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This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

20 Mar 1997: De Klerk, Willem

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POM. Let me begin with this kind of onslaught on FW that's coming from parts of the Afrikaner intelligentsia and Die Burger and the notion that he had sold out. Many people have said to me that he made an unfortunate choice of words when he used the word 'surrender' in London in whatever speech he gave, but it seemed to bring to the surface a lot of simmering tensions that were going on underneath the surface. One, are those tensions there, is there a belief that a better deal could have been struck? I refer that to Patti Waldmeir's book where she calls it 'a study in the psychology of capitulation', where in the end the National Party more or less threw in the towel and were either browbeaten or it was said you've run out of choices, this is the way it's going to be. That's one.

. Two is going back to the Truth & Reconciliation Commission and I remember the last time you said that you'd asked FW yourself whether there was anything that he should be concerned about and he said there was nothing that he should be concerned about, but the revelations in the last couple of weeks about the operations whether in Vlakplaas or elsewhere, the prospect is going to be more revelations yet no-one takes responsibility. I'll give you an example; I talked to Roelf Meyer the other day and he was Deputy Minister for Law & Order under Adriaan Vlok during a period when Vlakplaas would have been set up, I said, "Did you know anything about it being set up, did you know about any of its operations, did you know anything?" And his answer was, looking me straight in the eye, "I knew nothing." But where does accountability enter into this? You're a minister and things happened under your department. That's two.

. Three is this whole question of trying to get the new party off the ground or get a new movement off the ground and yet there seems to be still a certain defensiveness, almost recalcitrant defensiveness, in the way in which the NP accounts for apartheid. There is still this notion, I think even FW used it in a speech recently, that it was a noble but failed experiment rather than being able to say it was something really bad, evil, corrupting, dehumanising and we are deeply apologetic for the damage we have done. It looks as if the leap from saying well, yes, we made a mistake, but, and things shouldn't have happened, but, and bad things happened, but, to being able to come right out and make a true confession and say unless we confess and ask for forgiveness in a way we can't get to the future.

WDK. Well that's a lot. I'll try, I'll just try the three main things and I've prepared some papers, not for you specifically but if necessary I will refer to them. I prepared some papers for a presentation on the NP and I've got another thing and I phoned two people - I'll tell you about that a little bit later. OK. First of all the tensions within the NP focused on FW to a certain extent. I think it's a complicated thing, there is no one straightforward single answer to that. It's the interplay of a lot of dynamics. The first dynamic, it's not in order of importance now, the first dynamic is yes there is again a revival of something of the old south/north kind of political orientation. There is in the south, in Cape Town, the feeling that we're in power here in the Western Province, we want to maintain the NP as it is to a certain extent. There is even a feeling that we want to split from the NP and become a continuance of the old NP and we're willing to enter a federation with what's left of the NP. So there are feelings of power and sovereignty and autonomy of the southern Cape NP that doesn't want to be too closely connected to the northern policies and focuses of the NP. That's one dynamic, not very strong but it's an undercurrent.

. A second dynamic there is the dilemma of the NP that to maintain your power base in the coloured community specifically, but also the Indians, but let's put them in brackets for a moment, to maintain your power base with the coloureds you can't lean too much backward to the Africans. It's a fact and you must check that with typical Cape people, Willie Esterhuyse and those kind of people and the people you're talking to, that the average coloured worker, I'm not talking about intellectuals or middle class, is very anti-black even in a racist way, referring to them as 'die kaffirs' and 'we don't want to have anything to do with die kaffirs and you mustn't sell us out to die kaffirs and so on and so on.' So that's a kind of a dilemma, the more the Roelf Meyer exercise becomes the priority of the NP the more sceptical, according to the Nationalists in the Cape now, the more sceptical the coloureds become. So to keep and to organise and to consolidate your coloured following you must, according to them, distance yourself from this new move of 'we must become Africanised as the NP'. That's the second undercurrent.

. The third one is that there is within the Afrikaans press world, apart from Beeld the northern newspaper, a new kind of conservatism. We also refer to them as 'new conservatives' and Die Burger and specifically it's editor, Ebbe Dommisse, is to a certain extent a kind of a leader of this new conservatism and all of a sudden there are strange bedfellows, for instance Hermann Giliomee who was always more liberal than I was to a certain extent years back, and even according to rumours Van Zyl Slabbert, but that's only a rumour that Van Zyl Slabbert is also leaning a little bit in that direction.

POM. Dommisse told me that Van Zyl Slabbert had written a scathing article about FW for Die Burger. I don't know whether you saw it or didn't see it?

WDK. Well there was something of that in Beeld because I don't see Die Burger, it's not easy to find here. So, yes, but that's Van Zyl Slabbert. Then also, and that's in confidence, I don't worry if you ever use it in your book but this is a little bit confidential, that Ton Vosloo, he's the big Afrikaans press baron at this moment in time, that he is also inclined to be more new conservative. So there's a new mood of criticism against the NP and now they are trying their utmost best to look very, very carefully and scrupulously to find arguments for their critique. There is also a feeling that there is something of an organised plan, something of a strategy because, according to my direct information after this leading article of Dommisse he wrote a message on the letter on the computer to Kriel and he said, "I've done my part now, I give you ten months to get rid of FW de Klerk." So there is something of a conspiracy, there is something of a conspiracy against FW of the new conservatives under the leadership of Cape Nationalists. That's another dynamic.

. Another dynamic is, yes I think that it was unfortunate the words in his speech in London, it was unfortunate words and between you and me, yes, I think that during his term as Vice President he neglected to a certain extent the NP and all the trends and all the undercurrent accents and so on. So I think, yes, the NP was to a certain extent half and half without a leader during a long time before the elections and after the elections and during his Vice Presidency and so on. He is not a very good administrator. He is a very good strategist but he's not a very good administrator and I really think he neglected the NP to a certain extent. Another thing is that it's absolutely necessary, never mind the fact that he's my brother, you can't survive in South African politics as an opposition without a black power base. That's absolutely of the essence. Even if all the coloureds and all the Indians and all the whites come together in one grouping, within ten years that's absolutely -

POM. The black population is growing and growing.

WDK. Yes, even in the Western Cape.

POM. By 2004 it will be majority African.

WDK. It will be majority African. The majority of whites and coloureds now that's only a four/five year period, so it's absolutely of the essence that one must try to generate not for the NP but to generate and to support a movement and it must be a majority of black people for the country. So I am all for the initiatives of Roelf and FW, and that's the problem, FW is also really converted to the Roelf point of view.

POM. He is or he's ambivalent?

WDK. I think he's converted in his heart but, now that's my 'but', FW is basically a man for compromise and that's his strong point and again in this whole crisis he managed with a hell of a lot of quick moves to get a vote of confidence by all the national leaders and the federal commission, committee of the party and even the newspapers. He talked to every editor in the country, English and Afrikaans, and to a certain extent he was successful in calming things down but in the way of compromise. So it's not really a new consolidated NP.

POM. One view expressed to me rather succinctly was that, yes indeed FW was all for the new initiative provided it didn't split the NP, that he would like to see the NP absorbed into the new structure.

WDK. That will be typical.

POM. He doesn't want the party to split.

WDK. That will be typical FW's reasoning. I want to refer you back to my book. I have said there basically FW is a NP loyalist, that was part of his upbringing and that was part of our father's loyalties. He was a National Party loyalist and nothing must harm the party. It's a kind of a totalitarian kind of a concept, the party is the main thing. But I am sure that, still on this point, that FW is converted to the idea embodied in the Roelf initiative and I am very sure that something of this new initiative will emerge into a concrete kind of announcement and new structures, etc., etc., that's the deadline for them, by the middle of 1998. The bad news is that I really don't think that they have made any progress in this regard. If you talk to Roelf, he has been talking to a lot of blacks and FW told me, it was his birthday on Tuesday so I phoned him and he said, "Well I had about three weeks of touring the country, addressing black audiences in the townships and in town halls and really I am so excited, there's a lot of support for me." And that's again the politician's mentality, if you see fifty people in a hall you say there is an uprising against the ANC and that kind of thing, but I don't think that there are any meaningful results in this regard and I don't think there will be. I can understand the reasoning that you can't just dissolve the NP, it's very dangerous. You must first try to get this new initiative to a certain level and then dissolve and create a whole new political movement. But I really think that that will only, hopefully, be not finalised but will be something worthwhile after the 1999 elections. I don't expect anything before that. That's more or less this FW thing.

. Another thing that may be useful for your book, I had a real heart to heart chat with him because I was very worried about him, being my brother I felt pity for him, it's a tough time for him, so we talked a lot about two weeks back and he said, "Yes I was prepared, I hoped that after the Roelf initiative was announced and Roelf was the Director General or whatever of the NP, that Roelf will grow in stature and in credibility and that I can go now at the end of 1997." But that's now FW's subjective viewpoint on this, "But Roelf didn't succeed in growing in stature and in leadership and so I must continue and I am still focused on the hope that we will get things more or less a little bit more organised and settled so that I can go before the 1999 election." I think he's fed up with politics. I think he realises that his whole image is going to be very, very - will be harmed to such an extent that it's not -

POM. That it undermines all his accomplishments?

WDK. Yes. So he's in a personal crisis and I think there is, even Beeld, there is a mood within the younger generation that let it be Hernus, let it be Roelf, let it be Van Schalkwyk or somebody out of politics, a Thon Vosloo or a Marinus Dalling or a prominent businessman, Christo Wiese, whatever, but it's time for new leadership, it's time for a new phase in opposition politics and the pre-election leaders they are not fit for this transformation that is necessary, they are not fit for that. And that's the mood and I think FW registers this mood and I think he's trying his utmost best, he's working very hard at this moment in time and I can sense his motives. He wants somewhere during the end of the year or so that everything is settled and Roelf can report back that we've got two million blacks supporting us now and there's going to be a new black political party, let's call it an ABC party, and we've talked to the DP and the ABC new party of two million blacks now and the DP and us will enter into a kind of an alliance for the 1999 election. They are working very hard on Inkatha but their problem is Buthelezi because he's unreliable and too erratic, but they still hope that Inkatha can also be part of this alliance. They are working very hard to announce this somewhere at the end of the year, beginning of next year, before June. I've got the feeling and the direct intentions of FW, of course politicians always change their intentions, that he will then step down, say, "OK that's the best that I could do, here's the new alliance more or less put together, we hope to reach 25% of opposition power in the vote in the 1999 election and we will tackle the ANC in the next election 1999 and there will be then a rift between the ANC somewhere during the beginning of the 21st century and then there can be an opposition grouping that represents more or less a 40%/60% and that's a sound kind of a balance in a democracy." That's my comments on that.

POM. If you have Roelf Meyer and he's sitting in a room, in a way he reminds me of a student who's been given an exercise, a problem, and he is sitting there with a blank piece of paper in front of him and a pen and he's trying to think up ways of how do I translate the vision of this initiative into a reality? What must be done before any initiative can attract significant numbers of black voters? This is why I go back to the connection with the Truth Commission of where blacks that I talk to don't believe that anyone really feels guilty about the past, they say it was the same on both sides, the whole question of moral equivalence, murder was murder and it makes no difference who carried it out, you did bad things we did bad things, we're confessing our bad things, don't put everything on our heads, but they don't get the larger point.

WDK. Let's go into that. Yes I absolutely want to remind you that in my book that came out at the end of 1990 I pleaded that FW must stand up, well motivated, asking forgiveness and to be very, very open that apartheid was something of the devil, etc., and they didn't do that.  Leon Wessels tried something in that direction. I think that the NP makes not only a strategic fault, it's an existential fault, it's an existential attitude of the NP not to do this and that's a major stumbling block in even trying to get into the hearts and minds of certain anti-ANC black people and I think history will show that up.

POM. Can a new initiative develop? I told Roelf Meyer this before.

WDK. Before they do that? No.

POM. And he said write it down in a paper for me just what you said. We were having dinner together and he had just met with FW and he was depressed because they weren't exactly on the same wavelength that day.

WDK. But I think there is also, you know that's politics, I think Van Schalkwyk is all of a sudden FW's new (protégé) and I think to a certain extent he also dropped Roelf and I think there is a tension building up between FW and Roelf and that's a sad thing.

POM. This is the new Deputy?

WDK. Van Schalkwyk is the other. There are two legs of the NP now. The one leg must consolidate it's base, the other leg must create -

POM. The new initiative. It's not only dualistic, in some respects it's contradictory.

WDK. Yes, and that's a typical compromise and FW pulled this compromise through but it won't last, but it can last if Roelf can deliver but it's so difficult for Roelf to deliver. Number one, to a certain extent he's a wonderful man, I like him, I love him to a certain extent, but somewhere he hasn't got enough driving force to pull this thing off. He's accepted by blacks and so on, that's the personality problem to a certain extent. The second problem, there are a lot of enemies against Roelf Meyer in the NP so he must cover his back the whole time. The third thing is the whole attitude of the NP not to go to the TRC and really confess, really, really as if a confession before God I would say. That's the third problem for Roelf Meyer. The fourth problem is the more the NP becomes aggressive opposition, and I've talked you on that before, the more the NP becomes aggressive, street fighting kind of opposition tactics, the more blacks will be sceptical because that's not the way that opposition must be handled at this moment in our history. We're in process politics now and the opposition can best be handled behind closed doors, in private first in the framework of negotiation. So there are a lot of stumbling blocks for Roelf Meyer to succeed. They try to concentrate on ordinary grassroots blacks, like people working for me, and then they've got an action focus on middle class people and then the focus on very prominent leaders in the economy and professions and so on. But at this moment in time I don't think it's possible to predict whether this will be successful or not.

POM. Roelf has this, I would call it, fanciful notion or maybe ease him out of a dilemma that somehow he and Cyril can come together and form a party and they would be the -

WDK. No, that's wishful thinking.

POM. He actually says this. He goes into townships and people ask him, "When are you and Cyril getting together?"

WDK. Cyril knows where's the butter on his bread and he's waiting. He will perhaps return to politics, he just wants to see what's the performance of Thabo and if Thabo's performance is not that good somewhere maybe Cyril will enter the ANC again as a politician, somewhere in 2001, and  become the next president. He's then not even 50 years old.

POM. He would still be younger than - even if Thabo served his two terms out he still would be younger becoming president than Thabo would be when he takes over.

WDK. Yes, Thabo's now about 54, 55, 56 and Cyril I think is 43 or 44.  No Cyril is a converted ANC man and I wouldn't leave the ANC if I were a prominent black personality of potential. No. The ANC will be with us for the next 50 years I'm very sure about that and hopefully they will be well balanced to a certain extent and they need a strong opposition and a strong voice, not also this bloody Tony Leon's kind of opposition. It's nice for Tony Leon and he achieved something but this is not what is meant by real multi-party opposition. That's individuals and so on. So that's my answer on this more or less.

. Yes, then the whole question of corporative responsibility. FW told me when I congratulated him on his birthday that he will present a paper to the TRC somewhere next week, I think within the next two weeks or so, again. So I asked him will it be a main kind of a new attitude and so on and he said no he doesn't want to talk about it on the phone, but I confronted him with this whole thing and he said really it's impossible for him, he didn't even know that there was, let's say, a branch of a Vlakplaas unit and not even the Generals knew that, of the police, and the army, all the security upper echelons and that you can't blame him for that, and Kasrils' arguments and so on say well either you've known about that and ignored it and lied to the TRC or you've a very bad administrator, you should have known about it.

POM. Can he say that? Can he say I did not know but - ?

WDK. I think he can say I did not know but I should have known about that. I should have known about that, but I think he will call some, not in a court case, but he will call some witnesses to say if the Commissioner of Police and his deputy and  his deputy and this personality and that personality even didn't know about that then it's very clear that this was an initiative with political motives also to sink the whole new dispensation, it was also aimed against me and the NP to a certain extent. So that may be his back door but I still believe that he didn't know about that really, but you can't get away - unfortunately in South Africa's history compared with the European democracies you must resign or you will be fired in this situation. But here for years back there was always a cover up.

POM. The example I love is of Lord Carrington when the Argentineans invaded the Falklands and he cried to the House of Commons and said, "I didn't pay sufficient notice that Argentinean battleships were steaming towards the Falklands and I take responsibility and I resign", and they said, "Hear, hear!". He said, "I should have known."

WDK. Yes, that's it. That's not the culture of South African politics, unfortunately it's not the culture. Even within ANC now look at the Sarafina thing and there's time and again a minister, look at Dullah Omar now with Boesak's coming to Cape Town, his statements. That's not the culture here unfortunately.

POM. I may have asked you this before but I'll ask you again since I don't remember whether I did or not. Who are the real rulers of the country? Is it the NEC of the ANC, the Cabinet, the government as such, parliament, or do the NEC take decisions, the broad policy decisions and tell Cabinet to carry out these decisions so that Cabinet is in a way subordinate to the NEC rather than the other way round?

WDK. I think it's also a process. I would say that initially, that's my intuition now, yes, more than intuition, initially I would say after the election and the convening of the Cabinet there was a phase of this endless consultation, consultation feedback but it was a feedback, authoritarian feedback, we the Cabinet, I Mandela, me Mbeki, we feel like this and this and we're just giving you feedback. So then there was a reaction from the parliamentary committees and the parliamentary caucus and NEC members and the Women's League and the Youth League that we don't just want to be informed about things, even COSATU. You come to us with already formulated definitions of policies and policy directions and you just come to sell it to us and try to convince us of your points of view, you don't really consult. So that was the second phase and so the NEC and other people of the alliance, COSATU, etc., were really to a certain extent ruling and the Cabinet was on the receiving end. But gradually now things are again developing in the direction that Cabinet, and then as in all Cabinets, a certain inner circle of Cabinet is ruling the country. So I would say parliament, parliamentary committees, caucus, NEC, will always be handled with great care and with a lot of indabas and feedback but Cabinet becomes the last few months more and more adamant and they are developing in the direction to be really governing the country and not the NEC and others.

. And the first problem will be, and that's very interesting, I think that's the main agenda, one of the main agendas for this year on the political agenda, is what's going to happen with the NEC, ANC and then the COSATU branch of the alliance and they are on record, Trevor Manuel, Mbeki, Mandela, Kader Asmal, even Mac  Maharaj and others, even Tito Mboweni, that OK we want to work together, they are going to have a conference somewhere next week I think again, and there is no question that this relationship will be terminated but you must come to the, you COSATU people must come to the inside, that our GEAR, our macro-economic plan, and our accent on productivity and privatisation, etc., etc., is non-negotiable. So that's going to be very, not interesting, but a very important development during this year. Will COSATU resist ANC leadership to such an extent that there will be not a real break but a kind of a distance between them or will COSATU be so strong that the Cabinet will crumble and say, well, we're with our backs against the walls we can't resist COSATU any more we must play into their hands? That's the whole question.

POM. This general strike that's scheduled for 20th May will be a telling point in that regard.

WDK. I've seen in the newspapers that there will be bosberaad again somewhere between COSATU and the ANC and from my contacts in inner circles I have this message that it's an exercise to convince them that it's of the utmost importance that they must drop some of their ideologies and perspectives and policies about privatisation, about the whole strike situation, they must use the new labour law more for trying to find solutions and strikes must be the last thing and they must become part and parcel of the whole GEAR concept. But because they didn't accept that really it's also a kind of a compromise. The same thing is in the NP, everything is a little bit under, it seems that it's under control but it's boiling underneath and the same thing in the ANC with COSATU. But this friend of mine, I phoned a very prominent ANC man, he's not a politician but he's a political analyst, he's very well placed, I just want to read this to you.  "What do you predict about the COSATU thing?". So he said, "We're very, very relaxed that we're busy to win COSATU's support for our anti (he used the word) for our anti-socialist policies and we don't think there will be a break between COSATU and the ANC and we think that the ANC's perspective, the realists within the ANC, the more conservative part of the ANC, that their perspectives on economy and productivity and the whole labour issue, that will be accepted by COSATU." So that's perhaps hopeful thinking but there is optimism within the ANC that COSATU will be handled in such a way that they will come in step with the ANC's policies.

POM. I want to go back for a minute to the Steyn report and the allegation that General Meiring was among those listed by Steyn as being up to dirty tricks but that FW said to Meiring, "List which Generals I should retire", knowing this. Two questions: (a) would he have gone to Mandela and said, "Listen I have a problem here, I can fire Meiring, I can fire them all and God knows what the backlash is going to be, they can jeopardise all our negotiations so again I've got to make a compromise here. I'm going to leave Meiring alone but I'm going to have him fire people and in that way maybe make him more accountable", where Mandela would say, "Not only do I understand that", but he would come along afterwards and re-appoint Meiring Chief of Staff of the new SANDF?  In discussions you had with him at that time and with other people at the time was there ever a fear that if negotiations proceeded either at too rapid a pace or too much was perceived to have been given away that the defence forces would step in in some way to really stop the process in its tracks?

WDK. Yes, a few answers on this. I don't think that's FW's style to go to Mandela during those years and say, well this is my problem, etc. That's one of the problems with FW's relationship with Mandela. If he played more openly and more co-operative, that's during his presidency now, FW's presidency, and saw Mandela as a kind of a partner there should have been a lot more successes in the whole process. FW played his cards too close to his chest.  From the beginning he had this point of view that 'I am the President and I am not going to ask Mandela's blessing for everything'. So I don't think it's his style and I'm sure that he didn't go to Mandela and talk to him. Perhaps I'm not informed of this but I've got this feeling not. That's the first answer on this.

. The second answer is I think initially there was no fear within, no fear but not really fear, that there will be an uprising in the defence force and police force to sabotage the whole negotiation process but after it was known that Viljoen, indeed Viljoen said that now to the TRC, that there was a whole network of communications and strategies and even building up of weapons etc., etc., for an uprising and I know that FW also knew about that, so then, yes, the fear that under the leadership of old and the current Generals that there can be a kind of a revolutionary action and a kind of a taking over of power. I think the fear was there but not initially because Viljoen built this whole thing up not after the election but before the election and I know that even myself, I was very sceptical about that. When people said that, I said, "Well I don't believe that, I really can't believe it", and now Viljoen spelled it all out and everything was in place and Mandela knew it so there must be very, very strong informants within the old NP government's  espionage departments with direct lines to Mandela because Mandela warned, somewhere on record, FW that there is going to be an uprising of white people in South Africa and he rejected that and said that's nonsense. And he believed that that was nonsense at that stage and I think when he fired the lot of Generals round about Christmas I don't think he was worried that there may be backlash on this from the security forces but later on, yes, he worried more. I'm not very worried about Meiring's part in this whole thing. I think that Meiring is to a certain extent accepted also by the ANC establishment as a man of integrity but there are a lot of people of integrity that fell along the wayside.

POM. How about the allegations made by Mamasela first, who is not the most reliable of people, that there are at least five senior members of the ANC Cabinet who were government informants and that in fact he used to fly to Botswana and pay them off or they would come to Vlakplaas and receive the debriefings? Do you find this credible?

WDK. I think no, I don't think so. I've read some explanation in the newspaper that says there may be, it's a known fact within that kind of shady world of espionage, that somebody thinks he's giving information for the sake of his own organisation to, let's say, the FBI, and so the FBI will tap a man that's now Minister X and say what's going on in the ANC, what are the trends, this and this and that? And he thinks that he's busy giving information for a foreign power that's to a certain extent a partner for his cause, and then the FBI gives this information to the apartheid regime. That may be a route, according to this article I've read somewhere, but I really don't think that prominent and well known ANC personalities - there are a lot of deputy ministers that are not that well known and high profile people and maybe people in parliament, opportunists and so on,  but the really well known leadership of the ANC, no.

POM. You'd be surprised?

WDK. I will be surprised really. Let's say, for instance, during our talks five, six opportune times in London with Thabo and Jacob Zuma and Aziz Pahad and it was me and Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche, and there was another man, Sampie's brother, but the core of that deputation was Willie, myself and Sampie, Afrikaans speaking, Afrikaner people and so on and we told them a lot about what's going on in PW Botha's reasoning. We talked with them like I talk to you, and FW is a man of compromise but he's of the old school and he's conservative and we don't know whether he will be the successor to PW Botha and there is a hardening of attitudes within PW Botha's office. And they gave us information too and said, yes we also have to a certain extent two wings and there are problems with the exiles versus the others. So that was also information given to each other but for the cause of debating some issues, and maybe this kind of thing was there and on record. You've got Joe Modise perhaps on record somewhere saying, well we've got lots of problems within the armies of the struggle and there is an uprising of a certain faction, but that's not really - that's conversation, that's intelligent conversation and looking at each other's notes and the little bit of information but it's not really espionage. I will be surprised. And I am sure if Mandela says I want the names and he said that the names were already given to him and he's not worried about it, if it was a very important personality as a politician he would think something up. He's not that transparent, Mandela even, to say well it's for the better that we know because then we're going to have informants of the whole system also for the struggle people and it's going to be an exercise. So I am sure that's not true.

POM. OK. Thank you. I love talking to you.

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