This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
27 Aug 1990: Tugwana, Gabu
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POM. Gabu, when you look back on February 2nd and Mr de Klerk's speech on that date, were you surprised by what he said and what do you think motivated him to move so broadly and so sweepingly at the same time?
GT. Well, I think it is a combination of two movements, the order is not necessarily to do with the importance of the issue, but I'm saying in two ways: one, the internal pressure which had been placed by the community which is fighting against apartheid here at home; and, two, the pressure from external forces. Here I'm talking about the anti-apartheid movement outside, including our groupings which are in exile, which helped to spearhead the sanctions, the fight. I think that threw the economy of this country into disarray. The major foreign debts which the country had to contend with in this period before February 2nd, and the clear indication that it was going to become difficult to actually meet some of the commitments made by the government if there was no kind of alternative relief. The relief had to come through changing the order of the game and moving that old crocodile kind of administration by the previous State President, Mr P W Botha, with a more acceptable kind of administration like the one with the current State President, F W de Klerk.
POM. Do you think that De Klerk and the government have a grand plan in mind or that this is really an ad hoc process, that they don't quite know where they are going?
GT. Well, look, I think their short-term achievement is to remove the pressure, obviously, on them; to remove South Africa from being projected negatively internationally, short-term. Long-term they do want some kind of settlement. But now I think when they talk about settlement, which would realise that in all parties, on the government side, for instance, you've got the right of the right which is not interested in that type of thing or power-sharing, just interested in dictating terms. It cannot move away from the many privileges which they have enjoyed over the years. And also, you must think, in the left of the left, which also exists on our own side as well, which obviously would have a slightly different agenda of having an exchange of power more than a negotiated type of solution to the country. So, when you talk about agenda, you must realise that we have these two factors whether there's a hidden agenda or not.
POM. Yes. You used two words, 'long-term', regarding the government's desire for a political settlement, how long is the long term? And the other phrase you used was 'power-sharing', how do you relate that to this question? First of all, how long is the long-term, and then, do you think De Klerk has conceded the issue of majority rule?
GT. I think he has said so in his own way. Power-sharing he has accepted as a reality in this country, that you have more people of the other colour than the white people, and he has said that the days of domination are over. When he said the days of domination by one group against another, I think he was basically referring to the minority domination against the majority. So he has accepted.
POM. How do you equate that, then, with a power-sharing settlement?
GT. Well, power-sharing, I think, as espoused by the government is power-sharing which would ensure a kind of fairness to the minority of this country. In other words, power-sharing which would not entrench a kind of revenge type of situation, apartheid in reverse. I think that is the power-sharing which they are looking at, in my own opinion. I say so because, for instance, they have objected to the Constituent Assembly because, obviously, that immediately means that the government of the day becomes irrelevant and a new body should be elected. So you can see that they want to use this leverage which they have currently as the government of the day, to try and show that their interests are included in a newly developed country.
POM. Would you see that taking the form, perhaps, of power-sharing, where the white minority would still have a role in government? In other words, that, let's say you had an ANC government, an ANC party in the majority, that they would give two or three cabinet posts to members of the National Party so that the white community would actually share in the exercise of executive power, even though it would be a minority? It wouldn't be dominant, it would be a minority vote.
GT. My understanding of the ANC policies, and having talked with several people within the ANC, they are not looking at colour, so that possibility cannot be experienced, the fact that you would have still white people in the executive, for instance, in the cabinet of a new government in this country. But we must also accept that that must come through the qualities of people, if they are qualified, and also the vote. Basically, my understanding of the current policies is that we are saying we should replace the minority with a majority. They are saying when people have the skills, even if they may be in the minority they should be able to put those skills to use which would benefit both a minority and a majority. We don't want a government which is going to look at itself in terms of race. We want a government which will look at itself in terms of the benefit of the entire country.
POM. When you use the word 'long-term', how long is the long-term?
GT. It really depends on the government. The government is a key player now in that it is still entrenched. And for me, it is very, very difficult, it could be five, it could be ten years.
POM. What impact do you think the violence of recent weeks, particularly the violence in the Transvaal, has had on the process? One, how do you explain the violence? In reading The Nation it was quite clear that your reporters see a situation in which elements in the security forces are lining up with Inkatha. I'd like you to talk about that a little. Two, what that says about this negotiation process, who's trying to undermine it and why? And three, how that process can be gotten back on track again if it is slightly derailed?
GT. Well, I think what has happened in the past few weeks is so serious that I think, in my view, it's actually threatening the future of honest negotiations. Because here, again I think it is a power game that's playing. I want to take a chance and perhaps exonerate the contribution of the State President, Mr de Klerk, he seems to be a very reasonable and honest person, but I think within his own team he has people who have a slightly different agenda within the Cabinet. It's not the entire Cabinet. The majority of them would generally support all the honest positions. But there is still this minority. I think change is a very painful thing. Not everyone wants to accept change. I can make a small example even here in our own newspaper. It's a small environment. When you start talking in terms of this particular week, we have to finish the newspaper at six o'clock, complete everything, go to printer. When we actually go, ten o'clock, you can see how faces change. Change is, even if it is for the better of everyone, is not something which human nature just accepts. There will always be resistance. So, I think long-term, (a), it affects the honesty of the negotiations. Two, I think it's a bit unfortunate that it happened the way it did. And what happened over this weekend actually vindicated the position which we've been pushing, that the government is not making enough effort to stop this fighting by bringing in the troops in the hostels. If you look at what happened over the weekend, you will find that there were one or two deaths only. There were not as many deaths as before they brought in the troops, which is what we were saying all the time; that if the government had a real interest in stopping this, it could. But, now it has created this wound which I don't know if it's going to heal permanently. I see a scenario here where we have the warlords, people who are just worried about this change you are talking about, worried about losing their own position. They may be chiefs in their own area, traditional chiefs, they may be representative of a political or cultural organisation. And now, this change is clear with this huge recruitment drive which has been happening on the ground. Particularly I would talk of the ANC, because we can notice that it is very noticeable. Since they have stopped calling all rallies, there have been quite a lot of meetings of branches etc., etc., taking place. So, one can take a risk and say there was a need of destabilising that type of effort, so that the energy should be put on the peace process. And even peace within ourselves, at the low level in the townships. And if that was achieved, that would have taken a lot of time of the working group to get into the real issues of this power-sharing we are talking about.
POM. How do you interpret what is happening? Is it Inkatha, youth elements of the security people, with a benevolent nod from government people in Pretoria, with right wingers kind of acting in a loose collusion?
GT. It is a combination. You would have the element, which I talked about, of the chiefs, which you would identify probably with Inkatha. Individual chiefs it is mostly, I wouldn't think it would number more than ten to twenty. We are feeling that. Then there is another clique, a smaller one within the government which we didn't number, within the Cabinet as well, more than 5%. And then a slightly larger percentage on the right wing which have identified, also, the erosion of the privileges inside. I think it is a combination of the three which is taking place. I don't see why, for instance, if in our civic organisations during the state of emergency, you would have an AZAPO, you would have even an Inkatha, a person who supports Inkatha, being a member of a civic organisation and without any problem. But only now at this stage there is a problem of being Inkatha when you see ANC people. I don't accept that.
POM. Do you think Buthelezi is orchestrating this in any way, or that he approves of it? That it is doing done with his knowledge?
GT. I have no proof of the role which has been played by Buthelezi. But I think if he is a leader of quality, he should be knowing what is happening within his organisation. The question which I can raise is who gains from this? And I think he's got a lot to gain. But I have no proof of his direct involvement. But I know that he will gain out this situation.
POM. Do you think Mandela should meet with him?
GT. Personally, I think that meeting is important, but I don't think it is a long-term solution to the problem. I think you need to create some kind of infrastructure on the ground which will facilitate that. Because if you don't have the infrastructure, then you won't have - let me make an example here; the hostels are placed next to the townships, when these people go to work, they go past the townships. Take today, the stayaway, the stayaway was done at the last minute, I think within the last 72 hours. There had not been adequate notice. Now, these people in the hostel, when they have to take a position, they also have lost some lives. Would you say they are feeling cold that people have died? They obviously feel sympathetic, but who are they gong to consult with on the things there in the hostel now? Buthelezi is deep in Zululand, some 600 to 700 kilometres away from Johannesburg. They can't consult with him. Who do they consult with immediately? It is the people who are next to them. They will need to liase with the people in the townships and say, "Look, many have given us short notice, and we are migrant labourers, and we are less protected in terms of unions. Most of us are not affiliated to stronger unions, we might lose our jobs." So, I think that is the type of infrastructure that I am talking about. If on the ground there is no liaison, there is nothing between the two groups which is happening, then just the shaking of hands of the people at the executive level, Mandela, namely, Buthelezi, would mean nothing as far as I'm concerned. Morally it would be correct for them to do it, but I don't think it would serve long-term solution. The long-term solution is to create friendship at a lower grassroots level to be able to carry out best the spin-off from them, get together. To me, it should be the last thing, not the first thing.
POM. One or two commentators, I think Hermann Giliomee in The Star wrote an article saying that the violence meant that it would be very difficult to hold elections that will be without perhaps large-scale violence and intimidation. Do you see that as a misreading of the situation or as a distinct possibility?
GT. Well, I think violence should be expected. The urban situation we have here, we have people for more than 30 years that had no way of expressing themselves whether for good or bad reasons. But when that opportunity comes, they are going to try and get excited when their expectations are not met. There have been these great expectations. They were told that Mandela was going to be released, that there were going to be changes, etc. When the pace approaches this, what I could call slow-rise, people become impatient, because they have these expectations. And at the same time, you have the other ones who feel the pace is too fast. So, already that creates conflict. The atmosphere is atmosphere of conflict. One small spark creates violence. In terms of intimidation, I think there could be forums which can be created to deal with that type of thing. I don't think that intimidation is something which cannot be dealt with. It is the issue of discipline and organisations here can play quite a huge role to help discipline their members.
POM. I think what I'm getting at is that does the manner in which this violence happens, and the ferocity that attended it, make it difficult to hold free and fair elections? Not in the immediate future, in the next couple of years, unless some way is found of bringing it under control and stabilising the situation.
GT. My sense is that the longer the process, that a process of peace exists. My argument here would be that there will be, it will give more time for political education. Very few people operated on a political level and those who did, got to the Special Branch, which is detention, which is assassination. So, there are quite a lot of people who have grievances but they don't as yet know how to express those grievances. But now, if you make the process longer, that gives them opportunity to learn through their organisations. So, I would personally expect that there would be less violence if the process is longer. But if it's shorter, yes, there is more possibility of the situation getting more violent.
POM. How do you see the process itself unfolding? We are now at a point where the obstacles to negotiations are almost out of the way - let's assume they are. What happens after that? We've been given three general scenarios. One is the route of a Constituent Assembly; the other is a broadened negotiation table, with every political constituency represented, which draws up a constitution by consensus; and the third is an interim government alongside an assembly, perhaps appointed or elected, that would deal with the development of the constitution. Which of those three do you think is the more likely, or are any of them likely?
GT. Well, it is a problem because key players are disagreeing with those types of processes which you've mentioned now. But I would say if we are looking for a stable democratic society, we should follow the route of the Constituent Assembly and elect an interim administration. Because, to me, it means that there's been some greater degree of fairness in bringing those who are not a controlling power closer to power by going through this process. But as I say, I don't know how it is going to proceed.
POM. The government seems really opposed to this.
GT. Yes. Sure, sure, sure.
POM. In the absence of a Constituent Assembly, how do you think it will affect the negotiations?
GT. Well, I think it would, in my own mind, it would clearly affect the negotiations, it might create a breakdown of the negotiations, but I don't know how much compromise can be made. I am clearly sure that that is the attitude which the government is going to hold on. For instance, I think the ANC have already compromised on calling off, or suspending, the armed struggle. That was even before the government had stopped the hostilities, hostilities like, for instance, the police action in the townships which was one of the major things, that the police should approach the situation in an attitude of policing, not in an attitude of taking sides.
POM. Being on one side.
GT. Correct, on one side. But they have consistently taken sides and yet, despite that the ANC, I think, compromised. I'm not sure if in this particular case of the Constituent Assembly that there are going to be compromises.
POM. Start with the right wing, and breaking it down into the Conservative Party and then right wing militants, do you see them as being a real factor or as kind of a passing phase?
GT. Well, I think it will get worse but because they are in the minority. I think that it won't stop the general process of pushing South Africa to a different future.
POM. But do you think that if an election were held today, that the Conservative Party, for whites only, would win a majority seats in parliament?
GT. White elections?
POM. If there were a white election today, would the Conservative Party win?
GT. They would win, yes.
POM. They would? What about De Klerk's promise which he repeated this last week? He made it during the election in 1989 and he made it again last week, that he would take any new constitutional dispensation back to a white electorate and ask for their approval. Is that a promise he can keep or must keep, or is he painting himself into a corner?
GT. Well, I think he's talking ultimately about the method of referendum. I'm not sure that he will take a risk with an election.
POM. No, by a referendum, let's say he has a referendum, is that not also a risk?
GT. Well, he will win it by referendum, because there's the factor which we talked about earlier of intimidation. You see, this kind of violence which happens doesn't only intimidate blacks against other blacks, it also intimidates whites against other whites. So if people have a certain way of conducting some kind of secret ballot on their thinking of some things, for instance, you look at how the beaches were opened, how some of these cities were opened, swimming pools, the left position was winning all the time. So, if there is some kind of protection when people have to do some voting, they can get away with it. And yet, if you look at De Klerk going to address a meeting in Natal, in Vryheid, the meeting gets disrupted. In those situations, there's intimidation because you can see physically who supports whom, what he's doing. So there, there is violence. But a referendum, he can get away with it, I think.
POM. You're saying an election he would lose, a referendum he would win?
GT. Yes, I think so. I think so. There is a lot of goodwill among particularly white people here. I've had an opportunity of being with the South African Non-racial Committee, when they were conducting a commission of inquiry on behalf of the All-African National Olympic Committee, AANOC. They saw all sorts of men across the colours and the ones they saw, the number of sportsmen they saw, were more, because given the nature of apartheid in this country, they would be the privileged white sportsmen because they want the Olympics, they want international sport. Within those ten days I spoke to more whites than I had spoken to before in my whole life, and the impression I got, initially, they were very suspicious that we should talk about this, they thought this was coming to knock a final nail to get them out of things and miss more sports forever. But as soon as we started talking, they are so willing, and I'm almost certain they will do anything to try and reverse the current situation. But I also say to you they are not saying within their race, they don't have the interest of those who lead, they don't have any right wing, which was to confuse with their privilege which they have to allow blacks to come in, or other race to come in, this is an international sport, on the basis that it is taken that they are still isolated internationally. There are those who will not give up the effort but will bring in all other groups then who can go as a team. So, what I'm saying is that they are willing to do anything. And given that sports being such a big cultural event in this country, I don't see why they wouldn't do it in politics.
POM. Looking at, again, whites, what are white fears? What ones would have a basis in reality and which are purely imaginary? How do you think the violence over the last ten or eleven days, or the last two weeks, what impact do you think that's had, if any, on whites?
GT. Well, you see, before one talks about that, I think in South Africa you have a very unusual society, a society which has been throughout the periods both believing in what they see on the screen and believing what has been said to them by their leaders. The South African privileged society, the majority of it, has never had a chance to sit down and think for itself independently and objectively. And as such, the perpetrators of the violence, the leaders, the warlords, which would include also the conservative whites who are affecting this element of violence, knew what they wanted to achieve. And I think in answer to you, yes, it has affected their thinking. But, you see, this is what we are saying, that we cannot force change on people when they are not ready. Look, they are smashing each other to pieces! But those fears, I can say, are totally unfounded, because, as I say, if whites start reaching out more and more and beginning to talk to a lot of us, I've often heard people who are asking me - I've spent a total of 14 months in isolation and detention under the Internal Security Act because I was described as a terrorist and I was in there for ten years after an explosion. I was a news reporter who covered the 1976 and 1977 unrest, and I was identified by the state as a terrorist because of the way I was reporting the situation in the township. They never took me to court to check what they had seen as terrorism but I was just told privately that I'm a terrorist and I'm allowing myself to be misused by the communists. And I never even knew what communism was at the time of my arrest because I have never done political studies.
. So, what I'm trying to say to you is that the South African community in general, particularly the white community, is a community which is easily manipulated. And the more our society in South Africa opens, they will learn quite a lot. Only last week we called a white friend to come and give us advice on administration. Because while our newspaper is five years old and has been growing all the time, we forgot one area, we never addressed the administration part of it. And then we started having problems administratively, so we were looking for advice. At the end of it, this is a young white Afrikaner, he said to us, "You know what?" he said, "I never knew that a communist can be so forthright and so nice." That's what he said. I mean, what is the basis that we are communists? Throughout the discussion he never picked up any communism, and so he says that, in his comments he says he never thought that a communist can be so honest and open! So we say, "But, you know, earlier on you were saying it is surprising that we brought the business to this really high figure, taking the paper from 30,000 copies to 70,000", and he never thought that we are capable. But now, he's bringing the communist element. He said, "Well, you know, my father and all our friends, when they are looking over your newspaper, it's communist."
. So where does it come from? The government has always said it, so, you can see, it is a community which is reactive, they don't do their own research, they just accept what has been said. So, when we join the media, it also explains this demonstration on Saturday, calling on the SABC-TV to be open. If those channels can be open and be used effectively, perceptions could change a great deal. And I'm sure change in this country wouldn't be as difficult as it is at the moment to effect.
POM. The youth. We've heard a lot about this generation of young people, uneducated, unemployed, maybe unemployable, who have been raised on the culture of protest and confrontation, many of whom are somewhat disaffected by the cessation of the or suspension of the armed struggle. Are they a volatile element potentially, again, a destabilising element in this process of negotiation?
GT. Look, I think organisationally, if we accept that they belong to organisations like the ANC, then they would be disciplined members of that organisation and they will have to follow their instructions in a democratic way. They cannot elect people and later on undermine their position. I mean, if I elect you, when you are confronted in a situation of negotiations, you have to make decision then. And that decision, I think, was in the interest of bringing peace and bringing a new South Africa. I think they will accept it. I think what is needed is a lot of explanation, political education. People should be educated. Now it's just a small mistake, in my own opinion, we have both the Commander, say, of uMkhonto we Sizwe here and we have the Chief of Staff as well. Perhaps one of them should have been there outside. And then the Commander should inform the Chief of Staff that here is the development. Then the Commander would be there on the scene and addressing the people and say, "Here is the scenario." So, I think the other people which are there are slightly of a lower rank and I can see why people are talking about these tensions.
POM. The people who are where are of the lower rank?
GT. Outside, with the army, where the army is, with the guerrillas. If their leaders, the top brass of the army, the Chief of Staff, the Commander of uMkhonto we Sizwe was there, I'm sure with his explaining the whole thing of why this position was taken and what does it speak of, I'm almost certain that they will understand it is not different from the war which they have been fighting. A war cannot be only a physical thing. Wars are also won on the table, depending on how we present the case. So, I'm sure our people, when it is properly explained, will accept that. Coming to the youth, the younger people always feel they have the energy and, as such, they don't see why we discourage them from fighting. But, again, I think, if there is more political education which will indicate that laws are not only an exchange of physical violence, I'm sure there is quite a lot of room for convincing those people and carrying them with all of us.
POM. Where do you place the PAC in all of this? Are they attracting more support from young people now?
GT. Well, I would refer you to research which was done about three, four weeks ago by an independent group. You should try and get the report. It's called MMR, I think it is "Market" -- I'm not sure what the second "M" stands for but "Research". I can give you the number before you go. They are saying the PAC has got no support and I can believe that because if, on the ground, if you are not seen to be doing anything, we know that they are waiting like a hawk to strike when the talks fail, but if you are not doing anything, the only thing which affects people, and if they don't see your visibility to come to your rescue there is no way that you are going to gain support. I'm not saying they don't have support but I'm saying, in terms of the figures, there is no way that you can say they have the majority. For instance, there is an argument that they use, even within the ANC, for instance, AZAPO is more radical and disagrees with the talks. My sense is, again here, there's a need of a lot of neutral education, because even if they disagreed, they wouldn't switch and leave AZAPO or leave the ANC. That's the last thing. I think it's everything at which they would try to project themselves as a real liberator and indicate a power position or show competition which would shake a little bit the hierarchy of the ANC. But I don't see them crossing over, no, that is totally out.
POM. What change, you're a majority government tomorrow, and this is really is about expectations, if there were a majority government tomorrow, what difference would it make in the lives of the average person who lives in a township or in a squatter camp? Not just tomorrow but, say, over the next five years?
GT. Well, look, it would depend internationally how this country is going to go. I mean, this is one country which in modern history is the richest at the time of going into independence. The mineral deposits are very big, and the thing which makes the country economically backwards now is apartheid. When apartheid has been addressed, when we get rid of apartheid, I think there will be fairly enough for everyone. A man in the township wouldn't be looking at moving from the township to live in hotels, definitely not. But, he would be looking at a situation where he can be able to come to work, earn a salary, earn, with something to save in the bank, as well, to address his other needs. I think that's what the man in the township is looking at.
POM. How about somebody living in a squatter camp?
GT. Well, housing again, which in all countries is the responsibility of the government. I think our government here has shed responsibility and given it to business. It should actually be a government issue because the government owns land. As such, it should provide houses. People who live in squatter camps would expect, of course, to live in these same houses. It's very, very clear.
POM. But that's not going to happen soon, is it? I mean, my point is that resources are very limited, the tax base is limited, the problems are huge, and expectations are high.
GT. I don't think those things can be overcome overnight. But, like I was saying earlier, to me it would seem a more delayed independence will have a better spin-off for this country than a quick settlement. Because a quick settlement, given the expectations we are talking about, I think would create a lot of problems.
POM. One last question, or two last questions. One, if you look at Mandela and look at De Klerk in turn, what problems or obstacles does Mandela face in guiding his constituency through this process? And similarly, what obstacles or stumbling blocks does De Klerk face in guiding the process through the white community?
GT. Well, I think that for Mandela the great difficulty, as you pointed out earlier, is on the youth side. I think from his time of release, on more than two or three occasions he has emphasised the point of discipline among the youth. That's the most disturbing and that's a priority, I think, for him to address the indiscipline among the younger generation group. And for De Klerk it is the opposite. He has got very good support from the younger generation. It is the older generation which wants to keep the privileges.
POM. Do you think there are signs of potential divisions between the trade unions, say, COSATU and the ANC? That at some point their agendas diverge?
GT. I don't think so. You know, the ANC is an organisation which has accommodated a lot of different thinking, it's got a history of that. If you look at even this Communist Party thing, communists being also members of the ANC, it is yet another indication. You also had in exile factions which now work closely with COSATU. They are also members of the ANC. So it's a broad-based organisation. I think ANC has got room for people who differ. We have people with different opinions. We have had people like Archie Gumede, he's not been suspended up to now. He has made some of those speeches in Natal, for instance, and he was not suspended. But, of course, there have been certain rebukes because there is structurally … where you can address these things. But I think when you look at that track record, it indicates to you that there is enough room for differing. There certainly could be other programmes which the unions seek to have, but I'm also most sure that there would be accommodations to what they've been thinking.
POM. OK.
GT. And my suspicion, in fact, when you look at how much whites are being attracted to the ANC, my suspicion is that they see it as a broad-based organisation which is willing to accommodate a lot of individuality. I would even take a risk to say probably because of this combination, it's got this unusual combination of people from exile, people from prison, and people from the ground, which would be mainly the people from the unions, of course. There are different experiences that can provide this kind of chemistry which can build a very good relationship which will benefit the country in the future. For instance, this violence which we touched a little about, I think had to come because when the government tried to split the ANC it became discussed when they brought in this communist element, the ANC came out very strongly to say they are not going to associate with the Communist Party. They needed something and what they needed was the violence. This violence, combined with Operation Vula, which now they are trying to take these people from the Communist Party, saying they are associated with a violent approach to the situation and withdrawing their indemnity, also means that these people may be eventually faced with the process of leaving. When they leave the country, it means then they are outside. What the governments expects, I sense, is that they would create tensions outside. That the people who are negotiating there are selling out, are selling us out. Look, maybe you will want to ask the people who are going to protect your own thinking. But I think it is a cycle and I think the ANC will win it. I am almost certain, but I am not sure if the wounds are going to be totally cured of the differences which have been created by this killing, killing on the ground. I don't think they will be.
POM. Thank you very much. I've got more but I know you're very busy and I hope to see you again. I will be coming back maybe twice a year.