This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
18-21 Jun 2004: Maharaj, Mac
POM. This is the continuation, I assume, of Tongaat and why Jeremy Cronin, or the role of Jeremy Cronin in coming or not coming into the country and Mac has explained the set up of the organisation. The beginning of this tape appears to have somehow been deleted I don't know how.
MM. Slovo was General Secretary of the party, the General Secretary in my case before I left Lusaka, I was in the secretariat together with Sizakele Sigxashe, the Intelligence man. He was in the secretariat. It was like here's an organisation with people who are always on the move. The administration is supposed to be headed by the General Secretary but the General Secretary, because he himself is on the move, is bolstered by one or two members from the Central Committee or the Politburo. I was in the secretariat, Sizakele was in the secretariat, Ivan also joined the secretariat, to keep the work of the party going under the direction of the General Secretary and in the absence of the General Secretary the other members of the Politburo and Central Committee. Jeremy, while I'm in the country, now moves to Lusaka as editor of Inkululeko, the party publication. He has also clearly been co-opted into the Central Committee, possibly elected after Havana, at the Havana conference. Now he's in the secretariat and hears these messages to JS. JS says, "Draft a message", Jeremy drafts a message for me, discusses my ideas. Jeremy is supposed to draft it and the General Secretary says, "What a wonderful idea, I can't go." Jeremy says, "Well why can't I go?" "No fine, you go." A message comes to us, don't worry about the statement it will be coming with Jeremy. We say, "Chaps, when is Jeremy arriving?" We don't know the details, nobody is giving us that.
POM. How would he get indemnity?
MM. No they explained, the last night I'm sending radio messages saying when is he arriving, how is he going to come in? And they say, no, he's applied for indemnity. I said, "You mean that issue is going to determine whether we get the statement or don't get the statement? Why don't you just send us the speech through the normal transmission methods. Jeremy is here, if he's here he delivers it. If he's not here we deliver it and the conference goes on and it's delivered as a message from the General Secretary of the party." "No don't worry, Jeremy is coming." We find out this was Jeremy. JS didn't know that that was happening.
POM. Jeremy didn't?
MM. JS didn't know.
POM. Didn't know that?
MM. That Jeremy had not sent the speech to us because he had never raised the matter with Jeremy.
POM. So he would assume that when Jeremy wasn't able to go he would have sent the message?
POM. So Jeremy had accepted the Vula - ?
MM. He obviously had access.
POM. To the Vula equipment?
MM. No, to Ivan, because by that time a relationship because the Umsabenzi text it would be given not to JS to give to Ivan. JS would have said, "Jeremy, give it to Ivan. Ivan you liaise with Jeremy on Umsabenzi." So here on this matter JS is not in town, Ivan you discuss it. Ivan would know better about it, I've never discussed it.
POM. A screw up.
MM. Yes. And that was the start of my problems with Jeremy, well it wasn't the start, it was the second element, because when I came up to Jo'burg Jeremy has arrived now after the conference is over.
POM. We are going over Ivan's notes. Page 1. There's an insert and the insert is
MM. Page 1. Where is the insert he talks about?
POM. The insert is on page 9.
MM. Oh these are the inserts that page 9 speaks about.
POM. Yes. These are all messages, Adam and Sylvester. They're self-explanatory. These are sent in November 1988 and they talk about Vula. Maybe you'd like to make some comments on them, Mac?
MM. So within August, September, three months, a quarterly report that has been sent and obviously by that time besides having made our moves in Durban, we've explained our settling down in Durban, arrived in Johannesburg, we've explained our access to intelligence information, the structures, probably dealing also with our capacity distributing propaganda in the Durban region and dealing with the mass level contacts in Johannesburg.
POM. He has here in what's called 7A, he says, "With regard to 7/3 of your report I want to sound a note of caution with regard to the implementation of this side of your work." Do you know what he might be referring to there?
MM. "With regards to 7/3, read with 7/2, 3 of your report we want to sound a note of caution connected with the implementation of this side of your work." Now what has been scratched out?
POM. I don't know, something about, "except for personal use".
MM. Now let's get back to that interpretation. Now it makes sense. It's about the military side of work. We are now saying, obviously saying we can now create the conditions for storing weapons long term, etc., etc., so we are raising issues on the military side and it therefore makes sense what appears thereafter. Thereafter the emphasis is put back, remember your people's task, build the underground. We have previously had to engage in military action as armed propaganda in order that the masses would be organised. Now we've always had to work backwards, back to forwards, now we can do it the right way so will Vula attend to its part, don't just get trapped into moving into the military direction. Your military activity is a more long term activity so that's the caution that is scribbled in there as far as I can read it and it makes sense to me when you see what comes after that.
POM. All the rest making absolute sense.
MM. You can see that the point at which those insertions are to be made in the document is on page 4, after the post-election section. Here it is, it's after the Madiba secretary question.
POM. Post elections, see insert A, B and C.
MM. That's where he wanted the insert, right? So JS has drafted a set of responses, either discussed it but after discussing it now sent it to OR and OR is saying, "Please insert these things at this point." The point about it is it's post elections.
POM. Post elections of that's the 1987 elections?
MM. Yes. Let's see. Here it says
POM. You're on page 4 now.
MM. It says, "We're not happy about the purchase of weapons", meaning don't buy them on the ground, we're not happy about that move.
POM. OK, let's go through just the post elections. It says, "AA conference", what conference would that be?
MM. Anti Apartheid conference.
POM. Refers to SM.
MM. Sydney Mufamadi.
POM. "Possible Madiba release, get a briefing from SM on how we view the link between a possible release and the legalisation of the ANC by the masses." That would be they would just do it."If SM is too vague on this we will set out our thoughts."
MM. Interesting, you see this is November 1988.
POM. And you're already planning for Madiba's release.
MM. We are saying, our analysis is saying it's coming.
POM. Because Govan has been out now?
MM. Not only is Govan out, we've set up links with Madiba, stories are circulating and we are saying Govan's been released, Harry Gwala has been released, so our feedback, our assessment is it's coming. The precise moment when should not hold us up from deciding how we react. How will we react to that moment and what preparation do we have to do? And we are saying that's our understanding on the ground, please would you tell us how you see it. They're saying we've discussed it with Sydney, he will brief you and if he is vague contact us and we'll come back to you. So that is under discussion. The second thing is that in our proposal we have said we would meet to make sure that Madiba is equipped with a very competent secretary, not just a technical secretary but a secretary with political weight and they say that's a good one. I don't think we had reached a point where we were suggesting a name. Then it is at this point that OR, post the 1987 elections, is saying, "Now this whole thing about military work, be careful, do your primary focus at this stage. Yes, we see how we've done it in the past, we see our previous mistakes, we are thrilled about the breakthroughs you are making in the new path. Keep going that way." So the military action part should be more in the background and they say the Cuban supply of silencers hasn't come through and it said, "But don't be afraid of the budget."
POM. So here we have then, "We are not happy about the purchase of the weapons", because he said there was a supply risk.
MM. Because of the risk. They are saying, Jesus! They start buying weapons, they're buying smuggled weapons from the air force and army and police, it increases the danger of their getting caught. So let's not get involved there. But also they are saying if there are any differences between Gebhuza and my appreciation of the situation let's reiterate you are not there at the moment to start engaging in military action. You are there for preparatory activity, yes, but you are not there to start engaging in military action. And that has a significance because attached to this batch is the letter in OR's handwriting to Ivan requesting that he draws from the computer the document which I had prepared setting out the task of this mission and he's saying, "Get it out, I want to re-look at it", because that setting out of the tasks had the same perspective of what he's repeating here; get the underground leadership going, get your relationship with the mass structures moving so there's co-ordination going there, leave the exiting MK units that are operating, they'll do their thing, you on the MK side just build a long term sustainable basis. So that's it.
POM. OK. "All your security information has been passed on to the right quarters. Please give us all information of your basis of suspicions against Bulelani." So you had written to them?
POM. Saying what Mo had found?
MM. I would have not given - "Please give us all the information", I would have simply said in our contact with the mass structures we've encountered a problem, e.g. COSATU, we've got to be very judicious in the contacts we make. We're going to contact the General Secretary, we're going to contact Chris Dhlamini, we're in touch with Sydney, we are contacting Cyril Ramaphosa, and we are doing this very mindful that somewhere there in COSATU is a high level enemy agent. We have managed to identify him from here, his name is Xulu. Now in that one I am saying, Lusaka had said to me that in the COSATU delegation going to Lusaka they were thinking of detaining him and I objected, I said that would be a dangerous move because he is an elected official of COSATU. He's an elected official of his union, a high office bearer. You detain him there and the members here will be entitled to demand you explain on what grounds you've detained him and if you disclose your grounds you may disclose where your sources of information are within the enemy. So you've got a sensitive problem there. I say now I understand the constraints on you guys in Lusaka on how to deal with Xulu.
POM. What's his first name?
POM. He was revealed as a spy later?
MM. Yes, he was an RS agent. I said we on the ground here, the in-leaders, have an opportunity to deal with him. You have to tell us whether to deal with him. Their answer was please hold your horses. I remember what they meant, these are notes, the full message would be and was hold your horses, any action you take from the underground with Maxwell Xulu has a different danger, we do not want Vula exposed. There might be a slip-up and we're not saying it will happen but we say a risk of a slip-up is too much, you are doing such valuable work that we, Lusaka, will attend to this headache of Xulu. As it happened the sequel on Xulu was that some of the COSATU members in NUMSA were given a briefing by Intelligence when he returned to South Africa and began to raise the matter in NUMSA. Maxwell Xulu heard about it and there was a huge uproar in COSATU, but people said, "Look at the evidence, we want the evidence on which you are alleging that there's a suspect." It was a huge problem because people in the union began to take sides, they said there's not enough evidence, tell us the truth, what is your evidence?Where do you get it from? And poor comrades in NUMSA who were briefed by Lusaka couldn't produce proof.
POM. So you were able to identify him as that through the information that Mo was getting?
MM. Mo had identified him.
POM. Mo was getting - from the reports going back to there they would identify him. Now what happened to him?
MM. Subsequently in 1990, sometime in 1990 the story goes that he was shot in the spine I think three times, there was a newspaper report, and he is crippled.
POM. Where is he?
MM. In Durban. By that time he had lost his position in NUMSA, he was Treasurer General.
POM. High level spy in NUMSA.
MM. Preceding this in this communication in JS's handwriting is that, "All your security information is being passed on to the right quarters." So whatever we are sending is passed on and they say, "Please give us all the information re the basis of suspicion against Bulelani", because, as I have said before, my problem was I want to touch NADEL, the Democratic Lawyers Association, I want to get in touch with them. I got in touch with COSATU, I got in touch with the National Union of Mineworkers, I'm in touch with various individual unions but COSATU head office. I'm in touch with the UDF, I'm in touch with the religious sector, so the tentacles are there but the National Democratic Lawyers Association is a small but very active body in the mass movement. I tell Lusaka I can't touch NADEL yet, I have to find a way to circumvent this but I have to make sure that whoever I contact doesnot confide in Bulelani. Now until that happens - it would take me time to contact NADEL. And they come back and they say, "Please can we have more information on that." We would have either said get it from JZ or we would say whatever we have, what Mo's giving us, can we send it off? So that would happen but the statement is made very clearly here, everything to deal with security that we are passing is being sent to the right quarters. Who's the right quarters? Intelligence head office. In particular because we are dealing with enemy agents in our ranks it will go to the counter-intelligence unit. Who was heading counter-intelligence? Jacob Zuma.
. Who is Masher?
POM. I thought Masher was Billy Nair.
MM. Billy. But we would be dealing with it in two contexts, Masher is Billy but he would also be an abbreviation and a cover for Communist Party because we would not be giving Billy that amount but also we would have been preparing for Billy to go to the Havana conference.
POM. To the Havana conference?
MM. Yes, in 1989.
POM. "To Masher, Durban, Best wishes and love from all of us to you and for Ivan."
MM. Notice from R and O. This time it's Robin and Oliver, and other times it becomes R and R.Gemma is Zarina.
POM. We'll go back now to the beginning."Thanks for your valuable insights we will do our best to get him." This is on page 1, this is Zizi, the trouble you had dealing with him, dealing with was read by Xundu, this is the one that you - ?
MM. The document prepared for him for this purpose was read to Xundu.
POM. Who took notes.
MM. That's Reverend Xundu, that is the courier that Govan used to use.
POM. This is the guy when you came back you told him what was in his notes?
MM. No, no. I never touched Xundu. Xundu was a chap living at that time in PE, the Reverend. I didn't touch him but I knew that Govan used to send him directly to Lusaka. I used DM, Dr Mji.
POM. I interviewed him too.
MM. Did you?
POM. I didn't know what he was doing of course but I interviewed him.
MM. The reason, and I'll tell you completely off the record, the reason why I don't give his name is that this guy, Dr Mji, comes from a very stalwart family. His father and mother were university students with Madiba. When he went to Harare he confided in somebody that I was in the country.
POM. That you were here?
MM. OR got the report months later and frantically sent a message to me to flee the country, that I was in trouble, sell up the cars, give up the places and get the hell out of the country, you are dead meat. I analysed the message, got hold ofGebhuza, sat down in the early hours of the morning and said who slipped up? OR didn't tell me where or what had happened, he just says danger. I came to the conclusion that Diliza had confided in somebody abroad. Then I said to Mo when it came up, brief Diliza. He confessed. It took an hour. He confessed and said, "Comrades, I've done wrong, I realise it."
POM. Was he in the SACP?
MM. No. So he agreed and then that's the guy who I then said to him, "We're not here to destroy people." What options do we have, eliminate him? That comes from all the text books, but we're not here to do that. "We just need to know the truth. We need to know the extent of the damage, we need to protect. We know you confided in somebody abroad because he's a close comrade of yours", and then he corrected himself and he appreciated the line we took. We reported to Lusaka, this is how we sorted out this problem. Lusaka, don't think that we are just gung-ho chaps.
POM. Did you continue to use him?
POM. Did he ever tell you who he had confided in?
MM. Oh yes.
POM. Were you able to get to that person?
MM. That person was based in Harare in the ANC and still remains a good comrade and that person panicked when he heard this and he waited, the delay was caused by him in Harare because he decided that this was such sensitive information. He said, "Shit, Mac is in the country, Mac is not in Moscow, this nobody must hear." So he said, "I'm only going to tell OR when I meet OR face to face." So he waited until he met OR face to face and he said, "OR I must tell you, I was told by Diliza that Mac is in the country."
POM. Who is this guy?
MM. Terence Tyron. Tyron from what area was I house arrested to?
POM. In 1976/77?
MM. Yes, in Durban, there was an Indian area, there was a coloured area. Not Westville. Terence was living there. So that's why I've been dingy about this because he corrected himself and we said to him I mean if he was to tell his story I believe you'd be surprised how we were handling problems. I know at one stage when he was reluctant and as we were tying him up into knots, Gebhuza was, he's not a talkative chap, he turned round and said, "Comrade, you know we've got other solutions. We are not here to eliminate people, we are here to correct people. We accept that in the underground people make mistakes." And when he admitted we said to him,"Now we're giving you more responsibility because you've admitted, now you will be not expelled, you will be given more tasks in the underground to redeem yourself." Now I haven't met Diliza since 1992, haven't seen him.
POM. I think I would have been interviewing him in 1990, 1991, 1992. He was a good friend of, I'm trying to think of his name, Goodwill he used to work for an oil company, he gave me all these contacts, a great guy, he and his wife, they lived in Umlazi, he gave me all these people, put me in touch with them. He always knew what was going on. He always knew. In the sports area Goodwill Mkhize. Do you know him?
MM. Goodwill Mkhize? Yes, yes.
POM. He worked for Shell.
MM. He was, I think, a Lamontville organiser. At one time he was virtually a mayor of -
POM. He had a brother who was a Zulu chief.
MM. And I wouldn't be surprised if he was related to Zweli Mkhize.
POM. He knew these guys like that, he would say if you want to see somebody I will take you to see them. He was the most informed person I ever met in terms of a 'layman'.
MM. Yes he was in the party too. In the party also. Have you read this now? Now you've got to read this. Here you have got what I was saying, they have a courier that Govan is sending. I'm raising problems in my analysis and they say, "Thanks for your valuable insights, we will do our best to give Govan a comprehensive briefing. We have read our briefing to Xundu who took notes, we hope that the document reaches Govan but we intend to keep him updated." Then second point, "Diliza Mji is being told when he gets to Harare", because I'm sending him to Harare, "to come to Lusaka where Joe and OR will brief him amongst other things to inform Govan that OR has set up an APC in Groces."
POM. Where's that?
MM. I don't know where Groces is at the moment, whether it was an APC in Maputo, Zimbabwe, Botswana or London, because what he's saying is that or an APC in Durban. And it goes on, "Whatever co-ordination Zizi may require with Groces should be done with Masher and DM." What I am saying is, look, there's Govan and I'm probably saying there's Harry, and chaps what they are doing is not necessarily in conformity with what we're seeing as a solution. Now we've made enormous progress in Durban but Durban is getting signals from PE and from Harry, we're just going to be at cross-purposes with each other. So what OR and JS decide, look you're in touch with Diliza, what we will do is we will say to Govan, "Govan, if you want to have any contact with Natal, do it through Billy Nair (the party), do it through Diliza (ANC)."
POM. How do you spell Diliza's name?
POM. That's DM, is it?
POM. I've got him down here as Dr Z.
MM. Dr Mji, M J I.Dr Diliza Mji.
POM. Same person. I have that.
MM. So to avoid a confrontation and say to Govan to lay off, they come to the idea that they say to Govan, "Govan, we have got a functioning leadership structure in Natal. Any ideas you want to share with them, anything you think that they should be doing, pass those ideas to either Diliza or to Billy Nair and recognise the leadership that exists in Natal, don't interfere with that leadership." Now that doesn't mean that Diliza was in the Durban overall leadership but he was a contact. It's not to reveal to Govan who's who in Durban and they say, "We will do so when Diliza comes", and then they go on, "Has Masher yet been in touch with Zizi?" Meaning, has the communist party got in touch? "Should not Adam (that's Mac) find a way at some stage to make contact with Zizi (that's Govan)? As soon as we get the chance", now the next page I can't read, can you read that?
POM. We will debrief.
MM. Let me see that page. We will debrief Moss. Who's Moss? Moss is Moss Ngoaseng who used to be the economic adviser in the Deputy President's office and is now in Safica Investments.
POM. That's his full name?
MM. His full name, his surname is Ngoaseng. First name is Moss. I have said to them
POM. Moss is in what? What is he in at that point?
MM. At that point he is at University of Sussex. We have reported to OR and JS that a very good active comrade who would be very good for the underground and was in the leadership structures in the African areas, Moss Ngoaseng, is studying in Sussex. Just got over there, you guys want to understand what's happening in the African townships, in Umlazi, please contact Moss, debrief him, and because he's gone there to study will you draw him in into contact with the external arm of the movement so that if his plans are to return to the country it is handled properly. So they say, "We will contact him. And you will note from B above", B above is the Diliza thing, "that we are using the acronym APC, not the RPC and not RPMC." RPC was Regional Political Committee, APC was Area Political Committee, RPMC was Regional Political Military Committee. And they are now saying no to that because they're saying do you realise that we are fully in tune with what you guys are doing, we are not setting up a combined military and political structure, we are setting up an APC, a political structure, and in it it has a division looking at military work. So we have changed the name to remove the confusion.
POM. The primacy of the political.
MM. And they are saying this is deliberate, this is to emphasise the point that we are setting up political leadership structures within which all functions, including military, fall. So you see the longstanding debate, the progress that we were making in the country even got Joe Slovo at that stage to say that's the right way. But now what did they do? They changed the structures outside also but did they carry through the briefing?
POM. They changed the names, they didn't tell the people what the change of names meant.
MM. You see it couldn't be that OR and JS would be liaising with each structure. They could say to us the way OR is saying on this page here and we would take it seriously. Who was telling the comrades in Botswana, in Zimbabwe, in Swaziland, in Maputo, who was telling them? I don't know. But all that this thing does, this document, it gives you a verification that you want, independent verification, you've got it.
POM. I want this, what did you call it?
MM. Independent verification.
POM. Is this supposed to be some comment on your own infallibility or something?
MM. No, no, not on my infallibility, on my intelligence!
POM. Well that's fine for you to understand but other people might not.
MM. Might not, OK. Right, the next point.
POM. Re Madiba.
MM. By the way that E, that E has got to be related, paragraph E has got to be related to the OR inserts once more and it has got to be related to the OR note to Ivan on ANC memo, the one that asked for that document that I had prepared about the task inside the country.
POM. The dated one or the undated one?
MM. It's dated, it's just put there Saturday 16.30 hours. That one's paragraph 2 shows how seriously OR was looking at this.
POM. OK, we're now at? We're at Madiba. "Things appear to be reasonably in hand. Sydney should have reported to you on the nature of our discussions with UDF, COSATU on this question."
MM. That is the release of Mandela.
POM. That's on the release of Mandela. "The briefing you suggest to Madiba is still under consideration. A secure line as to when you're talking about it is welcomed. Maximum collective functioning of Rivonia group is vital, including - "
MM. Including contacts between Govan and Madiba. You see they are saying whatever the differences we've got to manage it in such a way that that Rivonia leadership is held together. Whatever Govan is saying, the only way to contain it is to get him into contact. Remember they have said to me, has the Communist Party got in touch with him? Masher. And they then say should not Adam first find a way at some stage to make contact with Zizi? That's what makes me go to Port Elizabeth. So they are saying differences aside chaps, let the work bring you all together. And they are saying here consider even facilitating that Govan gets in touch with Mandela direct. That's the extent to which OR and them are saying don't lose sight of holding the whole horse together.
POM. Now were you ever able to manage to get - ?
MM. I went to Govan, we had useful discussions, we agreed. There was no need at that stage to give him a line of contact with Madiba because they were allowed to openly visit Madiba and Madiba was now calling people to visit him.
POM. Madiba at that point, this is in 1988?
MM. This is November 1988. I go and see Govan somewhere in 1989. By 1989 Madiba is in Victor Verster. Now the problem about people going to see him, it's not difficult for him but he was within the country. He called several delegations, he called Billy and them in a delegation, he called the churches, he would be meeting with them. Now in those contexts meeting Madiba between Govan and him wasno longer a problem because there is no need to discuss clandestine issues. That's fairly open discussion. For instance if Zizi, if Govan, went to Madiba it would be about how you are running the masses. It would be accepted that we will not discuss at those visits what's happening on the ground in the military and all that, we'll keep that out. So that's what he's saying there.
. Now then he says secure line, so it gave me the green light for the security. It also encouraged me to make contact with Govan, which we did.
POM. Then you go to, "Addition to problems of reception which is vital to launch and intensify the Release Mandela campaign."
MM. I am busy saying, chaps, I think we need to set up a committee for the reception of Mandela and them when they are released. They say, listen, that's fine, but right now the mass organisations better intensify the demand for release. This is November 1988. The releases take place in October 1989. So they are saying, can the UDF, the mass democratic movement, the unions, can you interact with those leaderships and encourage them to intensify their demand for the release of those prisoners?
. Then we move to Gatsha. Here he says
POM. "The photo negative was transcribed and contained a useful outline of situation."
MM. I can't remember what photo negative.
POM. It would have been a document that Mo would have got?
MM. It's possible we sent a document this time in a photographic form. "And agree Madiba needs a special briefing on Gatsha, we will do our best." Again I told them to please put him in the picture and they say they will do so. They agree. "Please also get detailed briefing from Sydney on our input re Gatsha and Natal situation at the Harare indaba with UDF and COSATU." They say we had a meeting with the UDF/COSATU in Harare, there we discussed with them Gatsha and the Natal situation, we led the discussion. We briefed them how we see the problems. Get Sydney to tell you what we said there.
POM. How did they see the problem?
MM. Look, I don't remember the briefing as something I think that our position was, as we've been discussing, that post the breakdown at London meeting in 1979, post Kabwe 1985, our position was that we need to ensure that we create in Natal the capacity and space for UDF and COSATU to organise. We cannot allow Inkatha to have a no-go area. But in that confrontation be very careful, don't let the enemy get away with making us fight each other to the exclusion of attacking the enemy. So this is the complexity, understand why even though we don't trust Gatsha, that we keep looking for opportunities to engage with him both to disagree with him and also to draw him away from (the regime). You people on the ground had better also do your best to draw his supporters away politically. Your answer must not be simple fighting. Your answer must be not to be cowards to run away but also remember you've got to win those people politically. So that would be the line and he says we will do our best to give Madiba a briefing on where things went wrong but you will get a detailed briefing of the type of meeting that they had.
. Then we come to the post elections, we've been through that. We've been through the budget. It's interesting on the funds thing.
POM. It's like an accountant.
MM. Not only that, it's the issue that I made about - for this type of operation OR right from the beginning said he cannot go to the Treasurer General and access money because if he did that he would have to explain why he's accessing these funds. So here you have confirmation that the amounts were big. But secondly it says, "We are trying to place more funds into reserves."
POM. What's odd about that is that that's exactly the sum of money that Gebhuza gave him, the exact amount, 3000.
MM. So they found that Gebhuza
POM. We're on page 8 after the additions, back to just Slovo's handwriting. H, I, "You should for the moment leave Paul G out." Is that his handwriting?
MM. It's OR's.
POM. No it's the page with the worst handwriting and then it moves on to I have it marked page 8. It says, "You should for the moment leave Paul G."
MM. Paul Goitsemang, he's the one I told you. I told you we operated if we found trace of another comrade from outside operating and we knew who this guy is we let them carry on what they're doing, we would make our own observations independently of Lusaka but if we found that this comrade would be more useful in our structure we would write to Lusaka and say here's a trace we found of Paul Goitsemang, he is involved but we can see in this area of work it's the same as the area that we are involved in. Now we are speaking to the same people and our expansion is impeded by that, so better we think now to incorporate him but we don't know who he's reporting to. You can find that out from outside and you tell us whether we should incorporate him. If you tell us no we would respect that, we'd lay off. So here at this stage they're saying they've done this check, they said please, for the moment leave him because they have checked, the Internal Political Committee appears to be in intimate contact with him and has elaborated detailed plans for him. So that happened but as it happened very shortly after that they said go ahead because Internal Political had told them they had this guy, and he was trained, he was material Hey, wait a minute, we go to the head office of the Internal Political, OR says, he doesn't tell them that Mac and them want him, so he says to them, "By the way, PaulGoitsemang, is he ?""Oh yes he's ""What's he doing?" "Oh he's doing fantastic work." "Yes but what?" "We'll do you a report, Chief." "What are your plans for him?" "Oh we've got well developed plans for him." He sends off the letter, "Stay off." In the meantime, not to alert suspicion, he quietly says on that occasion, "Can I have a report on what Paul is doing, what are your plans, what's the progress report?" When they bring it he finds it's all drawing board stuff but nothing happened. They say here, "We are in intimate contact", right? So he believes that, he tells us lay off, we lay off. There is RK and JZ.
POM. That's the two guys who are one of them you were looking for.
MM. Again, Padraig, all I can say is that you have found a way to date this document as November 1988. The work was progressing at such a pace that we are pleading with Lusaka. We're saying, "Guys, we are working our arses off, we need help." And the same position, I don't care what criticisms I have of Ronnie or of JZ, I say those comrades I believe that they would be ready to come in, send them, send them. No question about it. So that's that one, but they say they've got problems about releasing them.
. Any doubts about whether I am Adam in that correspondence is in the heading of page 9, "Reply to Adam's Report". What date is that?
POM. That's 1 November.
MM. Oh 1 November, so that's how you did it.
MM. And what date were they replying?
POM. They replied on the 12th.
MM. That's pretty bloody good. That's pretty good. It says that OR and JS were taking that work very seriously.
POM. It's quicker than the post, than if you'd put your report in the mail to them and sent it off.
MM. I can't read this one, have you got another version of this?
POM. They're scanned ones, three of them. These are Ivan's, notes to Ivan from OR.
MM. Do you understand the message from Tony to Harry Gwala in its original handwritten form, or that it should be 12 May?
POM. No, no, it's the other way round. Is it? Might be?
MM. 12 May. OR and that's 12 May.
POM. These are just things he kept.
MM. No this is 12 May because the Harry Gwala problem has become bigger and I'm now saying, "Chief, you'd better communicate directly." Sending to Harry like we did with Govan, through my channel, is not good enough because it will be typewritten, it will have been handed by me. He wouldn't say it openly but he would imply to others, "That's not really OR's message. It's not really OR who wrote that message." So here it is, it says, "I am sending it to him in my original handwriting, or that it should be put through our systems to be delivered to him in a typewritten form. I would much prefer the former, the handwritten form, sealed and taken by courier to Tony. My handwriting would be important for Harry Gwala. What do you think? The problem about the courier that you had proposed, (Ivan had proposed some courier) is that delivery would have to be made to people who we are not sure of. What do you think about this?" That's how sensitively he took the question of how to nurse Harry to act in a unified, concerted way. He knew, he himself is in this writing saying unless it's in my handwriting I know that Harry won't talk to you, he'll start implying that it's not a genuine message.
. Right, next one.
POM. This is the undated one.
MM. I forgot to ask you, no it's Monday, "I forgot to ask you for a copy of GM, Govan Mbeki's report suggesting a demarcation of tasks between his collective and Tony's Vula."
POM. And 'Tony' is again you? How many names did you have?
MM. We changed names all the time depending on tasks. "I need it urgently and it is not in my files, I know it came", no, this is not Tony, it came via Tony? No.
. Clearly Govan after meeting me sent Xundu to say let's do it differently, let's just demarcate tasks. So that's that.
. "I'm terribly sorry about this meeting, about the meetings planned for today. I was only able to leave President Yasser Arafat about 11.45 at the airport. Besides, the document that I was to give to you is still not with me. It should have reached me last night. Comrade Makgothi (that's Squire) has it.We can't find him anywhere. I'll get back to you immediately we find him. Before he left to go in and during preparations for his departure, Tony prepared a document." Now this Tony is me maybe that demarcation he's saying that Govan's demarcation proposal came through me. "Tony prepared a document in which he set out what we all agreed were his tasks inside. I would like to look at this urgently. Are you still able to retrieve it on our computers?" Maybe he's saying I need to look at all that to decide how I respond to Govan.
POM. Good. More down.
MM. Right. What time do we break up?
POM. We're now talking about the SACP resignation.
MM. After I returned to SA on 15 June legally, within a week of that date there was a press conference held, hosted in the name of the SACP.
POM. That was on the 21st.
MM. 21st. Good, JS and myself. That's where we announced that the party would be launched and it will be launched formally on 29 July where the interim leadership and everything will be announced. We were merely two people disclosing that we are party members. In the meantime the background to that decision is after the Tongaat meeting, we had sent the recommendations, the Central Committee had decided in Lusaka let's have a launch. We sent our input, it was discussed at different levels outside. I come into the country. Again JS comes and discusses the matter with me, briefs me how far they've gone and says that they agree that the party should be launched on 29th. Now we say let's announce that. We're going to sort out the names and everything a little later. So we have the press conference and we also decide that it will be a rally at Jabulani Stadium so that's an organisational task that people will have to undertake. We have that Politburo meeting where the issue crops up about
POM. OK, you say, "We will fill it", who's the 'we' there?
MM. Those of us on the ground now, the underground, the unions, the mass democratic movement forces.
POM. What meeting were they at?
MM. They're not at the meeting but we are in touch with them.
POM. OK. So the launch - two meetings within five days. You said you had a meeting to discuss the launching of the party?
MM. The second thing. Once we've decided this, the number one thing was happening, we set up a coordinating machinery of the unions, the MDM, to say, now chaps, let's undertake the job of mobilising the rally. COSATU comes on board. Civic organisations come on board. We create these forums. Not only are we openly identified party members addressing meetings and calling on people, others are doing it, so the activity has started now, thus the launch.
POM. The meeting. The only people you can remember as being at that meeting were Chris and Ronnie.
MM. That's the Central Committee meeting. Yes, I can't remember who else was present. Certainly I know where the meeting took place.
POM. Was Jeremy there? It was in Troyville wasn't it?
MM. No Jeremy wasn't there. Jeremy wasn't there. It was in Troyville, it was at the house of the lady who became a Truth Commissioner, had arranged the venue. JS would have been there, Chris would have been there, Ronnie would have been there. Who else? Nkadimeng there? I don't know.
POM. In an extended meeting who's drawn in?
MM. For instance Ronnie was not a member of the Politburo.
POM. That's what I'm asking.
MM. Any member of the Central Committee who was in town would have been invited to that meeting.
POM. How likely is it at this point well who was sneaking away? Thabo was sneaking away? Who already had disappeared?
MM. I think we were not clear at that meeting, at that stage a number of comrades who were in the Central Committee and/or the Politburo, whether they would come or not come, I think some of them had raised the issue with Joe Slovo; is it wise that they should be identified with the party? Some of those who raised the question were themselves people who were saying is it wise that I should be associated with the party?
POM. 'I' being?
MM. Being the person who's raising the question. So just the talk would have been, I think JS would be saying and Chris would be saying what crap business, this is crap. What disadvantage is it to you? Just go to the township and see how popular the party is. And you say, well I must think strategically, comrades have a valid point and you can't be saying people must be there if they're doing it reluctantly. So that would be the sort of atmosphere on one side, a noise in the system. But we would have just said Chris is in town, JS is in town, I'm in town, that's a Politburo meeting. Let's not take a decision on our own. Invite anybody else, JS, you know who's here in town, whoever is there invite them. But the only one that I can remember is Ronnie. OK.
POM. In the public mind
MM. In my mind, because they were the chief speakers in the row that flared up when we discussed who should be in the leadership.
POM. You have been correcting the process.
MM. It's simple in the sense of that the danger is that you would be perceived as compromising your principles.
POM. Would be perceived by whom?
MM. Perceived by your membership, by our support base. This word 'corruptibility' out to 'principled'. This next paragraph about the youth leader and his death. It's a hell of a thing to say that he encouraged another youth faction to kill a person and people will say -
POM. Just deep down there's probably an awful lot of that going on because wars like this, up there at that time, were filthy, dirty and people settled scores with their neighbours and did it with politics.
MM. The only thing is that it would put me in a position where people would say, "Prove it." They would say, "You are maligning the name of a revered, deceased comrade." Think about it. The comrades present at the meeting say, "You're right." What I'm trying to say is that it's not the sort of issue that they wanted to grapple with so they were saying 'you're right', dismissing you, you know, Hani's sedition.
POM. Yes, Commission of Enquiry, the Jali one I assume.
MM. We've had that, we've had the Stuart Commission, we had a commission of enquiry. I don't know whether it comes up, I was saying, Party, you are immensely popular on the ground, in the working class, in the youth you are immensely popular. But Party, we have never existed since the party went underground, we have never co-existed with the ANC as rivals and competitors. We've always existed as partners. Now we're not going to take up a position that's going to attack the ANC for going to negotiations, we're in it. But how are you going to create a special niche and role for the party. Are you going to say it represents working class interests knowing what has been happening in the rest of the socialist world? Or are you going to say we're revolutionaries, we are working for long term revolutionary transformation of this country but in its current conjuncture where all sorts of zigzag routes have to be taken we are saying don't lose faith in yourself, be organised because the better organised you are the more we, together with the ANC, will be able to talk around the table with the apartheid regime and get solutions out which are more favourable to the transformation of our country. So that's all I was saying and I was saying for that don't allow the sense to grow that everything now has become 'what's in it for me'.
POM. The ANC has to make sure that everybody is behind it in negotiations. We as the Communist Party would insert our voice as part of a countervailing force. You say 'to all the carpetbaggers who are trying to come in'?
MM. You know who came in.
MM. All the Bantustan parties came in.
POM. Well that's the way you would have it.
MM. We wanted it that way but we were under no illusions that they were bloody crooks. They had no faith, they had no commitment to democracy.
POM. If you didn't grab a man De Klerk would go and grab him.
MM. So I was saying here we need to do that, yes, everybody is welcome but don't think that that means that if Mangope says he's coming in that means we're now going to dilute our bridging of democracy. Or let's say the party should be ensuring that each voice has the full working class and youth behind it. That would straightaway make it that voice would be in majority.
POM. I wouldn't use 'working class' because 30% of people are unemployed, the working are the elite, they're working people.
MM. You know what I'm trying to say.
POM. Yes. When you introduce the people to the crowd as a member of the interim leadership and say why, he says, "But everybody in the country is looking up to you." You disappeared in 1964, you're underground.
MM. You must remember, Padraig, that as Secretary of the ANC underground in 1977, Biko dies, I'm still transcribing Madiba's autobiography. St Paul's Cathedral memorial, a big memorial in London, Chief Representative Reggie September has differences with the organisers, Black Consciousness, the ANC. He says, "These BC people." I say, "Whatever it is we can't be seen as not being at the memorial."
POM. Not being at the memorial for?
MM. Steve Biko. Reggie's answer was, "You do it." So I do it. UDF is formed, the Delmas trial takes place. Everything's on a tape recording that I made of a video that involved me on UDF is used as defence. The NUSAS delegation that arrived when Moses Mabida (General Secretary of the party) died, I was on my way to the Mabida funeral when I'm told, "No, no, no, in Harare a delegation of the National Union of Students has arrived. Will you go in the delegation and meet them and have discussions?" So I go. That's the meeting at which Ruth Mompati, Mavis Twala when the issue of gays comes up, describe homosexuality as a disease. When it comes home the NUSAS delegation with that, saying, "You know, Mac Maharaj there were ANC leaders saying that homosexuality is a disease." Wherever you go from the position of Secretary of the Internal I'm becoming known here and JS is saying, for example, "You were present when you and I announced that the party was going to be legalised, it was going to take up the legal space."
POM. I'm sorry, I know what I'm getting at and that is we're failing to distinguish between I would say it would be the masses and the people who were active, everybody who was active knows about you. I'll leave it at that, OK.
MM. The majority of the activists in the country.
POM. "My name wasn't there and at the end of it I won't be saying anything but I will have gone into retirement." But you were resigning?
MM. You know Padraig I've always used the word 'retiring'. The reason was simple in my mind. I didn't want it to be asked, do you now disagree with the principles that underlie the ANC or the party?I don't. The idea of equality, the idea of national liberation, the idea that people should not be exploited, that type of society remains something I dream of. What I was disagreeing with is the tactics and the path that they were taking. At that stage I was not prepared to say, as I am now prepared to say, that I don't agree with the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. I don't think that's an expansion of democracy any more, but at that stage I was not saying that. I was saying I'm retiring, I'm not going to say anything about you, I'm not going to hurt you.
POM. That just leaves me, it arises some place else, but I read the other night you know what I do for my Sunday night reading? You know when people are relaxing or whatever, I was reading Joe Slovo "How Socialism Failed". I got to bed early that night.
MM. You had the courage to still read it.
POM. Now he kind of goes around in circles over a number of issues. He says the SACP is a democratic organisation. Well it's a secret organisation and secret organisations by their nature are now you elect people to the Central Committee right? But nobody knows who's on it. The Central Committee elects the Politburo but the Central Committee doesn't know. So it's a peculiar kind of
POM. Here we have free elections, who won? Oh I don't know but it's a good one.
MM. I told you at the heart of that is the problem that even now if you went to some comrades, if you went to a person like Kathrada and said the underground Communist Party needed a constitution, he would say it's a contradiction in terms. He says what constitution? Yet the issue arose in the early eighties and we adopted the constitution but we had a big fight about it.
POM. That's fine, we have a chapter on that too.
MM. So I'm saying yes but that's not because of the inherent thrust of communism, that's because of the external condition of the power that is in force making you illegal so that you can't exist except in the underground and the rules of the underground have to be such that you protect yourself from the powers that be and that forces you
POM. But in Britain where the party was legal, a cell was a cell and nobody knew who was in the next cell?
MM. I was in Britain in 1957 in the party, I was in a special section for the colonies, everywhere else branches were open. They would advertise their meetings, you could walk in, you could just pay your membership fee and be a member.
POM. I thought you had to be looked at first.
MM. No, no, there was no blackballing system.
POM. They didn't take anyone who came along.
MM. Yes they did. Look, they did a screening but they couldn't just turn you down just like that. The screening was, do you believe in this thing? Do you seriously believe in the cause of communism? Because your first line is that you commit yourself to the belief. So that was all. But it was open, it was known. Its congresses were open. Yes the congresses would go into a closed session where the media must leave but at the end of that they'll tell you the following people were elected to theCentral Committee, the following people were elected to the Politburo.
POM. So in Britain, you see I came to this point later, is that part of the thing I made when I discuss communism is that South African communists because so many had been in Britain in particular and the party was there for so long, that it was open to different kinds of influences that made it a different kind of party, a party that would be indigenous let's say to the USSR that was coming out of the Tsarist era with no history of democracy or democratic institutions.
MM. Or even of a capitalist society, because Russian society was just -
POM. A feudal system.
MM. The South African party was not an anomaly in that sense, all the parties from the British colonies grew up from that contact in London and the parties in the French colonies grew up with that contact with Paris. The thing is that the SA party was driven into clandestine existence at a time when all over the colonies communist parties were coming into existence legally and the SA party came from legality and was driven into illegality. So it had to go through a mindset change. Whereas most had to go from illegality to legality, the SACP had to go from legality to illegality when all its friends were surviving now legally in India, Malaysia, Britain.
POM. I suppose that's at one level but at another level when you're in Lusaka some members of the NEC can be looking at the next member and saying, I wonder is he a member of the Central Committee or the Politburo, that there wasn't a mutual exchange of information between the two, that OR never said, OK, just for the record hands up all who belong to we're all democrats here, hands up members who belong to the Central Committee, hands up people who belong to the Politburo, so everybody kind of was working together on a level working field.
MM. The environment abroad in Africa, in head office, was such that people used to laugh, we used to have a laugh. Once in a while there'd be a statement, I suppose throughout my stay abroad from 1977 there were two occasions when a statement was released saying, "A delegation of the ANC and of the SA Communist Party met", experiences and assessments of the development because our comrades were going for training in the socialist countries, they were all coming back well disposed towards communism.
POM. To be communists. Who in the MK wasn't?
MM. Now of course you will hear people saying, I didn't like this and I didn't like that.
POM. Sure - I knew at the time something was wrong.
MM. So there was no eyebrow raised. I think the real problem is that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the GDR, etc., created an environment where people would begin to say what did they think, and began to say how do I respond to these issues, to say I accepted everything was fine. You even hear some people saying that when they went to these countries they never had a chance to move about freely. They say that now. At that time to say it you would be criticised very severely by a person, you need not be in the party. Don't say bad things about the Soviet Union.
POM. Why was it sanctified in that way? Again I look at it, Mac, sometimes in terms of human responses, this is a country that's helping you, nobody else is; you're not going to piss on the people who are helping you, you just overlook what they're doing and say, hey, they're helping me, I want to do good things, therefore I'll project they must want to do good things too.
MM. Simple as that.
POM. I deny it and I don't see it.
MM. And if you saw it
POM. I rationalise it.
MM. Quite a few comrades got married to women in these respective countries, from Cuba, to GDR, to Hungary, to Romania, to Soviet Union and their wives are here now. And to the extent that they encountered racism they still encountered an environment that said we're opposed to racism. Therefore any trace of racism that you found you treated it as an aberration and you felt you needed to defend this friend because remember side by side we're saying these are our friends. We were also saying we're finding it impossible to get support from the US and from Britain and from France and from Germany. So that was the other side of the coin. We had no countervailing example to say, but look there are other parts of the world who are not socialist but who are friends of ours.
. That's why the Swedish example and Olaf Palme became so important to us because when Olaf Palme and the Social Democrats of Sweden really came to show that they were supporting us and we used to suspect that they are putting conditions of social democracy on us, mainly you don't have anything to do with the communists, but Olaf Palme was amongst the first to adopt that position. When I was in Britain in 1957/58/59, trying to work with the British Labour Party the question for them was, "Are you working with the communists?" Olaf Palme of Sweden said, "It's unimportant, we support your cause in SA. We are not communists but we support your cause." And the moment he took that position you see a good disposition in the ANC towards the Swedes.
. So you are right, just a normal human reaction and no amount of theorising provides any answers to that. It just says it was the right soil.
POM. I'll be back next week. You have that chapter, right? Go through it.Oh we have done this in fact.
MM. 24th I'm in hospital. In July, probably near the end of July.
POM. You arrived on 1 August.
MM. Between that exit and my return in February what type of interaction continued between Lusaka and home? Was it just nuts and bolts or were there strategic discussions going on? I have a suspicion that strategic discussions were going on.
POM. OK, that's in the second part. Got it, OK.
MM. Preceding my exit for that visit, November 1988 to July 1990 in that period we're looking for the letter. We're also looking for, in that period we're looking for the final version of this report which is in the notes of JS and OR because that's a note form you've got, draft. The final version will be more fleshed out. It's like JS and OR are meeting and he's made notes and then OR goes back and says, please do this. So final drafting JS would dictate to whoever is So let's get the version, if we could get it it would be jackpot. You could say here's the draft, it shows that JS and OR are discussing, preparing, and finally when they fully write it up there's the version that comes out. We are looking for, it would really, really, be jackpot if we could find that.
POM. Madiba's letter.
MM. Madiba's letter, the briefing to Madiba, not the Harare Declaration, the briefing or the briefing to Govan or the briefing to Harry. One of those three briefings, particularly the briefing to Govan and the briefing to Madiba. But the Madiba one would be jackpot because that would tell you how OR was reading the negotiations set up.
POM. The negotiations in terms of?
MM. Prospects, dangers, positive sides.
POM. What he was getting back from Mandela too.
MM. Yes, all that encapsulated in his notes because OR pre-eminently would be expressing a view, even if it's expressed as his view, it is a viewpoint where he would be taking the responsibility of ensuring that he's drawing from everybody and holding everybody together. JS as General Secretary of the party would be more what he thinks, what the party thinks, straight that way, and how and why we support the ANC. It's OR's briefing that you want.It's important for us because it tells us Thabo and them are having discussions at Mells Park, because OR would not be talking in two different tongues, one side to Madiba and the other side to Thabo.
POM. But does he know, have we ever established that OR knew about these talks? That's never been established.
MM. There's no independent confirmation of that but I am sure that if we searched his papers at Fort Hare we would find that.
POM. I may have to do that. Where are Slovo's papers?
MM. I don't know, you'd better ask Helena. The Slovo papers are still with the party, with Blade Nzimande, General Secretary of the party.
POM. They might contain material relating to Vula. They would?
MM. They would.
POM. This is taken from a file, the file name is 'S24 February'. Disk name is E8.
MM. It's a thing dated 24 February from me to K, which is Slovo, and it makes the following points:(i) thanks for the NEC minutes and the report of the mess up re corps plus subsequent decision re expanded corps. Made a quick printout of this and sent it to Masher (that's to Billy) to give same to Kathy to read to X, to give same to Kathrada to read to X which is Carmela.
POM. Which is who?
MM. Walter Sisulu, with the request that it be passed on to Sipho (which is Mandelawho arrives here tomorrow 11 am and leaves with Walter Sisulu for Bloemfontein at 12.30 same day. I was informed that on Monday they all, including Walter, leave for Lusaka. Regret it would be impossible to expect the corps of five. You see Lusaka has responded to my criticism and it is saying, oh yes, there was a corps set up, it was a mess up, there's the word mess up re the corps, plus subsequent decision re expanded corps. Then I say, I'm showing this to them but I say that the five cannot meet, that's Madiba, Walter, Govan, Ray, myself, because Slovo is out of town.
POM. Is this 24 February?
MM. Yes. I say it's not possible for them to meet under these movements. It will be impossible to expect the corps of five to meet to send collective views before Tuesday. Besides logistics of the matter and whether the other four will have time there is the security aspect regarding how Theo could join them at a meeting.
POM. Theo being?
POM. Yourself, Mac.
MM. Hope you are not forgetting that Theo is illegal here. So clearly there was a suggestion that the five should meet and I'm saying it's not to happen before they leave for Lusaka.
. Next point, (ii): have looked at the above report.
POM. That's the report that they sent you?
MM. Sent me explaining the mess up and everything.
POM. Over the appointment of the interim leadership?
MM. Yes. I've looked at this report with Karl and Masher (with Gebhuza and Billy Nair). All three are disquieted by the report. As for Theo, let me report that he has informed Karl and Masher that he is immediately RETIRING from the ANC and SACP (block capitals 'retiring'). Also he has informed (that is 24 February) X (that's Walter), likewise by means of a note. Decision is neither discussable nor revocable. Have transferred command Karl. Will need a maximum of four weeks to transfer all matters. Give Karl as much help to take over, possibly assist with Daniel entry if it takes place within that time limit that I have given myself.
POM. Daniel would be?
POM. It has to be.
MM. Meantime please take formal note of this decision. By this Sunday/Monday proper formal letter of retirement will be sent to both organisations from Jessie's after I get there tomorrow (that's from Johannesburg). You are free to do with it whatever you think best, whether to place it before the NEC and PB or not. Meantime ask you for the following help: please arrange with Big S (which is Shubin) to have visa and ticket available at Delhi for Ebrahim Shaik (the spelling is here), a ticket available at Delhi for Ebrahim Shaik, allow entry to Soviet Union to resume appearance, collect Indian passport, facilitate UK visa including help of the UK Chief Rep., plus ticket from Soviet Union to UK. Please inform me when I can expect visa and ticket in Delhi. Do not propose to come to Lusaka or meet with either organisation. Retirement takes effect with immediate effect. Other aspects will be dealt with in the formal letter to follow.No public disclosure at this stage that Theo has been in the country. Will keep to legend so as to minimise any ill effects to the movement. In period effecting transfer to Karl will keep minimal line open with you all for exiting purposes. Otherwise please communicate with Karl at lobby. (iii) Strongly urge you to keep Karl briefed timeously. Please send him PMC report which forms basis of NEC and NWC discussions. All for now. Signed off.
POM. Good. Now we have it. The interview that I was looking at last night, I was looking at a little thing I'd done with Kathrada and Kathrada said that you had retired from the SACP, he said, before you left the ANC. And I said, "Before?" He said, "Yes. That's my memory, it was before. He was threatening to retire from the National Executive and then Madiba asked me to talk to him and then he asked Walter and he got nowhere and then Madiba said, 'OK I'll take care of it myself'." This is like a mantra. They must have all said, you know we're back on Robben Island again, first me, then Walter, you know what?
MM. He's complaining, there was no chance. Because you can see here that I am saying, I give their movements and interesting, just let me get the calendar. February, what did I say 1990? Here it is. This is written on 24 February which is a Saturday and I say I made a printout, I gave it to Billy to give it to Kathy so that Kathy can read it out to Walter and with the request that Walter pass it to Mandela who arrives here tomorrow 11 am, that's Sunday. And then he leaves with Walter for Bloemfontein at 12.30 the same day, which is Sunday. Was informed that on Monday, which is 26th, all of them including Walter, will be leaving for Lusaka. So it's impossible therefore to meet before Tuesday. So they went to Lusaka on 26/27th, they left Jo'burg. Walter was in the trip, Kathy was in the trip, Mandela was in the trip. Clearly this matter is now raised from Slovo on that side. When Madiba returns he asks to see me. So it looks like that retirement was just a bloody week, but that's the crucial week, before anything else could happen. So those are the dates, that report, and it's clear that I was giving it to Billy because the arrangements were already from the time of Walter's release while I was out of the country that the easiest way to reach Walter is through Billy because Billy is legal and yet Billy is connected with us so Billy can very easily travel and see Walter. So Billy was the conduit for that. Now there are other little bits like that, interesting.
POM. I'll go through every page, Mac.
MM. Quite a bit of interesting reading. The discussions on the way forward, a very interesting it's an assessment of Peter Mokaba.
POM. Another disk. Sorry, this discussion about the role
MM. The role of the underground. There's a response here, clearly a contribution to the debate. I'm just saying how I think it was Billy and Ronnie were seeing the matter but it's here
POM. Let me mark that.
MM. What we are missing.
POM. I'll go through it page by page anyway but just to make sure.
MM. The other thing was so here are samples of communications, not necessarily fully put in the same order but put in different places where they select particular communications to help identify, correctly identify the person. There's that one. This is on primarily the Indians that they were trying to look at. There's Chippy, the younger brother, the arms dealer. This is Zac Yacoob's wife.
POM. Pretty looking person.
MM. This is Ramgobin's wife, the granddaughter of Gandhi. But here, that's Chippy. This is Kevin, the chap who I was saying we trained in Cuba. This is Dr Pillay who was in touch with the panel beater. Dr Rajan Pillay was in touch with the panel beater who adjusted the petrol tanks. This is Khetso Gordhan but he was in Sussex at that time. This is Claudia's first husband. Dipak Patel. PG, Mo.
POM. I must say Mo looks a lot a better without hair.
MM. George S the President of the NIC, executive member. Zac Yacoob.
POM. Is this Pravin?
POM. He looks like a wild man there.
MM. Yunus Shaik. This is my first wife's brother, M J Naidoo. Thumba Pillay, now a judge. This is Shoots. This is the chap who has now been appointed Deputy Minister of Science & Technology.
POM. The name of the panel beater was Nirosh Singh. The panel beater was the guy who made
MM. Who did the adaptations of the tanks.
POM. Who adapted the tanks.
MM. This is Farieda Jadwad who is working with Tim Jenkin now. She used to also be driving, cover. She used to belong to the underground structures also in Durban. She's now in the computer business with Tim Jenkin. I don't believe that this is a photograph of
POM. Susan? It doesn't look like her at all.
MM. Not like her at all. Soraya Philips, here's her surname, Mo's first wife.
POM. What name does she go under now? Is she in Durban?
MM. She's in Jo'burg now, Foreign Affairs. This is Bricks, the late husband of Tootsie.
POM. That's Christopher Manye. He was known as Bricks.
MM. Also known as Bricks. And Nora, also known as Andy. This is Mo Shaik, known as Philip. This is Jacobs, photo missing, known as Shereen. This is Billy Nair, Chan Govander, Clifford Collings. This is once more the doctor that I was talking about.
MM. It turns out this is the woman who was driving the car who was going to collect arms that capsized near the toll plaza. This is Yunus Mohammed the lawyer, Zac Yacoob, Thumba Pillay who is now a judge, Jeremy Siebers, Ridwaan, Pravin again, Anesh married to Selina.
POM. Anesh Sankar. He's married to who now?
MM. Selina, the woman who was in intelligence and also driving. This is the late Mbuso Tshabalala. Mpho Scott. This is the late Charles Ndaba. This is David. Now the problem is Paul Goitsemang, oh yes you've got a photograph, this is Dipak Patel, also known as Glen. Here's Katherine. Now here's names of profiling that we were doing of people in every township, etc.
POM. Now these were on the disk, right?
MM. On different disks, yes. Then the list goes on and on. Ridwaan, this is Anant, Ndaba, Shoots, Pillay, Sandy Africa.
POM. Now Sandy is working where?
MM. Academy (??)
POM. She's in intelligence.
MM. Head of the academy. This is Alf Karim and Yunus Shaik, Mbuso again, Jabu, Sipho, Mo Shaik now without hair, PG, Kevin. This is a photograph taken in detention.
POM. That looks like Pravin, is it? Mpho Scott again.
MM. It is. Sbu Ndebele, Cliffie Collings, Mpho Scott, Mbuso.
POM. To read sections, choirmasters, what were they?
MM. What they found in the communications as a code name they tried now to insert who can they identify. Here's Paul Goitsemang. See how much alike he looks to his brother. That's Paul Goitsemang, came in from outside. Mbuso who was killed.
POM. That's Paul?
POM. That's the guy who was mentioned who was in the country. And he was the brother of?
MM. Yes, Mbuso Tshabalala, right?
POM. Curnick Ndlovo, Diliza Mji, Mo again, Pravin, Claudia Manning training. That's it.