About this site

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

12 Aug 1991: Heyns, Johan

Click here for more information on the Interviewee

Click here for Overview of the year

POM. First I want to talk about something that might seem odd to talk about at this point. The question is: what is the nature of the problem that the negotiators, when they finally sit around the table, would be negotiating to settle? One the one hand there are those who say that the problem is a racial problem, a question of white domination over blacks that must be addressed, that's the main problem to be looked at. You have groups who say it's a competition between two nationalisms, white nationalism and black nationalism. You have those who say, yes there are racial differences but within each racial category there are also ethnic differences and future governance structures must take into account the ethnic differences and you must do that if you are to have a stable society. In other words there is conflict about the nature of the conflict, disagreement over what the problem is. In your view, what is the problem?

JH. All those things you've said do exist and have a certain influence over the situation which we are facing. Basically it boils down to one thing, diversity. Whether it's cultural diversity or whether it's nationalism diversity or whatever, the basic fact of the population of this region boils down to one thing that you have got a heterogeneous, diversified agglomeration consisting in a population of about 30 million people, which will have to be addressed in talks or in negotiations. The talks will therefore have to take into consideration all those factors. As far as I am concerned negotiations would mean one thing and only one thing and that is to get down to the basic brass tacks and facts of democracy because I believe totally that democracy caters for any or all of those diversified instances and all the problems that may come to the fore because of the situation.

POM. Let me put it to you this way. The ANC, for example, would be very reluctant, they would be downright hostile, to admit to there being ethnic differences and ethnic tensions that can lead to violence, like in other divided societies, in South Africa because it smacks too much like saying the government was right about there being different nations in South Africa; it was wrong in the solution it adopted. On the other hand if they exist and they are not addressed the prospect for durable and lasting governance arrangements begins to dissipate.

JH. Well you see it doesn't stop there. It doesn't stop at ethnicity. Are you aware of the fact that there was a symposium in Johannesburg on Saturday morning attended by probably most, if not all, of the women who are amongst the top leaders of the ANC plus various other people, inter alia one of the people here in the President's Council was present there. I would like you to have a talk with her. Let's first start with the talks, the talk there was that the women of South Africa inclusive of and maybe particular address being given to black women has for years and years been discriminated against not only by the government of the day, by the ruling whites, but also by their own men, and the time has now come when a specific charter for the rights of women of South Africa - please take note of the fact that I say 'women of South Africa' - be drawn up and to be specifically catered for in whatever future dispensation there may be. What I am therefore saying is, yes those differences do exist, not only on ethical, not only on ethnicity, but also a thing which is not actually, I think, taken into consideration, and that is the fact that in all these things we will have to appreciate that a sound economy and a sound economical system is going to be a pre-requisite for the welfare of a future South Africa. And that I think is going to be one of the big differences where the ANC, for instance, and the existing government of the day plus various other role players will have to come to an agreement because you must accept, I think you will agree with me, that the existing economic situation is a free market system. So far the ANC, although having moved already from the total socialistic and socialism that they propagated last year, they are still not in favour of private economic free enterprise specifically being intertwined and entwined with the South African Communist Party. That I think is going to be one of the main differences round the negotiating table. The question of redressing of wealth and the question of redressing of land are all linked up with the economic system which you are going to follow. Go to the rest of the world and see where this has worked. I have got no problems with equal opportunities. I have got no problems with equal access. I have got no problem with equality before the law. I have got no problem with giving the people who stayed behind extra opportunities and to try and create a new atmosphere, to try and create new chances, to try and create new jobs. But of all those the most important fact is to create new jobs and may the slogan on that score rather be one man one meal.

POM. Just to go back a few paces. Is it your understanding then that the ANC is still more or less committed to an economic structure in which nationalisation would play a big part?

JH. Unfortunately, yes. If you look at the Congress of the ANC which they had recently in July, during the course of July in Durban and you look at the people who were elected to their main body in the Executive, you will find that I think more than 50% are connected, if not totally outspoken, communists.

POM. So would you say that even if the ANC takes a public position that it is in favour of a mixed economy, i.e. a free market economy in which there would also be state intervention, that you would not put much credence in that statement or position if you see that their National Executive is dominated by communists?

JH. There are two factors which must be taken into consideration. The first is the dominance of people who expressed themselves and acknowledged themselves to be communists in their head office. Secondly, you will have noticed that up to now the ANC has never, their head committee, has never unanimously expressed itself against socialism, against communism. In fact if you will remember the thing of, you may have come across it, a few weeks or so ago just after their congress, one of the members, I think it was Mr Ramaphosa, specifically forbade and instructed members not to admit and acknowledge any communist affiliations or commitments. That sounds terribly strange. Therefore, I agree, therefore I would say yes, if the ANC's head committee with it's President is communism, secondly socialist, I would be very, very reluctant to accept that until the point has been proved beyond doubt.

POM. Do you think, in line with what you said, that the government will insist on guarantees about the economic structure being written into the new constitution?

JH. What the government is going to do I don't know, but let me on that point just make my own feeling about that clear. And that is that I don't think the government must be a party to the negotiations.

POM. The National Party?

JH. The National Party as a role player must be there but the government, my personal view is that the government must really be the facilitator. The National Party as such, of which I am a member, I think should, my personal view is that they must insist on a free economy. Question of redress, that's something different.

POM. The violence that broke out in the Transvaal last year?

JH. Last year or last Friday? Are you talking about black violence?

POM. Yes. Increasingly abroad there has been a propensity over the year to describe this in terms of tribal terms, Xhosa versus Zulu. Indeed The Economist of London, a well regarded periodical, a few weeks ago in an editorial said that the violence in the Transvaal between Xhosa and Zulu was in essence no difference from the violence between Serbs and Croatians in Yugoslavia. Would you subscribe to that belief, that is it primarily tribal violence?

JH. Yes I think I would primarily. I wouldn't attribute 100% to tribal violence and ethnicity but I think in basic essence, yes I think it was.

POM. Just following on from that, the ANC of course have always rejected that interpretation and over the year have increasingly said that there was a third force in the hands of the government. And then you've had these allegations of security forces involvement, making allegations that these have been topped off with Inkathagate which showed a link of some description between Inkatha and the government with regard to the passage of money. How do you regard their perception that the government in fact has a double agenda, that the government on the one hand is holding out the olive branch and on the other hand they are trying to undermine them in the townships. They believe this. It's not a question of does it cross their minds. It's more than a perception.

JH. I don't know how you can say it's more than a perception because you see if it's more than a perception then it must be proven. My problem is that although I can appreciate the perception, I don't think it has ever been proved. The fact that the government was proved to have assisted Inkatha by giving money to them doesn't answer or doesn't alter the situation of ethnic violence at all. If the government has given Inkatha R250 000-00 or R5 million or R50 million that may merely have assisted or facilitated the situation for Inkatha to act but the government could never, never ever, facilitate or foster the question of Zulu nationhood or Zulu national-hood. And then you listen to Mr Buthelezi and he has been on record or is on record, I cannot recall exactly where, to have said, and I think it was said at his congress, "A Zulu is a Zulu is a Zulu." The way I understood it, the way it's been interpreted by many people in this political atmosphere, a Zulu is a Zulu is a Zulu! What transpired over the last two years before which, and you and I had a discussion about that before, that was going down, the importance of Mr Buthelezi was going down and the Zulu nationhood was going down. And then Mr Buthelezi and the Zulu leadership sort of recreated and resurrected and brought this question of nationalism, Zulu nationalism to the fore again. Things which the ANC did I think also assisted in that re-emergence of Zulu national-hood. But I don't think that the government could by any means foster or stimulate that.

POM. My question would be: if this perception is now so firmly held by the ANC to the point where they totally distrust the government, they no longer talk about Mr de Klerk as a man of integrity, what can the government do to dissuade them?

JH. I think you've got the wrong perception there. I'll tell you why I say that. If that total distrust of the ANC is in the head committee of the ANC, it's got a political connotation, it is not limited, but it is most active in a political exercise as far as the whole situation is concerned. You will appreciate that this whole thing of negotiations has started already three years ago. The day Mr Mandela was released the negotiations in fact de facto started, not in fact but de facto. Secondly, the negotiations are played by position and this was a damn good point for the ANC. Look the ANC was going down, it was making all the mistakes over the last 18 months. The State President was doing wonderfully. This thing of the Inkatha association with the government was a breakthrough, was a godsend for the ANC. They played it up. Apparently they had a two months' notice. They timed it fantastically to link it to Mr Mandela's trip overseas, linked it to the Inkatha situation, but subsequent to that what have the polls in South Africa, done by Markinor who is one of the most respectable market research institutions in the country, has shown that Mr de Klerk's acceptance in the broad population spectrum has not declined since this. He has in fact gone up in the polls.

POM. Since Inkathagate?

JH. Yes. You see you must differentiate between Mr de Klerk and the National Party and/or the government. Mr de Klerk is something on his own. He has a quite different acceptability than to either government or the National Party. So your question to me, what can the government do? Nothing. What can Mr de Klerk do? I think he's already started doing. You must see Mr de Klerk in perspective. He has handled the Inkatha business the same way he handled Friday night's disturbance at Ventersdorp, which you know about. What was his reaction to Ventersdorp the moment they put him on television? He said regardless of the consequences I will try and handle this so good may come from this and good can come out of it. The same thing Mr de Klerk did with the Inkathagate. I suppose you didn't see, but the reaction to Mr de Klerk's appearance on television on Inkatha was, here's the first man who's made a clean breast of this and here's a man who's acceptable. I think there was a market polling just after that. So my answer to your question is Mr de Klerk may have lost in this but not as much as the perception is politically played. I think he will recoup and he has already made the moves in shifting or his Cabinet in sending two Ministers to other portfolios and bringing in specifically two guys who are totally clean on the two portfolios of Police and Defence.

POM. What has this done to Buthelezi? Has it hurt him? Hurt him badly?

JH. No, the only thing I could possible give you would be second hand or third hand information.

POM. Speculation as a politician.

JH. Oh speculation as a politician. I think that Mr Buthelezi's constituency was not entirely on the same lines as either the President of the United States or even Mr de Klerk as President of South Africa will be evaluated. You must see Mr Buthelezi in a totally different atmosphere and I think that he would not have had so much negative reaction as, for instance, Mr de Klerk would have had or as the National Party would. I think the National Party could possibly have had more negative impact by this than Mr Buthelezi.

POM. Governments and political parties don't give up power, they like to keep it. Yet South Africa is engaged in this exercise where on the one hand many people of the ANC still talk about it being a transfer of power, the National Party talk about the sharing of power. Two questions: one, what is your understanding of what the sharing of power means? Now one interpretation that I've got is that the sharing of power means that the National Party would continue in a post-apartheid government to exercise power at the highest level, i.e. at the executive of government, that it would have a number of portfolios in a government, it would be a partner, albeit a junior partner in an alliance and that power sharing has two interpretations. One would be temporary and two would be permanent. What is your understanding?

JH. Firstly let me say I don't agree with the premises made by you. No, let's say I agree with you that politicians and parties don't give up power very easily. You must bear in mind that there are instances where this was done successfully and let me take you back to Great Britain. The King of Great Britain had all the power. Though being forced on the one hand to give away power he voluntarily gave power away to retain power. With the background that we have I don't think it is as difficult for us as for many other nations, what their power and what their government has to say by virtue of force. Therefore having had that background in a Westminster style of government I think we could possibly have a more natural line to follow than some other countries. Secondly, the way I as a Nationalist see the sharing of power, and that has been exposed by the present State President as well as members of government as well as the Congress as well as speeches made by any of these gentlemen to say that we appreciate that in a country like South Africa, with the population as it is, the whites in this country will definitely not after negotiations be in the majority either in parliament or in the executive or in any branch of Government. We foresee and we will negotiate at all costs to have all the different sections of the population sharing not only in the power of government but also in the executive section of the government. And if we start looking at the report which we brought in last year in the discussion of different political systems, the question of sharing by the different sects must be permanent, must be affirmative and must be accepted by the grand league of the consociation of leadership with all different population groups. Therefore, yes, permanent; yes, in the minority; yes, not having power as we had in the past.

POM. When you submitted your report to the State President, procedurally what happened to the report?

JH. Procedurally what happened to the report? May I just say this about the report. In the report we ourselves say that this report is there for people either in government or around the negotiating table to look at a work of reference. We were not prescriptive. We have tried to give through the experience of all the years. May it be the United States of America, may it be the new constitutional dispensation in Germany, may it be the Swiss, we've tried to point out the pros and the cons. We've tried to point out how it will be effected as we see the local situation. Procedurally that goes to the State President. He and the Cabinet will look at it. Hopefully, I and the members of my committee hope that this will be a work of reference to all parties when they go and sit around the negotiating table to negotiate because in that report they can see how the things which may transpire should they start combining or should they start using the differences. May I just lastly say to you there are basically five systems, two of which have been tried by us and which didn't work. The unity system of Westminster that was tried by us and which didn't work. This partition which we thought would work and it didn't work. What's left is federalism, consocialism and lastly we can have federation. Of the three we will have to go and see which one or mixture of the three remaining that we can use.

POM. Consociational really being power sharing?

JH. Yes.

POM. Two questions, we saw the government as the facilitator of this process. One of the revelations of Inkathagate was the fact that the South African government paid a large sum of money to the DTA in Namibia during an election for which the South African government was supposed to be the overseer.

JH. No. The South African government was never the overseer. The United Nations was the overseer. The South African government was the overseer of Namibia up and until the time of the election but the election was not done by the South African government. It was facilitated by the South African government but monitored by the United Nations.

POM. Do you not think that that being done strengthens the hand of those who want an interim government during the transition process?

JH. Why?

POM. Well they say the government can't be referee and player at the same time.

JH. But that's what I say to you. The government can't take place in the negotiating process. The government must be the facilitator of the negotiation process but the negotiation process must be between the ANC and the National Party, the Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, Inkatha and whoever else may be there.

POM. But even Mr de Klerk talks discussions, about interim arrangements.

JH. Yes, but that's a different story. Mr de Klerk talks about interim measures to be taken by giving other parties input in the executive. Whether you would construe that as an interim government or whether you would construe that as participation, it's over to you but I'm talking about the government must not be a party round the negotiating table as part and parcel of the National Party, yes.

POM. Are there any circumstances under which you can conceive of this government resigning in order to become part of a broadly based "interim government".

JH. The answer is no.

POM. Do you foresee any circumstances in which - ?

JH. Except chaos. Total chaos, otherwise no.

POM. Would I be correct in saying that while the National Party accepts the inevitability of sharing power, it does not accept the inevitability of black majority rule?

JH. We've accepted that. Yes, that's been accepted long ago.

POM. Let me tell you what I mean by that. I mean that would be government by, let us say, the ANC alone but a government in which Cabinet portfolios would more or less be dispersed in proportion to the racial composition of the ANC's executive.

JH. But that's a hell of a big difference you know. If you talk about sharing of power and you talk about handing out Cabinet posts according to proportional representation, that's a different story.

POM. I'm talking about an ANC government who would appoint some white ministers from among their own membership. Joe Slovo as Minister for Industry and

JH. What you are putting to me now is do I say a majority government in the sense of the winner takes all? I say no, I would not like to see that. I would like to see, and that was said in my report last year, proportional government in the first House, when I proposed two Houses, proportional systems in the first House. Consequently it would mean that there you would have a black majority consisting of whatever. But the one thing I know there will be a white minority if I go according to proportional voting systems. Secondly, I proposed that there be a second House and that that second House be chosen or elected on a different system, either regional or cultural or political groups or whatever. But you see it's a question of checks and balances of which your American system is a very good example. If you have your first House and you have that one man one vote universal franchise, you would inevitably have a black majority. What I am trying to say is, if that is the check then let's balance it out in the second House, by a second House which can be elected on various other means. Pre-requisite with that, could then be, whichever way it is composed, that both Houses must agree to legislation or variations, that you can have an increased majority boiling down to a veto in certain instances. We deal extensively with that in our report.

POM. The National Party is a political party. Political parties like to have strategies. What at this point is the strategy of the National Party? How is it going to position itself with regard to the electorate at large?

JH. When you talk about the electorate at large I presume you are talking about 30 million people. The National Party believes that by virtue of the fact that it is trying to deal in a fair, reasonable and equitable way, trying to protect the rights of everybody, of all 30 million.

POM. Is the National Party saying 'We count our numbers and we count the number of whites and Coloured and Indians and whatever and we're going to be in a minority and that's that, so what we should do is - ?

JH. No, we don't believe we're going to be in a minority. We believe in alliances.

POM. Alliances. OK, that's what I'm getting at. Has the National Party developed a strategy where it could see itself in alliance with other either demographic or ethnic or cultural groups, whatever you wish to call them, in which their coalition could command a majority?

JH. The answer is definitely yes. Whether it be, and at this stage I can't foresee it because there are still big differences between the National Party, for instance their economic policy, between the National Party and the ANC, but I assume in politics stranger things happen than that so I wouldn't put it impossible. But let's just for the moment look at the practical side. The National Party with various other groups, say for instance, you've mentioned Inkatha, Inkatha is ethnically the biggest single nation or group. When you go into the analysis of voting possibilities of the first election please bear in mind that first election, not the second or following, the first election, the figures become very, very interesting because according to figures if you start adding up National Party, Coloureds, Indians, Zulus and you take the other nationalities which are not totally committed to ANC regardless of the fact that the ANC has big across the board support, they haven't got these people 100% behind them. Then you can start talking about alliances and you can start talking about various combinations and the National Party believes that by virtue of those things it can just as well call itself a possible majority party as the ANC claims to be.

POM. I suppose the next question would be then, is the National Party in a sense in a very good position strategically because on the one hand it can say to the ANC: If you want to govern effectively we have to have a part in government because the civil service, the total bureaucracy is white. If they don't co-operate with you it will make no difference whether you are the majority or not if the country doesn't function. So, rationally, there would be strong pressure on the ANC to think that's correct. On the other hand if you said you can cobble together a coalition of other parties, you could in fact form a majority so you've got two ways to go either of which look good.

JH. No, I don't think the ANC, should they take power, would have any difficulty with the bureaucracy because the man who pays the piper calls the tune. So if the ANC has to pay the salaries at the end of the month I think the bureaucracy will fall in line. There are not only salaries but things like pensions and stuff the bureaucracy has over the years built up and if a man doesn't want to carry out an order or execute the legitimate instructions given by the government of the day, he can not only lose his salary but lose all the pensions and stuff that he's built up over the years. I don't think you will find anywhere, I'm just thinking about Africa now for the moment, where the bureaucracy tried it. You may have little pockets here and there and all that but I don't think that's going to be a big factor. On the other hand, yes, the question of, or the necessity to form alliances and the necessity, even for the ANC, to form alliances, to become a majority party I think it's essential. The moment I say to you that I believe the National Party by virtue of alliances could become a majority party, I automatically mean that the ANC by not forming alliances may not be a majority party. But apart from all this, whether it's the ANC or whether it be National Party or whoever, by virtue of the special circumstances in this country, the power to be will have to form alliances unless the same thing is going to happen that happened in some places in Africa and I'm referring now for instance to Nigeria with the Ibos. You could have a similar situation in Natal where a power base of 7 million people of Zulus is placed, where the ANC is definitely not in the majority. And therefore I think successful government will require the government of the future to form alliances whoever they may be.

POM. So that even if the ANC got 60% of the vote in order to govern they would have to form a government which would share power with other parties?

JH. First election or post first election, the answer is definitely yes.

POM. That's the first election?

JH. Yes. I said post first election, with the formation of the first government, the answer is yes.

POM. And power sharing would be a permanent part of the first government?

JH. I say power sharing is permanent from my point of view.

POM. OK. I've got it. Definitely for the first government and then after that it's more problematic.

JH. If they can form a government and they can entrench themselves as government it can have all sorts of possibilities. Take the National Party. We came into power in 1948 with a majority of three and there was quite a lot of interest in situations where they had to go and fetch chaps from the hospital, and in the second election we had some more. We were progressing. We were entrenching ourselves as a government. Whoever comes in as the government post first election, I think if governing wisely, would entrench themselves. And therefore, that is about where my powers to look into the future will stop.

POM. The right wing, the Conservative Party, a year ago there was a lot of speculation as to how if there was a whites-only election again the Conservative Party might gain more than 50% of the white vote. There's much less talk of that today. Until this weekend, the right wing, I don't think it has been mentioned in any conversation I've had with people. Is the CP floundering in the waters or still a potent threat?

JH. Very potent. Very potent. Very dangerous but nevertheless very, very potent. Look at Ventersdorp, it was so unnecessary, it was so un-South African, it was so degrading, but nevertheless you must to a certain extent see the fears of people being manifested in that type of action. Secondly, you must accept the fact that the CP and its associates like the AWB and other right wing factions are feeding the whites, especially up in the north and especially up in the country, with fear. They are feeding the people with popular slogans. They are feeding the people with the belief that 'Let's reverse to square one', which I think is impractical and impossible. But don't make a mistake, the National Party came into power in 1948 with a political gimmick, or a platform gimmick, of apartheid which was popular. And therefore we made the mistake of institutionalising it, of upgrading it to a principle. We have realised the absolute foolishness of our political doings and the CP is pre-1948 and they think we can go back to pre-1948. I think they're impractical but definitely potent.

POM. Two last questions. One is over, the last year from abroad the ANC appeared to be following a very zigzag course in laying demands and setting deadlines and then modifying demands or letting the deadlines run by. It appeared to be uncertain, confused and the government always seeming to be in control of the initiative. Why do you think that was so.

JH. Oh very simple, because the ANC were radicals, ANC was a revolutionary force. They never had the experience of government, they never had the experience of freedom, they never had the experience of voluntary government, they never had the experience of democracy. The ANC, and let's be quite honest about it, the ANC was entirely a radical group of, at the best, freedom fighters with no, forget about experience, but with no interest in democratic government and that is one of the big things that they now unfortunately will have to learn hopefully as soon as possible, because up to the congress in July their whole infrastructure was bad, was in chaos, they didn't answer faxes, they didn't return telephone calls, they didn't attend meetings. Mr Mandela is on record having come over an hour and half late for his own doctorate at the University of Cape Town, saying, "Sorry chaps, this is African time." That gives you an example of the number one man, the way he looks at discipline. Hopefully, and I believe it is so, that with the new infrastructure and some of the new chaps, specifically Ramaphosa, there's been some change for the better. And I hope to God they will improve their infrastructure, their political experience, because after all they are going to be part and parcel in whichever way in the future.

POM. Since 1967 in Africa there has only been one case, in Cape Verde, where power actually passed from one elected government to another elected government. Why do you think South Africa may be different?

JH. I think South Africa is different because South Africa compared to the rest of the old colonies is a different story. South Africa has first of all got a very good infrastructure of government. Secondly I think by virtue of the fact that South Africa and the groups among the blacks who will be part and parcel of the future South African government, have had more experience in government than the rest of the groups who took control and power in the old colonies of Africa. With that experience behind them I think the chances are, and also let me add with the experience of Africa in that I don't think there are many successful examples, I think the practicalities will most probably be more discernible to blacks and whites in this country that they've got to support each other and support the basic. Look there are international factors which come to the fore too. The whole of Africa, during the period in which power changed from one to the other, was done in a totally different international situation than it is now. You had the big Mother Russia with communist influence supporting, influencing and financing most of these happenings, which you haven't got any more. So all of a sudden South Africa is most probably the only place left where communism is still popular, where communism is still thought to be possible. And I think here now, let us for a moment go to the old liberal portion of the country are now at the moment some of the most vicious opposition to the ANC's economic and communistic power. And that's also a difference to what you had in Africa so there are many factors which make the situation in South Africa different to the rest of the African continent.

POM. Do you think that the whites of the community owe blacks an apology, that they should apologise for apartheid, say it was wrong?

JH. I think that the government of the day has in fact, from the State President down to me, admitted and said publicly the system was wrong using several definitions to say that 'a platform gimmick' was institutionalised, was made a principle, apartheid was wrong therefore we've changed our views, we've moved away from apartheid. Apartheid is dead. When you asked me the question, and I think you asked it in a particular vein, shall I get up on a platform and say 'I apologise to everyone'?

POM. It would be the community as a whole saying 'We did you wrong'.

JH. You will never get communities as a whole. You will get people in a community.

POM. Do you think there's any kind of awareness among the majority of white people that apartheid was wrong, that they in fact perpetrated it.

JH. The answer is yes. The answer is yes. I think the three biggest mistakes the National Party made were that in 1948 when we came to power we stopped the massive immigration of whites that the Smuts government had on the cards. Some people will tell you that if that was not stopped we could have been over 15 million whites here. It could have been a tremendous development here.

POM. When you came to power in 1948 you didn't stop the immigration?

JH. We did. Smuts and his government, General Smuts had a massive, but massive immigration from Europe.

POM. That's coming in?

JH. That's right. And we stopped it. And people went to Australia and they went to New Zealand and they went to Canada. Scientists will tell you if we didn't stop that we most probably could have been over 15 million whites. You see what a tremendous difference that could have made to the development of this country? The second question was when Dr Verwoerd came along and said 'No white capital in black homelands', I think that was wrong. And thirdly, from the moment that this country was colonised we never taught the locals to participate in government with the result that we were paternalistic by giving bread but never responsibility. We should have.

POM. Thank you.

JH. Nice seeing you.

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. Return to theThis resource is hosted by the site.