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July 1991
With the dynamic negotiations now moving quickly toward the convening of an All- or Multi-Party Conference (APC/MPC), what levels of public support do the major political parties enjoy? How extensive is public backing for the negotiations process, especially for the idea of an all-inclusive meeting of the country's major political players? Our poll reveals that political party preferences, which are particularly hard to tap among many South Africans, tend toward strong support for either of two poles of an emerging center - the National Party and the African National Congress. Support for negotiations as a means for change is widespread among all communities, as is backing for the convening of an APC/MPC.

Party preference and leadership support

When our respondents were asked "Which political party or group are you at present most inclined to support?" by far the most common response (38%) is a non-response: "don't know". Possible reasons for the lack of a stated preference, and a way we sought to get around it, will be looked at in a moment.

But first, those that did respond verify rather steady support for the NP in the white community at 56% (June = 56%). The steadiness of support is especially noteworthy given the June repeal of the final pillars of apartheid legislation. Black support for the ANC rebounded slightly, to 50% from a June low of 47%, and is especially high (74%) among young blacks (18-24 years) with a Std 10 education or more. The National Party garnered 4% of support from blacks, whereas the ANC
received virtually no support at all from whites. Among the white community, the CP’s support is steady at 21% (June = 22%), and the DP polled at only 6% of the respondents. Among the coloured and Asian communities, there continues to be a high level of support for the NP (45% and 32%, respectively), and rather low support for the ANC (3% and 11%, respectively), but these figures are problematic because more than half (52%) of Asians said they don’t know which party they support, as well as many (43%) coloureds.

Personal leadership preferences are a bit stronger, with only 28% of our respondents not knowing whom they support to lead South Africa. In the black community, Mandela is still the most preferred leader (47%) and his popularity is consistent across gender lines, but is especially strong among young black males (56%). In line with earlier findings, support for Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the black community remains at a low 1%. In the black community, de Klerk polled 13%, down from the 19% reported in June.

Among whites, de Klerk’s support remains firm with 47% of Afrikaans speakers backing him (although a slip from the June 52%), along with a strong majority (66%) of English-speakers (this means 55% for all whites combined). Nineteen percent of Afrikaans-speakers choose Dr Treurnicht, while only 3% of English-speakers choose him. Among other population groups, de Klerk’s support is also strong. A fairly strong majority (70%) of coloureds support de Klerk, along with a thin majority of Asians (51%). On the other hand, Mandela’s support in these communities is weak, with few Asians (8%) and very few (less than 1%) Coloureds indicating him as the person they would choose to lead South Africa.

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Figure 2 [N=2103]

Political parties: close or distant?

When nearly four in ten (38%) black respondents consistently do not state a political party preference (May = 38%, June = 40%), there can be two sets of possible reasons: first, they truly don’t know (i.e., they have no preference) or, second, they don’t want to say. The first set might include things like a lack of education, or genuine confusion about South Africa’s complex political situation, while the second
deals with a possible sense of fear or other reluctance to state a party preference now. We sought to tap these attitudes more deeply by asking our respondents whether or not they feel "very close", "close", "neutral", "distant" or "very distant" to various political parties named in the question.

![How close do you feel to the different political parties?](image)

What we found is significant: overall, we reduced the number of respondents who "don't know" whether they feel close or distant to a particular party to between 7% and 13% of the overall sample, and we also found that there is a core of true "don't knows" in the lesser educated and uninformed sectors of the black community. Further, these indicators illustrate the "positives" and "negatives" - the direction of sentiment - toward various political parties that the public harbours. Here's how the parties fare: (the PAC was inadvertently omitted from the questionnaire).

**National Party.**

Among whites, the NP has strong positives and low negatives, and among blacks, high negatives but with some positives. 71% of whites feel either "very close" or "close", whereas only 15% feel "distant" or "very distant". Among blacks, educated (Std 10+) respondents feel "distant" or "very distant" (41% in rural areas and 46% in urban areas), but an overall 31% of the black community feels "close" or "very close" to the NP. Among coloureds and Indians, many more feel "close" or "very close" than "distant" or "very distant", although in the Indian community some "distant" and "very distant" feelings (22% combined) exist.

**African National Congress.**

In the black community, the ANC has very strong positives and quite low negatives. Sixty six percent of the black respondents feel either "close" or "very close" to the ANC, whereas only 15% feel "distant" or "very distant". Yet among whites, it has very high negatives (84% replied "distant" or "very distant") with few positives (5% "close" or "very close"). In the Asian community, only 26% of
respondents said they felt "close" or "very close" to the ANC, and a slim majority (50%) feel "distant" or "very distant". These fairly strong negatives are found even more intensely among the coloured respondents, where very few (14%) feel "close" or "very close" and a strong majority (60%) feel "distant" or "very distant".

**Inkatha Freedom Party.**
Whites feel remarkably close to Inkatha, while blacks feel remarkably distant. 47% of whites polled feel either "close" or "very close" to Inkatha, whereas 79% of blacks feel "distant" or "very distant" (of blacks, some 61% feel "very distant"). Among Asians and coloureds, Inkatha's negatives are also high (62% and 50%, respectively, feeling "distant" or "very distant").

**Conservative Party.**
Among Afrikaans-speaking whites, the CP has a near majority (49%) who feel "close" or "very close" (with a sizable core in the latter category at 25%), but the party also carries high negatives among whites (46% overall), even among Afrikaans-speakers (30% "distant" or "very distant"). Among blacks - especially those educated to Std 10+ - there is no feeling of closeness toward the CP whatsoever, and this sentiment is also found in the Asian and coloured communities (although 14% of coloureds feel "close"). Negatives for the CP are highest among blacks with 71% of those with Std 10+ education feeling "very distant".

**South African Communist Party.**
The SACP has a complex mix of positives and negatives among different sectors of the sample. In the black community overall, 25% of the respondents feel "close" or "very close" to the SACP, but even more than that (44%) feel "distant" or "very distant". Among Asian, only 11% feel "close" or "very close" toward the SACP, and the negatives are quite high - a near majority (46%) feel "very distant" and another quarter (24%) feel "distant". Among whites, support of any kind simply doesn't exist, and by far the most whites (87%) feel "very distant" from the SACP. Strongest support for the SACP is among young and middle-aged (18-44) black males.

**Azanian Peoples Organization**
Although AZAPO is not a draw among whites, it is perceived as slightly less distant from whites than the SACP. Only 66% felt "very distant" as opposed to the 87% reported for the SACP above, although it registers virtually no (2%) positives. But in the black community, 26% of respondents feel "close" or "very close" to AZAPO (but mostly just "close"), and 41% feel "distant" or "very distant". AZAPO registers little support and some negatives among Asians and coloureds, but with a noteworthy number (24%) of coloured youth (18-24) feeling "close" or "very close".

**Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging**
The AWB registers high negatives among all social sectors of the survey, but particularly among young and middle-aged (18-44) blacks (84% feel "very distant"), although it is nearly as high among English-speaking whites where 73% feel "very distant". Positives are highest among Afrikaans-speakers (17% feeling "close" or "very close"), but even among this group negatives are overall high (52% feel "very distant").
Means of change

A strong core of respondents (and this extends over all population groups) favour negotiations to bring about change in South Africa over other possible means, such as the armed struggle, mass action, boycotts and stayaways, and the present Tricameral parliament. Overall, 93% of the sample say that negotiations are a "very good" (70%) or "good" (23%) way to bring about change in South Africa. Support is uniformly very high, well above 90% in every community found to be statistically significant.

But for other means of change, the picture is not so clear. The armed struggle has some firm support among a minority of the black respondents (23% say it is a "very good" or "good" way to bring change), but a large majority (71%) say it is "not at all" a good way. Well over 80% of all other population groups say the armed struggle is "not at all" a good way of bringing about change.

Still other strategies, such as mass action, conform to a slightly different pattern. Fifty three percent of blacks polled support mass action as a "very good" or "good" way to bring about change, but 41% say it is "not at all" a good way. Mass action is generally opposed in the white community, although a notable minority (11%) of Afrikaans-speaking males say it is "a good way" to bring about change. Some respondents from the coloured and Asian communities indicate moderate support (a third of 18-44 year old Asians, for example) for mass action, but generally a high number (62% or more) in these communities think it is "not at all" a good way. When more personal sacrifice is implied - in boycotts and stayaways - support for mass action is not as forthcoming. 79% of respondents overall, including 58% of blacks, think that boycotts and stayaways are "not at all" a good way of bringing about change.

<table>
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<td>Very good way</td>
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The present parliament is seen by a majority (75%) of whites and Asians (these communities are not statistically discernible) as a "very good" or "good" way to bring about change, as well as 85% of coloureds polled. In the black community,
support is weaker, with 60% responding that it is a "very good" or "good" means of change.

**All- or multi-party conference**

With the convening of an All- or Multi-Party Conference (APC/MPC) on the political horizon, we sought to test awareness of "discussion recently about a conference of all political parties, called an All- or Multi-party conference, to meet and solve the country's problems, including discussing a new constitution" and among those aware of it, the level of support for the idea.

Roughly half (53% overall) of our respondents are aware of the discussion on an APC/MPC conference, and the pattern that emerges is clear; those who are well informed (level of education and regularity of reading newspaper are significant variables) know about the conference, whereas those generally uninformed do not. For example, 77% of those with Std. 10+ education are aware of the discussion. Awareness seems to be a function of information.

Of those that do know about the discussion (N = 1170), the vast majority (89%) support the idea, with race not being a statistically discernible variable at all. Support is especially high among English-speakers: 57% say it is a "very good idea", and a full third (33%) think it is a "good idea". Very little opposition to the conference exists, with only 6% of Afrikaans-speaking respondents thinking it is "not at all" a good idea. No other group registered more than 5% who think the conference is "not at all" a good idea. When asked whether other organizations that are not political parties should attend, those that are aware of the conference generally support (73% overall) such attendance. Education turns out to be a significant factor here: a strong majority (77%) from all population groups of those with a Std. 10+ level of education think other parties should attend such a conference. Such results would indicate an urgent desire among the public for the convening of a widely inclusive conference, ostensibly aimed at gaining broad consensus on a new constitution.
Who's the Boss?

While the current rhetoric in South Africa tends to emphasise that a new age is dawning which will be characterised by a non-racial society, there is ample reason to doubt that this ideal will be attained in the very near future. We have classified people in terms of ethnic characteristics (and speciously defended these classifications in the defence of cultural heritages) for too long to expect changes to happen overnight. While it may be reasonable, and even the most moral position, to look forward to the time when such distinctions will no longer feature in the thinking of the people of the country, it would be an act of intolerable naivete to assume that, with the scrapping of a number of laws from the statute book, we will find ourselves miraculously transported to a society which is non-racial in all respects.

In addition to this long heritage of thinking in terms of groups, the media has given considerable prominence to the current strife between the ANC and Inkatha and this is generally perceived as a clash between Zulus and Xhosas.

Various studies conducted in the past suggest that, while people in general in this country will express political opinions about the various groups that comprise the population of the country, these opinions are not always based upon an adequate understanding of the demographic realities of South Africa. In many cases, these views may be based upon no more than unfounded assumptions and myths. The origins of these myths are, of course, rather difficult to establish in the absence of detailed qualitative investigations. It is, nevertheless, possible to assess the accuracy of perceptions, given the demographic facts. In view of this, it was decided to ask the respondents three questions about their perceptions and opinions regarding Zulus and Xhosas.

The realities of the situation are that a census conducted in 1985 showed that there were 5,337 million Zulus and 2,080 million Xhosas within the geographical area defined by the four provinces and the six self-governing states in South Africa. Unfortunately, no census was conducted in the TBVC countries. While accurate figures for the whole country are unobtainable, the closest approximation is probably to be found in the percentages of blacks who reported that they spoke either Zulu or Xhosa as their home language when the data for the 1980 census were collected. Of those who spoke an African language, 29% claimed that Zulu was their home language, while 25% maintained that they spoke Xhosa. There is little reason to believe that the differential birth rates between these two groups would have changed so drastically as to influence these percentages unduly.

Whatever the reality of the figures in the country may be, there are theoretical points of view which lead one to believe that people's perception about which of the two groups is more influential or politically powerful affect views of the size of the two groups. The problem is, however, that the actual demographics and perceptions of power are likely to influence one another in ways which cannot be unravelled without the aid of highly complex and carefully designed studies. And these perceptions are also influenced by the often unexpressed, and even unconscious, wishes of the inhabitants of the country.
Relative perceived size of groups

When asked which of the two groups they thought the larger, 55% of the total sample of 2 105 usable responses indicated the Zulus, 23% the Xhosas, while 19% did not know, and 3% thought the two groups were about equal in numbers.

![Perceptions about group sizes of Zulus and Xhosas](image)

Figure 6 [N=2105]

The clearest distinguishing variable in the sample in terms of the degree of accuracy of their knowledge was the racial group of which they were a member. Whites and Asians gave the most accurate response with 74% of the 774 respondents indicating that Zulus constitute the larger group, 13% denoting that Xhosas were the larger, 13% claiming that they were about equal in numbers, and 1% believing that the two groups were equal.

The next most accurate subgroup consisted of 200 male coloured respondents. In this case, 55% regarded the Zulus as the larger group, while 34% regarded the Xhosas as the larger group, and 12% said that they did not know.

Rather surprising - a surprise probably indicative of the perspectives of whites in this country - is the lack of accuracy encountered amongst black respondents. This is particularly the case when it is borne in mind that the black subgroup, as in the case of the other groups, were people who had access to telephones. While having telephone does not necessarily justify classifying respondents as middle class, it could be assumed that they would have adopted many of the norms and values generally associated with a western style of living. Of the black respondents, the best informed were those who were between 18 and 24 years old and who had 12 years or more of formal education. In this subgroup 51% believed that Zulus constituted the larger group, 21% maintained that Xhosas were the larger, while 19% did not know, and 10% claimed that the groups were of approximately the same size.
In the 25 to 49 year age group, those respondents living in metropolitan areas were more inclined to identify the Zulus as the larger group (51%) than were people who reside in non-metropolitan areas (40%). Older respondents who fell in the 50 years or older group were clearly divided between those who regularly read newspapers and those who do not. In the case of the former group 41% correctly indicated that the Zulus were more numerous than the Xhosas, while only 22% of the latter group provided the same answer.

As far as coloureds are concerned, men generally had a better idea of the actual situation, with 55% providing the correct answer. Somewhat surprisingly, younger women were less accurate than older ones in this group. Of those between 18 and 34 years of age, 39% provided an accurate answer, whereas 45% of those who are older than 35 years were able to do so. The reasons for this response pattern are not clear from the available data.

Peace between Xhosas and Zulus

In order to probe the question of people's perceptions about Xhosas and Zulus further, the respondents were asked whether they thought that these two groups would settle their differences and live in peace in a new South Africa. In all, there were 2 104 responses to this question which could be used.

Of the total sample, only 43% maintained that these two groups would be able to resolve their differences and settle down to a peaceful existence, while nearly the same number (39%) did not think that this would be achieved, and 18% did not have any opinion on the matter. These results are depicted in the figure below.

![Possibilities of peace between Xhosas and Zulus](image_url)

Figure 7 [N=2104]
'Other' responses negligible
The respondents who displayed the greatest optimism about the possibility of the two groups being able to lay aside their differences, not surprisingly, comprised black people who spoke either one of the official languages or a Nguni language at home, and who had a formal education ranging between standard 6 and matriculation (69%). A very similar view was held by people who differed only as far as their level of education was concerned. Those with an educational level below standard 6, as well as those who had post-matriculation qualifications, shared this level of optimism to a considerable extent, with 64% believing that the problems would be resolved. Men who speak a Sotho language or one of the other African languages used in this country, while not as optimistic as the preceding two groups, were nevertheless reasonably optimistic. Of those in this subgroup who do not read a daily newspaper, 61% contended that the differences would be solved, while reading a daily newspaper resulted in a slightly bleaker outlook, with 54% claiming that peace would be realised between the two groups.

Looking at the more pessimistic spectrum, in other words those who do not believe that the two groups would be able to lay aside their differences and live in peace, one finds that, in general, white respondents are the least optimistic. As many as 74% of white men who either never watch television or watch for four hours or less per week express a negative view. This group is closely followed by white women with similar television-watching habits (66%), and the remaining group of whites.

It is interesting to note that the two groups who tend to express the greatest levels of uncertainty about the issue are Asians and coloureds who earn between R400 and R699 per month. Within this group, women are a good deal more uncertain about the peaceful coexistence between Zulus and Xhosas (41%) than are the men (29%). Asians and coloureds who earn less than R400 per month are also somewhat unsure of the situation, with 24% claiming that they do not know what the likely outcome will be.

The overall impression conveyed by the data is that black people, and especially those who are members of the two groups in question, are most likely to be optimistic about the laying aside of differences and being able to live in harmony. Whites, on the other hand, are more inclined to adopt a view which implies that such a resolution will not come about. It is rather tempting to speculate that black people have the most to gain from such a settling of differences, whereas whites have the most to gain if the status quo were to be maintained. After all, endless strife between Zulus and Xhosas is bound to present serious obstacles to the involvement of these two groups in the developing political process in the country. With these groups out of play, it ought to be relatively easy to maintain the balance of power. There is obviously no way in which such an opinion can be corroborated with the available data.

On the other hand, it appears less than likely that whites in general would be prepared to embrace such a cynical political stance when so much potential loss of life is at stake. More simply, the reason underlying the opinion expressed may be no more than a reflection of a serious level of despondency associated with the resistance to strike which has not abated for a considerable time.

**Views on ultimate supremacy between Xhosas and Zulus**

No situation of discord, and especially of violent struggle, continues indefinitely. Given the current rivalry between Xhosas and Zulus, it was assumed that one or the
other side would eventually triumph over the other, and it was, therefore, decided to ask the respondents in this survey which group they believed would eventually attain the upper hand.

Of the 2 091 usable responses, 23% thought that the Zulus would eventually rule over the Xhosas, 18% believed that the Xhosas would dominate the Zulus, 17% claimed that some other group would triumph, but nearly half the sample (41%) said that they did not know.

![Figure 8: Perceptions of relationship between Xhosa's/Zulu's in new SA](image)

The group of respondents who were most inclined to believe that the Zulus would eventually prevail over the Xhosas were white women, with as many as 41% endorsing this view. Other subgroups with a similar opinion were white Afrikaans-speaking men (40%), Asians who were either not economically active or who occupied jobs which were not managerial or professional (36%), white men who spoke either English or some other language (32%), and Asians in professional or managerial jobs (26%).

On the other hand, the subgroups which were identified as most inclined to believe that the Xhosas would eventually rule over the Zulus were black respondents with up to 11 years of education and who were either between the ages of 18 and 24 years (38%) or between 25 and 49 years of age (28%). Subgroups with similar opinions were coloureds with an educational level of eight or more years (21%), blacks with 12 or more years of education (21%), and Asians in professional and managerial jobs (21%).
There were also fairly substantial percentages of respondents who believed that neither the Zulus or the Xhosas would ultimately triumph. Those who tended to hold this view most strongly were black respondents with 12 years or more of education (30%). This view was largely shared by white men who were either Afrikaans-speaking (28%), or who spoke English or another language (28%), and Asians in professional or managerial occupations (25%).

Given the complexity of the current South African political situation, the extent to which various groups are vying for political supremacy, and the many imponderables that attach to the situation at this stage, it may well be that the most sensible, and quite conceivably the only tenable, opinion is that one simply does not know what the eventual outcome will be. As indicated earlier, the largest single response for the sample as a whole was, indeed, a "do-not-know" response (41%).

Those who endorsed this alternative most often were blacks with 11 years or less of education who were 50 years of age or older (61%). There may well have been an element of avoidance in this response as these people are also likely to be the most vulnerable to violence and intimidation. With an unknown person asking the questions, there could have been suspicion or a fear that the interviewer may have been a representative of some faction or other. But this can not be verified by the data.

The second group for which a "do-not-know" response of nearly the same magnitude was recorded, was coloured respondents with less than eight years of education (60%). The reasons for this high level of evasiveness could be similar to those discussed in relation to the black group. Asians in occupations other than managerial and professional were also relatively unsure about the eventual outcome of this struggle for supremacy (44%), as were better educated coloureds (42%), and black respondents with less than 12 years of education who fell in the 25 to 49 year age group (40%).

It is interesting to note that the group which expressed the least uncertainty were white Afrikaans-speaking men, and even then, the level of uncertainty amounted to 20% of the respondents.

The overall impression created by the responses to the three questions is that there is a lack of information about simple demographics, although the responses may have been influenced by common myths, misinterpretations of reports in the media, and a degree of wishful thinking. At least some of these factors probably influenced respondents' reactions to the other two questions, and the reactions also appear to have been influenced by the volatile political scene and the apparent capriciousness of the rhetoric of some political figures in the country.
7 Jun.
Employment in South Africa has not been as scarce since the depression of the thirties, says Mr Gerrie Steenkamp, president of the AHI.

Total gold and foreign reserves increased by 2.8% during May 1991.

10 Jun.
The 9.1% fewer vehicles sold during May compared to May 1990 confirms the recession in the motor vehicle industry.

14 Jun.
The value of individuals' debt sentences increased by 32% to a record level during the first quarter of 1991.

The ANC distances itself from a centrally controlled economy.

15 Jun.
Mr Khetso Gordhan, ANC spokesman on economics, says that the organisation is considering the iron, steel and building materials industries for possible state control, and has completed an investigation into the nationalisation of the pharmaceutical industry.

19 Jun.
Mr Peter Wrighton, chairman of Premier Group, says that the challenge on the road to democracy for South Africa is economic rather than political.

The ANC's Mr Saki Macozoma attributes the decrease in township violence to the ability of the Government to turn violence on and off "like a tap".

20 Jun.
The American Congress decides that ten million dollars promised the ANC will not be paid.

24 Jun.
It is reported that state expenditure during the first two months of the present financial year was 27.1% higher than during the corresponding period of 1990.

The inflation rate for May 1991 increased by 0.6% to 15.2%.

The Reserve Bank says that the lower turning point of the recession is not in sight.

26 Jun.
A total of 4 593 people are taken into custody in Operation Blitz, a national crime prevention operation.

27 Jun.
Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, Minister of Education and Training, says that schools closed as a result of under-utilisation will be made available to all races.

Mr R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announces that South Africa is willing to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

28 Jun.
Dr Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, gives recognition to the State President for what he has done to end apartheid.

29 Jun.
The 375 000 workdays lost since the beginning of the year as a consequence of strike-action compares favourably to the 1.2 million for the corresponding period of 1990.

The European Community decides to resume sports links with South Africa.

30 Jun.
The Interim National Olympic Committee of South Africa (INOCSA) decides to keep intact the sports moratorium.

2 Jul.
The Bureau for Economic Research at the University of Stellenbosch says that business confidence and activities in the manufacturing industry declined at a greater pace during the second quarter of 1991, indicating a deepening of the recession.

The 46th conference of the ANC starts in Durban.

Mr Nelson Mandela, says that
- the organisation should start to make the transformation to a political party;
- everything possible should be done to keep sanctions against South Africa in place until agreement has been reached on a democratic constitution.

3 Jul.
The group calling itself Businessmen for Growth and Stability confronts Mr Joe Slovo on the true role of the South African Communist Party.

Five members of ANC official Mr Ernest Soto's family are murdered while he attends the ANC Conference in Durban.

5 Jul.
More than a quarter of the businesses in Pretoria have recorded losses due to non-payment of accounts that are greater for the first half of 1991 than for the whole of 1990.
UPDATE TRENDS

Leadership profile

![Chart showing White and Black support for Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk](image)

**Figure 9**

Political affiliation

![Chart showing Political affiliation of Whites and Blacks](image)

**Figure 10**
UPDATE TRENDS

FW de Klerk

Support for F W de Klerk
[February to July 1991]

Figure 11

Nelson Mandela

Support for Nelson Mandela
[February - July 1991]

Figure 12
On a South African Bill of Rights

Special protection for minority groups

In the drafting of a Bill of Rights and a new constitution for South Africa the question of minority rights is bound to arise. It is also a much debated right in international forums.

In situations where individual rights are entrenched but where minority ethnic, language and racial groups have found themselves at a disadvantage compared to the majority who are in power and who control government, the protection of minorities is a matter of concern. In South Africa the circumstances are quite different. Here the minority is in power and there is no culture of individual rights.

Against this background, the question was put to our sample: Do you think minority groups need special protection in a South African Bill of rights? A substantial majority of respondents (69%) indicated that they believe that the rights of minority groups, be they racial, religious or cultural minorities, should in fact be protected in any future South African Bill of Rights. Although there were some differences within the various subgroups, the overall picture was one of widespread support for such a point of view.

White and Asian respondents in general strongly supported the protection of minority rights: 73% of males under the age of 35 years, 85% of males above the age of 35 and 75% of the women.

![Bar Chart: Do minority groups need protection in a SA Bill of Human Rights?
Black respondents]

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<th>Yes %</th>
<th>No %</th>
<th>Don't Know/Uncertain %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std.5 (Rural)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Std.5 (Urban)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std.6-9 (Men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Std.6-9 (Women)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Std.10+ (Sotho)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std.10+ (Nguni)</td>
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Figure 13 [N=891]