA authorities meanwhile supplying food and medical and other supplies. The then Minister of the Interior announced that those of the refugees who were Portuguese citizens would be allowed to land, would be transported to Windhoek, and from there flown to Portugal. The Portuguese Ambassador to SA and his staff boarded the vessels to determine which of the people qualified for citizenship.³

The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated subsequently⁴ that Portugal had accepted responsibility for 1 920 of the people, while 324 who were not Portuguese citizens would be taken to the Calai camp just over the Angolan border. The rest, including members of the crews of the vessels, remained at Walvis Bay harbour until early April, receiving supplies from SA, and eventually

¹ *Star*, 12 February.

² RP 23/1976, page 2.

³ Various Press reports between 16 and 24 January, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 31 March.

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 February; also SABC news broadcast, 30 March.

sailed in two convoys bound, respectively, for Portugal and Brazil.

As the MPLA/Cuban forces swept south, invading towns and villages, thousands of people who had been Unita supporters fled before them, arriving in the area occupied by the SA forces. The SA authorities arranged for them to be accommodated and cared for temporarily in camps established within Angola near the SWA border, at Calai, Cuangar, Chitado, Ruacana, and at the village of Pereira de Eca. They lived in SA army tents, supplemented by makeshift dwellings erected by themselves.

It was reported on 12 February⁵ that nearly 90 000 more refugees were fleeing before the advancing MPLA/Cuban forces. In the event, these further people did not arrive in the SA-held area: troops had, apparently, cut the roads.⁶ But SA was, by the end of January, caring for thousands of refugees in the five camps in Angola, besides those still in SWA or SA.

On 23 January the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller,⁷ announced that he had written to the UN Secretary-General asking whether the UN High Commissioner for Refugees would assist with the problem. Since August 1975, he said, the SA Government had taken care of some 13 000 Angolan refugees. SA's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. "Pik" Botha, asked the Security Council to do all that it could to help. SA, he stated, had already spent about R4 300 000 in supplying the refugees with accommodation, transportation, food, medical services, and other necessities. However, a proposed investigatory visit by UN officials was suddenly cancelled, no reasons being given.

The Press reported on 7 February that Dr. Muller had sent a second note to the UN Secretary-General, calling on the UN to give meaningful assistance to the more than 11 000 people who were then in the camps in Southern Angola, or to accept the consequences in human suffering if the situation got out of hand. The UN Secretary General is reported⁸ to have replied, "I am sure you will appreciate that the United Nations will not be able to respond to a request from South Africa for assistance to camps set up on Angola territory. I am deeply concerned about the humanitarian aspects of the Angolan conflict . . . As soon as conditions permit the United Nations system will certainly do whatever it can to meet the needs of the situation."

In a third note to the Secretary-General,⁹ Dr. Muller "noted" Dr. Waldheim's response that the UN would not be able to give aid, since the camps run by SA were in Angola. "This implies that the sole obstacle to United Nations assistance is the fact

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12 February.

⁶ *Star*, 20 February.

⁷ *Star*, 23 and 28 January.

⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, 12 February.

⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 February.

that South Africa has assumed this humanitarian task. It must, therefore, be assumed that if South Africa were to cease this task, the United Nations would undertake its responsibilities towards these refugees. In consequence, South Africa will seriously have to consider terminating its role in this regard, and if it should do so, please advise urgently whether the United Nations will render all the services at present rendered by South Africa".

In an explanatory statement, Dr. Muller said that SA wanted at all costs to avoid a situation where refugees were totally disrupted and would have to spend years in refugee camps. If SA did terminate its aid, this would not mean that she was indifferent to the needs and problems of the refugees. Indeed, SA had clearly shown its hospitality towards refugees who had been accommodated for long periods.

Dr. Waldheim replied,¹⁰ "The United Nations can only undertake humanitarian assistance within a country at the request and with the co-operation of the competent authorities in the country concerned". The Press posed the question, "Who *does* the UN recognise as the competent authority in Angola? A decision by the UN is unlikely until the General Assembly meets again in September."

Meanwhile, officials of the International Red Cross in Geneva visited Windhoek to discuss what help their organisation could give. Shortly afterwards, tents, food, medical supplies, and clothing began to arrive. Members of the South African public contributed to a special fund set up by the S.A. Red Cross to provide relief: the Northern Transvaal branch of this organisation reported that by early April it, alone, had received R228 894.¹¹

It was announced on 23 February¹² that the SA Government had decided to airlift refugees who could qualify as Portuguese citizens from South Angola to Windhoek, from where the Portuguese airline would fly them to Lisbon. A large number of these refugees were children who had lost their parents in the war.

The Deputy Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions said in the Assembly on 17 February¹³ it was estimated that by then, SA had assisted about 6 000 refugees from Mozambique and 16 000 from Angola.

A further announcement was made by the Minister of Defence on 12 March.¹⁴ All refugees eligible for admission to Portugal had by then been transported out of Angola, he said. The remaining people (reported to number between 5 000 and 6 000) had been gathered together in Cuangar and Calai, close

¹⁰ *Star*, 18 February.

¹¹ *Sunday Times*, 15 February; *SA Digest*, 19 March; *Star*, 7 April.

¹² *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 February.

¹³ *Hansard* 4 col. 252.

¹⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, 13 March; *Star*, 15 and 16 March.

to the Kavango border. All South African troops had been withdrawn from Angola except for those administering these camps and guarding the Calueque Dam and Ruacana scheme.

The Press reported that three representatives of the International Red Cross were at Cuangar and Calai, giving as much help as possible, mainly in the form of food and tents; but that this organisation had no kind of security force to afford protection nor the manpower to undertake administration.

A few days later the Minister of Defence stated that South African assistance at the refugee camps would cease on 27 March. The International Committee of the Red Cross then announced in Geneva¹⁵ that the responsibility for administering the camps would become that of the new Angolan Government. The SA Red Cross stopped sending supplies to Calai and Cuangar because of the uncertain situation, and the International body withdrew its representatives.¹⁶ When the South Africans returned across the border, they left tents and food for the refugees' use.

A Commission for Refugees was established in the Calai and Cuangar camps. Its leaders appealed to the Chief Minister of Kavango, Mr. Alfons Magevere, for political asylum in his territory: they feared that those who had supported Unita or the FNLA would be massacred when MPLA troops arrived. Several thousand of them, Black and White, swam across the dangerous Okavango River, or paddled across in hastily-fashioned canoes, leaving most of their remaining possessions behind. A temporary refugee centre was established for them about 16 km south of Rundu.¹⁷

Besides this, about 270 Black Angolans, most of the men claiming to be former Unita soldiers, crossed the border into Owambo from Pereira de Eca. After consulting his cabinet the Chief Minister, Pastor K. Ndjoba, said that they would be admitted, the SA authorities being asked to help care for them. They were accommodated in a temporary camp at Ohangwena, some 12 km south of Oshikango.¹⁸

Increased military activities in south Angola towards the end of August and during September caused many hundreds of further refugees, mainly women and children, to flee across the border into Kavango, Caprivi, and Owambo. They were gathered together in the temporary camps. According to Press reports, by the end of October there were totals of about 2 500 in Owambo and 4 700 in Kavango. The total number had mounted to some 8 000 by 10 November.¹⁹ The Owambo Cabinet asked local headmen to absorb as many of these people as possible into their

¹⁵ *Star*, 10 September.

¹⁶ *Star*, 19 March.

¹⁷ *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 and 27 March.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27 and 29 March; *Sunday Times*, 28 March.

¹⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 March.

²⁰ *Star*, 10 September.

communities; but the Kavango Government felt that the problem was beyond its resources and declined to accept responsibility.

OTHER APPROACHES BY SA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

In a speech made at a Security Council meeting at the end of January,¹ the SA Ambassador, Mr. "Pik" Botha, refuted charges that SA had committed "acts of aggression" in Angola. He is reported to have said that it was Russia that threatened the African continent as "the greatest imperialist of modern times". Cubans, using USSR armaments, were being used to "kill, maim, humiliate, and intimidate black Africans". Massive quantities of lethal Soviet arms were being used to destroy and devastate African villages, schools, and hospitals.

Mr. Botha said that his Government proposed that a UN factfinding mission be sent to Angola to establish for itself whether it was South Africa, or Russia and Cuba, that was posing a threat to peace there. His Government would lend its willing co-operation to such a mission.

Mr. Botha also suggested that the Security Council should assume responsibility for protecting the Calueque dam and Ruacana hydro-electric scheme until an Angolan government could handle the situation satisfactorily.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs followed up Mr. Botha's speech by sending a note to the UN Secretary-General, calling upon the Security Council to conduct an on-the-spot investigation in Angola, and offering to hand over the protection of the dam and hydro-electric scheme to a UN force.²

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MPLA AND SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SA TROOPS FROM ANGOLA

The MPLA Minister for Foreign Relations, Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is reported¹ to have told the Press, during a visit to Paris in mid-February, that South African interests in Angola "must not be considered a pretext for violating our territorial integrity. The Pretoria government should recognise the fact of our existence as an independent sovereign state and as the legitimate representatives of the Angolan people. Then we could settle all the problems concerning South African interests and investments in Angola".

It was widely reported in the Press that SA diplomatic efforts were directed towards securing an agreement for the protection of the Cunene River schemes in exchange for a complete withdrawal of SA troops from Angola. However, in a speech made

¹ *Star*, 28 January.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 7 February.

¹ *Le Monde*, quoted in *The Star*, 14 February.

in Luanda at the end of February, Dr. Neto is reported² to have said that he was not prepared to discuss with SA any guarantees for the security of the schemes until the troops had been withdrawn. Shortly afterwards he stated³ that the dam belonged to the Angolan people, not to South Africa.

As mentioned earlier, SA decided to terminate its assistance at the refugee camps by 27 March.

In a statement made on 20 March,⁴ Mr. Vorster said that in August 1975, while Portugal was still legally responsible for Angola and was the governing power there, SA had been forced to occupy the Calueque dam site because of "the complete breakdown of law and order". The Portuguese Government was immediately informed, and was asked to take over the task of protecting the workers and the installations. However, this Government requested SA to continue protective measures until such time as it could assume responsibility. The SA Government, Mr. Vorster continued, had on a number of occasions stated that its forces were at the dam only for the protection of the workers, and would be withdrawn as soon as assurances had been received that no harm would come to them, and that the flow of water to Owambo would be safeguarded.

Mr. Vorster concluded, "We have, during the past few days, received, through a third party, assurances which, in general terms, appear to be acceptable to us. We are checking whether we are interpreting these assurances correctly, and if this is so, South Africa will withdraw its troops also from the Calueque area not later than 27 March".

The Foreign Office in London confirmed⁵ speculations that Britain had been the "third party" referred to by Mr. Vorster. Britain's role had been to secure, via diplomatic contact with the Soviet Ambassador, certain assurances about the safety of the Calueque Dam.

The MPLA issued a statement⁶ to the effect that the installations of the hydro-electric complex, "whose defence is the sole and entire responsibility of the authorities of the People's Republic of Angola, will continue to function normally for the benefit of the brother people of Namibia, with whose legitimate representatives we shall soon establish the necessary agreements." A revision of agreements signed by South Africa with the Portuguese for the use of the Cunene River would "obviously be a matter of examination" after SA withdrew from Angola and ended its rule over Namibia.

On 25 March the SA Minister of Defence told the House

² *Star*, 1 March.

³ *Star*, 19 March.

⁴ *Sunday Times*, 21 March; *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 March.

⁵ *Star*, 22 March; *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 March.

⁶ *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 March.

of Assembly⁷ that the necessary clarification of the assurances received via Britain had been obtained through the UN Secretary-General. Seen as a whole, the assurances by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola were that it would not damage the Ruacana and Calueque projects or endanger the workers, and that the international boundary between SWA and Angola would be respected.

In view of these assurances, the Minister stated, all SA troops would be withdrawn from Angola by 27 March.

The workers on these schemes were apprehensive, however; and requested permission to move, with their families, from Angola to South West Africa. As a temporary measure some 130 Portuguese men, mainly artisans or foremen, and a number of black Angolan workers, were housed with their families in pre-fabricated houses and tents in South West African territory. Work within Angola ceased for the time being.⁸

On 6 April, seven unarmed SA officials, including Mr. Jannie de Wet, Commissioner-General for the Indigenous Peoples, the general manager of the SWA Water and Electricity Commission, and senior police and army officers, crossed the border for discussions with MPLA representatives: a political commissar from Luanda and a military commander. The MPLA undertook to guarantee the security of the workers and equipment at the Cunene projects. Both sides agreed to respect the international border; and it was decided to establish two check points on the border where police from both countries could control the movement of the workers. After this, most of the Ruacana employees agreed to cross the border daily to work, leaving their families behind; but some of the Calueque employees were still afraid to do so.⁹ However, it was reported on 6 May¹⁰ that work was again proceeding normally. A few Portuguese workers who were unwilling to return had been replaced. As described later, work was once more halted from 10 September.

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, MARCH

A meeting of the Security Council had been arranged, to start on 23 March, to debate South Africa's "occupation and aggression" in Angola.

Mr. Vorster's statement that if the assurances he had received proved acceptable the SA forces would be withdrawn by 27 March, was reported to the UN Secretary-General by telephone by the SA Minister of Defence on 20 March. The full text of the message was then delivered to Dr. Waldheim.

The MPLA delegate cabled Dr. Waldheim stating that he

⁷ Hansard 9 cols. 3916-7.

⁸ Press reports of 26 to 30 March.

⁹ Press reports of 6 to 9 April.

¹⁰ *Rand Daily Mail* of that date.

could not arrive until 25 March, thus the Security Council meeting was postponed, its opening practically coinciding with the withdrawal of the last SA troops from Angola.¹

At the beginning of the debate the current president of the Council, Mr. Thomas Boya of Benin, and the current chairman of the African group, Mr. Charles Maina of Kenya, declared that the debate was to be a limited one, dealing only with South Africa's alleged aggression in Angola and with no other issues. It was reported that, after much lobbying and appeals for unity after months of division, the African group had agreed on a "unity" strategy.

An MPLA representative, Mr. Pascal Luvuala, denounced SA's aggression in his territory and accused the SA forces of the "barbaric killing" of many Angolans, the looting of banks, farms, factories, hotels, and homes. He claimed that SA had intervened "at the very moment in time when the puppet armies had been all but defeated, and the MPLA controlled most of the country", and stated that the MPLA had taken many SA prisoners. He demanded reparation from SA for war damages.

The Portuguese Ambassador informed the Security Council that the SA troops had penetrated Angola on 9 August 1975 with neither the knowledge nor the advance authorization of the Portuguese Government. The Cuban Ambassador accused China of acting in collusion with SA in an attempted take-over of Angola. He alleged that SA troops had engaged in unrestrained looting and had adopted a "scorched earth" policy as they withdrew.

The president of the UN Council for Namibia maintained that all contracts entered into by SA relating to the Cunene River schemes were null and void. Only the UN through its Council for Namibia had the right to negotiate contracts with Angola. The projects, he stated, had been part of SA's "policies of plunder" of Angolan resources, in connivance with the former Portuguese authorities.

Other African states, together with countries such as the Soviet Union and Poland, condemned SA's alleged aggression.

The Chinese Ambassador disregarded the ruling by the president of the Council. After a perfunctory reference to SA he denounced the resolution before the Council because, he said, it legitimised Soviet and Cuban intervention, and the "towering crimes" committed by these countries in Angola, including the slaughter of tens of thousands of black people there.

South Africa's Ambassador, Mr. "Pik" Botha, attacked as spurious, transparently contrived, and hypocritical all "trumped-up" charges that SA had committed aggression in Angola. He

¹ The account of the proceedings that follows was based on numerous Press reports between 27 March and 1 April.

accused the Soviet Union and its Cuban "alien army", which had been manipulated in the interests of Russia's "global ambition", of brutal aggression in the territory.

At no stage had SA become involved, nor had it desired to become involved, in the civil war as such, Mr. Botha stated. SA had played a very limited role, motivated by essentially protective and humanitarian considerations. Any involvement beyond that had been the direct result of the "naked aggression" of the Russians and Cubans, seeking to introduce into Angola a new and dangerous imperialism and neo-colonialism. "Even as we sit here . . . the question remains why the Russians and Cubans are still in Angola", he said.

The British Ambassador, Mr. Ivor Richard, said that Britain associated itself with those countries which had condemned SA's intervention. The presence of foreign troops anywhere in Southern Africa could only render it more difficult to achieve a solution in Angola, and would make the White minority regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia still more stubborn in their resistance to international opinion. Mr. Richard added, however, that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for determining questions of compensation. He suggested that this matter be taken to the International Court of Justice.

France's Ambassador said, *inter alia*, that the trend of South Africa was to consider itself as a sort of gendarme in the region. There was no excuse for this, as there was no excuse for others who had intervened.

The United States Ambassador made no reference to criticisms during the debate of his country's actions in sending money and military equipment to anti-MPLA movements in Angola. He stated that SA was to be censured for the role it had played. But he also condemned Soviet and Cuban intervention. The attempt of the Cuban representative to distort the tragic story of foreign intervention had been a self-serving misstatement of the facts. The US strongly supported the motivation inherent in the resolution, but would abstain from voting because of the failure of that resolution to refer to other continuing interventions. "Such a blatant disregard of facts, such a double standard, such an exercise in hypocrisy, cannot further in our judgment this Council's discharge of its own responsibilities", he said.

By a majority of nine votes to nil, with five abstentions, the Security Council adopted the African resolution branding SA as an aggressor and demanding reparation for alleged looting, pillage, and plunder. China did not participate in the voting. The countries that recorded abstentions were Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan.

SOUTH AFRICAN PRISONERS

After some months of doubt, the SA Minister of Defence announced in the Assembly on 18 June¹ that an assurance had been obtained that the seven South Africans who were captured in Angola were being regarded and treated as ordinary prisoners of war. There had been fears about their safety, aggravated by the fact that certain British and American mercenaries who were captured had been executed by the Angolan authorities.

A further South African was captured by the MPLA at the end of August when, by mistake, he drove his truck across the border from Caprivi into Angola.

GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES WITHIN ANGOLA

As mentioned earlier, after the surrender of all the major towns in Angola to the MPLA-Cuban forces, Dr. Savimbi and a considerable number of his Unita troops retired into the bush and began a guerrilla war against the MPLA. Their headquarters were in the south, where they had received the backing of the large Ovimbundu tribe.

It was reported in mid-February that two or three supply planes had been transporting arms and supplies to Unita from Kinshasa. About a month later, however, one of Unita's aircraft was destroyed on the ground by MPLA MiG fighter bombers, while another two were impounded in Zambia.¹ President Kaunda made it clear that he would no longer allow Unita to use Zambia as a base.

Nevertheless, Dr. Savimbi is reported² to have said that by early in March he had sufficient weapons for a year of fighting. Unita had 6 000 hard-core troops formed into a semi-conventional force, with 7 000 more men undergoing intensive training.

According to various reports,³ Unita troops attacked a number of Cuban convoys, killing many men and capturing others. They countered various attacks on their camps made by Cuban-led MPLA forces. From time to time other Unita units blew up sections of the Benguela railway line.

The FNLA, too, was reported⁴ to be conducting guerrilla operations against the MPLA, in the northern part of the country.

A report published in August⁵ stated that, by then, Unita controlled large parts of the rural areas, especially in the south. On 10 September work at Calueque was halted again at the request of the Angolan Government. This request preceded a major offensive launched shortly afterwards by MPLA troops with Cuban officers, and with support from Swapo, apparently

¹ Hansard 20 col. 1251.

² *Star*, 16 February, 19 and 22 March.

³ *Star*, 16 February and 11 March; *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 March.

⁴ *c.s. Star*, 12 March; *Sunday Times*, 18 July.

⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 June.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 19 August.

aimed at wiping out pockets of Unita guerrillas and their supporters and sympathisers. As mentioned earlier, many hundreds of refugees, mainly women and children, poured across the Angolan border into Owambo and Kavango. They told of the killing of hundreds of people, the burning of villages, the destruction of livestock, the shortage of food. It was stated that a large number of men had been captured and handed over to Swapo guerrillas, who shot more than a hundred of them.

CONTINUED PRESENCE OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA

It was reported in May and June¹ that, according to informants in Stockholm and to a Nato official, at their peak the Cubans had about 18 000 troops in Angola. By May, possibly 15 000 remained there. The Cuban Premier, Dr. Fidel Castro, had stated that their numbers would gradually be reduced; but several thousand would be left there for an indefinite period, to help to counter the growing guerrilla resistance and to help Dr. Neto to tackle serious economic difficulties.

A subsequent report² stated that Dr. Neto had visited Cuba and had been promised the assistance of trained people to fill gaps left by the Portuguese who left. Volunteer doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, and others would be sent to Angola, as well as experts in trade, labour organisation, propaganda, and other fields. The families of many of the Cubans who were remaining were being flown out to join them.

During a visit to Lusaka in September, Dr. Henry Kissinger said that an estimated 10 000 Cubans remained in Angola.

TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

It was reported on 9 October that Angola and the Soviet Union had concluded a 20-year friendship treaty.

¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 May; *Star*, 3 and 14 June.

² *Rand Daily Mail*, 6 August.

RHODESIA

THE BACKGROUND

As reported in previous issues of this *Survey*, the African nationalist movements Zapu¹ and the succeeding Zanu² were banned in Rhodesia in 1962 and 1964 respectively and their leaders, Mr. Joshua Nkomo of Zapu, and the Rev. Ndabini Sithole of Zanu, and others, were placed under detention. Some of the leading members escaped to Zambia, however, and from there and Tanzania organised guerrilla activities against Rhodesia. Dissidents from the two movements-in-exile formed a body called Frolizi, headed by Mr. James Chikerema. Meanwhile a new body, the African National Council, was established in Rhodesia itself under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

Following discussions and negotiations between South Africa and Zambia, a conference was held in Lusaka in December 1974, attended by the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana, and representatives of Zapu, Zanu, Frolizi, and the ANC. Following representations made by SA and the other negotiating governments, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole were released from detention in order that they might be present. Terms proposed by Mr. Ian Smith for a cessation of guerrilla activities and for the holding of a constitutional conference were discussed. No clear-cut decisions were published. It was agreed, however, that the four African nationalist movements would come together under the banner of the ANC with Bishop Muzorewa as interim leader.

Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole returned to Rhodesia as free men, but Mr. Sithole was re-detained in March 1975.³ A court of law, especially convened to consider the matter, ruled that the detention had been fully warranted. Nevertheless, on the next day, after representations had been made by Zambia and SA, Mr. Sithole was released to enable him to attend an OAU conference in Dar-es-Salaam. After this conference he remained outside Rhodesia, fearing re-detention if he returned.

As reported in last year's *Survey*, Mr. Vorster of SA and President Kaunda of Zambia were instrumental in arranging for preliminary talks to be held in August 1975 between representatives of Mr. Smith's government and of the ANC, the object being for each side to declare its genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable constitutional settlement. Detailed discussions would follow. The talks were held in a train made available by SA and positioned on the Victoria Falls bridge, on the border between Rhodesia and

¹ Zimbabwe African People's Union.

² Zimbabwe African National Union.

³ The circumstances are explained on page 315 of the 1975 *Survey*.