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This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

September

SEPTEMBER 20

ZTTWOS4.DEC  IN BOOK No. 1

This is four

2.2     Our arrangements are as ff:  They'll be at the cinema on 27, 28, 29th of Sept. at 17.00 hrs.

2.3.1     Phone codes:

Ø     "Tell Tobile that Mandla would like to see her at.  From Lazarus."

Ø     Use your codes to signal venue.

Ø     Indicate exact time.

Ø     Meeting will be for next day.

2.3.2     For now:  Phone 42111 (MB hospital).  Ask for Ms Josephine Dlamini (also knows as Mrs Khumalo) of ward 10.  Leave aforementioned message.  This no. should be used from 23.9.89 to 30.9.89.

2.4     When Tot. returns we'll inform of new arrangements.

3.     Other matters:

3.1     Our lack of response to ZPC report:  In order to streamline work here and also too fend off growing pressure from other forces, the ff arrangement was made:  we pass ZPC reports directly to the IPC who are to respond, merely using the project as a conduit.  Since then there's been a response but one which I did not want to pass on to you…..

3.2     Tony and RK of IPC are meeting on Wednesday (20/9).  We'll send a response thereafter.

Send ff to Sipho:  from Shaun's father, on behalf of Presidential Committee:

"The National Executive Committee at yesterday's plenary session received a full report on Sipho's talks with the team.  There was unanimous approval for the way he handled the whole situation.  In particular, the meeting was overcome with his exposition of the movement's position on all the key issues in the document presented to the other side.  The meeting felt very strongly that if the document could be published without jeopardizing the "confidentiality" of the discussions, it would be a major mobiliser.  The other side has spread a great deal of misinformation about his positions.  Publication of the document could serve to correct wrong impressions.  If, however, he feels that such action is premature, the following alternate proposals are suggested:

Last one comes

SEPTEMBER 22

Date 89/09/22

This is four

2.3     Our arrangements are as ff:  They'll be at the cinema on 27, 28, 29th of Sept. at 17.00 hrs.

2.4.1     Phone codes:

Ø     "Tell Tobile that Mandla would like to see her at.  From Lazarus."

Ø     Use your codes to signal venue.

Ø     Indicate exact time.

Ø     Meeting will be for next day.

2.4.2     For now:  Phone 42111 (MB hospital).  Ask for Ms Josephine Dlamini (also knows as Mrs Khumalo) of ward 10.  Leave aforementioned message.  This no. should be used from 23.9.89 to 30.9.89.

2.5     When Tot. returns we'll inform of new arrangements.

4.     Other matters:

4.1     Our lack of response to ZPC report:  In order to streamline work here and also too fend off growing pressure from other forces, the ff arrangement was made:  we pass ZPC reports directly to the IPC who are to respond, merely using the project as a conduit.  Since then there's been a response but one which I did not want to pass on to you…..

4.2     Tony and RK of IPC are meeting on Wednesday (20/9).  We'll send a response thereafter.

Send ff to Sipho:  from Shaun's father, on behalf of Presidential Committee:

"The National Executive Committee at yesterday's plenary session received a full report on Sipho's talks with the team.  There was unanimous approval for the way he handled the whole situation.  In particular, the meeting was overcome with his exposition of the movement's position on all the key issues in the document presented to the other side.  The meeting felt very strongly that if the document could be published without jeopardizing the "confidentiality" of the discussions, it would be a major mobiliser.  The other side has spread a great deal of misinformation about his positions.  Publication of the document could serve to correct wrong impressions.  If, however, he feels that such action is premature, the following alternate proposals are suggested:

SEPTEMBER 24

FILE NAME [ZTFOURS1.DEC]     DATE [89/09/24]

Renold sends 4

1>     From Shaun to Sipho

\1\ A plenary session of the NEC has once again discussed the exchanges between you and the "team" in the light of the additional information contained in their reply.  We are launching a full investigation as to the source of the leak.  The document came to us in two stages.  (a) A report from the lawyer on the first portion (of about 5 pages) which was read but not circulated to a small NEC group selected by the president.  Unknown to us, the lawyer subsequently circulated these pages to a number of individuals in the MDM.  (b)  The first time that the document, or any part of it, was known to the NEC as a whole was at last weeks meeting.  At all stages the absolute confidentiality of the document was insisted upon and at the Lusaka end none other than the president and Shaun's father have ever had possession of the actual document.  We do not rule out the possibility of a deliberate lead by the team.

\2\     The NEC is of the view that a meeting between the two sides to work out pre-conditions for the creation of a proper climate for negotiations is premature and, especially in the light of recent developments, could have negative consequences.  The points we have in mind are the following.

\2.2\     The initiative launched by the NEC to gain acceptance of our negotiating concept has received overwhelming international endorsement.  It was accepted virtually without amendment by all the Frontline States and subsequently unanimously by the OAU which publicly identified the document as having been prepared by the ANC. Since then a similar endorsement was made at the Belgrade meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement.  At the OAU meeting the lone dissenting voice came from the head of PAC whose demagogical stand against any prospect of negotiation was rejected even by Mugabe.  Moves are now being considered to get the UN itself to accept the positions in the document.

\2.3\     A key element of the document (going to its very roots) is on insistence that the regime is obliged to take steps to carry out the pre-conditions upon which the document insists in order to create the atmosphere for the beginning of negotiations.  It is of the utmost importance to note that virtually all the leaders of the western world (U.S., U.K., France, West Germany etc) have, without referring to the actual document, accepted in their public pronouncements that the onus is on the regime to implement some or all of the conditions to open the way for meaningful negotiations.  Indeed Bush has threatened that unless this happens further sanction measures may be implemented.  Even the hardline Thatcher has been compelled by the force of international popular opinion to assert that she will find it difficult to maintain her stubborn opposition to sanctions if the regime does not fulfil some, at least, of the pre-conditions.  In her tour of Southern Africa she refused to include SA on her itinerary insisting that before she could go the pre-conditions such as the release of political prisoners would have to be met.  All this is of great significance for the forthcoming October Commonwealth Conference.

\2.4\     In the light of the above, a move by the ANC at this stage to engage in talks about pre-conditions would take the steam out of the unprecedented momentum which we have built up internationally on this question.  It would also provide an excuse to our reluctant "friends" (Bush, Thatcher, etc) to opt out of their more recent positions into which they have been pushed by popular pressure.  Many of our people may conceive it as a retreat, and it is likely to trigger off divisions within the MDM and between the MDM and those on its periphery.  We have to take into account that it has not been straight sailing to gain broad acceptance for the very concept of negotiations among our supporters in the MDM.  We have, in general, succeeded in allaying understandable suspicions and reservations.  If we are seen to move away from an insistence on the pre-condition measures (so universally accepted) we can expect a most unfortunate reaction.

\3\     Our insistence that the regime creates conditions to make the idea of "talks" meaningful is clearly not a tactical maneouvre, it goes to the very root of the problem.  As things stand at the moment only the regime has the freedom to consult.  We are all cut off from legality and deprived of any real possibility of meeting collectively with those of our leaders in the prisons and, on the ground, in the mass movement.

\4\     So far it is extremely uncertain whether De Klerk will move in any substantial way from the policies of his predecessors on the really fundamental issues.  What he has said before and after the election suggests a stubborn adherence to the concept that there will "never be majority rule" and a commitment to a constitutional mechanism which is not much of a departure from the old "Great Indaba".  We felt that the responses of the team to the 1st part of your document is not only insolent but confirms their "old thinking".  We believe that their implied readiness to contemplate talks with the ANC about pre-conditions is designed to depose escalating international pressure.

\5\     The NEC stresses that it has no reservations whatsoever about your initiatives to engage the enemy in the exchanges which have taken place.  We believe generally that the question of negotiations is a terrain of struggle in which we must also take the high ground.  We therefore believe that you should persist in your contact initiatives.  But for the reasons outlined we do not believe that, especially at this moment, is would be appropriate for us to agree to skip the stage of insisting that the regime takes measures not only to demonstrate its bona fides but also to create at least some of the key conditions in which we have the freedom to exist and consult without let or hindrance in preparation for possible negotiations.

\6\     You get well message to Timo will be delivered.  Your suggestions aboutg Adi and reducing his work burden are well-taken.  Shaun's father will be in Cleo next week and will update you on his condition.  Please also accept my personal affection, comradeship and brotherliness.  Its been too long but it does really look like we can get there.

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. Return to the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory site.