This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
ANC NEC Meeting, April 4
DECISIONS AND FOLLOW UP FROM THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ANC - 4-5 APRIL, 1991
1.. On Violence
*. Necessary to follow up on decisions of previous meetings regarding violence and see to implementation.
*. Look at the recommendations, particularly regarding structures, made in the memorandum submitted by Sydney Mufamadi.
*. Assess consequences and necessary steps to be taken if the government fails to meet the demands contained in the ultimatum.
*. President's Committee to obtain a report on the establishment of self-defence units.
*. Look into the question of some form of independent monitoring body on call when needed to go to crisis points and situations of potential/actual conflict.
*. Look at issuing a call to the people on what we expect them to do in response to the violence, relating to self defence and MK, plus soldiers and police who support peace. Advise DIP if this is to be done, and if so, in what form.
*. Ensure NEC meeting on strategic issues facing us other than the violence is convened.
*. Assessment required of implementation or lack of it of all our demands and agreements since Groote Schuur meeting, eg repeal of security laws.
*. Ensure proper communication and briefing of our members in all regions to ensure people are taken with us.
*. Ensure proper briefing of all appropriate bodies - church, diplomats, Cosatu, the SACP, influential individuals etc.
*. NEC Sub-committee to immediately contact Inkatha and activate PWV machinery to discuss growing tension and Inkatha strategy on the Reef. Nkadimeng to do this, and also to contact Mdlalose and inform him. Inkatha strategy to be put on agenda of next 12-a-side meeting.
2.. On the Draft Constitution
*. Check that the draft constitution has been sent to all regions for discussion.
*. Electoral Commission to take rate of illiteracy into account in voting methods.
*. Office of the Secretary General to advise all regions of the basic principles and procedures of branch and regional representation at conference, and explain nomination procedures in accessible terminology.
3.. On Somafco
*. Adult education programme for MK cadres to be determined and provided, using Somafco and Dakawa
*. Ensure closure of the primary school and placement of pupils in alternative institutions.
*. Decision of meeting is to advise donors that ANC plans phasing out within a 2-5 year period. It is the responsibility of the Education Department, with the Office of the Secretary General, to see to all the implications of such a decision. Get report from SGO and Education Department on exactly what steps are going to be followed in this regard, to be addressed by the Working Committee where necessary.
4.. On NEC Agenda
*. NEC meetings must be called with proper notification so members can plan properly.
*. Agenda should be such that it can be managed within the time allocated. Duration of meeting must take agenda into account. If to be more than one day, must be pre-arranged.
*. Tripartite meeting to be held on 29 April. Discuss agenda proposed by Cosatu and determine ANC input.
ANC NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING - 4 APRIL, 1991
Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo, TT Nkobi John Nkadimeng, Reg September, Christmas Tinto, James Stuart, Thabo Mbeki, Gertrude Shope, Aziz Pahad, Stanley Mabizela, Josiah Jele, Andrew Mlangeni, Mohamed Valli, Ahmed Kathrada, Sizakele Sigxashe, Joe Nhlanhla, Tony Mongalo, Jackie Selebi, Joe Modise, Tomothy Mokoena, Joel Netshitenzhe, Pallo Jordan, Zola Skweyiya, Chris Hani, Jeff Radebe, Jacob Zuma, Jackie Molefe, Mathew Phosa, Arnold Stofile, Behson Fihla, Robert Manci, Elias Motsoaledi, Kgalema Motlanthe, Sindiso Mfenyana, Henry Makgothi, Willis Mchuna, Ezra Sicwele, Harry Gwala, Sydney Mufamadi, Caleb Motshabi, Zakes Molekane
Comrade Mandela welcomed the members, declared meeting open and asked for apologies
Mzwai Piliso (in hospital), Dan Tloome (in Lusaka), Ruth Mompati (WDF congress in London), Steve Dlamini (no explanation), Steve Tshwete (apologised, visiting E. Cape), Wilton Mkwayi (in Ciskei), Govan Mbeki (no explanation), Raymond Mhlaba (no explanation) Vusi Khanyile (will come late), Simon Makana (no explanation).
1.. Report on violence. This is the main issue on the agenda and of crucial importance. Will also report on meeting held by NM and Buthelezi last weekend.
2.. Report of the NPC for conference. An additional report relating to the ANC constitution by Cmde Slovo.
3.. Report on the All Party Congress
4.. Report on the Somfaco Project
Report on Violence
Draft memo to De Klerk read by Secretary General
Propose the memo from SM be read, and after that discussions be held. Agreed.
NM's report on meeting with Chief Buthelezi
Suggested meeting to discuss nature of problem and measures to deal with situation. Suggested a one-to-one meeting to be free to look into these matters. Met at Durban Royal Hotel. First point made was that the violence now escalating in the country is an indictment to the black leadership as a whole, and that this is not the time to be apportioning blame to one another. We must accept a collective responsibility for what is going on, and we should discuss problems in that spirit.
Secondly, pointed out that we should be clear as to the nature of the problem facing us. Firstly, an element of faction fighting between black political organisations, particularly Inkatha/ANC. In some instances there is even a clash between Zulus and Xhosas. And it is necessary to recognise that there is a third force at work.
He said that when we provide him with facts regarding the allegation of third force, he will deal with this. NM pointed out there was not time to give details about third force, but pointed to Sebokeng and Alex vigil attacks. Asked if these attacks were conducted by Inkatha. He said no, it was contrary to African custom to launch such an attack, because once there is death, even between fighting parties, a truce would be declared. Therefore such attacks could not be committed by any of the black political parties involved. He said that while this allegation might be correct, he would want to place it before Inkatha central committee.
NM then said there is the unacceptable method of crowd control when dealing with blacks, unlike when dealing with whites. Pointed out that the pattern is very clear in this regard (elaborated and time spent on this in meeting with Buthelezi). Spelt out connivance of the government in the slaughter going on and in the actions of Inkatha. Explained efforts to alert the security forces to impending attacks, eg letters to Vlok and Van der Merwe regarding the first Sebokeng attack, which appealed to police to not allow armed men into the township to launch an attack. Asked De Klerk why police did not act, why no arrests and why had he failed to come out with a public statement condemning the massacre and expressing his sympathy to the bereaved. De Klerk could not respond. Examples also given of train attacks, despite warnings to police, and the occupation of Zonkezizwe and driving out of residents. Matter raised with Vlok and De Klerk, who were told that it is known who occupied the shacks previously, and who now occupies the shacks, including all possessions. Why no police action against such criminal action. Vlok's response was "whose land is it?" This has also happened in hostels, including demanding joining fees, and in Alexandra where shacks have now been occupied forcibly, including the people's possessions. This is the building of no-go areas.
Clear pattern emerging that the government is not prepared to take action. Told Buthelezi that he is deeply involved here, because it is no use telling me that these things are not known to the Inkatha leadership. Said that we had assumed that Buthelezi knew, but accept that he did not, but does now. Perception created that Inkatha is now establishing presence where it has no members. It cannot do so by just calling meetings, but is doing so by force. Our view is that Inkatha is doing something improper. We said this is a situation we cannot tolerate, and want to talk to him about it. We have to deal with measures to put an end to the violence. First step should be phasing out of hostel system and transformation into family units.
Buthelezi said he had been approached by ANC and Inkatha members, disturbed by hostel system proposal to be disbanded. We said this is a phased approach. Also we insist legislation be passed in the present parliament declaring the carrying of cultural and modern weapons in public prohibited. Buthelezi then wanted to call in Zuma and Mdlalose. NM pointed out that when he went to prison there was no carrying of cultural weapons, it is a new phenomenon. Weapons are not carried going to work or church. We cannot allow the carrying of cultural weapons, which is a major cause of the extent of deaths. We cannot solve this problem if we do not call for legislation making it a criminal offence. Matter discussed and they indicated it would be a matter discussed by Inkatha CC. In statement issued we merely say the possibility of the existence of a third force had been looked into. He accepted that such a force existed, and would take it back to his organisation, as would the question of cultural weapons carrying.
Report of impending attacks in certain townships on the Reef was made. Reported to generals Erasmus and Swart, and Buthelezi also informed. He was to contact his men to see to it that whatever attacks being prepared should be stopped.
Report by Walter Sisulu on meeting with Vlok of 3 April, 1991
Three members of the delegation met him three weeks ago. This meeting was to put certain propositions to Malan and Vlok, where it was indicated that there was a very grave situation in the country which the government should take responsibility for. Proposed that the question of carrying traditional weapons was endangering peace and was unacceptable to us. Something had to be done. Secondly, hostels were endangering peace being used as base for attacks on communities, and wanted them phased out and transformed. Thirdly, the fact that the government was unable to arrest criminals, even when perpetrators clearly identified, was unacceptable. If the ANC was doing any of the above, there would be strong action taken.
Yesterday's meeting was led by the Alexandra community (Popo Molefe). Discussions were worse than ever before. Vlok behaved like a dictator and tried to reduce the discussion to trivialities. Question of cultural weapons took a long time. Vlok was defending use of cultural weapons, but would put the matter to Inkatha. Meeting very inconclusive and produced no real results. Very defensive of Inkatha, and emphasised that the issue was something we had to resolve between ANC and Inkatha, while the police were above the conflict. Meeting re-emphasised how Inkatha was being used against us.
Further, necessary to deal with the way Vlok behaved, tyrannically and offensively. On cultural weapons, put to them that if we were to say to our supporters that from now on you assemble and march with weapons, they met this with stony silence. Point made was the contempt for black life. In Alex alone 103 dead since March 8. Said that in Alex they have a laboratory situation with which to work, yet no investigations or arrests. Yet in Eastern Transvaal, when three whites killed, reward offered and massive police deployment. In essence the meeting was disgusting, and at the level of the police we have not got a chance in relation to Inkatha if we leave it to them.
Very clearly ANC facing difficult and dangerous situation. Great deal of dissatisfaction and criticism of the lack of firm and clear response from us. This comes from our most loyal and even senior members. President's Committee met and reviewed the situation. Decided to call this meeting. On evidence before us no useful purpose to continue to draw attention of the government to prevailing situation. Taking advantage of the situation to enhance their position. We cannot allow this to go on. We must come out of this meeting with a response to shock the government into action. But before we address that situation, at the end of this issue we must be able to take a response to put us in a position we occupied when De Klerk made his first statement. He must not be able to seize the initiative as has been the case up to now. In our concern to keep negotiations on track we have made serious mistakes in trying to preserve negotiations. We must say we have decided to stop the violence and actions of the government, and our response must be commensurate with the seriousness of this nature. Notwithstanding the all-round offensive against us, we are a strong organisation and we can bring even greater unity by taking a firm and clear line to be a warning to the government that it cannot continue to behave in this way.
Adjournment for Tea Discussion
Worry was that we have called a meeting like this, while there is a repetition of previous decisions. Question is why have we not implemented decisions taken last time? We will come to the same conclusions. Problem is our implementation, or lack of it. Otherwise we will go over the same ground.
Our problem is slightly different. To put it bluntly is whether we should continue talking to the government in the light of the crisis facing us. This is the question facing us. To my recollection we have not posed and discussed this question except in a meeting of the NEC held earlier. This is what we are meeting here to face.
Then we should not go over the whole area, but focus on the question itself.
We need to decide whether the memo to De Klerk is to be discussed now, or after we discuss our approach to negotiations.
Memorandum should be read later. We need to have a general discussion. Sydney's memorandum should come first.
The purpose is to discuss our response as part of the question of continued talking to the government. Sydney's memo discusses wider issues. Inclined to accept suggestion of discussing negotiations first, then the memo to De Klerk.
I don't think we can be a drafting committee here. Idea of being a drafting committee is correct way to proceed. Need general discussion, to be started by President's Committee which has already had prior discussions on whether we continue talking. They should elaborate their views here. All associated questions can then be discussed. In the end decide what to do. If we must submit a memorandum, this gathering is too large.
But a draft is available and corrections can be made by all contributions, while a drafting committee can then formulate afterwards. Accept President's Committee lead discussion.
Support WS. Sydney's memo stresses need for coherent voice, and this is only possible if we have had a discussion on the violence. Our way forward can only arise out of this discussion as its conclusion so that all present are of one view, which can then be included in the memorandum.
Agreed that the PC will present its views, hold discussions fully and then look at the memo. Call on JS to outline views of the PC.
The PC considered the fact that the ANC faces its gravest crisis since February 1990. Points raised in both memos. In summary felt that our inaction in the face of a concerted offensive against the ANC is creating a gap between the leadership and the membership, and between the ANC and the people. For that reason an emergency meeting was called of extended NEC. The PC recorded that there have been previous meetings discussing similar problem. On each occasion we have come out with militant statements warning the other side that what is happening is endangering the peace process. View was expressed that we have, whether intended or not, created the perception, even in the government's mind, and in our supporters mind that we are so hooked into the negotiations that all we will do is issue condemnatory statements but go on with the process. Feeling was that we ought to consider what steps we should take if there is no response from the government to our demands. In essence, issue an ultimatum. The DP's views are that we should work out at this meeting a set of demands which we would place before the public, the government and the world, unless by a specific date (2 May) certain steps have been taken, we will take our own steps in relation to the negotiations. No question of calling the whole thing off, but to take appropriate steps. For instance suspension of talks at time of Sebokeng massacre prior to April 11. Measures within the negotiating process can play an important role in getting us out of the syndrome of allowing the government to have the upper hand.
Issues mentioned were that by May 2 (after 30 April deadline) to demand legislation be introduced to deal with cultural weapons, to be satisfied that the process of phasing out hostels will have commenced, that we must get satisfactory assurances from police about crowd control. These are just examples. This meeting must decide on proposals. It should be done in such a way that the whole process is not jettisoned, but steps taken to really see that some of the issues are addressed so that the government and our people are aware that we are not wedded to the negotiations willy nilly.
Extract from Viljoen's speech read on unconditional amnesty.
Did the PC, in the light of an ultimatum given, consider the consequences if they do not carry out demands.
Proposals include, for further action, suspension of all discussion on the APC, on the constitution etc.
Will take meeting back and run into conflict with the approach adopted by chair, so please indulge me. The memorandum prepared by the National Committee on Violence is what should inform our discussion even given the input now by the PC meeting. The memorandum characterises the violence as counter-revolutionary, drawing analogies between contra violence, it refers to the various agencies that the state has established in its counter-insurgency programme. In light of all that, it says that there is no third force, there is only one force, and that is the state. If assumed that this is correct, the question arising is that if this analysis correct, is one going to persuade such a state pursuing such a programme to desist from doing that by making the kind of demands we are making eg phasing out of hostels, stopping of carrying of cultural weapons. Or is the likelihood the fact that this is an aspect of state strategy whose purpose has not yet been attained. If approached from this viewpoint the options are very different from withdrawing from APC and other discussions. The conclusions we come to will also be very different, such as placing it at the door of the regime as to whether it does the things demanded. It is only if one is looking at what is happening as if it were an aberration then the PC approach is valid. But if Sydney's approach is valid, then the approach must be different. For their part talking and violence is part of the same strategy. We will talk and murder at, the same time, raising Inkatha as an ally. Withdrawal of talks will not alarm them. What we need to answer is the means to stop the counter-revolutionary violence. It does not exclude the measures proposed by the PC, but they do not question the regime's role and hand behind the violence. Nothing spontaneous about the violence. They are behind Inkatha and what they are doing. Objective is to destroy the ANC and prevent and stop campaigns and growth of people's power. We have to devise a means to stop them. The PC proposals do not tackle the issue.
Everyone is aware of the contents of the memo. What is important here is what are you suggesting in the light of the observations of the memo should be our response.
We have to agree on is whether that approach is correct or not. We must come to a consensus on the perspective of the violence.
I want you to give a perspective. We are faced with a practical question and we need to give a response. State to us what are your own views on the character of this onslaught.
This is not a fair request. Against my better judgment I will proceed. Firstly, we would have to devise certain demands which are going to directly point a finger at the government and its responsibility for the violence. Call for the removal of Magnus Malan from all posts, all officers in SADF responsible for CCB and hit squads, demand disbandment of the irregular forces of regime, Battalion 32, Koevoet and Askaris, public and visible disbandment, closing down training centres and camps, demand a commission, nonracial and multi-party to supervise their dissolution, establish a commission of inquiry, independent and non-racial to look into all complaints of misconduct by police and security forces, establish non-racial civilian review board to supervise complaints against the police. Must begin campaign, suggested by the NCV, to gather all necessary information to be placed before SA people and the world, demonstrating culpability of regime and Inkatha as its arm. Leave it to the commission on self defence to make its report.
Are you excluding Vlok deliberately?
You can add him if you want.
Faced with the crisis not of violence, but of credibility, because the people of SA have always looked on the ANC to lead them. The people are very angry with us, because we have one of the best leadership in the country, if not internationally, tried and tested leaders who are looked upon to guide this vehicle to freedom. People began by being confused, but are now disillusioned because certain things are not explained to them. If I follow Cmde Pallo, he is coming up with very good suggestions, but they leave out the people. They do not involve the masses. Commissions, demands etc are good, but where do the masses come in. Sydney's committee comes out with a very important point i.e. conception. How do we conceptualize the present phase of our revolution? What forces are involved in all this? At a meeting in Durban between NM and Buthelezi this question of 3rd force was mentioned. In the region of Natal I come from, there is no third force. Attacks are carried out directed by the warlords themselves. The two important players as far as Inkatha is concerned are the chiefs and the ZPs, not Mdlalose. Then you get the hit squads. In the final analysis this so-called third force is organised by the police itself. In Pietermaritzburg the riot squad goes to the camp where the people of Richmond are housed. They pick up a boy from the gate, take him to Ntombela's area, and shoot him dead there. Complaints we receive indicate the riot squad. Before the ANC and other organisations were unbanned, most criminal elements were informers. Now they are unbanned, they can no longer inform. But now, under the direction of the police, they go and destabilise. These elements pretend they are not in the pay of the police. Wherever you try to organise the ANC, there is trouble.
Another thing causing confusion is that we do not take the masses with us. There is the DP meeting with Buthelezi. He has given us the report. But it was an unnecessary meeting. It has not advanced the struggle one inch. All it has done is give credibility to Buthelezi. Inkatha is propped up by the government, but we have played a major part in building Inkatha, given recognition to Buthelezi, Ntombela and others, saying come, let us talk to you. We do not have one conception of the real issues involved. Some of us thought that the struggle was between the ruling class and the forces of liberation. Now that the regime is mustering all forces in its defence, we do not clarify the stage of struggle. We go and talk about blacks fighting blacks, giving us a bad name. This is not the issue. We seem to be abandoning some of the decisions we have taken. No one can quarrel with us that we have been to meet Inkatha. We wanted to prove that it would continue the violence even after our meeting. We are now giving an impression that if we come together with members of Inkatha things will come right. There was an Inkatha meeting on 24 March, where the very people who attended the January 29 meeting were calling ANC a Xhosa organisation, telling the people they should clear out of Richmond because it belongs to Gatsha. How far do you go with these people? But we seem to be giving them credibility, not exposing them. We are disarming the people because we talk of self defence, but do nothing about it. The question is what do we do about it?
The memorandum places the responsibility on the government, with Inkatha as a major player. The proposed Troika being backed up by the DP confuses the people. We need a similar interpretation of the situation to know how to go about the way forward. Otherwise we will speak with many tongues. We cannot say as the ANC that t he talks are off. But we can put specific demands, and even call for suspension. While doing this we should go all-out to build the organisation so it is capable of defending itself when attacked. We are not building this capability. In all areas under attack the chiefs play a major role in hampering organisation. Will we continue with these meetings with Inkatha pretending we are achieving our objectives?
What was put to me was that Buthelezi has suggested a meeting between him, me and De Klerk. This is a proposal I made to the leadership when I visited Natal for the first time last year. I said to them that Buthelezi, De Klerk and myself should visit all the strife-torn areas to find out what is happening. Everyone agreed to the suggestion, including Comrade Gwala. This is what I was responding to as "reasonable". Buthelezi has now in his press statement suggested the creation of a troika, a body consisting of these three people. This was never the intention as it goes no further than the three should jointly visit areas.
Any serious revolutionary movement has to review its work, and this is what we are doing. Events in the last 12 months have moved very fast, and the movement has adopted certain strategies and tactics to hasten the downfall of the system. But in the process there have been other developments as the enemy wants an outcome that will not favour the ANC. We decided correctly on initiating negotiations. I want to analyze the results of the path trodden so far. I want to say that the memo is an important contribution to keep added pressures on the regime. But we need to agree in general with the characterisation of the situation as presented by Sydney, and with Gwala that we assess our own forces.
On the ground there is growing demoralisation and open cynicism, saying the ANC is not doing anything. We have advanced because of the unity and support of our people. One of the regime's targets is to divide and attack the ANC to remove the confidence of the people. Systematic campaign through the media to discredit the ANC as much as possible. We cannot go anywhere without the cohesive support of the people. How do we recapture lost ground? Building of ANC very slow because of violence and a number of other factors. We have to discuss how to win back the ground lost. We also have to state what form of struggle should we adopt in the coming few months. How do we raise morale? These are the two main issues that should confront us as the leadership of the ANC. The regime is even focusing on the June conference, wanting to create bickering, inciting members against the leadership, insinuations prevail. We agree that violence is one of the most important weapons the regime is using to generate a climate of intimidation and fear to prevent the ANC from building. Push out the ANC from its strongholds. Violence is their important weapon. Inkatha could not make advances without violence. But they also know they cannot call for violence, so there is a two-dimensional approach - present themselves as people who want peace, but have another layer, working with security forces, to provoke violence. They are able to do this because of the umbrella provided by the security forces. De Klerk appears above the conflict, which suits them all.
Faced with violence, the only option we have to defend our people is to build the capacity to do so. We will create the space necessary to build the organisation. Where we can fight back, we are able to regain ground.
We should send the memorandum to De Klerk on violence, saying talks are suspended. But there is another important question: how are we going to justify the present talks with Inkatha. Do we not need to make demands on them also? Reports of impending attacks and continued violence. If the accord is to work, Inkatha should do things such as no-go areas, such as in Zonkezizwe. We do not think they are negotiating in good faith if behaviour such as this continues. What of our campaign to disband the ZPs? This should be disbanded as they link up on the ground with the warlords and continued attacks on ANC members.
Lastly, key to mention that we must not give respectability to the government. Maintain stance that it is an illegal government, and that we want to have an interim government. Once there is a decision, we must monitor and get reports on all aspects, specially on the self defence units.
Apologised for coming late. Agree with presentation by Pallo. On Wednesday last week we were discussing violence in the country as a region, and our assessment was in tandem with the views presented, namely only one force, the state, using various appendages. It is a development from the old JMC strategy which were developed into the structures conducting the violence today. We had agreed, and wanted to put forward in writing to the NEC, to demand:
*. removal of Malan, Vlok and the ZPs
*. dismantling of agents of the state, CCB etc
*. even if disbanded, they would still be replaced by the state machinery, unless monitoring is possible.
*. can this monitoring be done? View was that the government will not do this, and would devise means to hoodwink us. We do not as ANC have the capacity. So we propose consideration of monitoring force composed of an international force. This was dependent on the international community assessing the situation, as it now seems to give great credit to De Klerk, rather than to us. We must regain this ground by involving them in monitoring the violations taking place.
*. cancellation of the talks should be contingent upon the government's response. Rejection should mean suspension.
The position of the ANC is that we can only enter into negotiations when a climate conducive to negotiations exists. This is an important strategic position. Regime has denied us access to the masses, while lifting the bans on the organisation. Serious limitations on discussions with our people. Key issue creating the problem we have now.
While DP was in prison, he said his release without a free political process would not make sense. This forced concessions. There is no climate for negotiations, even if by 30 April and prisoners are released. Present talks should continue but should be done at a different level. DP should not be part of these discussions. Must also say that De Klerk is not a man of credibility. Also, no unknown force, only the state. Move towards mobilisation inside and outside the country. Memorandum should be made public and sent around the world. Regime cannot afford for us to pull out of negotiations. Working groups should continue as they focus on release of prisoners. Essential for us to consult and discuss with all bodies, churches etc to build the forces for unity and patriotic front.
I want to raise the memorandum from Cmde Sydney. It has now been circulated. We are faced with rather sensitive problems and there has been an alarming amount of leakages with regard to matters discussed in the NEC and other meetings. These leakages are a source of acute embarrassment. It should be available while in discussion. But how should we handle it after the meeting.
Each person should write his name on the document, and at the end of the meeting it be returned. Agreed, also the other memorandum to De Klerk.
Agree with the characterisation of the violence. Regime engaged in two-pronged strategy: negotiations and destabilisation. Our weakness is that we pursue only a one-pronged strategy, without taking account of the other element of the regime's strategy. We should continue process of negotiations with the above proposals around commissions, disbandments etc. But we should also begin to develop a response to the other strategy, i.e. a defence capacity.
What about suspension of negotiations?
The talks must go on. If we decide to suspend talks, we must have something else in its place.
Our approach is that we issue an ultimatum, and if that is not done we then suspend or cancel.
The capacity of the regime to switch the violence on and off at will must be taken into account. If we issue memo, there is the possibility that they will meet some of the demands, but also possibility that violence can continue thereafter, eg no violence until 2 May, meet some conditions, but then violence starts. Need something in the memo that clarifies how we will deal with the situation if violence is switched on again. Then that the regime is pursuing a dual strategy. Go back to decisions taken at last meeting. To respond in a strategic way, as per decisions of previous meeting, what are the problems that led to our failure to implement the decisions of our meeting of 23 January. Must find ways to ensure decisions are implemented. In addition to the memo to De Klerk we should consider a call to the people, addressing what people should be doing in response to the violence, relating to self defence units, including MK cadres wherever they are, and soldiers and police who support peace, must support the people, and broader call to our people. 'Therefore not only addressing the government but also our people. While we are protesting about violence, De Klerk will be putting forward a concrete constitution, therefore he is seen to be making progress while we are protesting. How are we strategising for this, so we are proposing things that are positive as well. At the last extended meeting was called to discuss violence, and the next meeting discusses the same thing. But between there is no discussion on other strategies. Therefore we are being locked into the violence and not discussing other strategies.
You have not been specific on suspension or otherwise negotiations.
Agree with the approach of an ultimatum and suspension, but something in addition so that if violence starts we have an appropriate response to it.
Agree with things already said. Must be able to defend our people. President's Committee to go into this matter In favour of continuing talks with government and Inkatha. Not in favour of ultimatum being issued. Agree with formulation in memorandum.
Government's actions call into question its genuineness.
Memo must spell out conditions enabling free political activity, and unless violence is ended there will be no negotiations. Elections taking place under these conditions will make no sense whatsoever. There are also things we are beginning to miss. There are a lot of supporting issues that also need to be discussed. Must put a set of demands, and be clear about them so that there is no ambiguity, they are reasonable, legitimate and able to be supported internationally. At Groote Schuur we spoke of review/repeal of security laws. It is not on any agenda now, but it is critical to the present situation. If it goes into confrontation and there is mass action these laws are being kept in reserve for this purpose. We cannot afford to leave the laws intact. It is not accidental that they have not been repealed. Our own legal department gave details to the other side on this, question. It should be high on our demands. These laws must go. They are going to be used against us.
Some things the regime cannot defend internationally. Foreign forces, with bases inside SA, must be confined to barracks - Battalion 32, Koevoet, Zimbabwe and Mozambique - these are mercenaries and should be out of the country. This is an element in itself. Only after this do you come to the CCBs, which are the internal forces.
On the prisoners etc, the release as if it is someone's tender mercy, not as if it is agreement reached by two parties. By now we should only be dealing with what were termed grey areas. All the prisoners should have been released by 31 December.
On Inkatha: we have reached the point where we are in fact denying that red-head-band men belong to Inkatha. We cannot pretend it is not Inkatha. In Sebokeng 16 of the 20 people who attacked the vigil were from Inkatha and the hostels. We have to confront Inkatha in this regard.
On third force: initially we said it was part of the security forces. But we were not meaning people with red doeke. We are handling this incorrectly. It is clearly elements of the security forces. We must put a set of demands, but weigh the demands and be absolutely clear. We must reclaim the high ground. Must achieve something positive. In the perception is that while we cannot defend our people now, we will not be able to defend them in the future. Must do something about our defence units. The main thrust has to be the political thrust, while we build other strategies and forces. There is not a possibility of a military solution to our situation.
We must be careful not to widen the scope of the memorandum. We want to confine it to the violence. We are on strong ground to give an ultimatum, expressly warning them at the highest level about this crisis. This is the strength of our case and we should maintain the focus. We want to give them no room to manoeuvre.
We are putting more emphasis on the response to the government and not paying equal attention, or even more attention, to the response to the other side. There is a need to respond also to the needs of our followers and the people finding themselves in a helpless situation. But this is even more important in my view, for it is here that we get the demoralisation and confusion.
One of the most important things is to strengthen the organisation. This must start here. We take decisions and they are not conveyed or implemented. We are all individually failing to do this. When we take a decision such as this we must realise the consequences and implications. It is easy when the situation gets hot to blame others. This meeting must bring unity, to begin with. We must examine this strategy from all angles. I do not agree with the line put here that there is no third force. That assumes the government is involved. But it has aims different from the right wing. We must take note of the differences. The government clearly wants to govern on its own terms, and therefore needs Inkatha and will use it. Our propaganda and machinery must take into account the realities.
We must take into account the implications of our actions: comrades in prison and in exile. Any handling of the situation must take this into account. I agree with the memo as it stands. I would have liked to discuss the memo presented by Sydney, but have not read it properly. This memo to De Klerk must be limited to the items we want to achieve. We must move as one after this. We must try to have one mind, and remove the ideas which can still divide us. We must have one outlook for the strategic objectives facing us.
Eleven speakers so far. There is only one speaker opposed to an ultimatum and following it up with suspension or cancellation. All the speakers are in favour of taking action of the government fails to comply. We must now have speakers who do not agree. The other point we must discuss is the point by Valli about ongoing commissions. We have to discuss this approach. Now, is there anyone else opposed to the line put forward here, that we give an ultimatum and if it does not reply, we will be forced to reconsider.
Have we said the same thing before? This was said before by the ANC.
The characterisation we made today is the same as made in September 1990. And all the suggestions made now were made then. Some of our decisions were even more thorough. The reality is we simply do not follow up or implement our decisions.
We are now saying to the government, not to ourselves, that we must now send a memo to the government giving them an ultimatum.
We have previously submitted numerous memos to the government. I think an ultimatum as formulated is a general statement without demands.
But that is the precisely the point of the discussions here, so that the demands are formulated.
But the government is not going to be able to act on the demands. Therefore we must be clear of the consequences. We have taken many decisions, but not acted - peace forum, media offensive, defence units etc. We have not created a base from which we can carry our people as a whole, nor the international community, on an issue as important as suspending the talks. If we are going to make such an ultimatum, the government is not going to meet it and we must prepare for the consequences. We should not make such an ultimatum and give a time frame. Object strongly and build structures and opinion so that we can actually carry it out. Otherwise our credibility will be even more dented.
Share views expressed by Aziz and Stuart. This ultimatum should not be presented. We have done this before on the violence. It came out of the NCC. Let us meet the enemy on its two-pronged strategy.
We are agreed we are faced with a serious problem. We are trying to respond to it. It is not present because of Alexandra, but has been with us for some time. We have not implemented all our decisions, so we do not have the benefit of their success. The same question was previously posed. We have the right to take the decision. We cannot allow the situation to continue without doing something. On the issue of the third force: if we say there is no third force, then we must be clear. Are we clubbing the right wing with the government? Presently AWB in southern Natal plans to eliminate white leaders. When we make conclusions we must be clear.
We must use different methods and tactics in struggle. The regime is using talk and violence. Why can we not use dual strategies ourselves, as they are doing? But we should not be talking about it, but act. This would prevent us from being seen as people not interested in peace. Our problem is not our decisions, but we have not implemented it. We must take meaningful action to deal with this situation.
With regard to the ultimatum. The one we are proposing is too short - May 2. Already conference has placed an ultimatum before the government. When we embarked on talking, how do we address the question to our people and supporters, even internationally, to take them all with us. I will find it difficult that before we say to people that this is over, we have not gone to discuss with our people and friends abroad. The deadline does not give sufficient time for international consultation so that we are not caught isolated.
What deadline would you propose?
I do not have one. I would say from now until our conference in June would be realistic. This would give us time. We must isolate the regime by exposing the situation.
I will call on the last speaker. We must bring this issue to finality as we still have to go through the memo itself.
I am persuaded by the arguments articulated by those who doubt the wisdom of issuing an ultimatum. The NCC ultimatum of April 30 requires of this meeting some preparations as to what we are going to do come April 30 if all political prisoners are not released. We must prepare ourselves, because the government is also preparing around that ultimatum. Yesterday met security police of Witwatersrand, which was revealing on their thinking. He said that in their own restructuring of the security police, he mentioned that they are going to have a department specialising on information and intelligence gathering, emphasising the area of interest of that department would be crime, and key would be our underground structures. He also boasted that during last week they recovered 100 AK47s in Soweto alone, but none of our underground comrades were caught in that net. The issue is not morale and despondency. The decision has already been taken regarding self defence. This NEC must take a decision that resources be made available for that purpose.
No one has suggested that we abandon negotiations. What is being suggested is what we have done more than once before, as mentioned earlier. On instructions of NCC we have given a deadline of April 30 which, if they don't remove obstacles and release prisoners, exiles, etc, negotiations are suspended. Therefore nothing being suggested here is new. What we are saying is that the negotiation process is being discredited in the eyes of the majority of our members, in the eyes of a large section of our people, because the other side is perceived to be treating us without our responding adequately, and is using the negotiating process in all kinds of blackmail ways, and is more and more confident in its manipulation of us. And in addition there is carnage of an unprecedented nature. We have characterised this in its very best presentation, as the government conniving with it. It is no good we keep repeating that if the violence does not end we will do something. And we must of course act on the question of self defence. What we are doing here is discussing our response. If anything the cynicism is increased.
We are not suggesting abandoning the negotiations process. What we are saying is can we do anything within the negotiating process to pressure and advance our demands. We should advance a set of demands that are "reasonable". They should not include all the demands, but focus on the violence. We must also make demands that will give us the moral high ground at home and abroad. We will not then face the kind of embarrassment people have spoken about above.
Propose the following:
At the end of the document put forward:
We therefore demand:
1.. Legislative measures to be taken at this session of parliament
. to prevent the carrying of traditional weapons in public.
2.. Effective steps to begin the process of phasing out hostels
. and transforming them into family units.
3.. Satisfactory assurances that the SAP and SADF will use
. acceptable methods of crowd control from hence forth.
4.. Undertakings that all CCB, Askaris and such units be publicly
5.. Resignation of Malan and Vlok.
If by ... these conditions are not met, we will suspend any further discussion with the government on the APC; suspend all exchanges with the government on the future constitution of our country. The date can be determined by the meeting, but we already have an ultimatum for 30 April.
Can I make an appeal? The normal thing would be to put this to a vote. I would like us not to do so, but to decide this matter on the basis of the people who have spoken. There are 11 who have spoken in favour of giving an ultimatum along the lines concretely. proposed by JS. Four who are opposed. Let us allow this memo as amended by JS to go through. We are going to still go through the memo. Let us endorse the suggestion that an ultimatum must be given to De Klerk. As far as the deadline is concerned, it would be a serious mistake not to give a deadline and a suggestion by JZ that we should stretch out the ultimatum until after conference is incorrect. The mood of our people would make this dangerous. We must act to stop the carnage now, so it must be a clear deadline.
The point made by Valli that we must continue working in the Joint Working Groups. If we do it will lead to the impression that we are again speaking with a double tongue. If we say we are giving the government an ultimatum, and if it does not comply then we suspend all discussions, then this must be that we suspend discussion in all working groups. Otherwise we are again being ambiguous. We have discussed the matter very thoroughly. Can we resolve the matter on this basis?
I am very loath to give additional powers to the government with regard to disarming people. If we push for this legislation about carrying arms, the government will do it, Inkatha will attack us, we will try to defend ourselves, they will shoot us and not Inkatha. I don't think we should include this appeal for legislation. It will be applied against us and not its auxiliary forces.
You think we are going to carry arms ogeiil?
In terms of the SA laws the government has the power to prevent Inkatha from doing what it is doing. It is not doing it because it does not want to. But in terms of how they apply those same laws against us is that they use the law as an excuse against us. I don't think we should ask for laws to strengthen them.
In the discussions with Vlok that the carrying of cultural weapons should not be allowed, they quoted a case where they had been taken to court. I want to appeal that the date be May 9. I want to warn those people who say the government cannot meet our demands within the time set. De Klerk needs us very badly. When we issue this statement he is going to phone and demand a meeting straight away. Let us not underestimate our own power.
Corrections to the Memo
. 1.0. It does not refer to the violence in Natal. We only react to violence outside Natal. Even gives the impression that violence began in Sebokeng. Want strong input on what has happened in Natal. Also amend figures to show since above date is figure of 1,200.
. 1.1. Throughout the period ... to rephrase in terms of Natal inclusion wherever appropriate in the document.
. 1.2. Remove having established their control.
. 1.3. There are cases which the police can quote as having averted attacks, and there have been some arrests. So needs rephrasing. But there is a general pattern of them not acting. We should not be too legalistic. Agree that any statement we make must be able to be substantiated, so we must be able to back this us. Also, clarify question of other factions, as gives wrong impression on which forces exist.
. 1.4. State it is an Inkatha rally
. 1.5. Quote Natal instances as well. From the point of view of diplomacy we should not refer to Inkatha, and makes it more difficult for them to reply. The document is going to be published.
. 1.7. Include example of arms being distributed in Port Shepstone, licensed, through the ZP. But it is illegal weapons we are referring to. Note arrest notifications.
. 1.8. Delete unpopular and call them community councillors. Remove Inkatha Freedom Party
. 2.1. acts or omissions
. 2.2. vigilantes. (they are accountable). Rework "added advantage ... ignored". End after democratic opposition. Rephrase weakened credibility to "designed to weaken and limit scope and to disintegrate"
. 2.3. Replace by rephrasing prepared by JS.
Roster of incidents should be changed in title as this roster is quite inadequate. It should only give a highlight of pattern and be included as examples of significant incidents.
*. Only deals with Transvaal so must include other areas, including Natal.
*. Change Peter Harris to Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom.
*. Submission by Zuma was not to be public. Therefore if included in this way we will be inundated with requests for it. 4 should be removed from document.
*. Give more details, including number of times police approached, for point 9.
*. Should Daveyton not be included. No, because we are looking at examples of inaction.
General point is that 30 April deadline will be extended while we are saying that the document argues that the violence is a means of repressing free political activity. Therefore we should use them together because it is its most effective argument. Agree that matter be left as it is as taken a lot of discussion so far. Date remains deadline of 9 May.
This memo will be reformulated in the light of amendments. What next?
Propose that it be a public statement of the NEC, rather than an memo to De Klerk, so that it can be released tomorrow.
We should not release it tomorrow. Considerations raised by JZ and Aziz. Means to proceed should include briefing of diplomatic corps and substance of statement and steps to be taken, so at least to carry as many of the international community with us. Hold release of statement to coincide with the briefing or some time on Saturday. We should still forward this to the government late on Friday or Saturday. But should not take step without support behind it. Also significant figures who should be met and discussed with, eg Archbishop, so that they are taken into our confidence.
Agree to the above. Suggest that there is no press statement tomorrow and hold that to Saturday. There be a briefing to the diplomatic corps Friday pm or Saturday morning, and briefing of significant figures.
What about Cosatu and the Party? They must be briefed. Also diplomats cannot be briefed between now and Saturday.
As soon as statement ready, sent to De Klerk. Then have copy sent to every diplomat.
Then we should aim for the press sometime tomorrow afternoon. Will require a press conference.
Agreed.. Pallo will arrange
We have to complete the agenda. The NEC will meet tomorrow morning to complete the agenda, 9am at HQ
Report on self defence units. Not being tabled here.
SG's office to determine who can brief Cosatu and the SACP on the discussion and decisions as a matter of urgency.
Meeting Adjourned till tomorrow
RECONVENED MEETING OF NEC ONLY - 5 APRIL, 1991
Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Alfred Nzo,. TT Nkobi, Henry Makgothi, Simon Makana, Jele, Gertrude Shope, Aziz Pahad, Joe Modise, Chris Hani, Timothy Mokoena, Joe Nhlanhla, Sindiso Mfenyana, Stanley Mabizela, James Stuart, Thabo Mbeki, Robert Manci, Sizakele Sigxashe, Tony Mongalo, Jackie Molefe, Reg September, Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng
Pallo Jordan and Jackie Selebi, (JS left after first item of discussion - constitution)
JS leading discussion on Draft Constitution. This should have been sent to all regions, but not yet received by some regions. In the draft left blank section dealing with nominations. The PC discussed this and makes proposals:
Amendment to page four of the Constitution. "At least 90% of delegates shall be elected by branches ..." But this will be unmanageable. Amendment: Delegates will come from regions, not branches. Explanation as to how this will work, so that regions get delegates allocated in proportion to their paid-up membership. Every branch represented at regional conferences.
That is the question on number of delegates and number of delegates they represent.
(Written proposal from JS) Deliberately suggesting not get regions at this stage who will be nominated for this position, because the papers will be full of crown princes etc and divisive propaganda about the fight for the top position. We therefore feel it should be conference where nominations are made. In order to avoid frivolous nominations, nominations must be seconded by at least 10% of delegates, and then an election from among the nominees.
On the NEC:
In the constitution said the NEC shall consist of 75 elected at conference, plus ex-officio. (Written proposal on nominations from JS)
Confronted by problem that the conference has to elect 75. We want to involve grassroots in the process. But also to say to all branches and regions to nominate 75, any name could be put down and make an unwieldy list. This will also encourage regionalism, rather than national. Ballot paper will also be sectional. Therefore, for a person's name to appear on a ballot paper, regions must think nationally and of people who might have some base outside the region as well. So proposal is that 15 regions, all people nominated by three or more regions, appear on the ballot paper. But undemocratic to prevent a delegate to conference from nominating anyone they wish. So, to avoid frivolous nominations, rule to enable conference to seriously assess whether a person should be on ballot paper or not. Therefore nominations at conference must be seconded by 100 people at conference. There is a lot of suspicion of leadership. There will be no lists from anyone, not regions or branches or NEC. For purposes of nomination the NEC will function as a region, with its same power. This will create problems. Our motivation, and this will come into the constitution ultimately, is that a NEC elected byu popular mandate, has at least a relevant contribution to make in participating in a nomination process. The other factor is that, assuming the list comes in from all regions, and according to our test that only those who have been nominated by three or more regions, the NEC could add its vote. This could affect social composition, women, etc and allows NEC to assist balance in its discretion. The contributions will simply mean that the names appear on the ballot list, but there will be no recommended list.
Electoral Commission (see written submission)
Looking into question of electronic counting of votes. Communication with British electoral reform society, but no decision of outside/neutral arbiter. For instance the Nupen Arbitration service used by the unions. We might want something like this.
Open for Discussion:
How have we dealt with the question of illiteracy. Electoral commission should take this into account. Agreed.
Where NEC becomes a region: this will give problems. Given the prevailing perceptions, is it correct to use this?
But it will be discussed at conference itself, so if conference says no, it will be listened to.
This executive must remember that conference itself requested the list to be provided given the extent of canvassing and their lack of knowledge of some of the candidates. They requested guidance from the present. The NEC was unhappy about it, but acceded to the request. Delegates were also given the option of voting for anyone outside the list. We should not be influenced by casual talk. We are creating a system for the future, not just for now. Fully support that even this NEC has the right to nominate, as it knows many of our people. We should expect a very difficult conference.
We need to be aware of the criticisms already abounding. For instance the number 75 is being viewed as leadership wanting to cling to power.
We are drafting a constitution for the future, not just for now. It will be placed before conference to accept or reject. It cannot be drawn up on the basis of appeasing criticism, but on what is correct. The decision will be left to delegates.
Note from General Erasmus. Two meetings taking place in Katlehong, one ANC and one Inkatha, both on Sunday. He does not think this is good and wants to discuss the matter and will phone later.
Western Transvaal women's launch, notified that Inkatha will be recruiting on the same day. Business administrator told he would be held responsible if any incidents occur. Women's conference moved to Jouberton as a precaution.
Pallo sent a note on nomination procedures. Stated that he was adamantly opposed to the NEC nominating candidates as a device for self-perpetuation. He said the process would contradict the balance of the constitution. These views are covered by the above decision.
As it reads now it is very constitutional. Propose that the NPC sends out simple directive based on this, indicating procedures, how branches be represented, regions to decide how big their conferences should be, and explain the whole nomination procedure. This must be done early next week,.
This should be done by SG's office, not NPC. Agreed.
Electoral commission should comprise experienced comrades from outside the NEC and should be drawn from people who have no intention of standing for election.
NPC needs wide consultation on the names.
Next item on the agenda is the Somafco Project, then Preparations for Conference, then All Party Congress.
The Somafco Project
Apologies to Tikly and Choabi. They have been requesting a meeting of this kind for a long time, but has proved difficult. They have been met by a small group from NEC, but the matters were so important that they need a full house of the NEC to address the question.
Introduction by Choabi, in accordance with written submission and recommendations that have been circulated. Document read to the house.
Main issue is dispute over the period during which phasing out should take place. The NEC suggested give years, but the committee is recommending two years. The committee's view was that the ANC has failed to ensure administration in an efficient manor to ensure a reputable education system. But there was now scepticism that sufficient attention will be devoted to those schools to ensure that they develop during this phasing out period. The school should be handed over to the government, and that students requiring continued study can do so.
Problem arises because memo from Choabi, and another from the OTG, dissents from the main recommendations. Main points are that the failures to date can be addressed if there is the will. Outline given as to reasons why Somafco should be maintained. Donors stipulated demands to ensure professionalism as a precondition for continued funding. Not prepared to involve themselves in capital expenditure, only assist with running costs.
Another meeting with UNDP which funds projects at the school. Ready to review level of funding to raise it in accordance with our requests.
Are you saying that instead of the recommendation of two years, you are saying five years? (Yes).
Are there any general comments?
TG also has some views. Should we not hear his views before commenting?
Yes.. Introduced salient facts from memorandum submitted to the NEC.
Discussion on Katlehong:
Propose the meeting that is scheduled must take place, and a possibility of adjusting time be considered. Inkatha must also make adjustment to the time. Supported by Nzo, especially given strategy of Inkatha to block organising of ANC by holding simultaneous rallies. Our security should be informed. TG endorses but requests for support for participants and security must be present.
This move by Erasmus comes out of our meeting with Vlok, where we suggested that prior to meetings taking place there should be some joint discussions to ensure no violence.
What do we do about contacting Inkatha and discussing the whole issue to prevent violence. These meetings are organised specifically to prevent our holding meetings. They are going to ensure that their meeting is held at the same time as our meeting. It is a matter to be discussed directly with the leaders of Inkatha.
Worried by the growing tendency to use violence to enforce recognition. Responsibility to avoid clashes, but pattern very disturbing. They will be bussing people from all around to be seen to be equal to and talking with the ANC. We must look into this question and find another way out. We should not be seen to be partners with Inkatha. They are scoring at propaganda level and appearance of equal strength as a policy from Inkatha.
This is the problem facing Natal for many years. The lack of recognition of Inkatha has caused many deaths. We do not have an option. If we do not do it we say let us increase the death toll. Meetings avoid more casualties.
We should go to the authorities who give both us and Inkatha the time to determine who meets when.
Until this committee decides otherwise, there are comrades given the task to liaise with Inkatha on the violence. There have been many meetings. What needs to happen is that we have to activise that machinery as it affects the Transvaal to carry out its mandate. Unless the NEC takes a different decision.
We must discuss with Inkatha and make sure there is no violence. The answer is for us to strengthen our membership in every area. Answer lies with increased recruitment of members. No people should die as a result of meetings. They want to establish their presence on the corpses of our people. We must prevent this. Our duty is to prevent bloodshed. Who is going to contact Inkatha?
Committee on Violence, Nkadimeng, to contact Inkatha and appropriate local structures.
The PWV region is the organisation to be entrusted with the task of liaison with Inkatha. It should not be the NEC involved in regional matters. Chairman of the region and its liaison structures must contact Inkatha so that the structures do their work.
Agree to the above with the addition that Nkadimeng contact Mdlalose and inform him, as well as put it on the agenda for the next full ANC/Inkatha meeting.
Requested to be excused to attend a meeting. Cmde Nkadimeng will chair.
Discussion returns to Somafco:
Complex and critical situation in Tanzania. 16 reasons why it is not feasible to continue in Somafco.
1.. Since unbanning we have said to the world that we want to continue with Mazimbu/Dakawa for at least five years, but taken no measures to effect that policy decision. In the last 13 months nothing has been done. Instead the settlements have been drained of all key people.
2.. Donors concerned that they will provide running costs for a limited period, i.e. will fund the phasing out only. Since donors conference they stipulated conditions regarding administration of Mazimbu and Dakawa. But nothing has been done. The Nordic countries say that you want to continue but are doing nothing about strengthening administration. Also saying we should have a precise plan for both, a modified plan from what we presented, which was considered far to substantial. Can only reduce the plan after NEC decision. Not realistic for settlement to continue as is. So donors are even less willing to support as than before.
3.. No viable administration in Dakawa and Mazimbu at present. Report sent by Manala Manzini which says most leadership comrades will be out of the region by September. NEC should look at this report as a priority.
4.. All four principals are leaving when repatriation begins. Resignations already received from one.
5.. Said last year that if we are continuing, should be planned recruitment procedure for staff and students. This has not been done. Moreover, no budget to support teachers in Tanzania.
6.. Cost of continuation is prohibitive. R8-m a year at least are running costs. Donors will not support this. For this amount of money we can educate six times the number of students in private institutions within the country as cost of educating them in Tanzania.
7.. If we are to continue, where are the alternative plans which should have been done a year ago, including curriculum, certification, teaching skills etc. There has been no such preparation. Any decision now will only take effect in 12 months, to allow for proper planning/staffing etc.
8.. Security situation desperate.
9.. Vocational training centre: this is not able to absorb 200 students and would require capital expenditure, which there is no funding for. Also problem of instructors, curriculum etc.
10.. No preparations made to transform the reception centre into an adult education centre.
11.. Morale very low. People literally sitting and waiting to. come home, having already packed their bags. Feel neglected and that none of their requests are addressed.
12.. Farms and small industries will collapse once repatriation begins. At Dakawa 1200 people, in Mazimbu 2,000. Most will leave. There will be nobody left.
13.. Deep emotional need by people not to remain outside. People will simply not come back.
14.. Swapo also wanted to continue external institutions. Found that all three institutions have collapsed and found places looted and affected relations between Swapo and the Angolan government because no proper transfer of these assets which got destroyed.
15.. Neither leadership nor membership concerned with external projects. We are not in touch with what is happening in these institutes and this will affect our approach to them. Neglect much worse since HQ transferred to Johannesburg.
Now two complicating factors: MK cadres outside who are demobilised and are in Mazimbu and Dakawa, who are waiting for scholarships, not studying. Reality is that MK cadres do not want to remain but want to get external scholarships. If we want to provide for the comrades from the camps, we need special programmes and will require at least a year, co-ordination between MHQ and security, and such recommendations made in the past have not been met so why will it be met now. The second complication is the people leaving the country now. They are not interested in remaining in our institutions, but want only to go on external scholarships. Therefore it is not true that these institutions are catering for the people who are leaving now.
View is that there is no basis for continuation of the settlements. Open to discussion:
There have already been three meetings to discuss this, and should have informed this discussion. Yet presentation again took same form as before. Consensus before was that donors should assist in winding down, and said that they would sponsor us inside the country for education purposes. Also profile should be compiled of all at school so that they can be incorporated into schooling inside the country. Facilities inside be looked at. All this was agreed. Proposed a new programme be considered specifically for MK cadres in terms of adult education. This was agreed so students can complete and proper arrangements be made to match the real situation. Funds have also to be found for those who were recruited and brought out for education now in Chelston awaiting education.
Propose we discuss in the following way:
*. Secondary school cannot continue
*. Provide facilities for MK educational facilities
*. Attend to the question of children awaiting scholarships
*. Look into internal educational facilities
Attendance at this meeting dwindling. We all have commitments, but we should take a decision here as the matter cannot simply be held over.
Primary school children: it has already been agreed that they should return home and the school close. Agreed.
Somafco has always been funded internationally, and without the donors it will be impossible to run the institutions. We have to take into account whether there is any continued willingness to continue funding. They are only willing to do this on a transitional basis to phase out, while they transfer into the country. They are also stipulating certain conditions. We have never achieved efficiency. And now that we are in Johannesburg this will even be worse as we are consumed with the tasks internally. We need to be honest and recognise our administration of Somafco has always been weak. We should phase out before circumstances force us to close the places down in an unacceptable way. Suggest that those places are going to be plundered, and thieving is already alarming. Necessary to look at transitional form during the phasing out, which should he within two years. Phasing out must be systematic and organised, with proper placement of students in alternative facilities. Make proper arrangements with the Tanzanians, and ask them to assist in running the institutions even during this phasing out period. With regard to people leaving, we should say publicly we are not in a position to provide education outside the country, even for people leaving on their own. Must not create false expectations.
We are in a struggle to run thousands of institutions, yet we are admitting that we are incapable of running two institutions. Majority of the children in Somafco's primary school not from home, but born outside. This is what we need to assess when we say bring them home. We must also examine the type of student at Somafco. There has been a serious struggle to get the children of people who have come home already to get their kids into school. The way the struggle is unfolding will require us to still have facilities abroad, as the next two years are critical to the process. The age of the children at school will affect their possibilities of admittance to school inside SA. When the children come back they will be on the streets. Comparison with Swapo incorrect because Swapo was in power. We are coming back to apartheid. Administration: pay is on the scale prevailing in Tanzania. Why can we not get teachers/administrators, sympathetic to the ANC who are seconded to the area. Unesco is ready to fund as many Tanzanian teachers as we want. We can approach the Tanzanian authorities to in the FFU to assist with regard to the security situation. We have never done this. We can also get assistance for administration from the Tanzanian authorities.
Support five-year phasing out.
Should highlight the problems in SA, with children out of school. How can this committee assist returning children when they are unable to assist the needs internally? Need to first find the places and then discuss the children's return. Supports the five-year phasing out programme.
Reality is that the situation on the ground is intolerable. A further deterioration is likely. Phasing out is a way of ensuring proper winding down. Donors also beginning to question our motivation and are unwilling to continue funding of external projects. More effective use of 'resources internally. Will need special programmes for those who have no skills. This decision was taken years ago already, and now that we are here are we going to even attend to this. Support 2-year phasing out. Everyone accepts phasing out, so work for two-years and can see if needs necessitate extending the period.
We should not repeat ourselves. Unless there is a new point, let us move forward.
Let us have decisions: primary, secondary, MK cadres to stop us going on endlessly.
Phasing out means closing shop.
Decisions have already been taken on the primary school. The only question remaining was the time scale for phasing out. Necessary to explain fluid situation to donors, which will dictate if two-years is realistic or requires revision.
Many people still fleeing. Need to decide on teachers and their pay. Recruitment of teachers and assistants can readily be obtained if conditions of employment have been agreed.
No teachers, no administrators, no money and soon no students. Two years should be our aim, and circumstances can be reassessed.
One question for the NEC to decide. A lot of issues must be attended to by our education department. The timespan is theoretical. Say to donors we envisage a phasing out within two to five years, depending on circumstances and reading of political situation. That has implications which our education department must then deal with. Prepare as part of the phasing out process intake of education opportunities for MK. This is the responsibility of the education department.
Above is agreed to by the house.
Point of order is that the NEC was to meet yesterday and today's appointments are being affected. Move adjourn to a meeting to be rearranged. Agreed.
Education committee told that resolution is two to five years and the education department responsible to deal with the implications of this decision. Thanks to the presenters.
Letters given by SG to make announcements.
Above decision does not take into account the realities. The education department, project department and OTG not able to solve the problems.
Decision of this meeting should ensure Working Committee address the needs of the Education Department. Makgothi to ensure attendance to this matter.
Education Department falls under SGO to ensure this thing is attended to, as this department falls under his Office.
Raised problems repeatedly and not attended to. This should not be the way the NEC works.
Agreed to by the meeting.
When does the NPC report?
Manner in which we plan our meetings is very bad. No attempt to find out commitments to departments and have such a huge agenda that proper decisions are not taken, nor is implementation possible. Therefore we adjourn incomplete. There is also the extended meetings where regions participate with last-minute notification to drive up. No proper consideration given to preparation. This means we always do not finish properly, and then call another meeting within a short time. Must have proper planning and decision-making.
Points noted and will be drawn to attention of leadership. Agree that the remaining business be attended to by the Working Committee.
Marches to prisons: notice of where marches taking place in Johannesburg.
What about marches in other areas? We are beginning to be an NEC of the PWV.
This is a correct point, but it is important to attend the marches as best as we can. (Agreed by the house).
Meeting of Tripartite Alliance will be held on 29 April, 9hrs 17hrs. Letter from Cosatu outlines agenda proposals.
The meeting adjourned 1pm