This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
25 Aug 1992: Hartzenberg, Ferdi
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POM. Dr Hartzenberg, first a question that I've asked many times, why did the Conservative Party make a decision to contest the referendum last March?
FH. Yes, you see the right thing would have been not to participate in the referendum, but if you know our people then they are democratic and when it is voting time they want to exercise their right and they want to vote and it was obvious that some people would have voted in the referendum if we decided not to participate and some people would have participated, others would have stayed away. If you want not to participate then everybody must stay away and for that reason we ultimately realised that it would be an unorganised thing and that it is necessary that we must participate in order to organise it although we realised it was not possible to win the referendum as a result of the fact that there were only three weeks, we have no newspaper and television cover on our side. So we realised it is not possible to win but for that reason we participated so that it could have been more or less an organised effort otherwise the results would have been worse.
POM. When whites voted yes, what do you think they were voting for?
FH. They only voted for the continuation of negotiations. That is the only thing that they gave a mandate for, was to continue with negotiations because the propaganda - we told the people, the electors, that the negotiations and the reform will lead to a communist government in South Africa and that they fear. They don't want that. So when the National Party, the government, employed the propaganda people from the United Kingdom, Mrs Thatcher's people, Saatchi & Saatchi, they decided that you must threaten the voters immediately. We told them in the long run they are going to get a communist government and so they said if you're going to vote no you're going to lose your job on the 18th March. And so every person had to decide, what now? He's going to lose his job on the 18th and ultimately he's going to lose his country and so he decided he must first secure his job and then he can look after the country on the long term. And that is why a lot of conservative people voted yes because they were afraid they were going to lose their jobs.
POM. Was the party ultimately surprised by the extent of the loss, fourteen of the fifteen regions?
FH. Yes. Well I didn't think that it would be as low as that but afterwards we made a survey and we discovered that a lot of our people voted yes and we analysed it and we discovered that it was as a result of intimidation because on that Thursday before the referendum, one week before the referendum, all the big employers issued letters and statements informing their employees that they are going to lose their jobs if they vote no. Even at that stage, if we had voted a week before, earlier, then it would be a totally different result, but as a result of that threat people decided to vote otherwise.
POM. So you think it was an economic concern more than a political judgement?
FH. It was an economic concern. The people who voted for us, of course they voted from political ground but I think about one third of the conservatives on economic grounds voted yes.
POM. How did de Klerk use the mandate that he got? How did he interpret it?
FH. He interpreted it that it is a mandate to hand over the government to the ANC. I think that is how he interpreted it. And that is not so. A survey by the Human Sciences Research Council afterwards indicated that only 16% or 14% of the white electorate are in favour of an interim government, only 16%. 84% are against it. 25% of the Coloureds and the Indians are in favour of an interim government and only 50% of the blacks are in favour of an interim government and that is not necessarily a communist government, it can be a government of Mr de Klerk, what he desires, a government where everybody is represented. So the majority of the people reject an interim government and that is not what they voted for in the referendum. If only 14% of the people who said yes in the referendum are in favour of the interim government then definitely they didn't vote for an interim government in the referendum.
POM. In the light of what has happened subsequent to CODESA 2, the deadlock and then the collapse of the talks, the ANC's resort to mass action, the continuing deterioration of the economy, do you think that if an election were held today, if that referendum were held today, that the results would be significantly different?
FH. I think so. Yes, I think so unless they come forward with another gimmick to bluff the people. But if it is a true reflection of the will of the people it will be different because the referendum was not a true reflection of the will of the people. It was a free and a fair election.
POM. Because of the amount of resources?
FH. And the intimidation by means of propaganda.
POM. Could you explain what that means?
FH. Well they threaten the people that they are going to lose their jobs because there was co-operation between the government and the employers. They co-operated, they planned it. It is not possible for people individually, employers to decide on the same day, that today I am going to tell the people that they are going to lose their jobs. Somewhere there was a decision that it must take place and then it must have been organised.
POM. If you could go through with me how the party subsequently analysed the situation, evaluated it in terms of strategy, of its goals, how deep divisions arose that led ultimately to the breakaway of the five MPs? What ultimately were the issues that were irreconcilable? Which issues couldn't be reconciled between the five who left?
FH. The five, after the referendum, of course, obviously we decided that we must take decisions on a strategy as a result of the outcome of that. But when we started to discuss strategy these people said no, we must change our policy and we didn't think it was necessary to change policy because our attitude is that we have different nations in South Africa and that they must be protected and that they must get security so that they can trust each other and that they can co-operate and the obvious way to do that is in a confederal system where there is territorial security for every nation and where you can unite the people inside a nation, where they can be united, because if you start dividing people of one nation then of course there must be a sense of insecurity. So our attitude is nations must be united and the people as far as possible and then you must create a situation where they can co-operate and I don't think there is a better solution for South Africa than that one. So they came forward, they said that we must change our policy. We must now admit and we must now say that we have lost every right on land and we have no land in South Africa and then we must go to the negotiating table and we must try to negotiate for a piece of land because that would be reasonable and then they would, the other people, the other participants would say, yes, this is reasonable we will allow you to have a piece of land where the majority of the people can be Afrikaners.
. So we realised that that is not a practical solution because the ANC and the Communist Party stated that no nation is going to be allowed to control land. It is only the Bill of Rights and the Freedom Charter, in those terms you must get your rights because if they allow the Zulus to control a piece of land it will be a problem for them. And if they allow the Zulus then they must allow all the other people. So, they rejected it, the ANC and the Communist Party. So we told them that we don't think that is a viable solution, but they insisted and ultimately they left the party and then two weeks ago on Agenda they had that discussion where the ANC was present, the PAC and Mr Beyers started and he said he read in the newspaper that the ANC would be sympathetic towards a homeland for the Afrikaners. So Niehaus said he's very sorry, Mr Beyers was making a mistake. There's no sympathy, only the Freedom Charter and the Bill of Rights, and the PAC chap said that they can only get Robben Island. So there's no hope that a communist government and an ANC government will give you a piece of land. The fact is that we own land in the country rightfully. We didn't rob it from anybody else and we are prepared to negotiate with other nations on the boundaries of the states which will participate in a confederation.
POM. Was there an issue about the size?
FH. They said we have no land. That is the first, we said we own land, they said we have no claim on land, we have lost all our claims. They said we must start from the zero point. We said, no, if we negotiate we will start from what is the reality. What belongs to the Zulus we admit, we recognise it belongs to them but what belongs to us we insist that that is what belongs to us and we will negotiate on what to sacrifice. So that is the first point. Secondly, they said we must only bargain for 16% of the land which we own now. Only 16%. Thirdly, they said that inside that area the majority must control the area, which is of course if you speak from a unitary state point of view, then it is so. But in the referendum we didn't win in that area so if it is granted we will not form the government in that area so it is a useless effort. So our attitude is that nations must become free in South Africa if they want to. If they opt to be free then they must be in a position to become free, then they must elect their own government and they must have their own civil service and all that type of thing, they must have their own land and the freedom must be protected of the various nations. We must agree on how to protect the freedom of the various nations.
POM. So the starting point for you would be the 87% of the land?
FH. Yes, but we realise, that is the starting point, and it is not true to say it is 87%. You know this process started in the previous century from the original South Africa. Only 45% is in the possession of white people. The rest is in the possession of the black people because this process started in the previous century when Botswana and Swaziland and Lesotho were excised from South Africa. And then in 1930 it was reduced, and then in 1936 it was again reduced and so we say we realise that we must use land to solve the problem and we will sacrifice land but that must happen in an orderly manner. We must negotiate it with representatives of the various nations and we must come to an agreement on the boundaries.
POM. You now appear to have a situation developing where stalled negotiations between the government and the ANC, they will get back on track perhaps in a new forum, the government is talking to the PAC and AZAPO and they are considering getting in on negotiations too. What conditions would have to be met before you could join the negotiations?
FH. Our position is exactly the opposite to that of the South African Communist Party because if you study the opening speech, address of Joe Slovo last year when he opened his Communist Party he said that the only condition necessary for them to control this country as a whole is a non-racial, non-sexist, unitary state with a one man one vote system. Unitary state, one man one vote. That is the only way they can control the country and they didn't agree to negotiate before that condition was granted. Firstly in Harare there was a resolution taken by the OAU, namely that it must be a unitary state, one man one vote. Then the United Nations adopted the same resolution and then the government gave in and when they accepted that principle the ANC said, now we are prepared to start with negotiations, because that is the only condition where they can take over the country. If there is an election among the Tswanas they will never win the election. If there is an election amongst the Zulus they will never win the election. Among the whites they will never win the election. So the only way they can win is in a one man one vote because then they get all the people who are against the national feeling of the nation. They get the opponents and they pull it together and according to surveys it is about 45% of the total population and with another little bit of intimidation they can get another 6%. That will give them 51%.
. So that is the only way and we say under those circumstances we are not going to participate because a unitary state is designed to put the Communist Party and the ANC in control of South Africa and we are not going to participate in a scheme which gives them their only opportunity to take over. So we will participate when the self-determination of nations is recognised. Those who don't want to be free and to determine their own destinies, if they choose not to do so then it is their case, but those who want to be free they must be allowed to be free and we want to be free. If that right is not recognised then we will not negotiate. For that reason we negotiate with black leaders of parties and of nations because we realise that they also want to be free and for that reason some of them oppose the Declaration of Intent of a unitary state. They oppose it, and for that reason CODESA 2 was a failure.
POM. Who opposed it?
FH. The Tswana delegation opposed it initially. The Zulus opposed it. The Ciskei opposed it, the unitary system. Now more people realise that they are going to be losers in a unitary state.
POM. The Ciskei and KwaZulu, at least through the IFP, is participating in CODESA even though ...
FH. Of course they are participating but as a result of the fact that they realise and that they oppose certain proposals. The ANC started with the mass action because they couldn't get what they want through negotiations and now they are trying to get it through mass action and for that reason CODESA was a failure. CODESA 2 was a failure because there was opposition to the ideals of the ANC. We feel that we have played a very important part to do that because if we joined CODESA then we would have been one party with a limited time to speak, no press coverage and so on, but the fact that we stayed away it pointed out very strongly that there must be something wrong and so did the other parties and they approached us and said why are you not going? And we told them, this is the reason, that you must look out for this and you must look out for that. And that they've done and ultimately they resist certain proposals and because it doesn't suit the ANC they wrecked CODESA 2. So the fact is in South Africa as elsewhere nations want to be free and the ANC wants to take the water uphill and the water doesn't want to go uphill.
POM. Do you see this, what seems to be a gathering momentum towards federalism as being a stepping stone to ...?
FH. I think the fact that they now talk about federalism is a move away from a unitary state, but because a federation is still a unitary state with power delegated to the lower echelons but the central power can still take away power granted to lower levels, to second tier level and other levels. It can still take it away.
POM. If those powers were entrenched in the constitution?
FH. Yes, but that means nothing because in Africa constitutions mean simply nothing, they tear it up and they trespass the constitution. That happened in several cases in Africa and eleven federations failed in Africa. So our attitude is that there must be more than federation. There must be confederation so that if they want to take away it is not only a constitution, then it must be an act of aggression if they want to take away. Then it must be war because territorial security, as I said to you, gives you supreme security. If a nation has its own land where it controls itself with no government above it, but when they participate on a free basis in a confederation then there is security and then they will co-operate.
POM. What if, it's like one scenario, what if there's a reconvened CODESA 3, call it what you like?
FH. Well it depends on what basis. If it recognises, if CODESA 3 recognises the right of self-determination, not only recognises but admits that the nation who doesn't want to be a part of a unitary state or a federation but wants to become independent like Bophuthatswana, if that right is recognised then it is a different thing. If it depends on the nation, not on CODESA and on the other participants, but on the members of that nation, if a nation can decide whether they will be included or excluded, then it is a totally different principle. Then, of course, we will consider it. But if that is not recognised we will not consider participating.
POM. Mr Mangope would be very close to looking for what you're looking for, but he's participating.
FH. Yes of course. He's participating but he has an option because he is a Tswana and if the ANC is going to take over South Africa nothing can stop him to join Botswana. He can join Botswana because they're the same people.
POM. Or he could still maintain his independence. He could say we're an independent country and we'll ...
FH. Yes, but if the ANC takes over this country and he said, look I'm not going to be part of it, then as a result of the fact that he has no harbours and all sorts of things, they can make it very difficult for him. And that he realises. Because in South Africa if we want to have peace we would also have to co-operate peacefully with each other.
POM. Let's take a situation of where these parties come back together and form two fronts, you've got the ANC and its allies that include the PAC, AZAPO and the SACP, COSATU, the lot of them on one side of the table and on the opposite side of the table is the government, the IFP, a broad alliance opposing the ANC. My question would be if they bargain and the ANC says a unitary state and the government and its allies want a very weak central government but a strong federal structure and they bargain and they come to an agreement which they agree to implement, where does that leave you?
FH. Well, I tell you what, I think we can do more and we can assist the other group more by not participating. Because Mandela said he doesn't want a Renamo situation in South Africa and he realises that 875 000 people who voted for us and he realises that there are more people who supported us, if we don't want to make a constitution work we can wreck it if we want to. He realises that and everybody realises that. And for that reason he wants us to participate and to admit that we will accept the outcome of the negotiations, and that we are not prepared to do. We say if we get an ANC government in this country we will do the same thing that we have done at the beginning of this century when Britain tried to rule this country. We will resist. We will not accept it and for that reason if we enter into negotiations then we are participants, we contribute and we will have to accept the outcome ultimately and for that reason we will not participate unless our right of freedom is recognised beforehand, then we will participate. So the other people can go and for that reason, once again, I believe if they get it on track it will once again be a failure, it will not succeed. So we are not going to try to make a success of a thing that cannot work in South Africa. We would rather stay away and by that we can contribute, wreck it before the time, before it is implemented because an ANC/SACP government cannot be a success in South Africa. It was a failure in the Soviet Union, why should it be a success in South Africa? But we don't want a communist government for 70 years. We want to prevent it becoming a reality in South Africa.
POM. In this context, I read in The Citizen yesterday that at the congress in Kimberley there was talk of setting up ...
FH. No, no, that's not what we intend to do. We say as long as the constitutional way is open we will only act constitutionally and we regard it, although the chances are very slim for an election, we say still the possibility is there and as long as that possibility exists ...
POM. For an election? For a general election?
FH. No, an election in terms of this constitution, to take over this government. As long as that opportunity is there we will not, we will only speak to the democratic measures and we will not do anything else. If there is no constitutional way then we must consider whether we are going to do something else, whether it is feasible. We haven't thought about other options. We are a political party and we only discuss political strategies and no other strategies. That is The Citizen, that is their interpretation, but that is not what it is. A political party is not an army. You cannot organise an army.
POM. At what point would you consider the constitutional option closed?
FH. When it is obvious and when it is sure that we are going to lose our freedom and we are going to be subjected to an ANC/SACP government. Then if it is totally sure that that is the outcome then if we are not free when it is totally that we are going to lose our freedom, then we will have to consider other options.
POM. Would that point be when, let us say that the government is talking about reconvening the parliament in October?
FH. No, I don't think they will have anything on the table by October.
POM. If and when it reconvenes?
FH. I think it will not be so easy. I think when there is a new constitution. I think this constitution will remain intact while a new constitution is negotiating and is drawing up and when they come to a final conclusion of a new constitution then you will see what it will be like. It will be a unitary state, one man one vote and there will be freedom for no nation in South Africa. Then, if that is adopted, and the only thing that must happen is that elections must now take place and the constitution must be implemented, then you can be sure that that is the position.
POM. So it wouldn't start if there's an interim government or what's called an interim government, that is some kind of power sharing arrangement?
FH. I don't think so because an interim government can be there but they cannot come to a conclusion and they cannot decide and come to consensus on a new constitution and then the present constitution will still be the constitution of this country. And if it takes then five years, then there must be a new parliament elected in terms of this constitution. So only when this constitution is not in existence any more and there is a new unacceptable constitution, then ...
POM. Parliament can only run to September of 1994?
FH. Yes. This parliament's time will be over in 1994, that's right. In March of 1994 because the election was, no September 1994, that's right. The last election was in 1989. But for that reason there is a small possibility that there is a constitutional way. On the other hand, we are in the meantime negotiating with other nations and there is a movement away from a unitary state. I am convinced that ultimately the proposals of the ANC will not be acceptable to them and that we will not accept a constitution and there will be enough people of other nations who will not be prepared to accept a unitary state and one constitution for all of us. If we can mobilise, therefore we say our attitude is mobilisation, mobilisation of the majority of our people and to speak to other nations and to mobilise more and more people and more and more nations to resist the unitary state.
POM. Which of these nations do you think are most disposed towards following the path that you are proposing?
FH. I think there are a lot of them. The Tswana nation, of course, is already in a position where this year they have a growth rate of 7%, while in South Africa the growth rate is minus 1%. There is prosperity and there is peace. Only the ANC is trying to disturb the peace, but there is peace in Bophuthatswana. In Botswana of course it's one of the fastest growing countries, although it's a poor country, it's one of the most stable countries in Africa because there is a democracy, there is free enterprise and all the things that are necessary. So you have the examples of success on doorstep. I don't think the Zulus will ever accept an ANC government because the ANC is dominated by the Xhosa of the Transkei and for that reason they will not accept it. And I don't think the South Sothos, the people of the Free State, that they will accept it. I don't think the Ciskeian people will accept an ANC government and the Vendas of Northern Transvaal and so other people, I don't think there is one nation who will accept, the majority of a nation that will accept an ANC control except for the Transkei because the ANC is Xhosa orientated, it is actually a Xhosa organisation.
POM. You talk about mobilisation, was it mobilisation of the people in white areas?
FH. Mobilisation, yes. To get the majority. In our case to get the majority of the people and then to go out and to get people who feel the same, other nations so that we can co-operate against the communist threat.
POM. How will you go about this mobilisation?
FH. We're going to accept the invitation of the Inkatha Freedom Party to review CODESA. What were the reasons for the failure of CODESA? Because that is not a conference which is based on the concept of a unitary state. It is a conference to discuss the failure.
POM. When is this called for?
FH. Last week, that was an invitation extended to the Conservative Party because they are going to invite other parties as well, but the Inkatha Freedom Party invited the Conservative Party to attend such a meeting to review CODESA 2 and our congress decided that we must go to that meeting and we would like to do that.
POM. When you're looking at white areas here, what techniques of mobilisation will you use to get people motivated, to make the voice heard, what will be the instruments through which they act?
FH. Political. Political instruments. All the means that the political party uses to get the support of the majority of the people. Those means.
POM. No election schedules?
FH. No, no. We cannot decide on an election. But if there is a by-election of course we will participate. We can organise on local level a referendum or more than one referendum on certain issues, very important issues.
POM. Would that have to be in areas where you already control?
FH. Where we control local government we can take the decision, but where we don't control it we can approach by means of the inhabitants of that city, we can approach the local government and request them to hold a referendum on a certain very important issue. And if they reject it then we use it as propaganda to mobilise the people against the government. And if they grant it, in most cases I'm convinced the issues, the very important issues, we will get the support of people who are members of the National Party as well.
POM. As you look back over the last two years can you see broad changes in what the government strategy is? Do you know what they're looking for at the end of the day?
FH. You see initially, well ten years ago when they started with this present constitution, the three-chamber parliament, they said it would only be a constitution for the whites, the Coloureds and the Indians and that there would be a totally different dispensation for the black nations. So they changed from that one. They realised that if they included the Coloureds and the Indians then they must also include the black people. So that was a total change. But then they said they will never allow the ANC and the South African Communist Party to take over the government, they will not negotiate with them. But ultimately they changed and now they are negotiating and they are prepared to hand over the country to them.
POM. In every report, I subscribe to two news services, clipping services from South Africa, and in every report whether it is the BBC or the major British newspapers or the major American newspapers, they all talked about the referendum as being about a process about the sharing of power in which blacks share power with whites so that everybody would be equal. Do you think the de Klerk government is committed to go so far but no further?
FH. You see that's what they say, and that's what they initially said. Power sharing, they must have a share. But that's exactly what the ANC is dead against. The ANC doesn't want to share power, they want to take over power and that is why they wrecked CODESA 2 to go to the streets in order to try to get the power. But the ANC is not prepared and if the government agrees to an interim government, what they have done, and a body must be elected on a one man one vote system, a constitution making body. If they agree to that one then, of course, they agree that if the ANC win the election then they can write the constitution and even if they built in certain minority protections and the ANC win an election with 51% of the votes and the constitution says you can only change the constitution with a two thirds majority, and if they have only 51% of the votes and they change the constitution, who is going to stop them? Nobody is going to stop them. They are going to do that, because they have done that, all over Africa they have done that. So the United Nations, do you think they will come and stop the ANC if they change the constitution? They will not come and stop them. Nobody will come and stop them. So that is no guarantee. A constitution means nothing because it's only a piece of paper. But if the government accepts paper guarantees then in practice they gave in to the demands of the ANC and they allow them to take over and that is what is going to happen if we don't stop them. Therefore, we are looking for allies so that we can stop them doing this thing.
POM. So you essentially see the government moving from the position where it gives lip service to the sharing of power to a point where it will cede control to the ANC?
FH. Yes.
POM. Given that communism was so thoroughly, utterly discredited practically all over the world, that it's failures in terms of economic systems and social controls are now so well documented that every country which had the system, whether in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union, has disintegrated and where the Communist Party here says, no we've not committed those failures.
FH. Yes, but they said they are going to repeat it. They are going back to true socialism, that's what they said. They're not going to change and to implement private enterprise. They said the land must be reallocated, there must be redistribution of land. The mines and the financial institutions, there must be a redistribution of wealth. All the old communist things. They still believe in that. But the people of South Africa, they have no experience of a communist system and the ANC said, look all the things that belong to the white people we're going to give it to you. And the white people they are going to work for you. So they will vote for it but afterwards they will be the slaves of communism. So we agree that communism is a bad thing, it is a failure, but it's still in existence in China which is the biggest country in the world. It is still in existence in Cuba and in other places. It is still there, although it is bad it is still there. And we are not prepared, while it is rejected throughout the world, to become a communist country. We're not prepared to do that.
POM. Why is it that the right wing in this country has so much trouble getting its act together? There are so many splinter groups, factions.
FH. That is a phenomenon, that is a characteristic of conservative people. They are bloody hard-headed and everyone knows the best and everyone is a leader. But the fact is the Conservative Party is the driving force of the conservative people. The AWB and all those organisations, they are really not political parties. They are in action and we don't fight with them. But when it comes to an election then they have no option, they vote for the Conservative Party because on the political front it is only we and the HNP, there are only two political parties and now this one will be there. But this one will not be, I'm totally not worried because they will not get support. And the HNP during the 1989 election they only got 4000 votes throughout the country - throughout the country! So we are not worried about the HNP. They can be there because it looks like a division and that will prevent people from supporting other parties, they will stick to the Conservative Party and for that reason these chaps will get no support. They will perhaps get four or five thousand votes in an election and it will not really make a difference. I think ultimately they are on their way to the National Party. I think so.
POM. If ultimately there were an election for a constitution making body would the Conservative Party participate in that?
FH. Well we'll decide when we come there. We will decide what is the best thing to do because if we don't participate then our people will vote for the National Party, which will not be a good thing. So that is a very strong point for participation. But on the other hand if you don't participate and you can keep your people away and there are other people, say for instance Zulus or Tswanas, we will also discuss the whole matter with our allies - see what they are going to do. If a large portion of the nation is going to stay away and not participate, then of course it will not be the right thing to participate. So on that one we will decide when we come there.
POM. What is your view about de Klerk and the security forces? There has been constant speculation that de Klerk doesn't have full control over the security forces, that he doesn't have a free hand to fire people he might like to fire or take disciplinary action against people.
FH. No I don't think so. I don't think he can fire, the government is in control. The government, they have got the right by means of the laws of this country. They can appoint and they can fire. They can do that. But that is communist propaganda because they want an impartial force and that's why they discredit the police and say the government has no control, because if the government is in control and if the police are impartial then of course there's no sense in asking for a foreign, impartial force to control the country. So that is only communist propaganda. I think our laws have a good reputation as far as is humanly possible and in comparison with other countries, I think our courts, we have a good system, we have good laws in this country and the police are not as bad as the communists and the ANC say.
POM. When you read the interview today in The Star with Colonel Hugo who was a former member of the Intelligence Unit ...
FH. I haven't seen The Star yet because I was on my way from Lichtenburg. It took me three hours.
POM. It took you three hours! Oh my God!
FH. No, no it's a pleasure. I'll do it again for you.
POM. Thank you. So do you see the ANC, as a result of the collapse, the ANC walking out of the talks, the mass action, do you think the mass action was of a sufficient level that it can ...?
FH. No I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't think the country will collapse as a result of that. What you must bear in mind is that the ANC is only a movement. It's not even a political party. It's a terrorist movement. It's not a nation and on the scene in South Africa there are thirteen different nations and the ANC is ignoring the fact that there are nations and they must pull support, their power base is people. They must get people. At the moment movements like the ANC they come and go. They're not permanent, but nations are permanent. And so the ANC, they cannot produce the goodies and they will not be able to produce the goodies and for that reason their support will fade away and people, to get security, will rally after the leaders and support the leaders of the various nations. The Zulu people will realise - but they destroy the economy, we lose our jobs and they cannot provide something for them. So they will, in a growing extent, support and fall back on their nationhood and that is what is happening at the moment. And the ANC will more and more lose support because they are not a nation, they are only a movement and they have no land. They can offer nothing. Their total history is one of destruction and of killing people. They cannot produce one single effort of what they have done constructively, because they have done nothing constructive. But the government of KwaZulu, the government of Bophuthatswana, the nation of Bophuthatswana can say, look we've built up this country and we've provided universities, schools, hospitals, work opportunities and what a nation can do they have done. But what can the ANC offer the people? They can offer them - if you don't agree you get the necklace and we'll destroy your schools and your houses. They've destroyed more schools than anywhere in the world.
POM. When you look at the violence of the last two years, since August 1990?
FH. Not only since then. They've started with their violence long ago, but since 2nd February it escalated because they operate from inside South Africa.
POM. You think it's really the ANC that's responsible?
FH. Of course. The ANC is responsible for the destruction of schools and hospitals and strikes and all the other things. The Inkatha Freedom Party is not because they told the people to go to work. They have been against sanctions. The ANC advocated sanctions. They advocated the school children to stay away. They forced them by means of necklaces and intimidation to stay away and to wreck their careers. They are responsible. It is not the leaders of the nations.
POM. Who would you say is responsible for Boipatong?
FH. I really don't know what happened there but it is as a result of the clash between the ANC and the rest of the people. That is the reason for it. I don't really know who was responsible for it because that was the hostels and normally the hostel is a place where the Inkatha people are living and the squatter camps are the strongholds of the ANC. So I don't know what was the position there, but of course there was provocation. At least there must have been provocation.
POM. By the ANC?
FH. Oh yes. Because if the ANC was not there then there would not have been.
POM. Finally, give me a broad picture of how you see the next year?
FH. Well I think in ten years time it will be totally different. You will have a set up in South Africa based more or less on the European situation.
POM. West Europe?
FH. Yes. Where you have economical operations, perhaps an economic community, various nations with political independence and they will control themselves and they will co-operate and we will say it was close, it was very close. We came to the point where the communists were on the point of taking over but fortunately it didn't happen.
POM. OK. Thanks very much.
FH. It's a pleasure. I'll do it again. Next year, you phone me and I'll come.