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This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.

09 Nov 1993: Dhlomo, Oscar

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POM. You know just as negotiations are coming to a close, there have been a series of polls over the last couple of weeks which show that the National Party is virtually disintegrating, 10% or 11%, and that the Freedom Alliance might even out-poll the National Party if they did contest elections as a block. None of the other parties are in sight of the ANC and it's quite conceivable that the ANC could get two thirds of the Cabinet positions in government and in effect be able to write their own ticket. What do you think is happening?

OD. Well first I think that we must remember that this is what we call a liberation election and the ANC carries the image of the premier liberation movement that has worked more than others to bring us to where we are. That is the perception that is dominating the mentality of the oppressed black majority. So I would not be surprised if the ANC won the election with quite a substantial majority. Whether they will get a two thirds majority that is the debate that is still going on now. It's possible they might do that. The National Party on the other hand carries the image, in spite of its changes, for the majority of the people it still carries the image of the oppressor who somehow has seen the light and is now facilitating the process of transition. So in spite of President de Klerk and in spite of the reformist policies that the National Party has been following since three years ago, there is still that perception.

POM. You were talking about the National Party still being seen as a party that was the oppressor.

OD. OK. I think I was saying despite President de Klerk, despite the reformist policies that the National Party has followed since three years ago people's memories are very long. It won't be possible for the National Party to be totally transformed to such an extent that it would pose a serious challenge to the ANC.

POM. But it seems to have lost support among its own constituency as well.

OD. Yes. The reason for that I think is that up to now there has been no clarity on the direction of the negotiation process. There is, therefore, a lot of uncertainty amongst the people who also support the National Party. We had a negotiation process that was very poorly organised when it came to transparency. In fact the crucial issue was to be as secretive as possible during the negotiation process. You will remember that CODESA was even more secretive, the press couldn't report on what was happening there, everything was behind the scenes. The negotiating forum is much better but still it is not as open and transparent as one would have wished it to be. Then the outcome of that is that the bulk of the population has been left behind. All they read in the newspapers is that there was a breakthrough, they don't know what the extent of that breakthrough was and in what direction it's going. Now where there is of course uncertainty then there is a reluctance to support whoever is responsible for that uncertainty. There is a possibility that perhaps after the weekend, once the negotiation process is concluded, once the constitution is publicised, once the representatives of parties go around the country explaining and selling the constitution to their constituents, the National Party's showing might improve because then people will begin to know that the party, if they support it, is not selling out or doing whatever.

. I was saying that there is a possibility that the National Party, like all the other parties, once it goes out to its constituents to explain the dynamics of the process, the constitution and the nature of the transition process, it might pick up some votes but still I don't expect that those votes will by any means begin to challenge the overall support enjoyed by the ANC at the moment. Now the Freedom Alliance, I believe that the Freedom Alliance is thriving on that kind of uncertainty because the driving force of the Alliance's strategy seems to be playing and exploiting the uncertainty and the fears of the people. For instance, they would tell you that there is no power sharing deal that is in the offing, what has happened is that the National Party has capitulated and there will be overnight black majority rule. The black components of the Freedom Alliance like the IFP will tell you that the ANC and the National Party have collaborated to the detriment of other parties, they are not democratic, they are driving the process on their own, they don't want federation, they want a centralised communist type state and all those stories are not challengeable in a situation where the people don't know what the constitution that has been discussed for two years now says about these issues, how it proposes to divide the powers, how the government of national unity for five years is going to work. All those issues are not really known to the majority of the people. Once again I will assume that when these issues are brought on to the table and thoroughly explained most of those people who feel that perhaps the Freedom Alliance is their refuge because of their uncertainty and the insecurity, might have to think otherwise.

. Thirdly, I don't see how the Freedom Alliance can contest an election as one power bloc. They are horribly divided amongst themselves in terms of ideology. There are factions in the Freedom Alliance that definitely want an apartheid type boere staat. There are factions that want a confederation where they will retain their powers that were devolved to them by the apartheid government and here I am referring to the independent homelands. Then there is the IFP which seems to be floating between federalism and confederalism and if they were to face the electorate as a unit I think they would have a very, very tough time trying to reconcile all these differing ideologies and I honestly think they would discredit themselves. So if the components of the Freedom Alliance participated in the coming election I would expect that they would do so as individual parties, IFP, CP and the two homelands, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei.

POM. Again, polls show recently that a majority of both blacks and whites believe that there will be some kind of war waged by white right wing extremists after an election and Buthelezi on occasion has said that the chances of a civil war are fifty/fifty. In what direction do you think things are moving?

OD. Personally I think the chances of a civil war are ten/ninety, 90% no civil war, 10% at the most perhaps a civil war. I do expect that if the Freedom Alliance or the white right wing racists choose to remain outside the election they will attempt to disrupt the election but I don't expect them to succeed, firstly because they don't control any chunk of territory in South Africa single-handedly and they are not properly armed to sustain what you would call a civil war like Jonas Savimbi has done in Angola. They would start with a huge disadvantage in that the entire, not only public opinion in South Africa, but the international public opinion would be against them as well unlike in Savimbi's case who after posing as a defender of democracy did have support from the West, especially America, even to the extent of getting substantial arms from there, and therefore Savimbi was able to control some territory. I don't see the Freedom Alliance or any element within the Freedom Alliance ever managing to wage a civil war to an extent where they would in fact control some territory. I suspect also that the future government of national unity, even the TEC before the government of national unity, will not be as sympathetic and cajoling towards the right wing and all the other spoilers as the National Party has been. I think they will be a bit tougher to say the least than the present government. So I don't really see that you will have a civil war. I expect you will have some areas in the country where it would be difficult to conduct a free and fair election but I don't expect to see that in an entire region, not even in this region where Inkatha has substantial support. I don't think Inkatha has the capacity to say there is no election in Natal/KwaZulu, we have broken everything, because it doesn't enjoy predominance in the entire region.

POM. Has it the ability to disrupt the process?

OD. No I don't see that it has the ability to disrupt the process. I would say it tried to do that when it walked out. The process went on. Not only did it go on, it's partners in the then Xhosa state negotiated until a few weeks ago when the IFP pressurised them to move out and even today at the eleventh hour as the Freedom Alliance resists accepting the present constitution nothing has stopped at the World Trade Centre, agreements are being sealed and tied up and everybody is saying the deadline, which is Friday, stands.

POM. Do you think that you can have a durable and lasting peace if Buthelezi isn't in some way satisfied?

OD. I think it would depend on how the cause for his dissatisfaction is interpreted. If it means that Buthelezi is not satisfied because he turned his back on whatever attempts by the other parties to accommodate him, to compromise, to appease him, then of course the process would go on without him and he would have no sympathy. At the moment the perception seems to be that whilst the negotiators have attempted to accommodate him he has not responded in a similar fashion, he has tended to be too rigid and unprepared to negotiate. Besides he appears not to have taken the process seriously. Buthelezi is the only leader who has not set his foot at the negotiation forum since it started two years ago even when it was still CODESA up to now. Right now he is overseas with two of his very senior negotiators, his key negotiators, when attempts are being made to accommodate the Freedom Alliance and it is his party together with the others in the Freedom Alliance who in fact requested that the conclusion of the negotiations should be postponed for a week, but he is not there. So his attitude would seem to imply that really his preoccupation may not be with the constitution itself, his preoccupation may be with trying to demonstrate that without his co-operation nothing is going to happen but so far it hasn't worked that way. The process has gone on without his co-operation.

POM. What does he want?

OD. I don't know what he wants because nowadays his public statements tend to be inconsistent and you cannot isolate what you would call his bottom line. He also seems to reject the entire package, both process and product and he maintains that the process should have been structured otherwise. Indeed he has even tried to suggest that the negotiation process should start right from scratch, of course unsuccessfully. My personal view is that Buthelezi is not so much concerned with the constitution as he is with the fact that he has not played a leading role in the genesis of the whole negotiation process. I think his political ego was mortally wounded when his initial suggestion of a troika consisting of himself, Mandela and de Klerk was rejected by the ANC and then later the National Party. Since then he doesn't appear to have taken the process seriously. He feels the National Party and the ANC have marginalised him. He is not regarded as a crucial player in the process. Then of course there was the Record of Understanding between the ANC and the National Party which seemed to endorse his fears and now he is busy with a campaign which seeks to prove that he is powerful enough to derail the process.

POM. Let's assume that he stays out of the process, that his party does not contest the elections or if they do contest them they contest them on the basis that they are totally opposed to what's in the package. Let's say a government is elected and it's a government of national unity and Buthelezi is still outside, what happens then? Is there any possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence, an attempt to secede? What are his options?

OD. Well honestly I don't see that he has any options if he decided not to participate in the election. For one thing he would find it difficult to convince his own colleagues in Inkatha that it is to the good of the party not to participate in the election. At the moment there is quite an uproar within the leadership of Inkatha, they are deadly opposed to any suggestion that they will not participate in the election. In fact they are busy preparing for the elections. At the conference over the weekend in Johannesburg we heard, I mean the Inkatha Freedom Party and perhaps the PAC, those are the two that had really powered delegations, and so the first hurdle he will have to cross is to convince his own party that they shouldn't participate in the election. I don't know that he'll get that one through without any repercussions. Secondly, he would have to find a way of convincing his followers that non-participation is not suicidal. Up to now it is clearly suicidal because it means that Inkatha would deny itself an opportunity to even fight an election in a region like Natal where they stand a reasonable chance of winning votes so they would just lose Natal sort of by default. Thirdly, once that happens of course he will not have the KwaZulu government power base because all that is going to disappear with the new constitution, self-governing territories with governmental structures. civil services and a budget, that's going to go. So he will not have the means.

POM. Do you think that Pretoria, the new government will pull the financial strings?

OD. Well they won't even need to pull any strings. The life span of the self-governing territories is limited to when the new government of national unity starts functioning. Then you will not have the KwaZulu government and Natal, it will be one region and you will have a regional government of KwaZulu/Natal in which there wouldn't be an Inkatha member because they would not have participated in the election. So this region would be governed by a party, say, like the ANC which is the strongest challenger at the moment in Natal. I don't think Buthelezi has an option. If he stayed out the only option I see for him is resigning from politics.

POM. I also thought that, although I have been struck every time I interview him at the number of times he uses the word 'insult', "I have been insulted", it crops up over and over again. When you talk about his political ego do you think perhaps he knows in the back of his mind that in a national election that Inkatha might pull no more than 5% or 6% of the vote, be a really marginal party in the new scheme of things and that that would be the ultimate humiliation?

OD. Yes I think he knows that Inkatha will not do well in an election nationally. I suppose he would still expect that 5% is a bit low, maybe it will be more than that, but I think there is no doubt that he realises he will not make it in an election. That is why my theory is, knowing him as I do and he being such a proud person, he might find it expedient in order to avoid what he would regard as humiliation, he might find it expedient just to bow out before the holding of the elections and be able to say, "The reason why I am bowing out is that my inputs were ignored, I am dissatisfied with the process we have gone through. I don't want a TEC, I don't want an election, I don't want a constitution making body and therefore I cannot participate in this dispensation. I therefore am resigning." I find that scenario becoming more and more real and in fact as the only option open to him if he insists that his party is not going to fight the election.

POM. He has played what one might call the Zulu card, that is he has brought the King in. What has always struck me about the King is that whereas people have said the King is a mere puppet in Buthelezi's hands, I find the King has very strong views himself that mirror to a very considerable extent, sometimes even to an excessive extent, what Buthelezi stands for or wants, that he sees this election as an attempt for there to be leading the way to an ANC state that will smash the Zulu nation. He speaks very passionately about that.

OD. It's difficult to be able to make an assessment of the King's independent views on these matters. It's not going to be possible whilst the KwaZulu government is there and whilst the King in fact derives his livelihood from that government. It would be much better if the King were expressing those views outside the context of the KwaZulu government because as you say now those are the views that he would perhaps read from his public speeches which are normally prepared by the Department of the Chief Minister of KwaZulu. So it's really difficult to be able to say what the King's own independent views would be on those issues. I tend to suspect that left to himself the King would wish at least to maintain harmonious relations between himself and all the existing black parties, ANC, IFP, PAC, AZAPO and so on.

POM. Do you think if the ANC alliance bends over backwards, there's one more step to make the governance system more federal, that would bring Buthelezi into the process? Do you think that the people like Harry Gwala will accept that or will they say too much blood has flowed for us ultimately to capitulate, as they would see it, to Buthelezi's demands?

OD. I am no longer sure that Buthelezi's problems are really with the constitution and I can no longer guarantee that if further concessions were made he would come on board. After all what concessions is one talking about? Because if you look at the constitution that he produced for this region which constitution he has not deviated from, it is not a federal constitution, it is a confederal constitution. I tend to suspect that even if a lot of that were granted to him he would still not come on board. The other problem of course is that conventional wisdom seems to say that concessions to regions will be concessions to Buthelezi in Natal. That is not a decided issue either. You might find that you would make concessions to the regions including Natal and it might be the ANC not the IFP that will end up being the regional government of Natal because those parties are running very much almost neck and neck at the moment in Natal.

POM. Do you see the violence ending, the violence both here in Natal/KwaZulu and also on the Reef? Do you see it ending before the elections or do you think we are going to see a lot more violence before the elections and also violence after the elections?

OD. I think that there will perhaps be a reduction in the level of violence both before and after. I think that is possible. I don't see the violence ending completely though. There will be sporadic violence here and there but I don't expect it to reach levels higher than perhaps now. No.

POM. When you look at the negotiating process over the last two years, since CODESA began first, what would you say were the critical turning points?

OD. Well I think the first turning point was the breakdown in negotiations which led to the disappearance of the first phase which was called CODESA, that was the first landmark. The second one was the Record of Understanding between the ANC and the government which heralded the beginning the second phase of the negotiations, and the establishment of some sort of constitutional common ground between the ANC and the government as to how the process would run. The third one I would say was the fixing of the date of the election which led to the walkout by the IFP and the CP as well as the KwaZulu government at that stage. Then the fourth one was of course the IFP's success to pressurise those that remained inside the process to move out as well, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and that leading to the establishment of the Freedom Alliance and the convention of COSAG into that alliance. The fifth one will be if by Friday they are able to tie up the whole process and the final one will be once parliament passes these bills and ratifies the constitution.

POM. Does the interim constitution cover both the period between now and the election date?

OD. That's right.

POM. So it will only come into effect after the election?

OD. No, no. The interim constitution strictly speaking is supposed to function for five to six months. It is meant to order the process leading to the election, levelling the playing field as they say, and preparing for the elections, ensuring that there is even-handedness with reference to the security forces, the media and so on and so on, that there is an Electoral Commission and they will attempt to achieve that through the Transitional Executive Council functioning through sub-committees, security sub-committee, elections, finance, media and law and order. So those are the portfolios which the negotiators in their wisdom felt were crucial for the conduct of free and fair elections and which, therefore, could not be left solely to the control of the government, rather needed to be joint control. Now the election itself is expected to deliver a group of people who will perform a dual function, govern the country as well as write a constitution. The latest, after the last bosperaad between the ANC and the National Party, is now that constitution writing which all along we had thought would take a year at the most, need not be rushed, it could go on perhaps for the next five years and that this constitution writing body which will be elected in April will therefore also become the government of national unity which would be under the control of the majority party plus a number of other parties that reach a certain threshold in the elections. So in effect we are now in for a five-year transition period.

POM. It struck me that during CODESA the government and the ANC were in a far more adversarial role to each other. The government was trying to build an alliance with the IFP, with all the other parties, with the homeland parties, and then with the Record of Understanding it seems their entire strategy was turned on its head, that they in fact said the ANC and us are the major players and we will push the process through together. What do you think accounted for their turn around?

OD. I would suspect two things. First, the skipper of the National Party's negotiation ship up to and including the failure of CODESA was somebody else, it was Dr Gerrit Viljoen who then retired. Up to that point the National Party strategy was indeed that the ANC/COSATU/SACP alliance were the enemies and that all the homelands, both self-governing and independent, plus some tricameral parliament parties, Labour Party and what have you, were the National Party allies. In fact that is the kind of grouping they had attempted to create even within CODESA.

. Now Viljoen was succeeded by Roelf Meyer who I think put his own stamp on the process and saw that the process would not go on at all without the ANC and the National Party at least developing a working relationship, that working relationship has of course led to quite an understanding on basic sensitive constitutional issues. That's why the process has gone on. That's one point, the change of negotiation strategy.

. But the other point is the National Party reached a stage, there had always been a debate within the senior ranks of the National Party, a debate about the advisability of going with Inkatha instead of the ANC, one school of thought arguing that going with Inkatha would be suicidal, politically, for the National Party. Inkatha, they argued, had a lot of political baggage. It was accused of being involved in violence. The surveys even at that stage did not show that Inkatha would be able to carry majority black support and therefore it was bad news to go with Inkatha. The other one was, no, Inkatha has been a loyal ally all these years. Our policies are compatible. They were anti-sanctions, they are free market people, they don't want violence, they don't want communism, they are our natural allies and we can't now dump them.

. There is now no doubt that the former viewpoint has prevailed which says Inkatha cannot be a viable alliance partner and the Record of Understanding, of course, has also ensured that that is no longer doubted and many other developments, even the general perception that the two people driving the process are Mandela and de Klerk, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee as well as President Clinton has also assisted that perception to be firmly entrenched.

POM. When you look at how the process unfolded from CODESA right down through today what do you think have been the major concessions made by government and the major concessions or compromises made by the ANC?

OD. Let me see. Well the very first concession of course was that initially when CODESA started under Viljoen the government was not prepared to share any governmental responsibility until there was an election for the new government. They didn't want that at all and the ANC insisted that there must be a transitional government. Ultimately the government turned round, in fact at the bosperaad which led to the Record of Understanding, and accepted that there needed to be a transitional authority but they then safeguarded themselves and said, "Look you can't have a Transitional Executive Council which has no constitution so let's start now and draw up a constitution for this TEC", and the ANC compromised on that as well.

. Then I think the other concession was that the government was saying that there is not going to be any Constituent Assembly, that's what the ANC called it at the time, elected that was going to draw up a constitution. The constitution will be drawn up by the very same unelected people who are negotiating at the World Trade Centre. The ANC insisted. Ultimately the government accepted that there would be that kind of Constituent Assembly but decided to call it a constitution making body, CMB. Occasionally they tied in their own conditions to it. First that this constitution making body, although elected, was not going to be given a blank cheque to write a constitution, there needed to be basic constitutional principles agreed upon now which would then bind the constitution making body in writing the constitution. The ANC didn't like that but they have now accepted that. Perhaps lastly then the government turned around and said, "Well in the new government after the elections what we are looking for is a rotating presidency consisting of three people whose parties would have done well in the elections and there will be no single President, let alone an executive one." The ANC rejected that. Those are the days of Buthelezi's troika which de Klerk initially bought. The ANC said, "No you can't do that, you can't enforce through the constitution that kind of coalition. It will have to be up to the majority party if it wants to be magnanimous and invite the others that's it but you can't have something like that in the constitution." The government has again climbed down on that one but with some concession from the ANC which now says certainly the leader of the majority party will be the President with executive powers but there will be two Vice Presidents coming from parties, the next biggest and the third biggest party, and the President will be duty bound to consult with these people on certain policy issues.

. On the ANC side the ANC, as you know, started saying that there will be no regional governments in the new situation because that would be entrenching apartheid or homelands and they said federation itself was a way of entrenching apartheid and you just couldn't argue with them even if you try and say, "No, we are talking about regions that are geographically defined not ethnically defined"' "No, no, no that's the government's attempt to slip in the homelands policy." Then they came around and said, "Yes there will be regional governments. Then these governments would have strong and effective powers." They left it at that. The National Party and all the pro-federalists were not impressed. They asked what guarantee was there that those powers would remain there. The ANC resisted the principle that the powers devolved to regions should in effect be defined and entrenched in the constitution and they resisted that for some time. Once again there was pressure from the National Party and the DP and perhaps the Freedom Alliance in their absence from the process. Then they considered the principle of entrenching powers to all the regions. More pressure was applied on them to say that, yes, these powers though are very, very minimal, they are meaningless in fact. They are less than the powers of the present provinces. After the last bosperaad the ANC has added more of these powers and also for the first time has added taxation powers for regions. The National Party is now satisfied, so is the DP. The Freedom Alliance remains dissatisfied of course.

. The other concession from the ANC relates to the future civil service. When they started the negotiations they were saying that there will have to be a totally brand new civil service overnight and the whole way we train the civil service will come to an end. They have now changed, again after the last bosperaad, to say that they will secure the benefits, pensions and so on of the existing civil servants. That didn't go down well with one of their alliance partners, COSATU, but it appears they have ignored COSATU and instead tried to extract a benefit for themselves from this argument about civil servants which benefit now implies that even members of uMkhonto weSizwe will be able possibly to qualify for pensions. So there has been that give and take. I'm trying to think of any other one. I would say those are the major ones.

POM. Do you think that that little exchange between the ANC and COSATU is a kind of harbinger about the way that relationship might move in the future when the ANC is in government and COSATU is still outside as a trade union movement?

OD. Yes I think there will be a rough ride all the time between the ANC once it becomes a government and COSATU because although COSATU has contributed to the election list of the ANC those people who will be going into parliament will go under the ANC ticket and I will doubt that they will find enough space to remain advocates of COSATU's cause within the ANC because their first loyalty will now be to the party that brought them to parliament and in the caucus of the party they will be talking as ANC and where there is a clash between the aspirations of COSATU and the ANC I am sure they will have no choice but to go with the ANC.

POM. Lastly, and thanks for the time again, you have been very generous with your time. Almost lastly, in March of 1992 de Klerk won this smashing victory in the referendum and the right appeared to be in rubble, demoralised and discredited with no leadership and yet here a year and a half later it's back as a more potent force than ever and de Klerk who appeared to be the decisive, authoritative leader is increasingly perceived to be weak and more ineffectual as time goes on. What do you think has happened to turn things around?

OD. I think what turned things around was the referendum was about a question and the question was, "Do you support the negotiation process as perceived by President de Klerk?" - something like that, and the answer was of course "Yes" because it was clear at that stage that the country wouldn't move forward, it would continue to sink unless there was a new negotiated constitutional settlement. People didn't tell de Klerk how they should negotiate and what type of settlement would have to come out. So the right wingers continued to maintain that de Klerk's settlement is a sell out to blacks, it has led to the upsurge of violence which is not agreed but perceptually you might be in line to believe that the government was no longer able to govern, which is true. Since the start of the negotiating process it is no longer possible for the present government to act unilaterally on anything, it needs to consult. Some government departments have seen the writing on the wall and they do very, very well, like Derek Keys the Finance Minister. Others still try and bulldoze, the people object, there is mass action then the government backs down like with the petrol issue and the rent issue. Now this creates a very negative image, it sounds a very wrong thing now. Then of course the right wing says, "You see we told you this man is no longer in control. The mobs are there and having control."

. Now de Klerk appeared like someone whose hands were tied at his back because when the right wing was saying he is selling out, the settlement is a sell out, he was not in a position to say, "No, no, it is not a sell out. There you are, here is the constitution." There was no constitution, he was still trying to negotiate. all he could say was to keep on reassuring the people, that, "Look, what will come out will safeguard the interests of my party and supporters don't have to be worried", and that's all he could say. So as a result of that the message that he deceived the voters in the referendum or that he had a hidden agenda, he wanted to capitulate and give power over to the ANC, still lingers on. It is going to be crucial for him to convince these supporters that the constitution that has been worked out is in fact not a sell out and I think that is why he set great store by the fact that the government of national unity is going to go on for five years. That's quite an achievement for him because it will certainly reassure his people that we are not talking about a 24-hour transformation here, it's going to be a period of five years during which period some sort of natural trust will begin to develop and the economy won't be harmed because there will be de Klerk and so on and so on.

. So that is why I think at the moment his fortune is down there. I suspect that is why he is now trying to convince the ANC that this constitution must be subjected to another referendum in order to legitimate it in view of the fact that the Freedom Alliance is not part of it. I think he expects that there will be an overwhelming victory again and the people who will take the honours are himself and Mandela together and just a few months before the election de Klerk and Mandela, National Party, ANC will be seen together on public platforms punting the same message and that will give him a bit of a boost, a well deserved one before the election. But it looks like the ANC is seeing through that. They are saying they must look for another method legitimating the constitution, not a referendum.

POM. Finally, one result in one of the polls that came out this weekend which asked whether it was legitimate to use violence to achieve certain political ends, 4% of Xhosas said it was and 18% of Zulus said it was which ran almost counter intuitive. What explanation would you attach to that?

OD. Well I was there when this survey was presented. I just couldn't find an explanation for that. I would have expected, unfortunately they were talking about ethnic groups not party loyalties, because if it were party loyalties I would have expected that Inkatha people would say no it's not acceptable because throughout the struggle they have been anti armed struggle. But I just can't explain why they would say so.


OD. OK. Keep well. Where will you be most of the time? Jo'burg?

POM. Yes. I'm going from here to Cape Town then be there maybe for the opening of the parliament or the parliamentary session, then go back to Jo'burg and stay there and then go round the country again.

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