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This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

16 Aug 1990: Clewlow, Warren

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POM. We're talking with Warren Clewlow, the CEO and Vice Chairman of Barlow Rand.

WC. By the time you write the book that will be different.

POM. OK. To go back for a moment to 2nd February and de Klerk's speech on that occasion, did what he had to say take you by surprise and what do you think motivated him to move so rapidly and so broadly at the same time?

WC. Well, in addition to my responsibilities here at Barlow Rand, I'm also Chairman of State President's Economic Advisory Council. And that position puts me in contact with the State President. So, although I don't profess to know him very intimately, I do know him quite well. So, I, in the months prior to February, I'd had a number of meetings with him which gave me quite a lot of insight into what his plans were. So, I'm possibly not quite the right person to ask that question, because I won't - well, if I say I wasn't surprised it's because I had discussions with him in the months preceding that which gave me more of an inkling, I had more of an inkling of what he was going to do. And I thought he did it very well. I wasn't sure whether the tactics would be to do - he had a programme, he has a programme and it was really a question of timing. How was he going to time his programme? And he's chosen his tactics. And I thought it was, from his point of view, he did it extremely well because he suddenly took that position from, shall we say, from a rearguard position to taking a lead, which I think he's maintained ever since. So, I think his timing of that was important. It was the timing factor of February 2nd which was much more important, I believe, than the actual content. I think what was going to happen was inevitable. Well, it was going to happen anyhow, perhaps even the previous President would have done the same thing. It's a question of how you do it. And the whole of this African scene now, the South African scene, is, I think, there's a new dimension to it, which was the timing aspect. I think if you - I'm sure you're going find out when you talk to most people - there is very little, I would say, not that amount of difference between the major players on the stage at the moment, but how they would time the moves. I think that's where the difference lies.

POM. What about his motivation?

WC. I think his motivation was from - the President has been in politics for a long time. He comes from a very political family, so he's a politician of our breeding where he's been involved in the field of politics for many years and he's thought out really clearly where this country's going to go in the next decade and then beyond. He certainly is a long-term figure, politician, as opposed to a short-term. You know, many politicians are short-term people. In the United States, you play election to election. There's a system as such, you know. The fact is that the business world in the United States is very orientated as to what the next quarter's results are going to be. You know, President de Klerk is, in my own view, a long-term politician. He's had a long-term plan which he has very clear in his mind which has to be implemented.

POM. I was going to ask you that. Does he have a grand plan, a strategy worked out for getting to where he wants to get? And where does he want to get to?

WC. I would believe he has, yes, I certainly believe he has got that. Whether one would agree with it, whether it's a good or bad one, but he's certainly got it.

POM. What is it? What's your understanding of it?

WC. I believe that he genuinely wants to bring the real players, those who have proven constituencies in this country, to a negotiating table and when they're there not to arrive with a preconceived plan but to work hard at bringing the real players to the table. And then when they're there, those real players then take the thing forward. I don't think his plan is to bring a whole lot of people to a negotiating table to implement a strategy which he has in mind.

POM. When you say the "real players", could you identify whom you would regard as being in that category at the moment?

WC. Well, one of the real players has to be the government. And there have to be individuals or a grouping of what one calls "the homeland states". There has to be the ANC, there has to be the PAC, there has to be Inkatha. And I think there have to be the two opposition parties in white politics, representatives of the Coloureds, representatives of the Indians. So, we've already got a large grouping. I don't think the business world per se has a right to participate as a player. Though there must be a very needed input from the business community on how the economics of politics are going to work. And likewise, so would the unions be there. I think their role comes in as a little bit more specialist in the, as I would see it, in the process but in a more specialist role. Then I think one has to also not to forget groupings like, more so in a specialist role, academics. There's a specialist role for legal people. It's not just a simple two or three people showing. It's almost becoming like a - it's a big scene and I think that's why the President is working hard to make sure it is properly representative.

POM. In having it properly represented, how will you give a sufficient weight to the relative standing of various groups in the population? For example, if you had a Constituent Assembly the ANC might get 45% of the vote and the PAC might get 5% and one would have a weighting mechanism as to the importance of their relative views. If you just had a table around which you put all the players, how do you differentiate between those who have large elements of support and those who have relatively important but small?

WC. I think that what you talk about comes a little bit later down the line. I think it comes a little bit later down the scene. I think this total grouping is part of a scene-setting process. Once that has been established, the broad principle, then I think it breaks down to almost, not so much the - if I was the person to tell, I'd look more to, not so much to people - I think people then start losing their identity of how they got there in the first place, and start applying more where their talents lie in the second phase. So, one starts putting the best brains on the job for certain jobs. So, I could see it becoming, if it was me, becoming a bit of a, I suppose I'm thinking of who I, one would tackle things more like a businessman - that basically you tend to select your - in a business once you've set your goals, which is our rule, then you start applying the best man for the job to achieve those goals. So, although the man comes from Natal I wouldn't, if he was good at something else I would put him on what he's good at, not because he comes from Natal.

POM. Well, there are three general scenarios, at least that have been given to us, as to the way forward. One is the route of the Constitutional Assembly à la Namibia. The second is this broad negotiation table which develops a consensus at the table itself about the way forward including constitutional principles. And the third is a combination of perhaps the first two. You'd have the present government which reaches out and takes in members of the ANC and perhaps other organisations, gives them ministerial posts, develops more into a transition government of sorts, or a coalition government, and while that is going on there is a constitutional commission with eminent people, the best people, again representative of every view, drawing up a constitution. Do you see any of those three, or one in particular, as the way forward?

WC. I think the second one. [ is, the second one would be...]

POM. That's the broad negotiation table.

WC. A broad consensus. And I think as far as transitional government is concerned I would hope that there wouldn't be a necessary, there wouldn't have to be a necessary step. I think it would become more onto the agenda if the timing took longer and longer. I don't believe transitional, anything transitional really works. It's far better to come to a speedy conclusion. And talking about that too, I believe the process started anyhow on 2nd of February. And so whereas there are no visible meetings where there are too many people of the same party, there are lots of meetings that are taking place which are really getting the show on the road. I think a lot of the initial spadework- I think the President has done a lot. He's made it one of his goals just to be in contact with all these various parties. And if one follows his pattern of meeting, his door's open, he's very genuine about that, his door's open and people are starting to realise that it is open. And that's why there are more and more meetings that are taking place, some publicised and, I would guess, many are not seeing the publicity. In fact, I know they're taking place all the time.

. I think the problems we're seeing in the paper this morning, between the ANC-Inkatha factions fighting that's taking place, is really also a part of that posturing position. They aren't able to, I think that's their way of reflecting their relative strength, or testing each other's relative strength. Sad as it might be it's a typical way to have to test one's strength. But that's also a part of the, and just as I said de Klerk's got a timing, and timing is of essence, that timing, time bomb, is really what's on Mandela's lap, now. You know, he has visibly made it quite clear up to now that he hasn't seen a need to meet Buthelezi. Whereas Buthelezi's taken a posture right from the beginning that it was important that he meet Mandela immediately. And so we have the two extreme points of view. And now all this has taken place in the middle and there's becoming increasing, I believe, increasing annoyance about the fact that Mandela's not making this move. It's a very obvious move, which he's not making. Now, obviously he's not making it because he's either not got the full support of his Executive to make it, or he's getting his timing, he's timing it differently. And only time will tell whether he's got that one right.

POM. Going back to timing, with regard to de Klerk, two questions. One, do you think that he has conceded on the principle of majority rule? And two, do you think he must have this process more or less wrapped up by 1994, that he cannot afford to go into - that we have seen the last whites-only election?

WC. You see the question of majority rule, the one-man, one-vote concept, he's already considered that.

POM. I'm making a distinction between one-man, one-vote and majority rule. They're not the same thing.

WC. Well, one-man, one-vote must lead to majority rule. You must tell me what the distinction is. His view, and I think that's the view of just about everybody in the country, it must be a constitution where, after one-man, one-vote, and therefore, the majority party has to win. That's just a logical, mathematical follow-up. It must be within a constitution that ensures that it doesn't mean that the ruling party or a minority party have a power, have a veto or power or whatever, which distorts the democratic process of the future. Now, you tell me the difference between one-man, one-vote and majority rule so I can understand you better.

POM. Well, a lot of, not a lot, perhaps a number of people some of whom would be close to the government and others in positions of influence in the media or whatever, will say, yes, there will be one-man, one-vote, but there will be a system in which the minority, let's say the National Party just for shorthand, will still exercise power. In other words it will be more of a power sharing arrangement rather than one party rules and other parties sit in opposition. That there still would be room for the National Party to have ministers who would carry ministerial portfolios. That they would actually be part of the structure of government itself, almost like proportional representation. For example, in Northern Ireland the British government has said in any new dispensation power must be shared. So even though Protestants are in a majority, if you get 60% of the vote, you get 60% of the executive positions and the republicans get 40%. So it will be both parties exercising actual power.

WC. That's probably, well, that is possibly what will be one of the ways in which the constitution debate will go along. Now, whether it comes to that at the end, I don't know. All I do feel is that there won't be a very simple solution coming out of this. It won't be, after locking together, like electing a Pope, [that will come] a decision which is quite straightforward and easy to follow. I think the machinations of all that's going to produce from this country have very much a checks-and-balances, complicated constitution.

POM. So, would a shorthand way of putting that be to say, yes, majority rule but majority rule with qualifications?

WC. Provided you don't read into qualifications as defeating the total result.

POM. They will not have a veto, there would be no veto powers.

WC. No, I understand that. I think it's going to be more on - you take Zimbabwe, I would be most surprised, I'm not a constitutional expert, but I would be most surprised if it came out with a constitution that said "And there will be X number of seats reserved exclusively for different groups of Indians, Coloureds, whites, or whatever." I don't think it would ever come to that sort of thing. [I think it will become, I think it could become,] I think it's a very important constitution. That's why the President is working so hard at it, that there's got to be someone - someone's got to start producing a role model for Africa. Because the ones that have been put into Africa have not worked. And it's important that South Africa as the biggest country[doesn't either, well, first of all] picks up the mistakes of the past, doesn't fall into a trap that it's an adjunct of a western type democracy and is possibly going to have to come up with a role model exclusive to this area which can be transplanted elsewhere or modified elsewhere.

POM. 1994. Does he have to have the bulk of this in place before that?

WC. Well, I would certainly hope so, not for any reason other than I don't think a country can live profitably in this uncertainty. And I would think the President has written off 1990 as the year in which, "posturing" maybe is the wrong word, but Mandela had been locked away for a long time. He had to have his tour of the world, he had to renew contact, he had to see things for himself, he had to have an opportunity to establish himself as the leader that was to be - in other words, the ANC had to establish whether they wanted Mandela as their leader or Mandela established himself accordingly. Now all that takes time, but I think the President would very much like to see 1991, next year, all that is over with, the shaking hands with Bush at the White House and saying goodbye to Mrs. Thatcher in front of 10 Downing Street, which really was a media event, not political. So having got that out of the way, we've now got to get down to the process.

POM. Before I turn to economics, I've one last question on the process. And that is de Klerk's promise to bring any proposed new dispensation back to the white electorate for their approval. Is that a promise he can keep or is it a promise he must keep?

WC. Well, first of all, I wouldn't ever take the words of President de Klerk lightly. He's not a person, I wouldn't waste five minutes of my time trying to read behind what he means. If he says something that's what he means. He's not a person where you have to - he's not obtuse. I think events are such that he, and I think in the last white election he got a mandate to do what he's doing now. I think it's the style of the white politics of South Africa to take it back. So it wouldn't surprise me, wouldn't surprise me at all if there was some form of white referendum which hopefully would actually also spill over to being able to read, as a result of that, what other groupings in the country thought about it, as well. So, I think the answer is to have a clever referendum.

POM. It must be very clever, since it must pass. I mean, otherwise, a constitution that would be acceptable to all other groups except whites ...

WC. Yes. Well, that's where timing becomes an issue, too. That's where the President as a politician has got to take it to. Mrs. Thatcher's got to go to her country not when it's going to suit Kinnock, but when it suits her. The only problem with having the American constitution is, unfortunately, you have to go on a certain day. And it has a - I mean, if Bush is proved to have been too precipitous and his golf expedition ... but was facing an election, it's the difference between winning or losing. I mean, it's quite ridiculous that a country's going to win or lose on what a man decided in an arid state. That's the sort of constitutional, what's the word? . As good as the American constitution is it's got some weak points, too. And, hopefully, when we start working it out we will take note of the strong and the weak. Everybody's got strong and weak points, don't they?

POM. White fears, what are they?

WC. I think white fears are - well, I don't think there are real white fears unless - you know I don't know of any fears. [I mean, because, and I don't think] It's not white fears, I think it's just normal fears. It could be American fears, Irish fears, black fears. That is, one doesn't want to - one wants to live in a country. We all know this is a country with great potential, that's a fact. I mean, that's probably even debatable. But we all want to live in a country that has a climate and a way of government which enables the true potential of this country to be developed. Up to now, it has been developed. You can argue, it's quite easy to argue two cases. It's easy to argue that the last thirty years has impeded the development. One can also argue that it was probably the only way in which the country could have been brought to the state where it is today. In other words, it needed that type of government control to get it through to where it is. One can argue about cases. I'll take de Klerk's, I've argued with him all my life. My own choice is, I think we have wasted years here. But then, world history has wasted years, Ireland's wasted years.

POM. 803 years and four months and two days.

WC. So, you know. The Russians have wasted seventy years, and so it goes on. But basically, the fear is that we have a country that doesn't allow its potential to be developed. And the potential in this country is really bringing the people, the entire population, closer together economically. It's too straddled over the seat. If it was a road race, the difference between the leader and those at the back is too far. One needs to bring the parties closer.

POM. Let's talk about economics now and business concerns. Here you have a South African economy that has been in the doldrums for most of the 1980s, with real per capita income slipping little rather than increasing.

WC. You're wrong.

POM. Wrong on which?

WC. Well, it depends. The most important part of that statement is that black per capita income has risen dramatically.

POM. But overall per capita income has declined slightly.

WC. Yes, but I mean ...

POM. OK, well, we can address that as we go on, because it's related to some of the issues. You have the Minister for Finance talking about the country heading towards a full-blown recession. You have huge unemployment, you've got these enormous disparities in expenditure by the government on blacks and whites, you've this massive backlog in housing, the awful state of black education. And a question arises: tomorrow morning you have a majority government for the next four, five, or six years. What difference would it make to the life of the average family that lives in Soweto or in a squatter camp?

WC. Well, I'm not sure. I might be wrong here, but I don't think it's going to be necessarily the change of government that ... I think if anybody responsible in power in this country, even if it was sectional responsibility, I mean, if it was to be a white government for the next ten years, or a responsible black government for the ten, or whatever or if you were asked to run the country for the next ten years - stop your writing and come here and run the country. I think, everybody that's responsible is united in the fact that these issues which you have spoken about have to be addressed much more forcibly. And again, it gets to timing. How fast can it be done, and at what expense can it be done? And that's where it's going to take very clever footwork. When one talks about the problems of unemployment and that sort of thing, if you're comparing it to countries that are more comparable to South Africa, South Africa is, in spite of those problems, is far better off than its counterparts. And what are you comparing us with? The United States? Do you want to start comparing the blacks in South Africa with the blacks in the United States? To be able to start to compare with ...

POM. Yeah, but I suppose I'm not making the comparison with any country.

WC. The conditions are better, the factory system ...

POM. My point of departure would be that you have in the black community a huge level of expectations about what change will bring about, where the capacity to bring that change seems awfully limited.

WC. Not "awfully" limited, "somewhat" limited. I don't take the view that it's ...

POM. Well, okay, if we just take the state budget ...

WC. Limited.

POM. Yes. You have a rather weak ...

WC. There's a cake that has to be cut. [I think the way the cake,] There's the cake that's got to be cut and the cake that's got to be maintained. So, the first thing a new government's got to do is decide how big the cake it wishes to bake. Certain policies, in my opinion, could bake the cake bigger. Other policies that will have the effect of restricting the cake.

POM. Okay. Can you run through which ones wouldn't make it bigger and which ones would restrict it?

WC. Well, without any doubt, the financial world, the investors of the world, will look at the new South Africa from how well they think it's going to be managed economically. Which brings in all factors, things like stability, the question of reasonable work demands, etc., etc. All those, whether it's a strife, an industrial strife-torn type of community or what. The bankers of the world, who have long experiences of disappointments of investments in developing countries and Africa even more so, are therefore not going to make their investments' decisions the day after a new constitution, a new government in this country is in power. That's a fact, something which a lot of people in this country are going to have to realise. The second thing is that when sanctions are lifted from South Africa, the bottom-line effect is going to be far less, in my opinion, than what a lot of other people think as well. I mean, it's not going to be the difference between a hell of a lot of things changing. It's going to be easier, no doubt, but not that easier that it's going to make that marked a difference. This country has adapted to sanctions to such an extent now that the changes are not going to be too different. They would be positive, but not dramatically positive, to make a difference.

POM. Would you draw a distinction here between trade sanctions and financial sanctions, or do you drop them all in the same category?

WC. I drop them all in the same category, because I don't think financial, I don't think from the financial, I mean, financial sanctions are a question of will people come back and reinvest readily? And they're not going to do so until they see what the new situation is. So, where one goes, or whoever's in power, they're not going to deal with a windfall or a bonanza of an extent which is going to materially change the economic structure of the country. Might make it easier, might make it better, but it's not going to just make such a difference that we've suddenly got a - there's more largess to spread. Now, the trick's going to be how, and it's a very tricky thing, it's going to be very difficult, and it's an exercise that's going to require an awful lot of cooperation between all the business players, economic players, and the government, how does one progress and develop the economic potential in this country, and having done that, what does one do with the fruits of it? [Now, the fruits of it...]

POM. Now, how does one go ahead, let's deal with how do you create it first?

WC. Well, one creates it in a climate which encourages investment, so it's a confidence factor. Will the Barlow Rands, the Anglo Americans, there's potential to put down new mines here, will they have the confidence to do that? Will the foreign capital that's required for these huge developments be available? And if available, at what terms? First of all, there's an availability factor, and then when it's available, how favourably is it available? Was it available at prohibitive rates? Is the finance short or long? It's no good, you don't build a mine on short-term finance, so the backers have got to be - it's a confidence factor. All the things we talked about earlier, the politics and all that, leads into that. So, that's an important thing. Given a positive confidence factor a whole lot of things fall into place. One's got to look at the fair, if we have the structure, right or wrong, but if all wages in our economic structure at the moment were doubled then many businesses would go out of business. So, you would face higher wages and higher unemployment. We've got to have a type of soup kitchen type approach to many of our major problems. For instance, housing, education, I think one's got to start re-looking at what does one do with housing. Is it the one extreme that says a house consists of a slab and a tent? Or does a house consist of a modest two, three bedroom thing? Because the one thing you're looking at so much money and certainly more houses, and the other one you're looking at, so much money and less houses. And there's all the things that go in between. There's the question of the power grid in this country. There are twenty million people who are given just one power point, one plug. This is a lesson from the Taiwanese, where they put a slab down and a tent. They also put a plug. That's fine, in my opinion, because give a person a plug, then you start giving a person a quality of life which is missing, even if it means boiling a kettle, and it also starts giving persons the ability to plug into the rest of the world. Just as we found out, to our surprise, a decade ago, but no longer surprised, when we tended to make decisions for black people, genuinely, you know, because we thought we were really helping uplift. When we put their priorities down we were always wrong. That's why, for instance, the television business has boomed here. But we thought people would say, 'Gee, television's nice to have', but it's after this uplift. [You know, it got sort of...] Now, if we have an economy that starts getting housing well off the ground, the progress then starts to feed on itself. And the trick that's going to be in South Africa is not how many new mines we make, [that's ???, that's underpinning the existing] but how we get the big mess of this economy to start its own engine. A little bit, in my perception, of how the black taxi associations started, and it fed on itself. It's not just a taxi, it's a tyre business, it's a repair business because they keep banging into each other, it's added to ...

POM. Multiplier effect.

WC. It's a multiplier effect, and there are many things which we can multiply in this economy, which we haven't done as of yet.

POM. A lot of what you're saying suggests that there will have to be a commitment to a free-enterprise system, or generally a market-oriented system.

WC. Yes, yes. Market-oriented, yes.

POM. Do you think that in the negotiations that will go on, that economic structures themselves will play a large part of those negotiations?

WC. What worries me, that's one of my concerns, is that there is no alternative. One's hearing nothing more at this stage than a lot of loud terms which have different meanings to other people. I think the economic debate is very much in its infancy and it's nothing more at this stage than just a lot of platitudes and slogans. I mean, really, the economic debate is just, at this stage, boiled down to just one thing, and that is the future South Africa has got to see a better economic deal for people who are having not a very good one. Now, that's really all I'm saying. It's not saying it's got to redistribute from A to B. [it's just got to say to those who think there's no future in this country - anyhow, no matter how perfect this constitution, if it was to - no matter how exciting it was to constitutional experts of the world, if it has no use to this country,] And basically it means that economically, this country will thrive. And economic thriving doesn't mean Barlow's thriving, we're thriving already, it's a question of how the total part of this country can thrive. And we won't continue to thrive in the new South Africa unless everybody starts moving up the strata.

POM. My point is, will there be a level of concern in the government about the economic future of the country and the possible directions that the structures of the economy might take? That in a negotiating process itself, it will demand prior agreement on the kinds of structures that can be put in place. For example, that it would be spelled out that nationalisation, for example, could only take place in, say, X types of industries, like the railroads?

WC. I don't think, I would be surprised if the constitutional debate got down into such detail. One of my fears is that there is such a lot of ignorance in that area, or lack of understanding, as it were, [that ... Is that the same as England's? Not quite.

POM. Not quite, no.

WC. If that were England(?), you tend to say he's not capable of understanding, as opposed to...]

POM. Mr. Mandela talks to people who if they say something he doesn't like, he talks about lack of understanding.

WC. I think in that part, it's going to be when these constitutional talks, my guess is that, it's on this economic side that they're going to be blurred and fuzzy and I think the economic work is not going to come out of it. That's going to come afterwards which it shouldn't do, but it's going to through lack of understanding, to use the terminology.

POM. Maybe the most direct question I could ask is, do you think the constitution might, or the government would want it to, contain a provision that would give a special place to free enterprise?

WC. Yes.

POM. Yes. Okay.

WC. Yes. I think it will. But I think out of this constitution will come a lot of gnarled economic terms. It was when the election that follows the constitution, that's when, I think, the parties contesting that election, and I think it will go that way, will start having to put economic policies down. And for the first time in this country, elections, I think, will start to have a strong economic flavour as opposed to ... which is very much a UK, in the UK economics has now become the dominant issue in their politics. In the United States I always read it to be a dominant factor, but there are others. I think if it has an 8 out of 10 ranking in the UK, it's probably 6 out of 10 ranking in the United States, and it's never had a ranking here, or had a very low ranking here, before.

POM. Is the business community suspicious about the association of the ANC with the SACP?

WC. Well, it's not suspicious, it has an association, so, I mean, there's no ... They're just, to me - I'm seeing the development of the SACP, I read, as part of the ANC's inability to ... If the ANC, the original Mandela dream of arriving at the negotiating table with everybody behind him, it's just crumbling all along. And I think it was far too ambitious for him to have thought that. I think that's the difference between what he would have liked as opposed to the realities of life having come out. And as each month goes by, as the fighting and this violence, it's proving that his base is shrinking, not that it's growing. Well, let me put it this way, instead of being ethnic, it's becoming ethnic and part of the coming down to ... And I think it's better for the country, to tell you the truth, in the way it's going, as long as it doesn't cost lives, which it unfortunately does. But the SACP, to me, the COSATU union groups, are such that they are re-establishing, having to re-establish themselves as their own identities as opposed to being part of the ANC one. And so, therefore, the surprise to me was that it didn't seem to be a cover, it fitted uncomfortably in the ANC so quickly. [You know, I thought it might have been ...] And again, it's personalities that are playing, and playing a role, you know?

POM. Two last quick questions. One, COSATU, one of the success stories in the black community in the 1980s has been the organisation of trade unions, the learning of negotiation skills and the hard bargaining they've gone through with employers and the success they've had in reducing the disparity between black wages and white wages. In a new dispensation the unions will be under a lot of pressure to press for immediate gains for their members. Could the unions be a serious obstacle to the development of a stable economic climate?

WC. Yes if they take a piece of it, if they take an unreasonable view. But can I just correct one thing? Was also the statement you made about the Indians? I accept, they're not the sole, by no means the sole, type of credit for increasing black wages. Those are the sort of things that responsible employers in this country have been doing anyhow, and do in many areas without any union role being played. It plays a role, certainly, in some areas, but there're lots of areas where there's not even union representation, it happens anyhow. And it's a policy of responsible business leaders in this country who have fought, have been against the system of the past for a long time, who have been adopting policies that are working towards ethical ... because we've realised, if you want to take a compassionate view or not, that it's the right thing to do. You can't have people in an organisation at such wide financial differences and so steps have all been corrected and the unions have been good at it. And the establishment of the unions has also largely been helped by the business community, as well. That role is not to be underestimated.

POM. Finally, what are businesses' greatest concerns?

WC. Instability. Yes. Instability, [ and I, because when earning...] Instability and a future which is too short-term orientated. It needs a stable long-term solution to this country. It doesn't mean a short-term, with the pendulum swinging from one type of direction to another. You can't operate on that basis. Business can adapt. [but that's the way in which it's...]

POM. Well, if you will leave it there, I know you have to go. I wish we had another hour.

WC. Another occasion. I'm sorry, I've just got to go.

POM. Thank you.

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. Return to theThis resource is hosted by the site.