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This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

21 Aug 1989: Boraine, Alex

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POM. Alex, Patricia and I were here on the eve of the first emergency in July of 1985 and now three weeks before a national election and we sense a very significant difference in the mood of the country at that time and the mood of the country today. Could you compare and contrast the two situations?

AB. You said 1985 or 1987?

POM. 1985, the first state of emergency.

AB. Okay. Not the election?

POM. No.

AB. Okay. 1985. Yes, I think the major difference is the recognition - at that time there was a feeling in the townships in particular that victory was around the corner, that the National Party was in very serious disarray, the security establishment had its back to the wall. It was a very unrealistic view but it was a view strongly held because their experience was confined very much to the townships and they saw themselves in control, they saw the tyres burning, they saw the police having to flee, and more and more army people having to come in and fight, and I think that they didn't feel that the state could actually become as repressive as it actually has become.

. Now I think they are very much more aware that the state will leave no stone unturned in order to maintain, the famous phrase, "law and order". So I think that's a very significant difference that the campaign, the defiance campaign, is very different from what it was. Where there was a lot of emphasis on stone throwing, on reactionary violence to the violence of the state and so on.

. Here there is a very clear commitment to civil disobedience, to non-violence. Now, inevitably that's not going to be possible throughout. I think that it is a much more subtle campaign, more skilful campaign, where people are saying not "we must fight to end apartheid" but "we will end apartheid, we will go to the hospitals and make it impossible for apartheid to rule. We'll go to the beaches and make it impossible for apartheid to rule."

. I think that's a very clever approach. People participating in their own liberation. Some white politicians, even on the left, haven't really understood that yet, that they can't speak for blacks. And, that blacks are determined to speak for themselves as never before. That's another very strong, stubborn and determined position taken by blacks. They are not going to simply say, "We must change the laws in parliament. We will change them at the places where they are being implemented." Like the hospitals, like the beaches. And they are going to do far more than that. The next couple of weeks I think you are going to see a lot of that and there is actually going to be a lot of growing controversy about that influence.

POM. You described the current situation to us as being one which on the one hand, the ANC realised that it couldn't win a national war of liberation, and on the other hand a recognition by the state that reform imposed from above would not succeed. This recognition of both sides that there is something of a stalemate is creating the ground for negotiations. Do you think that is an accurate reflection of the situation as it is?

AB. I think, yes, to an extent. I think the pressures on the ANC are not merely their own recognition that a national liberation is out of the question. I think they've known that for a long time. But I think the whole change in the Soviet Union has brought some fairly sharp pressure on them.

. The Soviet Union have made it very clear, a couple of years ago they were talking revolutionary terms. They are no longer doing that. And, I think that behind the scenes they've got a lot of pressure. I think the negotiation, successful negotiation regarding Cuba, Angola, Namibia, has also brought negotiation politics much more to the fore both in the minds of the National Party who suddenly have discovered people are willing to compromise because that is what negotiation is all about. It's give and take. It's not a demand - I want it all and this is how its going to be or I'm not playing your game. And I think they've been pleasantly surprised that people from Angola, from Cuba, people from even the Soviet Union, have been much more open in terms of possibilities that have been give and take. And I think they're hoping that can also happen in South Africa.

. The securocrats are not quite as in control as they used to be. I think the ANC is going through a pretty difficult time right now. We meet with them very often and clearly there has been this shift and they are talking about negotiation. Where the problem lies is that people inside South Africa, in the black community, are not nearly as clear in their own thinking regarding negotiations. Some of them are saying Mandela has sold out by talking to PW Botha. It's very interesting, not only young people that I've talked with in the townships but older people and academics and professional people don't understand the subtlety, the very good political move, I think, Mandela made by agreeing to have tea with Botha. No one can ever turn around now and say "you are a terrorist". Yes, it's great stuff.

. But we recently have been trying to organise a conference which would bring together the ANC and the internal opposition right across the spectrum, outside of South Africa, together with a whole lot of people from the international community. And, the ANC have been very keen on this, church people, Tutu, Boesak, have been very keen. Frank Chikane also, but COSATU and UDF are saying, "Wait a minute, we've got another agenda, we are on to the defiance campaign, we've got a conference in October." I said, "Yes, that's great but you also need to think of it more and to strategise more. And in a big conference you don't do those things. It's defending a position and apartheid is terrible. We shall overcome." That's also great, but you need the morale and that sort of thing.

. So I think that the National Party is in trouble because the right wing are saying, "You are selling out the white man in terms of the commitment to negotiation." But the ANC is in a slight problem with internal people, some of them saying, "You be careful, don't go too far on this. We want to speak about this one, too." So, yes, there is that stalemate in a sense. But it also presents huge problems for both actors.

POM. I will stop in a minute. But, I thought what you said was very interesting because Patricia and I met with some people from NTJNSA in Port Elizabeth last week and they went forth with their rhetoric about "democratic socialism" and a party line. And Patricia said, "What about the new constitutional guidelines from the ANC where they talk about a mixed economy?" There was a small silence and somebody muttered, "That's not settled yet." (Laughter)

. What would you say, looking at the black community as a whole, what have been the most significant developments in the last four years and what do you think are the major points of actual or potential division?

AB. I think the major development is the growth of the trade unions. If there is any organisation that has real power because they are working on mandate politics and accountability politics. Tutu hasn't, he's accountable to no one. So whilst he plays a big role and a very high profile role, in the end he doesn't have to go back to constituencies nor can a constituency go back to him. Where Ramaphosa and Jay Naidoo and all these, they better go and check it out and they better take people with them and the fact that they've been able to take people with them on this defiance campaign is because COSATU has been very instrumental in this and they hold emphasis on a week of action in the first week of September. It couldn't have happened a few years ago. They've got a maturity, they've got a following, they've got a base which is very powerful indeed and I think one must take this very seriously.

. They too have a problem because they have some people in their own movement who are focusing a great deal on 'workerist'. And there is a big clash going on there. I don't know how powerful the workerist lobby is, but it's quite significant.

POM. This would be trade unionists who believe the first responsibility to the trade union is to advance the economic ...?

AB. No, no. That the people who must actually run the revolution and run the workers and nobody else, and the workers are very narrowly defined in terms of people who belong to a trade union. Therefore, you shouldn't have alliance politics but other people dealing with teachers, and churches. OK, they've got a contribution to make but the engine room of the revolution is very clearly the worker. And, it's very socialist. And, I have come across documents which have been given to me where groups, Inkatha for example, are dismissed in so many words, the ANC is the sell...out organisation and therefore it is so because its links and its relationship with the ANC also shares the same thing. Yet, Ramaphosa and all these guys come on our platforms and they work together and they speak together, they work very closely with the national executives to go to the regional areas and there is a lot of feeling.

POM. That must have been some of what we were exposed to when we were talking about who's sitting at the negotiating table and NUMSA people were saying whoever is at the negotiating table, they will be workers.

AB. That's a real problem and it's going to grow. Particularly if there is a downturn in the economy. You now have got unemployed unions. I have never heard of that before. Unions of unemployed people who have got nothing to lose. They've got no jobs. Therefore they can take a very tough and very hard line. Whereas, your workers, trade union groupings are doing negotiations and deals with management. They've learned that there are also gives and takes and all sorts happening on that level. It is almost paradoxical that on one hand the growth of the trade unions has been the most significant development and also the source of possible division.

. I don't think the Black Consciousness Movement represents a possible serious division. I think its there and people are very critical of the Congress movement, the Alexanders and people like this are extremely critical. I don't think they've got a base on the ground, a popular base, whereas the Congress movement does have a very popular base ... UDF and churches, unions, and so on. I would say that the biggest possible split in black opposition could come from the debate as to what kind of economic system we are going to have. Whether it is going to be some form of market system or some form of socialist, strong socialist centralised system. And, that is very strong.

. [Some people have almost messed with the SACP comes in, the Communist Party, for so long they refused, they were quite uncritical of Stalin and the whole Stalinist era and they've now preceded that and Gossover] ... said to me at the conference we had with the Soviets, "One of our biggest weaknesses was that we were so damn uncritical." And I said, "Yes, but you've raised a whole generation of young blacks in our townships who are Stalinist." I said, "What are you going to do about that? Are you going to go there and repair that damage?" He said, "I admit, we've made some very bad mistakes." And they were very suspicious of Gorbachev and perestroika. But, that is beginning to change because of the experience in Mozambique, in Zimbabwe. [The real world is beginning to make Sombas so precious.]

POM. How serious is black-on-black violence and how is it perceived by the white community?

AB. I think that the Natal situation is extremely serious and there has been a lot of black-on-black violence. It hasn't been a question of as some people state it as in Zulu verses UDF. That's nonsense. A lot of the UDF people are Zulus. So its not a nice straightforward thing like that. It's not a tribal thing. It's a territorial thing. There is a very big difference. I think what has also happened is that people have used that battle to settle old scores, to start new wars and the third force, namely the security, the police, the right wing have used that. There is all kinds of evidence, I mean I'm not just sucking that out of my thumb.

AB. We've been doing a lot of research work in that area. We've come up with all sorts of info that makes it very clear that agents provocateurs are very active. So I'm not sure who's responsible for what, but the dissection in the white community is that blacks are very violent and that they want to kill each other and if that's what they are going to do to themselves, then what are they going to do to us if there is a shift towards blacks in power or black majority rule or whatever you want them to tell.

POM. We have one question about the ANC which we've been asking everyone and I set it up with a comparison to Northern Ireland even though the two situations aren't similar. The IRA has had a successful campaign against the British army for twenty years and there is at least one incident or two incidents a week and the military stations, the police stations, the policemen, the soldiers, what have you, have always been protected within their own community. Even with the best of British intelligence operating, and British intelligence is pretty good, the structure remains and the cohesiveness around that structure remains. When we look, I just might refer back to something you said before we started our conversation, that the ANC, we see that it has largely been ineffectual and there is not really what is traditionally what we would call an armed struggle going on. So we are a little bit puzzled. Is there a significant armed struggle going on? If not, what purpose is the armed struggle supposed to serve and thirdly, if there isn't any real armed struggle going on, why do the ANC have such difficulty in stopping it?

AB. Because they would be stopping something that doesn't really exist. Sure. I think it comes in waves. I think there are times when there are a number of incidences of a small bomb goes off here. I think the ANC has genuinely tried to go on hard targets but every now and again a cadre will disobey that and will go through a stage of bombing Wimpy Bars and hotdog places or hamburger joints and that sort of thing which are clearly terrorist, if you like. Putting a bomb, and no matter who is there irrespective of babies or women or men or black or white, they would get blown up and that, of course, brought about a huge wave of revulsion of uncontrolled violence and the ANC then took a very firm stand and would report ... statement that we were going to do even more than that and all of the time London saying "Absolutely not!" and that Chris Hani is responsible to the National Executive, not to his forces in Angola and as I am responsible to the National, so is he and the National Executive said, "We will focus on hard targets and not on soft targets but we recognize that there will be civilians who may well be injured or killed in the crossfire or accidentally but it wouldn't be a deliberate attempt."

. Now I think there's been a very kind of uneasy sort of relationship on that. Some people saying absolutely not, are we going to go into armed struggle and it's just too bad with war and you drop bombs from a plane. Sometimes they hit hospitals and then we don't like that but it happens because we are at war. There is a clash going on inside the ANC as far as I can see. I've talked with Chris Hani and I've talked with Thabo Mbeki a thousand times on these issues and I don't get real satisfaction there. Inside the country, the reason why the armed struggle was so important, occasional acts of violence, whether it be bombs or hand grenades or the police barracks, or that sort of thing, has helped blacks inside the country to feel less impotent. That's very important. And, that certainly is regarded as very important by the ANC. The irony of it is until the time of the tricameral parliament and the referendum and the state of emergency, the ANC was really at quite a low level. But the National Party chose the ANC as its most important opponent and elevated it to an extent and the ANC was like manna from heaven and they grabbed the moment and, I've seen this in the last four or five years, the ANC membership has grown enormously even though they've done very little.

POM. There is almost a direct analogy to the way the British government focuses all its attention and the United States on an organization called The Northern Ireland Aid Committee which is supposed to be a bunch of Irish Americans who are supposed to be very conservative but who believe that English domination in Ireland was the problem and they've picked on this as being the source of all funds from the United States and they picked an organization to whom nobody paid any attention.

AB. Well this is exactly what they've done here. We've talked collectively and individually to the ANC on this, the armed struggle, saying strategically once you're taking on the state where its strongest and you're not going to really achieve this and a lot of people in black Africa are critical of the ANC, saying, "Well, how much longer? When are you going to deal with these boys in South Africa?" We've achieved it and we have this irony of Thabo getting up to defend himself and getting up to defend the ANC and black countries and saying, "Hang on. This is a very tough battle and this is the strongest army and the strongest security forces."

. And they say, "Well, why do you bother to continue with this? Isn't there some other strategy?" But, of course, you know, you are not going to, I mean, how - I mean the real crunch question surely is how do you put pressure on the South African government to actually move away from rhetoric the NP may say to succeed. Who's going to be in power and who is can use all the power to do that. The NP is making a lot of capital at the moment by saying, "We're in the centre, we're the moderates." But, the far right, who are crazy people because they are not aware that things have changed, and its the DP who is going to hand over and capitulate and therefore look at the violence, so come to us. But, words like reform, negotiation, justice, fair play, equal opportunity which has been a building block of the PFP (Progressive Federal Party) ever since its beginning. Those are now on posters put out by the NP. I wrote an article saying that I think that the DP is absolutely right focusing on the economy because their clothes are being rapidly stolen and they are naked. The moment they come up with a nice enlightened sort of view, the NP takes it over and I think the NP is moving rapidly into that area which means that the DP is going to make up their minds as to where do they go. Dennis Worrall and I would say, "Great". Probably. We'll do a deal with the lads. We'll negotiate and we'll enforce our form of coalition and we'll support them. I think he's got no problems with that at all. I think he just thinks the leadership there wasn't all that good and there was - that's the real vehicle for change.

POM. In your own view now, if you were at the negotiating table and you had the UDF and the ANC and COSATU on one side, where would the Democratic Party sit? Would it sit offside or would it sit alongside?

AB. They would be splitting off. There would be some who would say that they want to sit with the ANC or with the MDM. Not many but a substantial section. Others would say they want to sit very much with the left. And others would say they want to sit somewhere alongside. That would be the pure true blue, the Eglins. I don't think he would go with the left. He'd sit somewhere. The big thing is, for example, right now the DP of course are not quite knowing what to do.

. The MDM are mounting a defiance campaign. Many in the DP sympathise deeply with why they are doing this but wish to God they wouldn't because it's making life difficult for them. So what happens is they've got to actually be cautionary; they will criticize the government as putting dogs on their leashes. They have no alternative. They've got to do that. Which seems to put them into the MDM world. And a lot of whites are saying, "Wait a minute, this is what its going to be like. Perhaps we should stay with the left. On the other hand, they are going to have to be ready to criticise the MDM when there is any sort of violence or any kind of rough stuff developing and it will have to - people are not going to shut up with the police and pack them with tear smoke and dogs, and all that stuff. They are going to take the black guys' knives. The stuff in the townships is a frustration which said we've got to get them back whatever the target might be, where it presents itself. My own view is that the DP can't afford to be ambivalent on this one. If they really want to have some sort of a future and some role, I actually think they ought to be supportive and make it very clear that if there's violence it's because there are people who haven't a normal way, they haven't a vote, they haven't a right to participate in an election which yet again is about black South Africans. This is the theatre of the absurd. We keep on doing it. We have election after election and the central issue is what about the blacks? But who is voting? Whites. Blacks are sitting back as spectators. And, they are not going to sit back as spectators this time.

POM. If I give you three scenarios, one in which the National Party is re-elected with a comfortable but not great majority, second one in which they are re-elected with a small majority where the vote is shifted to the Conservative Party, third in which there is a hung parliament. What policies do you see developing out of all the three?

AB. Well, the first obviously, with a comfortable majority, but with a reduced majority means that de Klerk can rightly say, "I've been given a mandate for another five years", and I think he will try and woo Buthelezi, a particular key person. He may well even release Mandela. I can't see him un-banning the ANC. I think he will start sending out signals and send representatives to start talks with the ANC and there will be a lot of pressure on the ANC to do the same kind of PLO thing - that we will abandon violence on condition that A, B, and C and if they are wise they would sell it to the United States and to Germany and to Britain, to the Soviet Union and to a few other places ahead of time. And I would encourage the ANC to do that now. They may not be ready for that, they may wait and say let's see what happens. So I think there will be a lot of moves, a generation of possibilities of false alarms, of missions going out, perhaps missions coming in. Or perhaps Margaret Thatcher in October with the Commonwealth, coming down very hard on de Klerk but making also making a big offer. I think she wants to play a very significant role in the resolution of this situation beyond management of the situation. I think the October Commonwealth meeting could be quite critical. I think they are well positioned to play a role here.

. If they get the second scenario - it's slow, it's cautious, but nevertheless he stills has a workable, manageable majority and can try to entice and encourage people from the DP side to be more supportive, more reasonable to help them, and I think they'll get the Labour party behind him as well to help them. But, then you've got to give so much and I think he'll - bear in mind he's got five years under normal circumstance, constitutionally. I think there is going to be a shift toward making it a lot easier for people to live in areas where they want to be. Slow, sure process. Perhaps parliament should commission an inquiry into the group which locks them in for a year but you can say, "Damn it all, I'm doing it." But you've got to do it properly. And these people are looking at it. Like the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act, then they scrapped it. You soften up the whole situation. But very much more slowly, obviously. Cautiously.

AB. The final scenario - a hung parliament is very interesting. One wonders what the military will do. De Klerk is not very close to the security and I think he wants to shift back more power given to the National Party caucus and to the Cabinet and far left, State Security Council which has been running this country virtually. We're very militarised, the JMCs and all that sort of thing. We don't even know there's been a coup. We've been taken over by the military in many ways. I think De Klerk would want to bring that back to the politicians and I think that could be quite a struggle. The possible other development is within the DP where they would help De Klerk to get a workable majority in a parliament situation. I think a lot of people will be jumping around. You may even find some of the Nats going to the CP (Conservative Party). The CP would have to do well for a hung parliament to come about. I would think that the CP would be the number two party, DP number three. Which means that some Nats will be seeing the writing on the wall and saying, "My God, if we want to claim power next time round, perhaps we should jump it now." So I think it would be a very uncomfortable, difficult situation because I don't know, constitutionally there is a whole parliament - how do you elect the State President? You've got to have a majority in order to get all those votes in order to secure that. The Labour Party comes now in to the fore. So it may be that they can carry on with an Acting State President, as it were, and decide if they are going to have a Minister's Council and try to woo some of the Labour Party into that to run the country until such time as they can bring about some sort of break in the DP probably because that's where their natural allies, as you go towards the reform movement, will be.

. The CP will be rampant, they will be very tough and I think the other disturbing fact is that I think that the incident of white right violence is on the increase. I think it is already on the increase, we are actually going to sue the Minister of Defence for accusing either us for violence or the ANC. Our lawyers are looking into this today. Because I think there are a lot of people who are looking into this today and who are saying, "My God, we must get rid of some of these people for acting so irresponsibly." And I think the right wing, because it is becoming more powerful, a lot of people will resort to more excesses. I think they're heading for an extraordinarily uncomfortable time if there is another parliament.

POM. Just two more questions. You mentioned the rising of the trade unions and COSATU as being one of the most significant if not the significant development in the last four or five years. Where would you place the emergence of the black middle class? What role does it play or is it largely irrelevant?

AB. I think that this is certainly a new phenomenon but I wouldn't put too much stock on that. I think that, in any situation where you have a minority of people but with very strong passionate views, you could neutralize the inevitable, conservative role of a middle class that is rising. I just don't think they could afford it - blacks aren't stupid, you see. You have everybody locked into the same ghetto, into the same township, whether you're earning a hell of a lot of money or a little. Therefore, you can be subject to the huge amount of repression by even a minority of very tough blacks who are saying, "You are selling us out. Therefore, we want money from you for our work. We want you to toe the line and don't you talk." I mean, you can see the municipal election votes, for example, there are a lot of people probably who don't want to vote. But, I dare not, I don't think that honestly in terms of political development or action the attempt by the National Party and business to create a middle class is largely lost.

POM. You've talked a bit about violence yet I am struck by the lack of violent reaction by the township blacks against the state. Again when you look at Northern Ireland one would find it very difficult to describe Northern Ireland in the worst of circumstances as one of a repressive regime and yet the situation spawns a lot more violence, why is it that you think blacks have not expressed their anger more in terms of violence?

AB. That is a great mystery. We should be enormously grateful that it has actually happened that way. And I don't want to say that one must therefore be complacent about it and depend on it but if you look at the history of the ANC, part of the clue is there. When the 1910 constitution was written that was a clear emphasis on a white nation and the healing has to take place between the Afrikaner and the English speaking and the blacks were excluded. The direct result of that was the formation of the ANC. But, their goal for decades was to become incorporated into the white nation. Remember that they used the phrase, "Let's not talk about a white nation. Let's talk about a civilized nation." So you must incorporate those blacks who are educated, the social workers, the clergy, the journalists, the lawyers, a small group, an elitist group. That was very much the goal of the ANC. It's in all their documents. Their demands were unbelievably moderate. Some people believe that's because of the influence of the church and the teaching of the church and that for generations the schools were under - churches ran those schools, both Protestant and Catholic. And that that sort of influence of loving your enemy, your neighbour and being moderate in your response has had a huge influence. I don't know if one can do it because in other parts of Africa you also have the involvement of the missionary and the church and they certainly participate in it. I can't explain it. We've talked of blacks and blacks trying to say why there is no solid way they appear to be - they are much tougher and don't take us for granted and we're going to show you but really and truly, OK in 1964 and 1985 you had a great deal of violent reaction, of burning and plunder and burning of tyres and of killings even but it was almost like gang warfare. It wasn't organised by the military. Then you had the state of emergency which almost made it impossible to do anything. You've also got a very strong informer influence in the black community. There are far, far more black informers than there are whites.

POM. Is that because of economic desperation?

AB. And also because they also get a hold of people. In my own experience I've had people who informed and opened mail and all sorts of things because the woman who was working for us at the time had been caught by police and they said, "Right, we're going to take action against them and if you work for us ", and she said, "Sure." And I think a hell of a lot of that goes on. But I think there are economic factors. A lot of people are being paid. Its almost very systematic sometimes. I'm quite sure that I've got people who are working for the security division here at IDASA. I just don't know who they are. So there is no organisation that they're not in, whether it be student organisations, democratic parties or anything at all, I'm quite sure there are people who are working for the security and a lot of them are doing it, whites of course as patriots. They are being told, "These people are dangerous. These people are traitors. They are in there. Please help us. Give us information." But, they are always paid. Two members of my staff were approached and their salary would be three times what we could afford to pay them. Now, that's very wise.

POM. Tempting.

AB. Yes, you could always rationalize it like that - I'm doing my best for my country. But, fortunately, these people have come to us. "Look we've been approached by these security folks and they made this offer", and we've checked it out. It's true and thank God they came to us but now what other ones haven't come to us?

POM. The one point was about what happened at the weekend here. The strong show for Summerstrand Beach and Hendrickse and his militancy and sort of juxtaposed what you were talking about relative to the rhetoric of the National Party campaign was like the Democratic party. What is the strategy there? Evident or not so evident?

AB. One of it is the National Party's ability to say what the Democratic Party can't say, namely, reform with security, the order that reform can happen ,we've got to keep a very strong hand on law and order and we mean to do that. And, if people try to break the law and go on to the beaches and disrupt things and make things difficult for whites, we can stop that.

POM. Do you see it as part of a campaign tactic to show whites might be trying to appear as tough as they ever were?

AB. Yes, and a lot of whites will react well to that. They'll say, "Well damn it all. They've got their own beaches. Why do they want to come and mess around like this?" That sort of thing. "And it's time that somebody took a stand around here." You can almost hear why they are saying that inside the DP. Certainly those who are flirting with the CP are trying to say, "Hey, hang on a minute, we're not weak. We're not just giving in. We are determined and ready to take a stand." So I think we're trying to say to the DP fallout people, "Hang on a minute. Yes, we are for negotiation. We are for reform. But, we're not going to allow it to just become chaotic." And, that's what the DP wants. They'll use that. Of course, the DP doesn't want it. That's the image they want to put on it.

. And, as for the CP, they're crazy. You're going to have more and more black reaction, lots more violence, if you are going to vote for them. We are prepared to take action where action is necessary. And, look at what we did here. We prevented them. We had road blocks out, and we stopped them from taking over of the whole situation. So I think that that is very much a tactic to - I think some of them actually believe it by the way.

. There's all sorts of various successful election tactics. See, those that go to the CP, they are just like, "Why the hell didn't you take out the guns? Mow them down." And I think De Klerk knows now. De Klerk is desperate to try and reconcile the Afrikaner. That was his biggest motive two years ago. He really wanted to do that. He told me so. I think he's recognised now that its not honour and I think he's more or less given away a number of seats unless I've got it all wrong. I mean there are some commentators who say the CP are not going to do well and, in fact, the DP will get to be the political opposition. And they are very sceptical commentators. I think they're wrong. I may be wrong. We'll wait and see.

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