This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
16 Aug 1989: Xundu, MO
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POM. Father, when we met you in 1985, it was on the eve of the first emergency and you were pretty pessimistic about the future. One gets the feeling from you today, on the eve of a national election, that you are far more hopeful. What has happened in that period of time to give you relatively more hope about the future?
MX. The reason for that is at that time the members of the Nationalist Party especially were using the total onslaught strategy to mobilise whites on their side. And also we're seeing the ANC and the other groups just being manipulated by the Russians. What has changed since that time is the fact that the Resolution 45 caused a different outlook because the government realised that their military prowess is not what it was because when it was unleashed it did prove formidable too. And therefore, what they thought they would do was to bulldoze the neighbouring states. Second point is that with the implementation of the Resolution 45 the government here had to speak face to face with Cuba, with Russia, and with Angola, and that gives us the impression that they are taking it seriously, that you don't negotiate among friends, you negotiate with enemies and therefore there is now a relative hope because of the co-operation they have received from Cuba and Russia about the partial withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola.
POM. A number of people have said to us that one of the reasons for the defeat of the South African Defence Force in Angola was the fact that the Cubans had superior aircraft and one of the effects of the sanctions has been the inability of the South African government to purchase more modern aircraft or replacement parts. Do you think that is accurate?
MX. Yes, I would think that is true, yes.
POM. And at lunch we were talking about this dilemma that Patricia and I have in understanding the nature of the armed struggle in South Africa and we were making comparisons with the IRA in Northern Ireland which has safe sanctuaries within it's own communities where a very small number of operatives can bomb military or economic targets regularly, or the comparison with SWAPO or even the comparison with the West Bank in Israel where there is an uprising that they have sustained for the last 18 months. Why can't the ANC's military wing conduct and maintain an effective - by effective I don't mean successful, but effective in terms of a continuous onslaught; not onslaught, they are able to bomb, sustain a campaign on a regular basis?
MX. First of all I think that there has been a very long campaign by the churches away from violence. From the time after the wars between blacks and whites the churches have tried to, as far as possible to stabilise blacks by talking an anti-violent kind of language completely. So much so that I think even for the last two wars, major wars, it was difficult for black people because they were saying appreciate the fight because this has been what has been done all along. But the option to take to arms was not an option before. The ANC believed in negotiation, believed in politics and persuasion until it got to the point where it got to be outlawed in 1962. When that happened, of course, a lot of propaganda was being put on that the ANC is now under the influence of the Communist Party and these two together created a climate in which people did not easily want to identify with violence. Then in 1958 also, the PAC had come out in 1958 and they were both banned, and when they were banned they had not made adequate preparations for an armed struggle as such. They had never done so, they had never prepared themselves to take up to arms they had always thought that a moment of reasonableness would prevail. Because I think that they assumed the countries of the west would probably take the position of the Africans seriously or the United Nations would see this, take this seriously and for that reason therefore violence, a violent option has never been necessarily the people's option. And you have to therefore build a very strong programme to make people accept violence as such because that has been whipped away from by the Nationalists. Also I think it must be said that the older generation had been taught that way and therefore the greater number of people in the ANC were the old folks, and the young folks because ANC were not part of it ... we need a great upsurgence of people now committed to go into exile then they became part of the army. But at that time the government was working on this homeless problem, offering a political solution. It would say, You can have your own homelands, you can manage them, you can run them. And there was a lot of confusion because all of the political people were under restriction.
POM. All the political people?
MX. The political opposition of the people were under restriction. The government had a free rein of mobilising the people within this media to try and sell the new dispensation that you will have homelands which you can run yourselves, the Transkei will ultimately benefit you, and again this sabotaged the people because the people thought, This could be right, what about trying it? And at that time that this was happening the black people were saying, What's wrong with us governing ourselves for a change? And all this therefore affected this ... against the physical presence of the armed struggle among the people because the people were not convinced that this was the solution. Not everybody was convinced that this was the solution.
POM. Then when the government says to the ANC today that it must give up the armed struggle, isn't the armed struggle in a sense only symbolic rather than real?
MX. It is symbolic to an extent because, you see, the ANC itself does see that they cannot engage in a conventional war in South Africa. They can only engage in guerrilla warfare with some limitations because of the extreme dependence of the frontline states of South Africa on the South African economy. The ANC knows of the limitations, but the ANC cannot play down that limitation because if it played it down then there would be problems about the youth. The youth want to engage in a military struggle whether they understand or don't understand the consequences is irrelevant. But they say that the only way you can make this government understand is to be military.
POM. So did you think if the ANC were to quickly say we are abandoning the armed struggle only for negotiations that there would be a backlash against it among the young people in the townships?
MX. You see the ANC understands its membership to be here and overseas and therefore this is part of their constituency and they must take their constituency seriously because the people in exile are just (a minority). The masses of the people who claim to belong to the ANC are inside. And they have got also to take into consideration their aspirations and what they are saying. Two, there has not been a flow of contact very much before 1985. Communication has been very minimal. It has either been by means of directive but after 1985 there have been a number of people both white and black to engage in meetings with ANC and some people even to go to the reigning government and become government officers which has created an experience for whites which is easy to see the ANC. But the point I am afraid of is if the ANC's existence is both inside and outside, therefore they cannot create policies which are in contradiction of the aspirations of the people inside because the aspirations of the people inside are that in their experience it has not helped very much. There is no negotiating with this government, it has not attempted to negotiate seriously with the people. And therefore the armed struggle cannot be abandoned in spite of the difficulties.
POM. Even if it is largely symbolic? The fact that it happens periodically is sufficient to assuage people on the ground here particularly young people. Would that be correct?
MX. That's right. And when my age group goes, I think what the last group of people who have been brought up in missionary schools and so forth, when this next group comes in, my son and others, they will host guerrillas to the same extent that they are hosted elsewhere. My age group is a group of people who were brought up in missionary schools and so forth, who are in nature to that kind of culture of the non-violent, passive struggle, that is how we were brought up. But the other group is the group that has sacrificed a lot of men. They have sacrificed and they are angry with the system. They say they would rather die now then die in the future because if our project goes on we will die in any case.
POM. I think you answered it, I was going to ask you how their frustration manifests itself. Your age group is the same age group you are talking about, who were, in 1976, ten to sixteen years or older and to the young people now who are there, who are ten, thirteen, fourteen, sixteen years or older, then there must be a lot of anger and is it repressed, is it being suppressed? How do these young people accept this notion of negotiation instead of going on inside the country, outside the country and it seems to me difficult to reconcile that they would be satisfied in any way except with more violence.
MX. In fact the government contradicts itself because they have said that because the ANC knows that they cannot militarily overcome us they are trying to promote civil disobedience. What has therefore caused the churches also to direct non-violent action and it has moved the churches to take up themselves for these marches and I think we are going to be engaged in that in the next few years. The people in the pew are being prepared. If you say you don't want violence, say it is against your Christian ethics to go into violence and house guerrillas, now the option is direct non-violent confrontational system. And the Catholics and the churches which belong to the SACC, they are with the participating churches, are already putting possible plans which I will do and aid, we will take this option.
POM. But to go back to the young people; who controls the townships? Where does power lie? Does it lie with the comrades or the comrades now a group whose power is largely diminished? Does it lie with the UDF?
MX. Comrades are part of UDF. You see, you cannot talk about comrades as if they are different entities. You have got the youth wings of UDF, you have got the women's wings, you have got the civics, you have got different professions like the doctors, the lawyers forming themselves into groups. You have got the trade union movement, progressive trade union movement. I want to talk about the kind of movement you are including the trade union movement. Therefore, one would say that when you talk about power, you say where does the level of taking the sacrifices against apartheid lie? The youth have definitely made bigger sacrifices in terms of exposing their lives, in terms of going to jail, in terms of taking their lives right in the power of their hands. And less cautious than the others, if you are talking about that area, that is so. If you are talking about maximum participation in shared leadership there is the degree to which you have that, but if you don't have a card-carrying membership you cannot pretend that you can have a disciplined ... around the issues of the day, and therefore I would say that to a certain extent the youth sometimes take a more hard stance than the civics. But as far as all are concerned that does not mean that they have the power in their hands because the power is normally entrusted among those people who have been duly and democratically elected. And there has never been ... when they are flouted about things that they hold dear.
POM. We hear a lot about black on black violence particularly with regards to the UDF and Inkatha and here we have been hearing about it in terms of the UDF and AAZAPO. Could you tell us the source of the conflict in each situation and why it is a continuing problem?
MX. I think that when people use the term 'black on black violence' they are in fact underestimating the people's structure. In Ireland you can't say that it's an Irish on Irish violence, there are ideological hooks, other religions or otherwise who cut across whether you are black or white whether you are Irish or not Irish. And therefore it makes as if our struggle, our particular struggle - if you were in Belgium at the time Hitler was taking Belgium and you began to be the collaborator the Belgians would kill you, there will be a fight among all those who want to collaborate and those who want to resist. So there are Belgians and Belgians although the tragedy is so colossal about them being whipped out by the German forces, but the fact of the choice now becomes ideological, it takes that kind of flare. And so that I do not want necessarily to agree. Our struggle has been one in which Inkatha was seen as a collaborationist movement operating within the system and wanting therefore to canvass for recognition and justification. UDF was saying we're unable to operate with other nations who are operating within the system because you are operating within the system therefore because you cannot call the ... you are paid by the system, you have got to collaborate with the system and therefore would not believe you would be honest in operating with us. And that is the conflict now in recruiting people ... who did not have a problem of voting after ... The problem arose when we refused to be incorporated into KwaZulu without consultation and in the previous six months the KwaZulu government had opposed the incorporation of ... into Swaziland without their consultation, and because of that Inkatha people began to now resign from the government. They were never made to resign before they were members of the civic in their own right as persons and who had allowed it to happen but when that happened they realised that these people were going to be exposed to a different style of leadership and he came in and tried to malign our efforts as if we are fighting the Zulu people. I never understood that except the struggle has always been that the people are South African people and the question of emphasising their Zuluness their has never been the ...
POM. So Inkatha were propagating a form of Zulu nationalism that people who did not identify with that were enemies of that state. There were Zulus who said we are part of something larger?
MX. The people in ... are Zulus that is why he is not able to obliterate them out of the conflict in Pietermaritzburg because those people are also Zulus themselves. And what compounded the issue is that when there are attacks on communities people defy the police marching along with the ... and therefore this again creates concern.
POM. This would be the Zulu police?
MX. Not necessarily, even the South African police. And that created the problem of that the police were acting, taking a position against Inkatha and they would not even investigate cases where Inkatha was involved.
. They would not insist on them investigating and therefore Inkatha was seen for that reason as collaborating. Here in PE and in Johannesburg the question of AAZAPO and UDF, in PE in particular AZAPO was misused by one Reverend Maqina, he pretended to be going along with them and was with their leader and people had been saying here that he is co-operating with the system with the South African government and with the South African police. Towards the end of 1985 AZAPO identified that Maqina was in fact not using his position in order to enhance his position with the police, they dropped it. And again you can see that it was a group resisting to be overcome by the system and those who were acting as collaborators with that system and the conflict.
POM. So can the AZAPO people be seen as those who were co-operating with the system? It seems like a contradiction in terms.
MX. That was the confrontation because Reverend Maqina was on their side and they did not realise that he was with the system. And then they discredited themselves among the people. And so I want to therefore submit that to my understanding of the so-called black on black, it is not so much immature, just trying to work themselves out. The fact that they are black would not mean that we share one ideology straight against apartheid and, further, the system each time has seen it proper to buy certain people to its side, like the homeland states and so forth.
POM. How wide-scale is the presence of informants in townships?
MX. That is the only way the system can exist, I think, is to pay certain people. We're not sure as to the extent of using information, you see, because the system might be paying informants to listen to meetings, they might be getting certain categories of government servants to give information and pay for that. And therefore I think that the system is paying a lot for informants and they have a fairly large group of people who inform.
POM. Do they get a large group because people are so desperately poor, that they would take money even if it means betraying their own people?
MX. I think that the poverty and unemployment play a big role in why people inform. Unless people of my category inform it is either because they have been blackmailed for some reason.
POM. If you had to look at the black community what do you think have been the most significant developments and that's within the last four or five years?
MX. The first one is the development of the trade union movement to the extent to which it has developed both in the mining industry and in the other industries. And the fight that COSATU took a stance that played close to the Freedom Charter and therefore created a groundswell of people who are affiliated to the Freedom Charter and therefore relating closely to the ANC ideals. That contribution has been a very big contribution. Second contribution is that the coming to birth of UDF correlating around it a number of people beyond those who are charterists mobilised the people against apartheid and gave the people the opportunity to reflect and analyse what it was worth, this situation in which the people found themselves. That also created a situation in which the whites began to – OK, a state of emergency in which a number of whites were caused to go into the townships and begin to ... people and cordon off townships. That created a question mark among whites as to whether the army was being used correctly. And the conscription committee took an upsurge and therefore created doubt among whites about conscription per se.
POM. Doubts in terms of that it would be unwise to recruit blacks?
MX. No. They began to say what war are we fighting? Are these our own people? Again the unprovoked attacks to the frontline states created a degree to which whites were doubting and also the reduction of the democracy to the white man in the street. The white man in the street got more and more democracy reduced from himself. Parliament began making a fuss because when they asked from their ordinary MP what was taking place, why do you have soldiers there, you don't know? You'd say I don't know, whereas before whites used to enjoy a true democracy and the MP would know, even give answers to all of their questions but these were questions where they had to say, I can't answer that. And the fact that a lot of money was being misused in the homelands, and many whites began to ask themselves and they wanted to shift away because they knew that that was taking the taxpayers money which was being misused in corruption in the homelands, because the corruption in the homelands became more unsophisticated and blatant than the one which was being practiced by the ... groups. And therefore all these factors together created a mood of questioning the system for what it was worth. And also the fact that (dissent) existed in the white universities and university people began to make inroads and address meetings among intellectuals again caused a number of whites to change. Hence the ... and the ... parliaments; that was unlike a confrontation because they caused a number of whites to doubt that this edifice of parliament is in fact promoting democracy. ... that can go out and create a people who doubt parliament as such and with their initiative ... who was promoting whites to go and see for themselves who the ANC was. That again created an area of doubt.
POM. This is a related question which you answered in part; what are your perceptions of the changes that have taken place in white attitudes in the last four or five years and have they moved from a position of where four or five years ago they would have been saying no change under any circumstances we're going to hold onto all the power we have, to one today in which they know they have to give up power, but they are slow to actually get down to the process ?
MX. After the election on 6 May 1986 the whites gave unprecedented power to PW Botha. He was saying, What can I do with security and what can I do with safety? And even the English speaking voted for the government. And after that May 1986 election some whites began to realise that the economy is going down, their reception from outside South Africa is getting cooler and their friends are beginning to drop them. Then they began to make a reassessment and whites began to say, "Why can't we negotiate?
POM. We talked about the changes in the attitude, what changes in the attitude of the white community have taken place and whether they have psychologically moved from a position of saying never under no circumstances to one in which they know change is inevitable, but they are slow to get down to the process of actually bargaining away their power?
MX. What frightens whites more that anything, those that I have spoken to, they say that they don't mind having a new government but they have a guilt complex. Secondly, they think what they did to the Africans will be done on them. Thirdly, they feel that there will be a downgrading of their positions. And indeed even in conversation we are not able to guarantee that there will not be any downgrading. They want us to guarantee that. We can't guarantee that because there is a reservoir of unemployed black people and at the moment some South Africans are living so well, beyond the money they need for themselves and their family to pay school fees and so forth that that they'll protect so heavily in order to collect the money to be resourceful to others. But I suspect that there would have to be a concerted effort which starts out both from the churches and the political groups. Teachers have got to bring about what would be a morally just wage, and start it off living very much by the Bible standards.
POM. But do you think that whites subconsciously know that black rule is someday inevitable, but that they are resisting, denying it by ignoring it?
MX. I think so, I would say that the majority of whites in South Africa accept that.
POM. And would you say that has been a change that has happened in the last four or five years or else has it been a process that has spilt over?
MX. I think it has been a process. From the time of Ian Smith, I think when he was painted as a ... when they saw Mugabe's reasonableness as a person, and those which have seen the difference and do recognise the difference. And I think there has been a change and the chances of taking a certain position again, and almost all the churches are saying, we cannot survive with apartheid and apartheid is a sin. We cannot forgive this sin.
POM. Are you saying that the churches officially don't give very much support to the South African Council of Churches?
MX. They don't, but morally speaking they have supported them, but physically they have not. Churches in South Africa have not given to the South African Council of Churches.
POM. So the churches haven't, in a sense, put themselves on the front line. Is the church, I know Patricia asked earlier at lunch, a player? Is the church as far out front as it should be? Will it participate in negotiations? What role will it play?
MX. At the moment, I think we are evolving a programme or strategy which was to say the church also should be on the side of the struggle. We have got tremendous contradictions among church men here but the church has always been neutral in the struggle. But nonetheless you have got a sufficient group of clergymen and church men who identify with the liberation struggle and you have got the youth also in the church who identify with the liberation struggle. And for this reason therefore the SACC, the church in its organised form, SACC (South Africans Catholics Position Conference) will be invited with the rest of the groups to take part in the conference table either as observers or as members of the Mass Democratic Movement per se, against the evil of apartheid and the church, I think, will be happy to do that as long as they are not bound to an ideological cluster, as long as they don't lose their freedom to criticise. Because, I think, we have gone so far in the church in South Africa but human rights we hold dear. If you went into Zambia and those places, we are the first persons to complain about lack of human rights, if you are in the Kenya and the Kenyan Christians don't say that, but the Christians of South African are the first ones to express our discomfort. Even there in Zambia we have complained when we have gone to meetings when people say, this is stage one is it now. We have already been accused of that. So there is a degree of maturity among the Christians here and a degree of accountabilities to the church worldwide. Because we have tried to convert on a worldwide basis that this system is wrong and therefore we should reciprocate that by standing for human rights wherever it is possible.
POM. You do acknowledge though that the outside perception is different. The outside perception is that maybe not so much the institutions of the church, but certainly the clergy are very much on the front lines of the struggle. The way many in the anti-apartheid movement look to principle people in South Africa, Tutu, Boesak, Chikane, that seems to be, not to discredit their efforts, somewhat of a misperception.
MX. The fact of the matter is that also the media plays a big role in building pieces of the struggle, that's one. Two, Tutu, Boesak, myself and others are not paid by the state, therefore the state can not come and say, We dismiss you. The state cannot dismiss me, the state does not feel comfortable with me but they could not dismiss me. They would wish that I went as quickly as possible. But they know what would happen if they dismissed me as such, and therefore because we do not owe our livelihood to the state one's wife must be careful about how she expresses herself because she owes her livelihood directly to the state as a teacher. Say that the trade union movement has gone beyond some of the churches sometimes in standing up for what they consider to be right and, therefore, those people who don't owe their livelihood to the state have expressed a great degree of witnessing against apartheid.
POM. Just two questions on the elections: Let me give you three scenarios and tell me what would happen if each one of the three would happen. The first situation in which the National Party is elected with a majority, or not just a majority but quite a substantial majority. The second case in which the National Party is the government again but with a severely reduced majority where support has gone to the conservative wing. And the third case where you have a hung parliament. What do you think would happen in each of those three cases in terms of a movement towards negotiations or away from negotiations?
MX. I think the reality of the issue is going to depend very much on the economy. If big business as they do see now that it is moving a political cul-de-sac and a collective cul-de-sac ...
POM. The Conservative Party is going into a cul-de-sac?
MX. That is right, they will support under Anglo-American rule, support government. And if government is going to the support of Anglo-American and I am sure that Anglo-American does support the block moving away from sanctions and negotiating with the outside world and the climate in which it is acceptable. They therefore would support Nationalist Party and persuade the Nationalist Party to negotiate.
POM. Even if the Conservative Party goes ...
MX. I think so. PW Botha is a very powerful person and has built around himself powerful bureaucrats. PW Botha could have easily if he had support of the army, which I don't think he had, could have easily called it a day and moved to a military coup on that day, at least if FW ...
POM. If he had moved to make constitutional reforms there could have been a military coup?
MX. That's right. So I think that F W De Klerk and Pik Botha are the persons who are pushing for political negotiated settlement. Pik Botha is the person who is actually more responsible for the Angolan settlement than Magnus Malan and he is on record, in point of fact, to have said much more left wing things and not just as a mode of convenience but amid confrontation about the course of events as they are seen. The South African economy realises that it would be the strongest economy without the apartheid, the economy would be more stable because I think Zimbabwe and those countries would support it and others who would want to trade with South Africa, if South Africa would change its political mood away from apartheid.
POM. So you think that a backlash from the right is not now serious enough to cause the National Party to slow down this movement towards negotiations?
MX. I doubt it very much, I doubt it very much. I think the mood at the present moment is that I think the CP played their cards too early and if they had not played their cards that way they would have duped a number of people to take their course. But I think that the whites here are feeling, now we have had in one year we have had ... rising three times, the cash flow is beginning to come down, and I think that people realise that it is better to have a Nationalist Party, it is better to have a courting partner with DP and the Nationalist Party than with CP, although the CP would precipitate at a much better rate than ...
POM. Do you see any difference between the Democratic Party and the Nationalist Party, any real difference between the two of them?
MX. At the moment I think that the Nationalist Party is saying most of the things which are much more on the left of what they stood for for a number of years. It is a question of how quickly they apply the things that they are saying they must apply. The Democratic Party is dangerous as far as I am concerned because I think our experience of the English speaking people in South Africa is that they are more dangerous than the Afrikaner. The Afrikaner has got nowhere to go. The English people have got several options, they can go to Australia, they can go to New Zealand, they can go anywhere. And when it comes to the crunch they get to go opportunistically. They go to the winning side. And I think they would like to have a protected ... with the Nationalist Party than with the Conservative Party at this moment in time.
POM. If there were negotiations on which side of the table do you see the Democratic Party sitting, would it sit with the Nationalist Party and the Conservative Party or would it sit with the mass liberation movement?
MX. They would split. Wynand Malan would probably stay with the Mass Democratic Movement, but I doubt if it would come that way.
POM. Do you think sanctions have been effective? This is the second to last question I have.
MX. They have. If they had not surely we would not panic as much as we are panicking. They have. The whole idea about sporting ties, the whole idea of not having cultural relationships, the whole idea about the tax of this investment of our American friends. That stabilises the government. Without sanctions this government would not have anything to bother about, they would just go on. But sanctions like any other weapon are not necessarily un-painful. But it is better than war.
POM. My last question, as I said reading part of the biography of you in the Who's Who in South Africa last night and it said that you saw the ANC as a vehicle for the church to carry out social and economic policies. Do you believe that or if you do what do you mean by it?
MX. When the ANC came up with the Freedom Charter it was informed most by persons with a strong Christian background. The communists were very few and their effect was minimal. Because the document comes out of the person who actually, the first person to talk about the Charter was Professor ... after he had travelled in Europe and seen, you know and so forth, and he came out with a charter which would be an alternative to the racist South African, social, political, economic situation and said that it's the purpose of our government. That comes from the fact that men are equal, and made out of the image of God and that the first obligation is to enshrine that and if we attempt to divide men you are actually undermining God himself. And the question of talking about sharing the resources also comes from the experience from the Bible of the jubilee. That after ... forgives us will be jubilee. Therefore no ... will be allowed to be ... the advantage of others. And as far as I'm concerned the ... is the nearest document to the Christian ethics as we see them. And therefore the political distribution that is now making every adult giving a franchise to every adult over the age of 18 is the nearest thing to the church's concept The church is more comfortable in that kind of concept than the Dutch church, the Afrikaners church, finds supporting a racist movement which they can no longer support politically. There is more support politically in South Africa from the Bible than not to support it. Testing it against the norms of the extinct race. Whereas the racist programme which the church tried to justify through apartheid was really a heresy. And therefore a heresy then had to be disowned at this time and age. Therefore, that is why I am saying that in terms of that the church would be more comfortable with that kind of economy.
POM. Where do you think South Africa will be four years from now, five years from now? What kind of conversation would we be having with you five years from now?
MX. Seriously, I think that if the only contribution that can be made by Margaret Thatcher, by the western powers is to cause this Government to go and talk to ANC. And when that happens there is going to be a chain of events which will take place and they are settled right now with Mandela inside. They would like to release him, but they can't because they would release him to a political vacuum. And Christian South African movement moves closer to civil disobedience or disobeying the laws and when that happens you are therefore ... in which people are clutching at straws to stabilise. I want to say that in the next few years a serious attempt is going to be made to talk to the ANC by the government. When that takes place there may be partial upliftment of the ANC. And when that happens I think that negotiations will be beginning to roll on. People have said there must be a particular assembly which takes charge between now and that time. That will all be things which should be negotiated, I can't say that one will follow the two, as two of the three, but I can see a process which will change the law and in which there will be many players involved, people will be talking whether we should move in a federal direction, or into a unitary South Africa direction.
POM. Thanks very much.