This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
27 Jul 1990: Konigkramer, Arthur
Click here for more information on the Interviewee
Click here for Overview of the year
POM. I'm talking with Arthur Konigkramer and you're the Editor?
AK. No, I am the Managing Director of the Company.
POM. Of Ilanga, on the 27th of July in Durban. Could we begin first with the government's actions on the second of February with the unbanning of the ANC and the SACP and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela. Did that take you by surprise? What do you think motivated de Klerk to move with such rapidity and scope?
AK. No, it didn't take me by surprise. Well, it did and it didn't. What had happened was that we were fairly well-informed in that Inkatha, which is an organisation with which I work very closely, had been debating with the Nationalist Party for years, for more than ten years, not always with good results but they engaged them in dialogue. And then, I think it was about a year ago, there was a very serious initiative which was launched between the Inkatha and the South African government and in those, it culminated ultimately in a document which was drawn up by Inkatha, which was not accepted by the government although there were very clear indications that a very big portion of them actually agreed with the document. Now, that document set out what they perceived to be the preconditions for negotiations. And those are now history, but few people actually remember that. They actually set out that you would have to immediately release Mandela, you would have to unban all the political organisations. They even went into the details, the modalities of how you could get exiles to return to the country and how and what categories of exiles. Now, that document, as I say, it wasn't accepted by the government, but there were very clear indications that there was a lot of sympathy for it. And I think the government very clearly were very impressed with the thinking behind that document. But, of course, at that stage PW Botha was still Prime Minister, was State President. Now, immediately after he had that stroke, there were a number of meetings between de Klerk and Chief Buthelezi. And during that meeting it became very clear that a very fundamental shift had taken place. Now we had information there that he was planning fairly major initiatives. So therefore, in that sense, I wasn't surprised. But I didn't believe that he would actually go as far as he did. Because if you look very carefully at what he did, if you compare the document which Inkatha submitted with his actions, they are almost verbatim, the same thing. Exactly what they had told him to do, he did.
POM. So, in fact, Inkatha had articulated what the obstacles were to talks before, in fact, the ANC had.
AK. Oh, yes. The ANC had nothing to do with it. Of course, we don't know, there are fairly firm indications that, particularly Kobie Coetsee, the Minister of Justice, that's actually a very interesting phenomenon because the Ministers of Justice in South Africa have not exactly been known for their commitment to democracy and justice, but this particular individual obviously is a fairly enlightened man and now there are fairly clear indications, which became evident during those talks, and which was not a known fact, that the government was having very serious discussions with Nelson Mandela. And it culminated in that very strange meeting between PW Botha and Mandela when Mandela was suddenly taken to Tuynhuys for the famous tea party. But nothing happened as a result of it. But the man behind that was Kobie Coetsee.
. Now, it became clear during those talks that this had been going on for years. That there had been consultations, particularly between Kobie Coetsee and the ANC. Now, of course, that has never been made public and nobody knows exactly what was discussed there. That has never been revealed. But I think it is fair to say that, and I think this is another thing which many people don't actually give enough credit to Inkatha for actually achieving it. Although Mandela, when he did come to Durban, I mean, he did publicly thank Inkatha and particularly Chief Buthelezi for the role they had played in securing his release and the unbanning of the ANC. The irony now, that having achieved that, Inkatha has now become the target number one and the enemy number one of the ANC.
POM. That was going to be my next question. What accounts for the enormous degree of, not just bad blood, I mean, animosity, total animosity between the ANC and Inkatha?
AK. That's a very complex issue and you know, I think one of the problems in South Africa today is that there is, for whatever faults there are on each side, I think it's very unproductive to start wanting to point fingers and say, you know, if there is an incident then immediately you start blaming the others and say, well, you caused it. I think that's really unproductive. What we really need to try and do is to look at scenarios that will actually try and resolve the conflict. But be that as it may ...
POM. But can you do that unless you first define what the problem is?
AK. Well, let me just give you some historical background on the relationship between the ANC and Inkatha. There is an admission, which at some stage caused quite a lot of conflict because the ANC on a number of occasions publicly made statements that they were, in fact, responsible for the creation of Inkatha. Now, the reason for that in the early years was that it was very clearly perceived to be, and I think it worried the ANC and I will come back to that, that it was a major political force and they were trying to claim credit for it. Now, there is a measure of truth in that which is not well-documented but there is no doubt that there were very detailed discussions between the ANC and various emissaries from Inkatha and that, in fact, they encouraged Inkatha, the formation of Inkatha. And that goes way back when Chief Albert Luthuli was still, although that's a separate issue, but it's interesting just to follow the thing through that Luthuli, in fact, encouraged Buthelezi to assume the position of Chief of the Buthelezi tribe. And as he tried to get control of that system to stop the government from leading KwaZulu into independence as it succeeded to do with some of the other major homelands, major ones being the Transkei and, as you know, the others.
. Now, it was very clear then, [and there was some ???] for example, the fact that the colours were the same, the ANC and the Inkatha colours were the same. I mean, there was a very clear indication that there had been a lot of consultation and it appeared that technically at some stage the plan must have been that, at the right political moment, Inkatha would have transformed itself into the ANC. There was a lot of speculation about that. But anyway, what happened then was that in 1979 Oliver Tambo asked to see the Chief Minister, the President of Inkatha. And he flew to London with a delegation of 17 people, of eminent people. [including people like the Shubzulu(?), who is now dead.] But anyway, at that meeting there was a total breakdown because from the Inkatha side, and, again, I mean, history will have to define exactly what happened then because I don't think it's been properly done, but I think it cannot be said that one of the main motives of the ANC was actually to turn Inkatha into its surrogate. It wanted to actually control the agenda and it was becoming more and more worried with the growth in the numbers. It had grown into the biggest political organisation South Africa had ever seen, Buthelezi was being seen by the presidents of the major western democracies, he obviously was beginning to become a ..., and I think they felt threatened.
. Now there was a suggestion made that Inkatha should become a surrogate and that led to total confrontation, not total confrontation but it lead to breakdown and Buthelezi came home and said, 'No, thank you, we'll do our own thing and we will take orders from nobody.' And from that day onwards and I mean, you can trace that back, you will see for the first time Oliver Tambo and the other members of the ANC started attacking Inkatha publicly. If you would, say, look back in the newspaper files, you will see that just prior to that and after that, Durban, for example, which was politically totally unimportant but it became the most bombed city in South Africa. There were bombs exploding all over the place, at supermarkets and bars, at war memorials, and I think it is, what was happening was the ANC was trying to just remind people that they were actually around because of the growth in Inkatha. Then the situation became progressively worse, culminating in statements by particularly Chris Hani, the commander of uMkhonto, in London where he publicly called for the murder of Buthelezi and other members of the Central Committee of Inkatha.
POM. When was that?
AK. That would have been, we can look it up in the files, but it was a couple of years ago. Then there were also repeated calls in, by Chris Hani but also by Oliver Tambo, that they described Buthelezi as a traitor and as a snake that needs to be hit on the head, which was virtually the same thing as saying that he should be assassinated. Now, that is again well-documented, you can go into, if you look at Sechaba, and if you look at the transcripts which are available from the BBC in particular, the transcripts of Radio Freedom, you know, they provide transcripts of Radio Freedom, the ANC's transmitter in Zambia.
POM. BBC do in London or ...?
AK. Yes, the BBC provides transcripts for it. I mean, those could be dug out. I mean, we've probably got those on file here as well. Certainly in Ulundi they would have them on file. And it became progressively worse. Then, after the unbanning of the ANC - now, that, again, is a great irony. Nobody in my view is more responsible for the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela than Buthelezi. I mean, he has consistently for 15 years, I mean he even stuck his neck out in saying, in calling for the man's release. I mean, again, it is well-documented, it is not a matter of opinion that he should now be singled out as the bad man. Now, after the unbanning of the ANC a major assault was launched on Inkatha and, again, this is well-documented, even when the peace talks started between the ANC/COSATU/UDF and Inkatha, a document started doing the rounds which showed very clearly what the strategy was. And they are now articulated by people like Chris Hani, Jay Naidoo in COSATU, where the tactic was to isolate Buthelezi. Now that is a well-documented thing. There's a guideline they put out, a guideline to the comrades, which are these radical youth movements in the townships that are really answerable to nobody, but in their guideline they set out in great detail how one should go about depriving Buthelezi of his power base and through selective violence on Inkatha supporters.
. So, again, when these peace talks started, they tried to distance themselves from these things and they said, well, they admit these things had been distributed but they don't come from what they call "the formal structures of the movement" and somebody lower down must have done it. But it was so widespread that there's no doubt in my mind, certainly, that it was a feeling, you know, that it had the blessing of the top. And I think history has now shown that that is what the tactic was and it is now being articulated by people like Chris Hani, publicly within South Africa. Although he had said it in the past in Sechaba and elsewhere.
POM. Are the guidelines to comrades available in Ulundi?
AK. Yes, I could give you a copy of those. We've actually published them, as well, in our newspaper.
POM. That would be terrific.
PK. Could you go back to a little piece of history here, the peace process last year that was supposed to proceed with the meeting in London, how did that fail? How did it break down?
AK. You mean the peace process here, the local one, how did that break down?
PK. Well, when we here in August of last year, there, I believe, there was a process going on with meetings in July. There was supposed to some kind of meeting in London with Buthelezi going to meet with Tambo and leaders of the various organisations.
AK. Now, there is an interesting question because, you see, while these talks were going on, there were increasing indications that while they were talking, underneath they were still trying to isolate Inkatha and they were attacking Inkatha. One of the issues was this guideline to comrades which was very widely distributed and, as I say, when it was raised they then tried to distance themselves from it and there are press releases to show how they did it. So part of the process was, there was an agreed document and it was then agreed by these parties, that there should in the first instance be a meeting between the presidents. Now at that stage, now, that is also very interesting, because there was enormous agitation going on and part of these guidelines to comrades and the agitation against Inkatha was that they had seen, they had become scared of the movement but what they then decided to do, that above all else, they should not, they should peg Inkatha to Natal and not allow it to become a national force.
. Now, there were enormous influences within the ANC that said by allowing Buthelezi to talk to Tambo, you were, in fact, giving him a national and an international role and there was no way they were going to agree to that. And so Buthelezi wrote, after that agreement, a number of letters to Tambo which were never answered. After the release of Mandela, when he publicly challenged him about this and said, 'You know, I've agreed, I've given you dates, I've gone to great lengths, and I don't even get the courtesy of a reply.' Then they got a cursory note back from London saying, 'As you are aware, Oliver Tambo has had a stroke and we weren't able to attend to it.' But it was left to that. And he has again given them dates and it has never been followed up.
. Now, just to take it then into the immediate present, Mandela then agreed telephonically with Buthelezi to have a meeting, a joint peace meeting in Maritzburg where the major violence was. They had actually even agreed on the dates and the venues and everything and then, and this, again, is now well-documented, Mandela suddenly backed out and press statements started appearing immediately by major ANC players, like Harry Gwala, who's the leader of the midlands man, a real Stalinist, and he said there is no way that they would allow that to take place.
POM. That was Harry? What was the name?
AK. Harry Gwala. G-W-A-L-A. So Mandela then, when he visited the Transkei a couple of months ago, publicly acknowledged, he said that he had agreed to this, but when he had told his lieutenants about it, they threatened to throttle him. Those were his words. So, there is the history of that little incident. Now, it is interesting again, when Chris Hani and others have now publicly again called for Buthelezi's isolation, that last week at the press conference in Johannesburg when, after the National Executive Meeting, when one of the reporters there challenged Mandela about this and said, 'Do you agree with that?' And Mandela then backed off and said he's not prepared to discuss issues like that through the press. Now again, it shows very clearly the differences between Mandela, who is very clearly, I think, committed to try and resolve that but there are people lower down that will not allow it to happen.
POM. So let me give you first some of the things people have been saying when we've talked to them, and this will cover a wide spectrum, from church people to members of the Liberal Party through members of other political groupings through ANC, UDF, COSATU. I mean, we would expect where some of them are coming, they are going to give their point of view, but I want to say we got these from more than simply people who are firmly and absolutely on one side and believe that Inkatha and Buthelezi are the absolute bad boys. One was that some of the factors aggravating the conflict in KwaZulu, one is the KwaZulu police side with Inkatha, that Inkatha has lost support in urban areas and is losing it in rural areas and that it using the conflict to prevent a situation from occurring where, in fact, people could freely choose what they wanted, which organisation they wanted to belong to, because in that case there would be a massive movement of people to UDF, COSATU, whatever, away from Inkatha. That the government, the South African government, is using the conflict as a way to, in a sense, hoping to marginalise the ANC to a degree in ...
AK. That's really quite nonsense, really, you know. Just on that last point, because it really is so amusing, that they are equally from the other side, and I'm not talking now that those things I haven't heard from Inkatha, but they are, and there are very firm indications that the government is, in fact, trying to do the opposite that it, in fact, is working to strike a deal with the ANC and, in fact, that it is trying to, itself is trying to marginalise Inkatha. So that's a diagonally opposite point of view.
POM. What would you point to as an indication of that?
AK. Let me not give too much weight to that but I would ask of you, why is it that the President is constantly talking to Mandela, and that they are constantly at every opportunity, there's immediate consultation, why? I mean, are you going to suggest that Mandela, having been in prison for so long and the ANC haven't had the opportunity to organize its structures, can suddenly, magically, become the organisation that is going to guarantee democracy in this country? I mean, that's surely from any logical point of view is not a tenable argument. So, why?
POM. Am I supposed to have the answer?
AK. No, I'm just posing the question. Why? If that were the case. Now, again, if we logically, again, look in terms of the ANC's strategy, what it has said and done, it will tell you that KwaZulu and Buthelezi is a tribalist, I mean, they love using that word, and it's a Zulu organisation and it's all the epithets they use and it is a regional power base. Well, then, of what utility can Inkatha be to the government, if it is regional and tribal? And how on earth is the government going to manage the rest of South Africa by forming a coalition with a tribally-based regional power? I mean, that's illogical, isn't it? I mean, I just think that propaganda, you know, that's part of the thing you have to live with, but I don't attach any credence to that.
POM. How about the police, KwaZulu police and South African police?
AK. Well, I don't accept that at all, knowing what goes on on the ground. Look, let me preface my reply with a statement that, given the horrendous proportions that violence has assumed in this country, given the social dislocation, given the social disintegration that has taken place, the lawlessness, the hopelessness on the part of all sectors of the population, it is inconceivable that there is not going to be ugliness on all sides. So, therefore, I would not be, I would not be prepared to say that some members of the KwaZulu police haven't made themselves guilty of that. But what I can tell you is that the violence which has been directed against KwaZulu police is unspeakable! I mean, large numbers of those policemen are not even able to sleep in their houses, they sleep outside on the lawn! Now, given that situation, again, are we, therefore, going to say that - and another thing is that you must not forget, and this is documented, go to the transcripts of the BBC, go to Sechaba, and you will see that long before this conflict started...
POM. Where would one get copies of Sechaba?
AK. Sorry?
POM. Where would one get copies of Sechaba?
AK. From the ANC, they would have them. That's their publication. Now they called for the country to be made ungovernable. They called for the murder of community councillors. Anybody working in any structure within the government, apart from the fact that it's outrageously undemocratic, it doesn't matter what one thinks about them, but to actually call for that, I think, is horrendous. But be that as it may, they called for the murder of policemen, again, and again, and again, repeatedly. Now, given that scenario, who was it who called for the murder of those policemen? Are you then now suddenly going to say, 'How can one justifiably now say that the KwaZulu police are responsible?' And that some of those people no doubt are going to commit atrocities? I mean, if you are attacked [and given the]- I mean, look at the figures, look at the number of policemen that are being murdered everyday it surely is not surprising that some of those people are not only going to retaliate, but some of them will actively begin to say, 'Well, now, hold on. If you people are going to call for my murder, then I'm going to have a go at you.' Now, and I think, I have no doubt that, and the number of KwaZulu policemen have been brought to trial for that. But there is another side to the coin. I mean, the other thing which is not repeated often enough is that there are members of the South African police that have been committed, that have been convicted of murder of Inkatha supporters in Maritzburg and other places. And that, again, is well-documented. That were committed in a court of law, of murder of Inkatha supporters.
POM. There's the case of the Deputy Minister.
AK. Yes, of KwaZulu, Jamine. Yes, look, I wouldn't like to comment on that because it's a case which is being heard before the Supreme Court at the moment and I think one must let justice take its course. I can't comment on that.
POM. What I'm getting at, in a way, I'd like to go back for you to address whether or not Inkatha is losing support, that it would lose more support if there was freedom of association. What accounts for the ferocity of the violence? One can understand if you said violence will occur ...
AK. Let me just pose a counter-question first, and I will give you the documents, where Inkatha put its document on the table, we published it, and very few other newspapers actually published it, long before de Klerk was even in office, where it called for Mandela's release, where it called for the unbanning of the ANC, of the SACP, and every political organisation. If it were not prepared to enter into a democratic contest with others, why on earth would it go and negotiate for the unbanning of its political foes? I mean, that is illogical, isn't it? Now, I mean, how does one answer that? I mean, that is not an opinion. That is a fact. You know, you can, it is documented, we can give you the documents. So to repeat, if it were not prepared to enter into a democratic contest, why on earth would it call for the release of Mandela and unbanning of the ANC? Then surely it should have gone behind everybody's back and done the secret deal with the government and said, 'Look, we'll come into coalition with you and we will just keep those guys in their place and we'll manage the whole show for you.' I mean, that would be logical, wouldn't it. But it didn't do that. Now, is Inkatha losing support or not? Quite frankly, I don't know. But I would be surprised if it weren't.
POM. Why so?
AK. Well, given the euphoria that is being created after the release of Mandela, given the hopelessness of many people and the lack of candour on the part of many of the ANC leadership, they've really, I think irresponsibly given the people the impression that we will abolish apartheid and then it's all going to be milk and honey. Now, any sober analysis of the fact, even if you were to confiscate every bit of white property and redistribute it, there would be nothing to redistribute. So a lot of those people, particularly the youth who make up 50% of the black population, 50% of the black population in this part of world are under 15 years of age, now very impressionable, a great degree of hopelessness. Now it is not surprising given the sudden collapse of the system that they don't, that a lot of people don't get taken in by this and think, 'We've backed those guys, we're going to have fantastic houses, we're have motor cars and everything you can buy.' It's not going to work that way. Now, disillusionment will set in, as it is now. So I would be surprised if Inkatha didn't lose support. But what I have been told, and I'm satisfied myself because we actually had management within the Inkatha organisation for a couple months to help them sort out their administration. And what I do know is that they are also gaining large numbers of members. Now, so there is no doubt that they will be shedding a lot of people, but I think they, well, I know that they are gaining people as well. Now exactly where the balance is, I can't tell you. I simply don't know. And you know, you also have, because of the massive breakdown of law and order and standards, and I mean, the intimidation that goes on, the only way that you can really answer that question is through the ballot box. That's what's going to tell.
POM. Two questions I just throw at you and I throw them at you because they have come up in other conversations with people and I just want your comment on them more than anything else. One is that, in part, the conflict is a conflict about values, that Inkatha has an organisational structure that still puts the chief at the top of the hierarchy, so it's hierarchical, it's tribal values. And ANC/UDF/COSATU would be a different set of norms and values, not accepting that model, not accepting the authority of the ...?
AK. Yes, I think that again is a gross exaggeration. There is no doubt that there is an element of truth in that and I think realistically, you cannot expect a society like South Africa where there are still large numbers of people that are not urbanised, there are still large numbers of people that are not, and I'm not attaching any values here, but that are not 'westernised'. And, you know, so there is an element of traditionalism. Again, and I don't mean that in a negative sense but simply as a de facto situation, so therefore, yes, that exists. I mean, I've got people on my staff, very highly intelligent, westernised, that pay lobola, dowry for their wives, that make sacrifices to their ancestral spirits. Again, which I think is noble, there's nothing that I see in any way is lesser in its value compared to western society. But the fact of the matter that there is a cleavage in South African society. Now, that I would argue that that cleavage coincides between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF. I would say to you that there are large numbers of people ...
POM. Sorry, that it coincides, it's on, it exists on both sides?
AK. Yes, there's no doubt about it. Oscar Dhlomo until very recently was the Secretary General of Inkatha. Now, I mean, there is one of the most highly polished, educated people with one of the most incisive minds I've ever come across. Now, I mean, he was Secretary General for five or six years. Are you saying that he's urban? I mean, rural, or tribal, or traditionalist? I mean, what are we saying? They are, the Youth Brigade is by far the biggest element of the Inkatha hierarchy now of the Inkatha movement, in terms of numbers. And they will give you those figures in Ulundi. Again, I cannot accept that those are all traditionalists. I mean, Musa Zondi, the Chairman of the Youth Brigade, is again, one of the most intelligent people I have ever met.
POM. We talked to him the other morning.
AK. Now, is he a rural person? I mean, how does one make that judgement? It doesn't make sense to me. I think it is exploited, again, you see, because again, you stick labels on people. You say they are tribalists, they are traditional, you know. I really don't think that is very helpful and I don't think it's actually accurate.
POM. The other thing that was posited to us was that there's the tribal element insofar as all of Inkatha is Zulu but that the ANC was originally tribally-based in the Transkei. So this is like a different tribe, in a way, moving in and taking, trying to take territory.
AK. I think that is a very silly argument, really. Again, it is mentioned again and again. Then I would say to you, how is it that virtually the entire leadership of the ANC is Xhosa? Now, I don't want to stick labels on them. But that's a fact. Now, if I want to follow that argument, then I could counter by saying, well, why are you all Xhosas? Why is Patrick Lekota a Sotho? You know, their convener in Southern Natal? Why do they allow that and then Archie Gumede. I mean there has been a huge controversy and differences of opinion in the ANC in Natal in the recent weeks between Archie Gumede, who is a Zulu and Patrick Lekota. And it's very widespread, the talk among black people that say the reason is, you see, that they will not trust a Zulu to the organisation in Natal. They've got to bring in an outsider. They wouldn't want a Zulu. Now, I don't know whether that is true, but that is the reality. Now, why is it that the entire leadership of the ANC is Xhosa? Why?
POM. I haven't found the answer to that yet.
AK. Now, they are typical. You've researched these things at great length, so you know, there are stereotypes and there are, I mean, that's one of the biggest problems in South Africa today, is theft and breakdown of law and order. If a vehicle is stolen, a typical Zulu, if you ask him, he will say to you, 'It's been stolen by a Xhosa.' If I say to him, 'But how can you say a thing like that?' 'Because these are thieves!' Simple. And if you ask him where it is, he will say, it is Pondoland, you know. Now, unfortunately, you have to live with that sort of stereotype. And it's very difficult to get rid of them.
. [Tape switched on and off] I think one must be fairly careful with those. You know, the Inkatha has branches in the Cape, and Cape Town, and I would presume, because of that vicinity, that the bulk of the people down there are Xhosas. Because that's where they, the people that make up the black population, like South Africans in Cape Town, are predominantly Xhosas, because that is the area which is closest to that area. It has branches in the Free State, large numbers of branches, and they are Sothos, those are not Zulus. So that it will be predominantly Zulu must be a fact of life, because the Zulus are the biggest group in South Africa. Their home base is Natal, which is 99.9% Zulu, maybe not quite so high, but large numbers of them.
POM. Looking at the Zulu nation, one, in your view, is there such a thing as the Zulu nation? And two, would a Zulu see himself first as a Zulu, then as a South African? Where is his primary identity?
AK. Whether they would see themselves firstly as Zulu and then secondly South African? Yes, I think one would have to admit to that. You know, you have got to look at it again in historical terms. The Zulus have produced some really outstanding characters, men, in the last centuries. And talking about that particular issue, of course, is King Shaka. And he, the Zulus, as you well know, the Americans are the best authorities on the Zulus as you know through people like Donald Morris, who has written the standard works particularly on the Zulu wars and the history of the Zulu people. You know, it was a huge conglomerate of divergent tribes and factions and clans and Shaka welded them into the nation. Now, there is no doubt that there is, to this day, that Zulu unity has to a very large degree survived and their influence is also very marked over the whole of, not only South but Southern Africa. If you go into Zimbabwe you will see very, very strong Zulu influences among the Ndebeles that were driven out by Shaka. There are also empirical studies that show that Zulu is one of the most widely-used languages in Southern Africa, even in places like Soweto. I mean, it is arguably the dominant language. So, yes, Zulu nationalism is obviously a very potent force. There is no doubt that Zulus are very proud of their Zulu-ness but that does not mean, one must not fall into that trap. The South African government through its apartheid policies abused ethnicity. Now, the Zulu, although he may be very proud of his Zulu-ness, but I don't think he wants to exercise it at the expense of his fellow South Africans.
POM. I'm asking it in the context of you have the Afrikaners who see themselves as a nation who promulgate Afrikaner nationalism. And even with these two strong nationalisms at force, my question is, I suppose, is, that would suggest that a unitary state would not be a very good model for a new South Africa.
AK. You know, I would hesitate to comment on that. [because I have no carrot(?) in my own mind.] It depends on how you structure the state. I think, I, personally, cannot conceive of a situation where you don't have one sovereign parliament, which I think in a sense entails a unitary state. But that there should be, in my own view, although as I say I don't have any very strong feelings about it, I believe that you will have to adopt fairly pronounced elements of federalism within the constitution. For example, there is no doubt that if you look at the recent history, most of the political initiatives in South Africa's recent past have come out of Natal. The KwaZulu Natal Indaba, the Buthelezi Commission, the Joint Executive Authority, there has been a much greater willingness here on the part of blacks and whites to actually come to terms with each other and to compromise. Inkatha was the organisation that was actually debating with the government the release of Mandela, There's no doubt that things here are different to, for example, in the Transkei and the Ciskei. I don't think, and I think that one should allow for people to adopt different models in different areas. But that there must be one sovereign parliament, of that I have no doubt, who must oversee things like foreign affairs and money policy and so on.
POM. That's what I more or less had in mind when I said it. How do you see the process unfolding in the next year? And what role do you see ...? So I can come back next year and say, Well?
AK. You're wanting me to become a prophet now?
POM. Yes, what role do you see, I mean right now it looks as though Chief Buthelezi has been locked out of the process.
AK. No, I think you are wrong.
POM. Most people say he must be brought in.
AK. No, but I don't think that is an accurate statement. In fact, there are very clear indications that it is not accurate. Despite what I said earlier about the affinity between Mandela and, not affinity but very close relationship, between the State President and Dr. Mandela. No, I don't think so. I would say that you are going to have a fairly long drawn-out procedure to try and establish a formula for negotiations, and when those negotiations, substantive negotiations, will actually take place, I really wouldn't know. But I would say that, logically, they must take place before the expiring of the current life of the South African parliament, which is, I think, three years down the track.
POM. 1994.
AK. Yes.
POM. Three possible scenarios are most frequently mentioned to us. One is the path of a Constituent Assembly which would draw up a constitution. The second is a broad negotiating table where everyone who has a political constituency will be represented.
AK. I mean, that is the only realistic one. There is no way that I can see, I mean the demand of the ANC is a Constituent Assembly. I don't think that is practical politics. It's not going to happen. However desirable or undesirable it may be, it's not going to happen because that implies - I mean, how are you going to actually constitute that Assembly? How are you going to ...?
POM. It concedes majority rule before it's negotiated, doesn't it?
AK. Yes, but how are you going to do it? Are you going to have a national election or what? How are you actually going to it?
PK. Well there are lots of models for elections to a Constituent Assembly. What it does do is it answers the question that people, including yourself, keep posing, and that's the legitimacy of what the ANC represents.
AK. Yes. [We need to stop, this call's coming in. [Tape off, then on]]
PK. Practical issue of the fact that de Klerk maybe would just put down the gauntlet and say, 'No Constituent Assembly.' Wouldn't it be in Chief Buthelezi's interests to support this ANC call for a Constituent Assembly as a way of perhaps even resolving some of the issues in the conference?
AK. Well, I can't speak for him, I don't know. All I can tell you is that he is publicly opposed. Well, he hasn't opposed it, what he has said is that it is not an option. And he said it again in his address at the last conference.
PK. Now, do you think it is not a good idea to have a Constituent Assembly?
AK. Yes, personally I don't. Well, let me say again that I don't believe that it will happen.
PK. So, therefore, it is not even worth entertaining or discussing whether or not you think it is a good idea.
AK. Yes, I really don't think it's practicable, I don't think it is going to happen, the government will not allow it to happen and therefore, really, it's, I don't think it's an option.
PK. But how do you get to the legitimacy factor in terms of who sits at the table, "constituency"?
AK. That comes back to the issue that we were discussing earlier where you said, or where you were quoting others as saying Buthelezi is being marginalised and he's being pushed out. No, I don't believe that. And I don't, there is no way that the government would be able to justify that, and if you really want to see violence in South Africa, then you must pursue that path, because you will have an uprising among the Zulu people the likes of which you've never seen. And that is not practical, it simply won't work. How are you going to do it? I think that you are going to have to, in this long drawn-out process of negotiations, you are going to have to arrive at a formula in terms of which there can be agreement on people with recognisable constituencies whose right to debate at that table is accepted and that, at the end of the day, you reach a consensus among those leadership people which will result in some sort of formula in terms of which you can have an election and then a government and then built-in guarantees and whatever to enable the people that come afterwards to actually debate and possibly alter what has been agreed to, but within accepted perimeters. I think that, presently, I believe that, I'm a really, and, again, this is my own personal opinion, but I very strongly believe in the efficacy of the work which Orrin Ledford(?) has done on consociational democracy. I think there is a lot of merit in that, particularly in South Africa. That if you can reach, if you can get recognised leaders who have a demonstrable power base to agree on something, then you've got a very good chance of them reaching an accommodation through the ballot box which can result in a government which is acceptable to the mass of the people.
PK. Just to carry this the next step forward. From what we understand from the briefings we've had from the government, once the ANC's preconditions are met, like Buthelezi's preconditions were met, then the next focus is the PAC. Say the PAC and AZAPO decide after much hand-wringing to come into this process. Does AZAPO get the same number of seats of representation that Buthelezi gets at the table if you don't have an election to determine strength?
AK. Well, then, how are you going to have the election? Are you going to have a rational election? How are you going to do it?
PK. No, well, let's say you are not going to have one. I mean, it doesn't happen. Does Buthelezi accept that he is stronger than AZAPO and therefore should have more representation at the table, or that he would be, everybody would be on an equal basis?
AK. Look, I simply don't know the answer to that question. But I would say, logically, that he would have to accept a situation in terms of which you will not be able to quantify what every person present supports. I mean, for example, let's just take the case of the Indian people that are a minority in this country, but they are very significant politically and they are as important as any other South African. Now, how are you going to represent them? Are you going to say that because they are a minority that they are not entitled to an input at the negotiating table? My own feeling would be to say, no. And that is where I come back to consociational democracy. If you have, I don't want to use the word Indian, but Indian leaders that have got a demonstrable power base. and I think they are entitled to sit at the table and hopefully reach a compromise with the other leaders which they have. If they cannot sell it to their constituents, then very clearly they've lost their power base.
POM. Over what period of time do you think this process is going to unwind?
AK. Two years. I would say two years, given the fact that the last of the parliament will run out in 1994, is it? I would say two years, two and a half years.
POM. When you look at the ANC?
AK. Can I just qualify that? [You see, I think we put it in an ??? at the moment.] I think it is absolutely critical that violence is stopped, it's got to be stopped, because you cannot, in my view, start really meaningful negotiations with this sort of anarchy and violence going on. It has got to be stopped somehow.
POM. What steps to you think must be taken to stop it?
AK. Well, I think the first thing, personally, is that you have to have a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi. I think that is a prerequisite.
POM. Do you think a joint call by both of them for their supporters to cease and desist would in itself be enough?
AK. No, I don't believe so. But that's the start which you have to have, I believe.
POM. And then?
AK. And then you can go into all sorts of other scenarios. I think you have to, you have to accept that people have to be given hope. You have to be able to demonstrate to the youth that you are serious about sorting the educational problems out. You have to be able to demonstrate to millions of people that you really are going address their housing needs, their education needs, their health needs, and so on. You are going to have to embark on projects that will actually take people off the street, that will open opportunities for them to earn a living. I mean, those sort of things are going to have to be done. So, simply a joint call for peace, that's not going to work.
POM. But in a sense, you're suggesting that real negotiations can't get underway until the violence is under control, but at the same time, steps that would bring the violence under control are almost long-term steps.
AK. No. Why is it long-term to have, if you had joint meetings between Mandela and Buthelezi and if you had joint calls for peace and those are not long-term issues with regard to development, OK the impact of them. But you must give the people hope. The South African government has made, I think it is, what is it? four or six billion available, and they have created special funds in Natal. And I believe that people, the large majority of people are actually reasonable people that are just caught in this web of hopelessness, that if you give them hope, I believe that they will say, ah, OK, let's ...
POM. In the United States, when Mandela was asked about the violence, he was asked about it pretty much repeatedly, he pointed the finger of blame at the government, saying the government could bring the violence under control if it wished to, they'll have brought violence under control in other areas and in other situations, that it was quite adept at doing so, so the fact that it hasn't chosen to do so was a major statement that they were the primary agent of its effectuation.
AK. Yes, look, two things. The one thing which I will admire Mandela for, for making a statement, he said he resists the tendency of his lieutenants to simply point the finger at Inkatha and say, 'You are to blame.' So he tried to shift it elsewhere, so that's a positive thing. Now, I think in very general terms he is correct, that the cause of the violence in South Africa, in Natal, is ultimately apartheid. But it is not going to help, as I said earlier, to point fingers now. We are in a situation, and people have actually exacerbated that and we can come back to that. His organisation actually has made it infinitely worse by calling for ungovernability, by calling for the assassination of Inkatha leaders, for calling for the assassination of policemen, etc., etc., so I mean, they are not blameless.
. Now, as to whether he can, again I want to point out another contradiction to what he is saying, On the one hand, he and his lieutenants have said The troops out of the townships, the police out of the townships. Well, how can you call it both ways? You can't demand that de Klerk stop it and on the other hand say, 'Take your troops out of the townships.' You've got to be logical then and say, if you want him to stop it then you must allow him to put even more troops in the townships. So, I think he's been a little bit inconsistent. Whether the South African government can stop it, yes, they could stop it, but then, I think, with fairly terribly results. I think if they did it the way they traditionally did it, there would be an outcry not only from the ANC but from the whole western world and possibly justifiably. I mean, you can't stop it by simply mass arrests and curfews and all sorts of things like that. But I personally don't believe that's the way to go. I think the much better route is to actually get leaders to issue joint calls and that they should go out on Sunday platforms together in the arenas of conflict and actually insist on their supporters to stop. I mean, that is a prerequisite.
POM. What is your perception of what the ANC stands for? What an ANC government would, in fact, articulate as an ideology?
AK. Well, I think that the problem is that the ANC is such a conglomerate of interests that it is almost impossible to answer that. I mean, the South African Communist Party, and I think there can be no doubt that it has a massive influence over there, in my view is totally undemocratic and I totally reject their policies and their principles and the ANC still insists that it has an alliance with the SACP. So, I don't know, where does the dominance lie? I don't know. People speculate and they add up numbers and they say, so many are communist, I don't know. Again, I have to wait and see.
POM. What divisions do you see within the ANC?
AK. Well, I think there are large numbers of divisions. I think there is the traditional African nationalist movement which I think is, to a very large degree, embodied in very similar organisations like Inkatha. Then you get a very strong Marxist influence, they sort of ride on the back of African nationalism. And, I mean, that's also well-documented, if you look at the clashes that took place in the expulsion of the so-called African nationalists. Then you get very strong trade union influences, some of which, again, are very Marxist, others very workerist. So, I mean, it's really, and I think all the cracks are beginning to show now, and that is good. Not because I want to see them disintegrate but that's what democracy is all about, is actually getting people to state their positions so people can make choices. I think that is where we need to go.
POM. What are your own greatest fears and concerns for the future?
AK. I think that my greatest fear is that if South Africa continues to go on the path that it is going on now, for whatever reason, I don't believe that, if the economy is damaged much greater than it's been damaged right now, I think the chances of us protecting foreign investment are zero, and if we can't protect foreign investment, we've had it. I really don't believe, you cannot if you look at the statistics, that the masses of unemployed that will simply not be employable, and particularly given this cultural violence that has been engendered in them, you know, that you get a total breakdown of law and order and disintegration and I think that is a frightening scenario. The other thing that you mustn't forget, and this is where South Africa is totally different from other African states, is that the rapid urbanisation of blacks is now proceeding apace. There are millions of people that live off the cities, either through petty crimes, through rummaging in the dustbins, through getting jobs washing motor cars, by whatever means.
POM. You were talking about, if the ...?
AK. That is the real problem. I think that you then degenerate into a situation of total hopelessness. The problem is that in South Africa - things are terrible in places like Mozambique because of the war and so on but very small numbers of those people are actually urbanised. They can still scratch in the ground and raise crops. You can't do that in this country anymore. There are just too many people. And given the population growth, which is over 3% as you know, unless we get the economy rising, I think we're headed for a disaster.
. Again, if I can again digress for a moment, and this is the thing which really distresses me, if you look at what happened in Europe, I'm originally a German and I take a very close interest in German history, if you look at what happened in Versailles, and the consequences of Versailles, that lesson was learnt by the West after the second World War. And they not only ensured that democracy succeeded, soon pumping in enormous amounts of resources and persuading people that really it can work, they were all bolstering it through the Marshall Aid Plan and making it work. And today Germany is, I don't think one can dispute that, it's not only economically powerful but it is a very stable democracy.
. Now, I don't believe that in the South African situation - it disturbs me how people can believe that you can actually change things by damaging the economy. It doesn't matter what Mandela and others say, that is totally illogical. It doesn't work, and history has - there are many examples that have shown this. And that, it scares me. I think, if anything, what we need now is rapid economic growth. And the other thing is that, as South Africans, we have to learn that the world doesn't owe us a living, and I think black Africans in particular need to learn that lesson. Given the events in Eastern Europe, there is no doubt that that's where enormous amounts of the resources of the West are going to flow.
PK. It's not only that, but can you see it in the rest of Africa? The West hasn't come to save Africa.
AK. Absolutely.
POM. What do you think are the greatest fears of whites? Because I think, related to what you have just said ...?
AK. Insecurity, that's the greatest fear. Fear of anarchy, fear of breakdown of law and order, that is the greatest fear. I think they will live with the drop in standards, physical standards, but I don't think they will live with insecurity.
POM. Do you think de Klerk will attempt to try to have inserted into the constitution some guarantees relating to the structure of the economy?
AK. No, I would have no doubt about that.
PK. And Buthelezi as well?
AK. And Buthelezi as well. And I think that is an encouraging thing because I have no doubt personally that that will have the full backing of the major western democracies. Namibia has shown that. And I think that's very encouraging.
POM. Just three last things: the obstacles that de Klerk faces in managing the process from his side, the obstacles that Mandela faces in trying to manage it from his side.
AK. Well, the obstacles de Klerk faces are, I think, fairly self-evident. Now, you've seen what the right wingers have been doing, you've seen the growth in their support even in places like English-speaking Durban. In the Umlazi by-election the signs were very clear. I believe that unless he is able to show the very dangerous path he has chosen, because let's face, I mean again I think one must concede that any form of change on this scale is exceedingly dangerous. Unless he can actually show positive results I think there is a very real chance that he will be swept from power. Now, there are a number of scenarios, and God help us if it ever happens, but I think that the fact the military may well at some stage believe that it's gone too far and stop it. And that is the ultimate in that case, and very violent. The other scenario is that if he went to an election, he'd be voted out of power.
POM. If an election were held today, that he would be voted out of power?
AK. I don't believe that. But I think if, unless he gets rewarded by the West, that there are actually positive developments, and rewarded by the ANC, then I think, yes, there would be a chance of that happening. In which case, Mandela would find himself negotiating with Andries Treurnicht and I don't think there is much chance of that succeeding. What are the obstacles to Mandela? I think Mandela has got arguably even bigger problems, because there is no doubt that there are enormously divergent forces that are nominally working under the gambit of the ANC. And I alluded to that, I think it's going to be fairly difficult to marry those. I think, also, that one must have no illusions that even among black supporters, there is no doubt that ethnicity is going to play a role. And I'm not suggesting in any way that it needs to be accommodated but the fact of the matter is that it will play a role.
POM. Sorry, that which has to do ...?
AK. Ethnicity. When the chips are down. Let me just give you one example. In the ANC's constitutional thinking, where does the Zulu King fit in? Again, I don't want to speculate about that, but I'm saying there's a reality which goes back for centuries and you will not marginalise the Zulu King, that, I can tell you. And neither among urban or rural people, they will not allow it. So, you are going to have to allow for him. Now, if, for example, the ANC were to simply say, 'Well, that's all old hat', they'll have a problem. So, I think he is going to have a huge problem. Now again, what I would say to you is that where I see the great challenge, really in a sense it's a hope, and that is why it's absolutely necessary that people like Buthelezi and Mandela get together because there is no doubt, both of them are great men. No doubt both of them have got great faults. But there is a wisdom there and I'm sure there could be an enormous compromise.
POM. How would you assess Mandela's performance since he has been released from prison? Has he exceeded your expectations, lived up to them, fallen beneath them?
AK. Well, you know, I must say that I've never really thought about it in those terms. In other words, saying, well, what I would expect you to do is this, and you actually haven't done it. But let me say this, that I would, my own personal view was that there were expectations raised that were completely unrealistic. I don't believe Mandela, anybody, particularly a man that has been, that is on in years, that has been out of circulation, I mean one thing that I find absolutely remarkable is that he has been able to come to grips with the real world so quickly. That, I think, is incredible. But having said that, I really believe that the expectations of him are just unrealistic. You cannot expect one man, it doesn't matter who he is, to suddenly produce a solution out of the hat. That's not going to work. And that brings us back to the question of the negotiating table. You are going to have to have the wisdom of a lot more than Mandela around that table otherwise you simply won't resolve it.
POM. Your outlook for the next year. Where will we be at this time next year, when I come back to talk to you again? At what point do you think the process will be?
AK. Well, I believe that I would like to see fairly serious negotiations start early in the New Year. The critical issue, and now I'm talking from a Natal point of view, is the sense that this is the area, the arena where the mess, where the worst violence is going on and which is going to be most difficult to stop. The critical issue is that unless efforts to isolate and marginalise Buthelezi stop, I think the chances of actually getting down to serious negotiations are very slim.
POM. Pat?
PK. To take you back to a point you just made a moment ago about the qualities of Buthelezi and Mandela that make you think that these men could reach some kind of resolution and your last point about the isolation of Buthelezi. What are those qualities? They have different strengths, I think, and what you're looking perhaps at is something that's complimentary. What are the problems they have?
AK. I think the problems are that Mandela is, and I mean, I don't want to make that in a very derogatory sense, I think it's a fact, that Mandela, in fact, is still not free. That he is imprisoned by forces that he cannot control. He, as the leader of the ANC, publicly agreed, and announced publicly that he was going meet Buthelezi in Maritzburg. He was prevented from doing so by his lieutenants. I believe that Mandela faces a very difficult task and I come back to what he said two days ago after the meeting of the National Executive when a pressman asked him whether he agreed with Hani on this marginalisation of Buthelezi. And he backed off and he said, 'I won't answer that, I don't think we should discuss that in public.' That gives me hope. And I think Mandela correctly perceives that it doesn't matter what he would like or what others would like, that it's unrealistic to isolate Buthelezi and that can only lead to more violence. And I hope that he is going to be able assert himself.
PK. If he can assert himself, then you think he has personal qualities?
AK. No doubt about that.
PK. And what do you see those as being?
AK. Well, I think he's an extremely intelligent and incisive thinker. I think he's demonstrated that by his enormous capacity to come to grips with a very complicated world after sitting behind bars for twenty-seven years. I think that is remarkable. That shows that the man has got a very firm grip on reality and also having had been given insight into the sort of things that he said when he was in prison, in correspondence which he addressed to Buthelezi, which I don't really want to reveal publicly, but I had insight into those letters and there is no doubt that there was an enormous warmth towards Buthelezi months before he was released. He wrote a letter saying that one of the first things he would do was to visit KwaZulu and to pay his respects to Buthelezi and the King. Now, as you know that has been derailed. Yes, I believe that he has those qualities and what we really need, possibly, is for the two of them, I don't know whether that would be acceptable, I have my doubts, particularly in Ulundi, but personally, I would say that what is needed is, you need to get those people around a table, away from the public spotlight.
PK. And what kind of man is Buthelezi? I'm sure you get asked that question all the time.
AK. Yes. Let me answer it this way. I would say to you that, and this is what is dangerous, is that Buthelezi has been in the front line of pressure for a long time, both from South African authorities, from the ANC, from whites, from radicals, from left, black and white. And I think one can see the signs of this now. Any man that is subjected to those sort of pressures and in this crucial time, right from the top hierarchy of the ANC, is publicly targeted as an enemy of the people, I think he's going to be, become insecure, possibly paranoid to a degree, and I think that's dangerous. And I think the signs are there. And I believe, and if you go back to their press conference, that Mandela's correctly perceived that. Now, the people, the radicals, lower down, no doubt have also known that and they are just stoking those fires even more. And that is not a recipe for peace. That's a recipe for disaster. Let me not go any further than that.
PK. OK.
POM. Thank you very much.
PK. A lot. It's fascinating.
POM. Thank you very much.
POM. The documents?
AK. Let me see what I can get out for you.
. And I will show you the documents. Whereas, let me go back a few steps. This fund is only made available to, it is under the direct control of the ANC, and it's only made available to structures of the ANC. Now, I think not only is that undesirable but it is grossly undemocratic. They have manipulated the situation in terms of which Buthelezi and Inkatha and all the structures, as they call it, of its effect, undemocratic, and therefore they will give no funds. Now, those people have got access to 116 million rand this year alone. And they are using that for political agitation. Now, Inkatha is totally bankrupt and poor. Now, I don't believe that it is in the interest of democracy that you fund, that democracies of the West fund one party.
POM. Is this a South African trust?
AK. No.
POM. It's set up in the States?
AK. No, it's here. It's here. It's based here but all the funds come from Western Europe. I will give you all the particulars. Now, the pressures started to build up particularly from Britain, Belgium and Holland where they became nervous about this and they realised that these funds were being seriously abused. And they started applying pressure. Now we got, managed to lay our hands on a document, lay our hands in the sense that somebody very high in the ANC leaked it to us, where they saw that there was a chance now, or that their monopoly in terms of funding was going to stop, and so they needed to broaden their base. And then they, one of the main issues was, they were not prepared to accept American funding because of its involvement in Angola. That was a policy decision they took. Now they said, well, they're going to review that, because it was clear now that the West was no longer prepared to fund one organisation, that they wanted to be more even-handed. And so they said, well, now we can release some of the funds so we'd better go and talk to the Americans. That's why Mandela went to America. Now, the other thing is, as you well know, the American Endowment for Democracy has budgeted a sum of ten million dollars. Now again, I think it is very critical that those funds be spent even-handedly. That you give those, that those funds are made available to people even if you disagree with them. For example, the PAC. Now, whether the Americans would be prepared to fund the SACP, I don't know. They must take those decisions. But certainly, I think, one should be very careful, if you want democracy to emerge, that you don't fund one side of it. I think that is very undesirable.
PK. I think what you find with PAC, what you find in the American legislation, is that if the PAC were going to participate in the negotiating process it would be an entity that would be entitled to participate in that support. But the Congressional legislation is pretty specific in terms of these funds being used for the negotiating, across the broad for the negotiating process. But as long as the PAC, which it did a couple of weeks ago again, comes out in opposition to this process, it sort of self-eliminates.
AK. All right, then I would ask of you, as I know the American legislation, one of the criteria is also is that you will renounce violence.
PK. It says that you have a commitment to the renunciation of violence.
AK. No, the ANC very clearly has not got that commitment.
PK. Well, the State Department says, based on the Harare Declaration, that it has made a commitment, that before proceeding into negotiations it would suspend violence.
AK. Well, you've heard Nelson Mandela again, day before yesterday. You've heard what Chris Hani has said.
PK. Yes, well, I'm just telling you this, how there's a difference in that legislation and if it doesn't get read correctly, it gives, one has the wrong impression of what it actually says. It says the commitment, and, you know, that's something because it gets debated very publicly. I mean, we, the foundation that I am with, will make application to the Endowment for Democracy for funding of proposals.
AK. This is Nelson Mandela's address in Durban at King's Park on the 26th February this year, the first ANC rally in Natal. And he said, "Although there are fundamental differences between us, we commend Inkatha for their demand over the years for the unbanning of the ANC and the release of political prisoners, as well as for their stand on refusing to participate in a negotiated settlement without the creation of the necessary climate. This standard Inkatha has contributed in no small measure to making it difficult for the regime to implement successive schemes designed to perpetuate minority rule." Now, I think that's a very generous and accurate statement. And one therefore asks, How is it that these people can now call for his marginalisation and isolation?
. This is a working document of obstacles impeding negotiations and it was published, it was in March 1989. So the obstacles were that first of all, the negotiations should be exclusive as opposed to inclusive negotiations. In other words, they were saying that the South African government seems to favour exclusive negotiations, negotiations with people that it agrees with and that it likes. KwaZulu government favours inclusive negotiations, negotiations that include all groups and individuals without any preconditions.
. Now, to come back to your point, if Inkatha doesn't want to have competitors, why did it do this? "The immediate and unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other Rivonia trialists, the declaration of an amnesty which would enable all political exiles to return to South Africa and participate in negotiations. Unbanning of organisations so that leaders might truly consult with their followers before and during negotiations. The lifting of the state of emergency. The removal of discriminatory laws. The inability of the government to allow groups to form themselves voluntarily and the insistence that only race-based groups should be consulted. The existence of the tricameral Parliament." I mean all, everything they have done, was spelt out in this document. And then they actually went into the modalities as to how to do it. "The following procedures should be adopted. Mr. Nelson Mandela and other Rivonia trialists, these should be released immediately and unconditionally. Political prisoners that have served over 15 years, these should also be released. Other political prisoners, the principles of remission of sentence and parole should be immediately applied to all political prisoners that qualify, as happens with other categories of prisoners. The declaration of amnesty." And so they go on. And this is exactly what de Klerk did and Inkatha drew up that document!
PK. Do you think that the state of emergency should be ended in Natal?
AK. That is a very difficult one to answer. If you don't have a state of emergency, you cannot deploy troops in the townships, so therefore - let's not even start talking about the moral issues - but then, if you cannot employ the troops, then there is simply not enough manpower on the ground through the police. Now, we are not now going into the technical things of the state of emergency where you can arrest people without trial and so on, but without the state of emergency, you cannot deploy troops. So therefore, maybe what they should do is create a new state of emergency which would cut out all the sort of more obnoxious things like where you can arrest people without trial, although even that might be necessary at times, I don't know. But I would think it would be fairly difficult. I mean, I have sympathy with de Klerk for not lifting it. I think he would have a problem. I don't think he could control the townships without troops. And Nelson Mandela says himself he should put it down. Well, he can't put it down without the troops. OK, let me do that. You want a copy of that?
POM. Please.