This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
Chapter Eight: Destabilising the Opposition in 1994
The Viewpoint of the Inkatha Freedom Party
Introduction
In the perspective of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies continued their drive for political hegemony in 1994. Intent on securing a strongly centralised state, the alliance offered only token compromises regarding the powers to be accorded provinces in the transitional constitution. It proposed some changes in terminology-and hailed these as significant concessions-but nevertheless ensured that the central government would retain the capacity to override all provincial legislation and to keep a tight hold on provincial purse-strings. Shortly after the election held on 26-28 April, the new government-in which the alliance held some 62% of seats-assumed control of all provincial powers and functions, saying that provinces would have to demonstrate their capacity to execute these before they could be restored.
As the election came closer, so the ANC alliance increased the momentum of its drive to destabilise its opponents. It sought, in particular, to overthrow the administrations of the three homelands which mounted opposition to it and presented voters with an alternative choice. These were Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu.
To achieve this goal, the ANC alliance took full advantage of the powers conferred on the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), in which it commanded an overall majority. Though the ostensible purpose of the TEC was to level the playing fields prior to the election-by preventing unilateral government action in key policy areas such as policing and finance-the TEC in fact began to play a very different role. Echoing the ANC alliance in this regard, it took the view that freedom of political activity was being denied in Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu. Ignoring the many other threats to free political activity-including threats by the Transkei administration to prevent the National Party (NP) canvassing for support within its territory-the TEC proceeded to act against the three homelands which presented a challenge to the ANC alliance.
Loan payments due to Bophuthatswana were stopped, and it was threatened that all revenue from Pretoria would be withheld. Civil servants, including police and army officers, were told that their jobs and pensions were at risk. Civil servants in Bophuthatswana were encouraged to strike, and the police and army to turn against Chief Lucas Mangope, the president of the territory. Radical students at the University of Bophuthatswana-buttressed by youths bused in from other parts of the country-were encouraged to riot. Unrest, accompanied by burning and looting, broke out in Bophuthatswana. Police and army officers joined the rioters, and turned their guns on right wing members coming to the aid of Chief Mangope. The South African Defence Force (SADF) was sent in to restore calm, and remained to oversee the toppling of Chief Mangope. Based on the contention that Chief Mangope had lost all support and was no longer able to govern, the TEC-acting without lawful authority, as its jurisdiction did not extend to Bophuthatswana-removed Chief Mangope from office and appointed two administrators in his place, to administer the territory until 27 April. One of these, Mr Job Mokgoro, had been the chairman of the ANC's Mafikeng branch.
In the Ciskei similar pressures for the ouster of the territory's military ruler, Brigadier Joshua 'Oupa' Gqozo, began to intensify. The Ciskei administration read the writing on the wall, and Brig Gqozo resigned from office. Two administrators were appointed by the TEC to administer the territory until the election had been held. One of the advisers appointed to assist the administrators was the general secretary of a trade union aligned to the ANC.
That left KwaZulu. From early on in the year, allegations that free political activity was being denied the ANC alliance in the territory were constantly reiterated. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, president of the IFP and chief minister of KwaZulu, was depicted continually as a 'spoiler' and a 'wrecker' because he refused to accept the cosmetic changes made to the transitional constitution and continued to press for a federal dispensation for the country. As violence intensified in Natal, this too was blamed on Chief Buthelezi and the IFP. Against the advice of senior police officers in the region, the state president, Mr F W de Klerk-at TEC behest-imposed a state of emergency in KwaZulu and Natal on 31 March. Convoys of troops in armoured vehicles, armed with 90mm cannons, were sent into the region. Some KwaZulu civil servants went on strike, while others remained loyal to the territory's administration. The ANC alliance called constantly for Chief Buthelezi to be removed from office, and for administrators to be appointed in his place. A secret document prepared by the ANC alliance-detailing plans to topple Chief Buthelezi through means similar to those employed in Bophuthatswana-was referred by the IFP to the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone commission) for investigation, but no inquiry was initiated.
Violence intensified in the province until the week before the election, when an agreement (on 19 April) to recognise the status of the Zulu king, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and to refer all outstanding issues to mediation, made it possible for the IFP to participate in the election. Despite its late start, the IFP won majority support in KwaZulu and Natal, and secured 10,5% of the vote in the country as a whole. Chief Buthelezi was appointed minister of home affairs and Dr Frank Mdlalose, national chairman of the IFP, became the provincial premier.
The ANC sought initially to have the election results in KwaZulu/Natal set aside. Having been advised by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that this was not possible, it was compelled to accept the outcome. Relations between the ANC and IFP in KwaZulu/ Natal remained tense, though violence declined to some extent. The ANC sought to drive a wedge between King Goodwill Zwelithini and Chief Buthelezi, hoping that this would rob the IFP of significant support in the run-up to local government polls, scheduled for 1995.
This chapter traces the events which appear to support the perspective of the IFP.
Destabilising the Opposition in the Run-up to Elections
In early January two South Africans were convicted of smuggling guns through Namibia. They told a magistrate's court in Rehoboth (Namibia) that 'they had bought the weapons to kill IFP supporters'. (They said this was in revenge for the IFP having killed their relatives.) The arms being smuggled by the men included 12 AK-47 rifles, a G-3 rifle, and ammunition. Police said it was clear that a weapons smuggling route had been established through Namibia. 'In most cases the smugglers were Xhosa-speaking,' police added.
Also in early January, it was reported that self-defence units (SDUs) established by the ANC alliance were 'fuelling township violence'. An SDU member, identified only as Tembo, said in a British Broadcasting Corporation Radio 4 interview broadcast in Britain that 'he did not think about killing people, had not kept count of the number of people he had killed and saw no reason for someone to survive if he did not understand what was the will of the people'. He added that he killed people 'like chickens'.
The IFP denied a report by the regional police commissioner in Natal, Lieutenant General Colin Steyn, accusing the IFP of being largely the aggressors in political violence in northern Natal. The IFP's political director, Dr Ziba Jiyane, said the 'wrong impression was being created'. IFP members, he said, 'were not the aggressors but the victims'. Gen Steyn had also stated that 'various ANC structures had contributed to violence', and had noted, especially, the youths who left the area 'for short periods of military training in Transkei and elsewhere'. Gen Steyn had added that members of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Umkhonto) were also being used, and were brought in for this purpose from Empangeni (Natal north coast) and Durban.
In mid-January the Freedom Alliance (FA)-comprising inter alia the IFP and the administrations of Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu-said it was committed to further talks but that the ANC 'must stop playing with words and start discussing substantive matters'. Chief Buthelezi said that the IFP would not tolerate an ANC bid to seize power 'through the ballot box, mass action, rolling mass action, or through revolutionary violence'. The IFP also stated, however, that it would continue negotiations with the ANC for as long as these seemed likely to yield a fruitful outcome.
Towards the end of January the IFP called for the arrest of an ANC 'hitman' based at Donnybrook (southern Natal). The IFP said the hitman had been 'linked to the killing and maiming of several IFP members in the Bulwer, Donnybrook, Ixopo and Richmond [all in southern Natal] areas'. The IFP stated that the man had previously been charged with the illegal possession of an R-5 rifle. He operated under several aliases, and 'regularly visited the ANC office at Ixopo'.
Towards the end of January it was alleged that the IFP was conducting 'military training' to 'kill opponents' of the party. Mr Ed Tillet, a spokesman for the IFP, said that there was nothing secretive about the training of self-protection units (SPUs). These units had been initiated in 1993 by the KwaZulu administration, on the instruction of the chiefs, to provide protection for traditional leaders and their communities. Mr Tillet denied that the training was aimed at killing opponents of the party. The IFP also repudiated claims by the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) that it was involved in training members of the IFP on a farm in Vereeniging (southern Transvaal).
In January, 1 000 people-including 200 hostel residents from the Witwatersrand-were being trained by the IFP at Mlaba Camp (near the Umfolozi Game Reserve) to serve in community SPUs. Training was financed by the KwaZulu administration, and it was intended that some 3 000 trainees would have completed their courses by March 1994. Chief Buthelezi said there was nothing illegal in the creation of the SPUs, which were authorised in terms of the National Peace Accord. He added that he had discussed the creation of the SPUs with the commissioner of the South African Police (SAP), General Johan van der Merwe.
At the end of the month the TEC announced that it would block a promised R216m loan from the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to the Bophuthatswana administration unless 'the homeland committed itself publicly to free and fair political activity'. Mr Tito Mboweni, an ANC member and also a member of the TEC subcouncil on finance, threatened to cut off all central government transfers to the homeland. The DBSA said that delays in making the loan-intended to finance development in the territory-could cause legal problems as it had contractual obligations to fulfil.
Towards mid-February the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly resolved to suspend participation in further negotiations until the government and the ANC moderated their unwillingness to accommodate KwaZulu's constitutional proposals. The assembly said the government and the ANC alliance had 'failed to accommodate its reasonable demands' on the issues of exclusive provincial powers, a measure of fiscal autonomy, and protection of provincial constitutions against arbitrary decisions of the constituent assembly.
The IFP resolved not to contest the election, and so too did other members of the FA, including the Afrikaner Volksfront. The Bophuthatswana administration failed to register for the election.
In a memorandum to Mr de Klerk, King Goodwill Zwelithini rejected the transitional constitution and the process of negotiation leading up to its adoption, charging that the latter had been conducted 'on a base so narrow and so unrepresentative of the people of South Africa' that he did not regard the agreements thus reached as binding on him or the Zulu people. He stressed the importance of the right to self-determination of the Zulu nation, and said it had been his wish that this be exercised within the framework of a constitution which 'allowed sufficient space to breathe'. The transitional constitution, however, made no such provision. It did not offer 'any space in which the Zulu nation could survive as a nation among other nations', for it provided 'no recognised area of self-determination'. To make matters yet more disturbing, the transitional constitution could quickly be superseded by a new constitutional text, which could be 'far worse'. He stressed that neither he, as monarch, nor the Zulu nation could accept this. Instead, to secure the right to self-determination, the Zulu nation should have its own territorial basis and its own government.
He accordingly gave the president formal notice that, as king of the Zulu nation, he claimed 'exclusive and independent sovereignty' over all territory under Zulu dominion in 1834. He stated that the sovereignty of the Zulu nation had been limited and compressed through conquest by the British and Afrikaners, but had not been extinguished. Now those who had conquered the Zulu nation were 'relinquishing their sovereignty over the land of South Africa'. This meant, according to the international law of decolonisation, that the 'sovereignty of the Zulu nation was revived'. He warned that attempts to force the Zulu nation to participate in a unitary state would fail 'on account of the resistance of the Zulu people'. He announced that he was preparing to promulgate a constitution for KwaZulu and Natal, which would establish a monarchy modelled 'after the best examples of democratic and pluralistic monarchies in the world'.
King Goodwill Zwelithini stated that he was not willing to enter into negotiations regarding the sovereignty of the Zulu nation, which was indisputable. He was, however, 'prepared to negotiate about how that sovereignty could be expressed in terms of a government, a public service, a police force, a defence force and all the other structures of government' necessary for a workable administration. He undertook to avoid Zulu domination over other racial and cultural groups within KwaZulu/Natal and said that he wished to attain 'a workable constitutional arrangement between the kingdom of KwaZulu and the rest of South Africa'.
Chief Buthelezi said that the IFP and the KwaZulu administration had always sought, in negotiations, to accommodate KwaZulu's interests 'as a fully secured state in a federal South Africa'. This had proved impossible, however, because of the intransigence of the ANC and the government. He said that he hoped King Goodwill Zwelithini's claim would send 'shock waves of reality' in their direction, and stated that there would have to be a 'meeting ground' between the call made by the Zulu king and the totally unacceptable position in which the monarch had been placed by the transitional constitution.
Commenting on the impasse reached, an article in Business Day said that Chief Buthelezi's demands for a federal state were far from unreasonable, given the fact that South Africa was 'one of the most ethnically fragmented societies on earth'. The ANC had refused the IFP leader the strong provincial powers he sought, and seemed to be acting on the premise that 'blacks should not fear other blacks'. However, the article continued, 'the history of African decolonisation suggested that the highest price was usually paid by Africans'. It noted that even some ANC officials believed the party had not tried hard enough to accommodate the FA in negotiations. The ANC could have conceded what the FA sought-marginally increased powers for regions (including limited regional taxation)-and could have offered to entrench those powers in a final constitution. 'Such a deal had been on the table, agreed between the Freedom Alliance and the government in 1993, but the ANC had rejected it. In the end, the ANC had made a purely tactical offer: two ballots, but nothing on regional powers. It won the tactical battle, but lost the moral high ground.'
One ANC official commented: 'I put myself ten years down the road and I say: should we have been so stubborn on this and that? Was it worth it?' A government negotiator echoed his concern: 'Is the ANC really prepared to accept a civil war to ensure central government has overriding powers on health policy?' Another government official, however, vowed that the state (with ANC support) would be ruthless in suppressing dissent: 'If the fight is on, then it is on. We will act with full force right at the beginning and wipe them out.'
Soon thereafter Mr Nelson Mandela, the president of the ANC, announced a set of compromise proposals on the transitional constitution. (He made the announcement at a media conference shortly before his departure on a visit to Holland.) The proposals would give provinces autonomy in determining their own 'legislative and executive structures' and in choosing their own names. They would also safeguard the powers given to provinces against future encroachment. Mr Mandela described the proposals as a 'mark of our good faith' and said that the ANC was 'committed to bending backwards in order to find a solution'.
The proposals, however, met none of the IFP's demands. They did not increase the meagre powers given to the provinces, rendering meaningless the promise to entrench the powers granted. Moreover, they were the very same proposals that, earlier, had led to a deadlock in negotiations. Chief Buthelezi accused Mr Mandela of 'utter hypocrisy' in introducing them as 'breakthrough proposals'. He charged Mr Mandela with 'cheap politicking on life and death issues'. He said the IFP would oppose the constitution and the election 'with every available democratic means at our disposal'. Reacting to warnings by Mr Mandela 'of strong action' against anyone attempting to disrupt the election, Chief Buthelezi said it was 'the IFP's democratic right to oppose the constitution'.
An editorial in The Citizen noted that the government had been upstaged by Mr Mandela in regard to the proposals. Both the government and the ANC had agreed on the proposals, but the ANC had presented them as its own. The organisation had done so, moreover, without consulting Mr de Klerk, who said that the ANC had 'tried to hijack it as if it were their own initiative'. Mr Mandela had also taken it upon himself to telephone the president of the United States, Mr Bill Clinton, to brief him on what the ANC had done by way of compromise-and had been congratulated by Mr Clinton for 'having gone the extra mile'. Mr Mandela had thus obtained an accolade not due the ANC alone, and not merited by the content of the proposals. Mr Mandela's actions, commented the editorial, reinforced the image of a 'lame-duck government', and provided the impression that the ANC was already running the country.
Soon thereafter Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC's secretary general, said that the organisation now accepted that provinces could have 'exclusive' powers in certain respects. However, such powers would have to be exercised 'within national framework legislation'. The FA said this defeated the purpose of exclusive powers. It added that 'even the limited powers the provinces were granted in the interim constitution could be removed once an ANC-dominated constituent assembly sat to draft a new constitution after the April elections'.
Chief Buthelezi said the IFP would continue to negotiate, even though it would not take part in the election. Addressing a rally at Taylor's Halt (near Pietermaritzburg), he stressed the IFP's commitment to peace. 'We know,' he said, 'that war serves only to divide the people of South Africa. It serves only to split communities and break up families. We know that in the end it will pit brother against brother, sister against sister, mother against daughter, father against son. We in the IFP therefore do not want war. No one wants peace more than the IFP.' He noted that a spokesman for the ANC alliance had threatened that 'army tanks would roll against the people of KwaZulu'. He warned that 'if the ANC won the elections, it would try and destroy the IFP and KwaZulu' and said: 'We must brace ourselves to this onslaught if this happens.'
The FA boycotted a meeting of the negotiating council to amend the transitional constitution in accordance with the 'compromise' announced by Mr Mandela, and to extend the election registration date. Members of the FA said 'they had already rejected the ANC's package during talks two weeks ago', and charged the ANC with 'negotiating via the media in a bid to win the moral high ground'.
After the meeting of the council, the FA said that key issues remained unaddressed and unresolved. In particular, 'the powers and functions of provinces had not been improved, and no concessions had been made in this regard'. This issue had formed the crux of its earlier proposals, and had not been dealt with in any way. The FA said it remained committed to negotiations, and would welcome it if other parties made further discussions possible. Chief Buthelezi said that to 'describe the latest constitutional amendments as a concession to the Freedom Alliance was an insult to his intelligence and to Inkatha'.
While these developments were taking place, at least 47 people were killed in a single weekend in different parts of Natal. Included among the dead were seven people-one of them a four-year-old child-who were shot and killed in Ntembeni on their return from an IFP rally at Taylor's Halt.
The IFP rejected ANC allegations that 15 of its supporters had been killed by the IFP while preparing for a voter education workshop at Creighton (southern Natal). According to one informant, three ANC youths had been intimidating the community into attending a voter education meeting on Saturday 19 February. One of the three, aged 26, was a trained Umkhonto cadre. They had been putting up posters and distributing pamphlets about voter education. 'The pamphlets said everyone had to pay R6 to learn to vote' at the Saturday meeting. The three ANC members had also 'been knocking on doors and demanding protection money, as well as R6, or the houses of those who refused would be burnt'. One youngster, aged 12, had been 'hauled out of his house to toyi-toyi up the road. Other children playing with balls were also made to join in, plus two who had been herding cattle. Others were collected from the neighbourhood.'
Shots were heard late on Friday night. Two of the ANC youths were wounded and the third was killed. The children who had been 'more-or-less pressganged' into joining the ANC youths were also killed. (The informant believed the attackers had been IFP supporters, but had no evidence of this.)
The ANC-claiming that all the dead were its supporters-exploited the killings to the hilt, and turned the funeral into a political meeting. 'There were no prayers. It was just a big political meeting with a slaughtered ox and merry-making. The ANC paid for the ox and the funeral.' A Catholic priest from Ixopo was told that he could speak for no more than five minutes.
Mr Mandela said at a press conference at the World Trade Centre at Kempton Park (east Rand) that Chief Buthelezi was fanning violence with his opposition to the country's first all-race election. Mr Tillet said that Mr Mandela's 'intimations that Chief Buthelezi was responsible for the weekend massacre encouraged further violence'. He said that Mr Mandela's comments, 'far from subduing inflamed passions, would encourage a violent counter response'. He added: 'For a man of his perceived stature, we find it highly unfortunate that he succumbs to apportioning blame before allowing law enforcement agencies to determine culpability.'
An IFP organiser in Ixopo, Mr Dumisani Khuzwayo, appeared briefly in court in connection with the Creighton deaths, and the SAP said that they were questioning two other IFP leaders. The IFP expressed outrage at the arrest of three of its prominent leaders, and described the police action as a 'transparent attempt to placate the ANC leadership' and to 'take the pressure off the SAP'. 'This token action by the SAP,' it said, 'not only poses a grave threat to the IFP in the region, but also has important political consequences, given other actions by the SAP in this area against the IFP and its leadership.' The IFP called for its leaders to be charged or released.
Responding to allegations by a violence monitor, Ms Mary de Haas, that the IFP and 'its right-wing backers' had placed themselves on a 'war footing' and that this accounted for their 'intractability in the negotiation process', Mr Tillet said that Ms de Haas was partisan in her reporting of violence in Natal. He described Ms de Haas as a 'mouthpiece of the ANC' who had 'earned her propaganda medals by disseminating violence analysis which was totally prejudiced and discriminated against the IFP'. Her report, he said, studiously concentrated on the IFP as the perpetrator of violence, while 'ignoring the ANC's involvement'.
Amendments to the transitional constitution, adopted at the end of February, gave the provinces the competence to enact legislation in some 30 spheres of jurisdiction, including housing, education (at primary and secondary levels) and welfare. They also made it clear, however, that provincial legislation within these spheres could be overridden by national legislation in wide-ranging circumstances. There was thus no real change in the limited autonomy accorded the provinces.
Earlier in the month the TEC had been asked to investigate the training of a large number of Umkhonto cadres in Venda, who were undergoing training on the orders of the military leader of Venda, Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana. The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Roelof (Pik) Botha, called on the TEC to investigate the matter, as well as how the training for Umkhonto members was being funded. No investigation was initiated by the TEC, however.
In early March Chief Buthelezi met Mr Mandela in Durban. On the eve of the meeting, Chief Buthelezi said his aim was to talk peace with the ANC leader. The meeting was a follow-up to the one held in June the previous year at which they had agreed inter alia to address rallies together. This, said Chief Buthelezi, had not happened-even though he had given the ANC dates for possible joint public addresses. Chief Buthelezi criticised Mr Mandela for having said that he would 'go down on his knees to the IFP president to prevent bloodshed'. 'The insinuation,' said Chief Buthelezi, 'that I am responsible for the bloodshed I throw [back] at him with the contempt that it deserves.' He reiterated his rejection of the transitional constitution, saying that the IFP intended to 'oppose the constitution and the election with every democratic means at our disposal'. He hoped, he said, that Mr Mandela would not waste his time by trying to persuade him to enter the election. The key issue was the violence-and he was willing, stated Chief Buthelezi, to 'co-operate with Mr Mandela in any efforts that we agree can end or reduce the levels of violence'.
Following the Durban meeting, both leaders agreed that they would address joint rallies in troubled areas, in order to pass on to their respective supporters 'their newfound political understanding'. Mr Tillet said joint rallies would go some way to defusing a volatile situation, but that the role of Umkhonto in violence remained unresolved. He accused the government of 'turning a blind eye to huge MK [Umkhonto] arms caches, MK training camps and highly trained MK members in the region'.
Commenting on conflict in Bhambayi (near Durban) which left 11 ANC supporters dead in early March, an IFP official, Mr Bonginkosi Bhengu, said that the ANC had 'reaped the fruits of their labours'. Mr Bhengu said that five IFP supporters had been attacked the previous week. Four had been killed and one, a woman, had been injured. Another IFP member, Mr S'bu Ntuli, had been driven out of his shop by ANC supporters. In addition, IFP members had been attacked while returning from a meeting held between the Zulu king and Mr de Klerk.
Having initially blamed the IFP for the deaths, the ANC later said they had been caused by the internal stability unit (ISU) stationed in Bhambayi. The ISU denied the allegations against it, while Mr Bhengu said that 'complaints against the ISU were part of the ANC's national propaganda campaign against the unit'. Mr Bhengu added that the ANC wanted to remove the ISU in order 'freely to kill people'. The minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, said that the claim made by Mr Ramaphosa-that the Internal Stability Division (ISD) was responsible for the deaths of thousands of people-was a 'blatant lie'.
The IFP also said that it did not trust some of the peace monitors in the Bhambayi settlement, as they were biased in favour of the ANC. Thus, while many incidents of violence took place against the IFP, these were not reported to the press. By contrast, 'some monitors were quick to inform journalists and the police if something happened to the ANC'.
IFP supporters in Bhambayi claimed that they were living under siege in the settlement and that they were 'virtually walled in in their areas for fear of being killed'. 'We're hungry and afraid to catch the taxi into town. The Red men lie in the green grass waiting for us,' said one IFP member. ('Red men' was a reference to 'the Reds'-the ANC faction in the settlement.) 'Day and night we are not sleeping,' she said, adding that families spent their evenings together for safety. A fellow IFP member said the ANC was 'on a territorial drive' in the area. Some monitors said that 'without the presence of the ISU in Bhambayi, IFP supporters would probably be chased out of the area'.
Responding to allegations by a former KwaZulu Police (KZP) officer, Lieutenant Westleigh Mbatha, that Mr Themba Khoza (the IFP's chairman in the Transvaal) was linked to the massacre of 11 people in Nqutu (northern Natal) in November 1993, Mr Khoza denied any involvement. The commissioner of the KZP, Lieutenant General Roy During, said that Lt Mbatha had never been involved in the investigation of the massacre, and had been seeking early retirement from the force, for health reasons, since December 1991.
In Bophuthatswana, tension arose around the issue of pension payments to the territory's civil servants and came rapidly to a head. Despite actuarial analysis showing the value of assets held by the fund as exceeding R3,7bn, health and post and telecommunication workers went on strike, demanding the return of their pension contributions and a 50% salary increase. Soon teachers, transport workers and other civil servants followed suit, demanding the payment of pensions, a 50% salary increase, and the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana into South Africa.
In early March the TEC agreed to ask Mr de Klerk 'to force the issue of access to the voters of Bophuthatswana by proclamation'. The TEC sought, in particular, the bringing into operation of section 6 of the transitional constitution, dealing with the rights of citizens to the franchise. This was necessary, said Mr Ramaphosa, to challenge 'this unrealistic dream of these little entities believing they are independent'. Mr Popo Molefe, the ANC's candidate for the premiership of the North West region (which included Bophuthatswana), said that if the administration failed to register for the election, 'the ANC would encourage South African citizens in the homeland to intensify mass action'.
On 7 March the Bophuthatswana cabinet decided against participating in the election, but said that the issue should also be addressed by the territory's full parliament. A special parliamentary session was called for this purpose, to take place on 15 March 1994. In response, the ANC called for a blockade of Bophuthatswana to prevent the entry of South African goods, and said it would also ensure that revenue transfers to the homeland administration were halted.
On the same day it was reported that 'chaos reigned' in Mmabatho (the capital of the territory) and the adjoining town of Mafikeng, as 'police and striking civil servants clashed in the streets'. The following day striking staff at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) assumed control of the building and took hostage Mr Eddie Mangope-chairman of the BBC and son of Chief Lucas Mangope. Violence intensified thereafter as students from the University of Bophuthatswana and youths bused in by the ANC from the University of the North and elsewhere, took to the streets of Mmabatho in protest. Rioters attacked the Mega City shopping complex adjacent to the administration's offices, marking the beginning of three days of destruction and looting at the centre.
The following day a group of about 250 disaffected policemen handed over a memorandum to the South African ambassador to Bophuthatswana, Professor Tjaart van der Walt. They demanded participation in the election, the payment of their pensions and the removal from office of Chief Mangope. Police then went on strike and left their posts, refusing to 'kill their brothers'. Arson and looting became widespread, while members of the police force-whom the ANC alliance had long exhorted to switch sides-stood by.
The leader of the Afrikaner Volksfront, General Constand Viljoen, said that the FA had decided to terminate all negotiations and submission of candidates for the election and would maintain this stance until the ANC stopped its action against Bophuthatswana. Gen Viljoen said that the situation in the territory was totally unacceptable, and that Chief Mangope must be allowed to decide whether to give up or maintain its sovereignty 'without being intimidated'. He continued: 'It is blatant terrorism aimed at destabilising the situation to the level of anarchy so that the South African Defence Force would be justified to intersvene and force President Mangope, under intimidation, to submit to the TEC. The phase of strikes and labour unrest has been followed by the phase of burning, and now groups of 30 to 40 Umkhonto we Sizwe members are entering to start the shooting phase. If this action by the ANC/SACP [South African Communist Party] alliance is allowed, the next will be KwaZulu and the Afrikaner people.'
On Friday 11 March the AWB sent a contingent of armed men into Bophuthatswana to help Chief Mangope restore order, amid controversy as to whether this had been requested by the Bophuthatswana administration or not. A confrontation developed between the AWB members-who were reported to have been driving around Mmabatho 'intimidating and shooting at people on the streets'-and the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF). The AWB contingent was compelled to retreat from the territory. In the course of the retreat, three wounded AWB members were shot dead by a Bophuthatswana policeman.
A convoy of SADF armoured vehicles, having driven into the South African embassy in the early hours of the morning, moved into Mmabatho in the late afternoon. The next morning, a joint SADF/BDF force began mopping up operations in Mafikeng, which had been badly looted in the night. In general, however, calm prevailed in Mmabatho. An article in Business Day reported that 'life went on for the vast majority of inhabitants. There was no local exodus, no procession of refugees out the Zeerust or Lichtenburg roads … Even though there continued to be the odd burst of gunfire, a relatively small force of competent soldiers had restored order'.
On the same day (Saturday 12 March) Chief Mangope was ousted by the TEC and the South African government. According to one source, the decision to remove Chief Mangope was made only after a TEC delegation had arrived in Mmabatho and had realised that the Bophuthatswana president was no longer in control of the administration (as the police, army and civil service were unwilling to accept his authority). It seems, however, that the decision to oust Chief Mangope was in fact made considerably earlier. On Thursday 10 March an agreement had been reached between Mr de Klerk and Mr Mandela in terms of which the TEC would appoint an administrator to replace Chief Mangope. Mr de Klerk subsequently argued for Chief Mangope's retention in office, in return for his participating in the election. When Chief Mangope failed, however, to give satisfactory assurances to the IEC chairman, Mr Justice Johann Kriegler, regarding free political activity in the territory, the ANC reportedly 'led the charge within the TEC management committee to take control of the situation'.
The management committee of the TEC held an emergency meeting in Pretoria on Saturday 12 March, and decided to oust Chief Mangope. The decision to do so was announced at what was billed as an 'ANC press conference' by Mr Ramaphosa. A delegation from the TEC and the South African government then flew to Bophuthatswana to inform Chief Mangope that his rule had ended.
According to Mr Pik Botha, the deployment of the SADF on Friday 11 March had come as a surprise to Chief Mangope. 'When [Chief Mangope and his administration] woke up [on Friday morning], the SADF troops were there, it was still dark, and I don't think they expected it,' he said. By Friday afternoon, Chief Mangope had agreed to participate in the April election and to accept the reincorporation of Bophuthatswana. Mr Botha said he doubted this would have happened 'if the bantustan had not been rendered ungovernable and the SADF had not gone in'. He continued, 'OK, OK, OK. Dammit. Let's call it a bloodless coup, a bloodless takeover.'
A senior ANC negotiator said the day after the ouster, 'There is no doubt about it. It was the ANC resolve which eventually prevailed.'
The interim administrator initially appointed to the territory was Professor van der Walt. Within days, however, a second administrator was appointed. He was Mr Job Mokgoro, then an official of the DBSA and formerly the chairman of the ANC's Mafikeng branch.
Senior legal advisers to the government-interviewed by the South African Institute of Race Relations in the days following the ouster of Chief Mangope-stated that there was no basis in law for his removal from office. At the time, Bophuthatswana had been-in terms of South African law-an independent and sovereign state. Moreover, the TEC had no jurisdiction in the territory in terms of the legislation which defined its powers. All confirmed that the government and TEC had no legal authority to oust Chief Mangope, or to dismiss the territory's cabinet and dissolve its parliament. Legal advisers at the TEC, said one official, had 'their hands in the air' as they had to 'find something to make the practice legal'.
(Chief Mangope's ouster was later upheld by the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court. This was on the basis that the interim administrators were in effective control of the territory, even though the initial intervention in the affairs of Bophuthatswana had been a breach of international law.)
Following the ouster of Chief Mangope, Gen Viljoen questioned 'why the Bophuthatswana leader had been toppled by the South African government and the ANC despite his undertaking to recommend to his parliament that Bophuthatswana take part in the April election'. Gen Viljoen said he would be asking for a 'special urgent meeting' of the FA, as the toppling of Chief Mangope had eroded hopes for an all-inclusive settlement.
Addressing a rally at Mmabatho's Independence Stadium following the ouster of Chief Mangope, Mr Mandela said that right-wing members 'had been given a lesson by the Bophuthatswana police and defence force which they would never forget'. He praised the latter for the role they had played in the fall of the territory's administration. Mr Mandela was asked at a press conference whether he agreed with 'the reported indifference' of Mr Popo Molefe to the execution of the wounded AWB men. In reply, Mr Mandela said: 'There were more than 70 people who died. I don't see why we should concentrate on two.' During the rally, Mr Mandela also addressed the implications of the ouster of Chief Mangope for KwaZulu. 'The people have risen and the tyrants have fallen,' he stated. 'The demand for free and fair elections is very strong,' he added later. 'What is happening here is going to send a message to similar areas.'
Chief Mangope later announced that his career in politics was not yet over and that his North-West Christian Democratic Party (CDP) would contest the election. Soon thereafter, however, Chief Mangope withdrew from the election because of intimidation. This followed inter alia the necklacing of a CDP supporter and former Bophuthatswana MP, Mr Shadrack Kadi, and his younger brother.
An editorial in The Citizen noted the silence from foreign peace observers, monitors and governments regarding the ouster of Chief Mangope. It said that they should at least have 'recognised that toppling president Lucas Mangope was illegal' in terms of South African law. They should also have recognised that 'the necklacing of a former Bophuthatswana MP was the savage killing of a Mangope supporter', meriting condemnation by the IEC.
Responding to events in Bophuthatswana, Chief Buthelezi said that the TEC and the South African government had removed Chief Mangope from office illegally. The action, the IFP leader said, 'showed that opposition to the interim constitution would be smashed by whatever means, including mob violence and anarchy under the guise of popular uprising'. 'President Mangope has been overthrown,' he continued, 'not by violent, looting demonstrators under the control of the ANC and South African Communist Party, but by the South African government in league with the ANC/SACP, in terms of powers which they have given themselves.' Noting that the ANC alliance had 'at no stage deplored the criminal activities of those engaged in public murder and mayhem', Chief Buthelezi stated, 'I fear for our future. The right to disagree with the ANC/SACP/NP/SA government alliance is being ruthlessly snuffed out.'
'This deliberate plan to oust an elected leader,' he continued, 'was plain for all to see and now, staggeringly, it is being applauded by some here and abroad as a triumph for democracy!' Chief Buthelezi said there were indications that the same strategy was being devised for KwaZulu. 'All I can say is that KwaZulu is not Bophuthatswana,' he concluded.
Conflict intensified in KwaZulu and Natal. The ANC accused IFP supporters of occupying a stadium booked by it for an election rally in Umlazi (near Durban). In response, Mr Tillet said that 'the occupation was a response to continued attacks on IFP members in Umlazi and surrounding townships'. 'What has happened does not surprise me,' he stated. 'Under normal circumstances, we would never condone this. The extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the area have culminated in this action. We believe the ANC has got their just rewards. This is a taste of their own medicine.' He said that the occupation had been sanctioned by the South African Hostel Dwellers' Association. This was non-aligned, but was sympathetic to the IFP. The IFP's regional secretary in the area, Mr Solomuzi Masondo, added that the occupation was 'in protest against the fact that the ANC had burnt down an Umlazi hostel housing IFP workers'.
The ANC called a stayaway in Durban and a rally in Umlazi in protest against the IFP's occupation of the stadium. ANC speakers addressing the rally 'took turns to issue ultimatums that the days of the KwaZulu government were numbered as the election date drew nearer'. Leaders also warned that Chief Buthelezi would suffer the same fate as Chief Mangope.
Police reported that at least six people had been killed and seven injured when gunmen sprayed commuters with gunfire at Enseleni (near Empangeni on the north coast). Mr Tillet said that at least 20 people had been killed. Dr Gavin Woods, director of the Inkatha Institute, predicted an escalation in violence as the election came closer. He said that turf wars and the flight of refugees had already made 90% of black communities in KwaZulu and Natal 'no-go areas' for one party or the other. He accused the ANC of gross intimidation, saying that 'ANC thugs marked waverers' doors with ink blots and strolled down streets rattling matchboxes in a sinister reminder of a favoured method of dispatching political enemies with burning tyres around their necks'.
In mid-March the Goldstone commission released a report implicating three police generals in various 'third force' activities, including gun-running to the IFP. Mr de Klerk announced that the three were to be suspended from their duties with immediate effect. One of the three generals, Lieutenant General Basie Smit, senior deputy commissioner of police, described the allegations in the commission's report as 'absolute rubbish'. Gen Smit criticised the superficiality of Judge Goldstone's investigation as well as the conclusion that there was strong prima facie evidence of the policemen's guilt. On the contrary, he said, the 'evidence' relied upon consisted of 'unfounded and untested allegations'.
He added that Judge Goldstone had made no attempt to put the accusations to the three generals, nor to allow them to test these through cross-examination. In fact, Judge Goldstone had not intended to speak to the generals at all before handing his report to the state president. He had done so, in the end, only because the commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, had insisted on this. The specific accusations had not been put to the generals, however, and they had been given no opportunity to refute them.
Another of the generals, Lieutenant General Johan le Roux, also expressed shock at the report. He said that his future career in the police force had been ruined, irrespective of whether he was ultimately found guilty or not. He described the report and the decision to suspend himself and his colleagues as 'a shocking misapplication of the basic principles of justice'. He stated that the mysterious disappearance of Mr Japie Maponya-in whose death he had been implicated by the commission-had been investigated by the Harms Commission as well as in inquest proceedings. His (Gen le Roux's) name had never been mentioned in those investigations, and yet he was suddenly now accused of third force activities.
Towards the end of March the IFP said that an informant had supplied it with a secret document, outlining ANC/SACP proposals to 'produce a situation of ungovernability and crisis in KwaZulu through mass action, including the destabilisation of the KwaZulu civil service'. The IFP said it had no doubt that the document was authentic, for its informant had 'insisted it was genuine and produced by a senior member(s) of the SACP/ANC alliance'. The IFP asked Judge Goldstone to investigate its contents as a matter of urgency. The document, it said, 'revealed sinister ANC/SACP plans to secretly orchestrate "emerging instability" in KwaZulu, leading to TEC and military intervention, while publicly downplaying the actual and direct involvement of the ANC alliance'. The document also confirmed that 'there were approximately 2 000 members of Umkhonto deployed in socalled "self-defence units" throughout Natal, working together with members of the Transkei Defence Force and "several thousand" informally trained SDU members'. The IFP said there was evidence that the steps outlined in the document to destabilise the KwaZulu civil service had already begun, as reflected in 'untruthful and insidious propaganda about the safety of KwaZulu government pensions'. It said it viewed the document with alarm as the tactics it outlined were a continuation of 'existing and blatant ANC/SACP machinations' reflected in 'its overt and covert actions in KwaZulu/Natal, Bophuthatswana and elsewhere'.
Key excerpts from the document, entitled Prepare the Anvil for the Coming Hammer, read as follows:
The recent period has seen further dramatic shifts in the balance of power towards the people's camp. The collapse of the Mangope regime in the Bophuthatswana bantustan is a signal achievement in this regard. The most significant outstanding obstacle which confronts the people's movement is the problem of Buthelezi and the IFP. Events in Bop, combined with the deteriorating situation in Natal, now urge the accelerated implementation of a strategy, which though generally accepted within the movement, needs to be more fully elaborated.
That strategy is the destruction of the KwaZulu bantustan … Conditions for the fall of the KwaZulu bantustan must speedily be created. Bop has served to underline the fatal weakness of all the bantustan administrations. That is that they cannot survive for long without the financial support from the De Klerk government. Combined with the long-standing programme of mass action against Mangope, the mere threat that the tap would be tightened combined to create a situation of ungovernability culminating in an effective coup by South African security forces.
Though conditions in KwaZulu and Bop differ materially, and the strategy of the people's movement towards the Mangope regime cannot be mechanistically applied, our strategy towards KwaZulu includes important common elements.
There can be no doubt that sufficient consensus now exists within the TEC for using maximum firmness in dealing with threats to a democratic transition. But we must first create conditions, primarily through mass action, heightened public awareness and work amongst KwaZulu civil servants for decisive state intervention in that bantustan. In other words, we must prepare the anvil for the coming hammer.
Successful and long-term efforts by the people's movement to isolate Buthelezi and separate Inkatha from its constituency and potential constituencies have unfortunately been offset by serious and unexpected reverses in the Natal region. Principally this is evident in the growth of ethnic chauvinism under the banner of King Goodwill Zwelithini, [which] has stabilised Buthelezi's support base … [This calls for] accelerated implementation of a strategy which has as its objective the destruction of the KwaZulu bantustan.
Immediate proposals are as follows.
The Natal situation should be more closely monitored by a task force of the TEC, [which should analyse] all intelligence reports which relate to the Natal situation; security force functions presently carried out by the ISD should be assumed by the SADF and NPKF [National Peacekeeping Force]; in particular those units which proved themselves most reliable in Bophuthatswana should be considered for priority deployment in crisis areas of Natal; and the SAP leadership in Natal [which might otherwise prove unreliable] must be firmly subordinated to the TEC.
The document continued:
The military training and deployment of IFP members in Natal also requires restrengthening of an effective MK presence and more active implementation of people's self-defence measures. In any event any security action considered by the TEC should be supplemented by informal MK deployments.
According to intelligence sources, approximately 5 000 IFP members have been trained in a relatively short space of time. Counterpoised to this private army are approximately 2 000 MK members deployed in a self-defence capacity throughout Natal, several thousand informally trained SDU members, as well as disposition of some members of the TDF [Transkei Defence Force].
The TEC also needs to assume the payment of salaries of amakhosi. Subordinating reactionary institutions to the control of the TEC and a new democratic order is necessary not only as a prelude to their transformation, but it removes an important instrument of social control from the hands of Buthelezi and the IFP.
The IEC, it continued, would 'need to assume a far more active role in Natal' and this should be combined 'with the organisation of a broad front of forces against any disruption of elections. This organisation could serve as the basis for further isolation of Buthelezi and the IFP'. 'Most critical,' it continued, would be 'work amongst the KwaZulu civil service and efforts to win over the Zulu king'. Organisation among civil servants, it stated, should be intensified immediately. 'Significant advances,' it added, 'have already been made in this regard and important sectors of the KwaZulu civil service have already been organised by the ANC and allied formations.' It urged, however, that 'continuing efforts be made to persuade civil servants that job security and pensions could only be secured by a people's government and not by tribal despots of Buthelezi's mould'.
The document continued:
One may go so far as to say that the KwaZulu civil service is the most important base of ANC support north of the Tugela. And even though the KZP have traditionally functioned as Buthelezi's private army, increasingly members of the KZP, including command elements, side with the people's movement. It is clear that in a situation of crisis, Buthelezi cannot take the loyalty of the KZP for granted …
Combined with mass action and stepped up organisation within the sectors of the KwaZulu government a situation of ungovernability could reproduce itself fairly rapidly in the areas it administers. Though the consequences will be more extensive than in Bop, this should not deter us from the political correctness of such a strategy. It is important, however, for this crunch movement to have an appearance of spontaneity and popular support. Direct ANC involvement must be played down.
Emerging instability within KwaZulu, as well as providing an increased public profile to acts of violence, particularly when directed against the ANC and its allies, should provide a persuasive argument for TEC intervention in KwaZulu. The tempo and extent of that intervention will be conditioned by the development of these conditions and the degree of resistance encountered by the TEC.
Comrades within the TEC have made it clear that, in conditions of growing instability or ungovernability, … as in Bop, decisive military steps will be taken.
The IFP sent a copy of the document to Judge Goldstone, requesting an immediate investigation by the Goldstone commission. Judge Goldstone replied to the IFP's letter the following day. He said he had asked one of the commission's advocates to contact the IFP 'to obtain details which would enable us to launch a meaningful investigation'. The letter continued: 'If you are unable to furnish such information I would be grateful if you would inform the commission what action or inquiries you propose we should institute.'
The IFP proposed, in response, that the commission subpoena the co-chairman of the management committee of the TEC, Mr Pravin Gordhan, to reveal the name of the author of the document, and obtain further information regarding the implementation of the proposals. It said that it had reason to believe that Mr Gordhan-a member of the ANC and SACP-had knowledge of the document. In addition, it stated, recent public statements by Mr Gordhan about 'proposed TEC intervention in KwaZulu were exactly in line with the strategy set out in the SACP/ANC revolutionary blueprint'. It indicated that Mr Gordhan could thus provide a starting point for an investigation.
In a further press statement, the IFP urged the Goldstone commission to investigate the issue immediately, as the plan 'had the gravest implications for stability' in KwaZulu. It proposed, in addition, that the commission investigate three issues: whether Mr Gordhan had told other members of the TEC about the document; whether other ANC and SACP members of the TEC were aware of the document, as was probably the case; and what the TEC intended to do, now that it knew of ANC/SACP plans to destabilise the area.
No inquiry was, however, initiated by the commission, nor did the commission provide any reason for its failure to investigate the document.
An editorial in The Citizen noted that the IEC was becoming more involved in KwaZulu. Mr Justice Johann Kriegler, chairman of the IEC, was 'about to descend on Ulundi [the KwaZulu capital] to get assurances from Chief Buthelezi that the election would go ahead in his territory without any intimidation by Inkatha'. (According to the Sowetan, Judge Kriegler had been mandated by Mr de Klerk and Mr Mandela 'to give Buthelezi a last option before the TEC and the government took "drastic action", possibly an army takeover'.)
In addition, The Citizen commented, 'the Goldstone report on third force activities by policemen, including three generals, … was being used as a means not only of whipping up sentiment against the policemen named, but in providing a stick with which to beat Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi'. Furthermore, it 'added to the excuses for possibly intervening in KwaZulu to bring about a situation similar to that which collapsed Mr Mangope's government'.
A task group appointed by the TEC to investigate hit squad activity in the KZP said, in a preliminary report, that such activity was 'rife'. The TEC immediately mandated its management committee (on which the ANC alliance held the majority) to 'take whatever steps might be necessary' to ensure a free and fair election in KwaZulu. The IFP slated the claims as a 'despicable travesty of justice'. Its spokeswoman, Ms Suzanne Vos, said: 'We are not on the TEC. It is dominated by the ANC and its communist allies. This is a deliberate propaganda attempt by the ANC. I would take a bet that none of these allegations would stand up in a court of law. It is a deliberate attempt by the ANC to bad-mouth the IFP and to destabilise KwaZulu'.
Chief Buthelezi also denied allegations of hit squad activity in the KZP and described these accusations as 'hideous propaganda'. He warned that South Africa was entering a period of unprecedented political crisis, while Parliament 'was being sidelined into irrelevancy'. He continued: 'We are perhaps rapidly approaching a situation in which the Machievellian dictum that "might is right" is going to dominate over the causes of political fair play and justice itself. It is critically important that … the transitionary mechanisms launched by the World Trade Centre negotiations should not be allowed to destroy the country in the name of the search for democracy and justice.'
At the same time as these events were unfolding in Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, the Ciskei administration had been coming under increasing pressure, with public servants-including members of the police and army-threatening to go on strike to secure pension payments. In mid-March the chairman of the Returned Exiles' Committee, Mr Pat Hlongwane, warned that 'Umkhonto had infiltrated Ciskei's defence force and that it was only a matter of time before they acted to overthrow that government, as they had in Bophuthatswana'. Mr Hlongwane stated that Umkhonto cadres had infiltrated the Bophuthatswana security forces months before the ousting of Chief Mangope, and it was these cadres who 'were responsible for the murder of three AWB members' in Mmabatho on Friday 11 March. Mr Hlongwane added that his own forces had in turn infiltrated Umkhonto, and hence knew what was being planned by the ANC's armed wing.
Within ten days of this warning, Brig Gqozo had resigned from office. He did so after 3 000 striking policemen and a number of soldiers had commandeered the Bisho police college, detained the territory's commissioner of police, Major General M Noqayi, and taken some 40 people hostage. The hostages included three brigadiers, two colonels and two captains, all of whom were accused of corruption. The strikers also claimed that Brig Gqozo had been placed under house arrest. The strikers, singing and chanting 'Viva ANC' issued a list of demands, including pension payouts before 28 March.
Brig Gqozo resigned on 22 March, stating that the situation in the Ciskei was getting out of hand, and that there was a possibility of large-scale bloodshed. According to Mr Pik Botha, Brig Gqozo's decision was prompted by his realisation that 'he ought to relinquish power in an attempt to reduce the growing tension'. The situation was not comparable to that in Bophuthatswana, said Mr Botha, because 'this was a request by an administration which is a member of the TEC for its control to be assumed by another administration'. The TEC resolved to send a two-member team from its management committee to the Ciskei. This team would be assisted by Mr Rusty Evans, director general of foreign affairs; Mr Sam de Beer, minister of administration with responsibility for the rationalisation of the civil service; and Mr Philip Dexter, general secretary of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union.
An editorial in Business Day said that the reincorporation of the homelands was happening before the scheduled time, and seemed to be occurring 'at the behest of the ANC'. Moreover, those affected were 'either ANC opponents or not slavish devotees' and it was 'hardly a coincidence that the ANC faithful such as Transkei military strongman Bantu Holomisa were not threatened by riots, pension demands or other "spontaneous" outbursts of public concern'. It urged the ANC to 'call off its revolutionaries', as it was 'being seen as an authoritarian bully'.
An editorial in The Citizen rejected the contention that the Ciskeian situation was not comparable to that in Bophuthatswana. 'It is clear,' the editorial continued, 'that Brigadier Gqozo was a victim of a plot to create conditions that were so volatile and threatening that he had no alternative but to resign. Three thousand policemen and an undisclosed number of soldiers mutinied over pay and pension benefits, which they wanted to receive before the reincorporation of Ciskei into South Africa. It was a similar protest over pay and pension benefits that caused a strike of civil servants in Bophuthatswana that led to the so-called uprising that gave the TEC and South African government the excuse to topple Mr Mangope.'
'We need hardly tell you,' the editorial continued, 'that Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is the next target, with the same tactics being used of stirring up protests over the pay and pension benefits of civil servants, including police and soldiers.' 'The stage is being set,' it concluded, 'for Chief Buthelezi to follow Mr Mangope and Brig Gqozo into the sunset.' The difference, however, was that 'Chief Buthelezi had a powerful organisation in the IFP', as well as the support of the Zulu monarch who 'was in no mood to allow his Zulu subjects to be swallowed up by an ANC, Xhosa-dominated government'.
In KwaZulu tension continued to rise. Judge Kriegler journeyed to Ulundi to address the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and demand assurances of free political activity in the territory before and during the election. Chief Buthelezi told the IEC chairman that all non-essential government buildings could be made available to the IEC for voting purposes. He said he could not accede immediately to all the requests made by the IEC chairman, as they 'needed to be discussed with tribal and other communities and individuals'. He suggested that a working committee be set up 'to co-ordinate [the meeting of] the IEC's requests'. (Judge Kriegler was heckled by members of the assembly, and Chief Buthelezi had to call for order during Judge Kriegler's address and the stormy debate that followed.)
The ANC said, however, that 'the time had come for the TEC to take charge in KwaZulu to ensure free political activity in the run-up to the elections'. This was accompanied by a warning from KwaZulu civil servants that 'they would strike if Chief Buthelezi had not been replaced by an administrator' by the following Monday. (Both calls were issued on Wednesday 23 March.) The ANC's deputy secretary general, Mr Jacob Zuma, said the government had given Chief Buthelezi 'too much leeway already'. 'The longer the government takes to act,' he continued, 'the more chance there is for Buthelezi and the IFP to prepare resistance. KwaZulu does not even have the excuse that it is so-called independent and government is treating it as if it is. Government and the TEC can just go in and tell Buthelezi he is no longer chief minister and remove him from that post with far more legal and moral credibility than they had in Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei.' Mr Jeff Radebe, the ANC's southern Natal chairman, demanded that the NPKF be deployed in KwaZulu, plus a large contingent of international observers. An ANC rolling mass action campaign, he added, would immediately commence. More than 1 000 public servants from KwaMashu, Umlazi and Umbumbulu (all near Durban) marched to KwaZulu offices to demand immediate pension payouts.
In KwaZulu and Natal, conflict continued. Two members of the IFP, both also members of the Umbumbulu Peace Committee, were shot dead shortly after a peace committee meeting in Engonyameni, near Umlazi. The chairman of the regional peace committee in the region, Mr M C Pretorius, said that there had been 'an ominous change' in the attitude towards peace monitors working in the region in the past week. He said monitors had always had a good relationship with the communities in which they worked. Following the murder of the two IFP monitors, however, 'the committee would send monitors only to areas where they were welcomed by the community'.
About 2 000 public servants, pupils and traditional leaders marched through Ulundi to reject the TEC and display support for the KwaZulu administration. A memorandum was handed to the district commandant of the KZP. The publicity secretary of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Mr Zenzele Phakati, told the crowd that 'bloodshed would follow if the ANC and the government attempted to dismantle KwaZulu'.
As tension mounted in Ulundi, the IFP denied allegations that it was attacking ANC supporters in the KwaZulu administration who had been named in a pamphlet distributed in the KwaZulu capital. Mr Joseph Masango, a member of the IFP's central committee, said that the IFP was committed to political tolerance and would not prevent Ulundi residents from exercising their democratic right to vote in the election.
The ANC began its programme of mass action in Natal with a march through Durban and a rally at Curries Fountain Stadium (Durban). Speakers demanded 'the immediate deployment of the SADF and NPKF to ensure free political activity' and warned of 'unprecedented mass action' if this demand was not met. The ANC condemned the ISD as the South African government's 'killing machine' and said it must be disbanded urgently.
The ANC alliance described the march as the 'mother of all rallies', and claimed 200000 participants. Police put the crowd at between 45 000 and 60 000. The alliance claimed that the rally proved that 'the ANC called the shots in Natal'. The IFP described the ANC march as a 'spectacular failure'. 'What was touted as the day Zulu-speaking citizens of Natal would amass in their tens of thousands and deliver to the ANC an unqualified mandate in favour of participation in the April 27 poll fizzled into the breathtaking non-event of the decade,' it stated. Mr Tillet said the expected Zulu supporters had failed to arrive. 'Instead the ANC had bused in Xhosas from Transkei and the eastern Cape to bolster its support.' The IFP said it had witnessed women with traditional ochre smeared on their faces-a tradition 'strictly observed and associated only with Xhosas'. Moreover, 'a cursory analysis of the profile of the marchers indicated that the vast majority of marchers were under 18 years, and therefore ineligible for voting'.
An article in the Sunday Nation said that the only way to ensure a free and fair election in KwaZulu was through 'decisive intervention by the TEC and the government to wrest control of the KwaZulu administration from Buthelezi'. It noted that the ANC had 'urged the TEC to move swiftly and take charge of the homeland'. It also acknowledged, however, that there were difficulties in taking such a step. According to Professor Marinus Wiechers (an expert in constitutional law at the University of South Africa), events in Bophuthatswana did not provide an adequate precedent. In Bophuthatswana, there had been 'a complete collapse' in administration, whereas 'KwaZulu could still be considered normal administratively'. However, Professor Wiechers continued, 'if the situation in KwaZulu deteriorated, then the South African government would be obliged to do something, as it did in Bophuthatswana'. A further difficulty, however, was that Chief Buthelezi and the IFP would be likely to offer resistance, and it was uncertain whether the SADF-which was already deployed on the east Rand, in Bophuthatswana and in the Ciskei-would be able to counter this effectively.
An article in the Sunday Telegraph in the United Kingdom predicted that South Africa would become 'the first country outside the former USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] to elect a communist government by supposedly "democratic" means, even though this might involve tens of thousands of deaths'. It said that what was happening in the country was 'the end-game of a sinister process that had been unfolding since 1984, when the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party, launched a deliberate campaign to eliminate by terrorism all their black rivals, particularly Inkatha'. It added that, 'having succeeded in destabilising Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, they had now switched their attention to achieving the same goal in Natal and KwaZulu'. The article criticised the British media, especially the British Broadcasting Corporation, for 'pushing the "fairy tale" that the peace-loving, democratic ANC, led by the saintly Mr Mandela, was about to come into its inheritance'. 'So flagrantly have they misled the world about what is happening,' the article concluded, 'that when catastrophe comes they should share some of the responsibility for having helped to bring it about.'
On 28 March thousands of Zulu loyalists armed with traditional weapons marched through Johannesburg in solidarity with the call by King Goodwill Zwelithini for sovereignty over KwaZulu and Natal. The protesters gathered at the Library Gardens in the city to listen to an address by two IFP leaders, Mr Humphrey Ndlovu and Mr Themba Khoza. A journalist reporting for The Star saw Mr Khoza reading a message on his radio pager and managed to decipher it over his shoulder. It said: 'ANC provocateurs placed among marchers. Instructed to begin random shooting.' The message came from the IFP information centre in Durban.
Within minutes shots were fired from the eastern edge of the crowd. 'For a few brief seconds the thousands of Zulus who had gathered in the Gardens did not react. It was as if the thought of someone firing into their massed ranks was too incredible to be true. Then they started to break for cover, running in all directions to escape the gunfire. Their bodies were crouched towards the ground as they ran.'
'Rooftop snipers had opened fire on the Zulus below and frantic police returned fire.' One of the snipers appeared to be positioned in a building in Market Street, and 'policemen kept their guns trained on the window where the suspected sniper had his lair'. Before the shooting began, Mr Rupert Lorimer of the National Peace Secretariat (established under the auspices of the National Peace Accord) had reported that the Zulu marchers were 'reasonably restrained'. By the time the carnage ended, six 'bloodied bodies were left in the Gardens'.
As chaos erupted at the Library Gardens, a breakaway group of loyalists marched towards Shell House, the headquarters of the ANC. 'ANC security guards opened fire on them and within minutes, 11 of these Zulus lay dead, caught on ANC turf. The ANC claimed the Zulus had tried to storm the building. But the IFP, police and the ANC's political opponents were adamant that this was not the case and that the security guards had opened fire on the marchers without provocation.'
Mr Tony Leon of the Democratic Party (DP) said he had seen 'what appeared to be snipers scurrying along the rooftops around Shell House, firing into the crowds'. Gen Constand Viljoen said the Freedom Front would ask the Goldstone commission to investigate 'the Johannesburg war'. He said that the ANC alliance aimed at 'the elimination of political parties from the contest' and that 'intimidation through fear' was an essential part of the revolutionary war it was waging against all who stood against it.
Police obtained a warrant to search the building, but were denied entry following the intervention of Mr Mandela. Mr Mandela told a press conference some days later that 'he had refused police permission to enter Shell House to gather evidence on the killing of the eight Zulus'. Mr Mandela said he had told the police that the timing of the intended search was most 'unfortunate'. This was because the SAP had not acted impartially. 'You must act in an even-handed manner,' Mr Mandela told the Witwatersrand police commissioner, Lieutenant General Koos Calitz. 'You must raid all the hostels-then you can raid Shell House.' According to a senior police source, Mr Mandela also said that the ANC 'would not in a thousand years co-operate with them in a search of the ANC headquarters and would defy a search warrant issued to the SAP'.
In the aftermath of the march, King Goodwill Zwelithini suggested a postponement of planned talks between himself, Chief Buthelezi, Mr Mandela and Mr de Klerk. He asked that the talks take place only after he had an opportunity to observe Holy Week celebrations. He said another reason for the postponement was the 'slaughter of the innocents'-the killing of some 50 IFP supporters in Johannesburg. He said that he was 'painfully aware that the deaths were a result of ordinary people marching in support of their king's call for the recognition of the sovereignty of the Zulu kingdom'. Chief Buthelezi called for 27 April-one of the days scheduled for the election-to be a 'national Zulu day of mourning' for the 53 people killed during the rally.
At the end of March the TEC resolved that 'intensified security operations' were necessary in KwaZulu and Natal, including the declaration of a state of emergency. Members of the SADF and police were to be given increased powers of arrest 'to prevent lawlessness and intimidation'. A government source said Pretoria was holding a 'sword of Damocles' over the KwaZulu administration.
Emergency rule was proclaimed on 31 March. 'It was evident from the proclamation in the Government Gazette that steps had been taken to directly inhibit the continued training of Inkatha "self-defence units" and the carrying of "cultural" weapons in public.' Both steps were met with anger by senior IFP leaders. Dr Mdlalose commented: 'No doubt, training people out of the country is exonerated. But the small, little training at Umfolozi must be punished.' Chief Buthelezi said he would still attend a meeting between himself, Mr de Klerk, Mr Mandela and King Goodwill Zwelithini, if this were arranged. He stated, however, that the meeting would take place in a 'sour atmosphere' because of the state president's 'appalling and shameful' declaration of emergency rule, and Mr Mandela's remarks that the KZP must be confined to barracks.
An editorial in the Sunday Tribune said there was a clear perception that Mr de Klerk had been 'coerced into [declaring emergency rule] by the TEC-or as Chief Buthelezi so bitterly remarked, "For TEC read ANC"'. 'That perception,' the editorial continued, 'had been reinforced by Mr Mandela's apparently precipitate announcement that the KZP would be confined to barracks and that KwaZulu would no longer have a minister of police, the post held by Chief Buthelezi.' In the light of these utterances, 'Mr de Klerk's assurances of independent decision making had a hollow ring'. The editorial noted, moreover, that some 1 200 soldiers and their weaponry could not bring peace in KwaZulu and Natal. Moreover, the emergency itself could not resolve the political crisis-and would, by definition, 'make free and fair elections impossible'.
Time magazine reported that the security forces would be given 'broad authority' to act against anyone promoting violence. They would decide 'which rallies to permit and which to ban'. They would be empowered to detain suspects-such as those conducting 'selfprotection training' for the IFP-and seize weapons. According to the magazine, 'De Klerk had stressed that Buthelezi was not being replaced-yet.' At the same time, 'De Klerk had warned that Pretoria could intervene in KwaZulu if it tried to block free elections'.
Soon thereafter an article in Business Day described the forthcoming election as 'the final act of a slow-motion coup'. It noted that the election would automatically be deemed 'free and fair', irrespective of how much violence might attend it, because 'the purpose of the exercise was not to solicit the electorate's true will, but to legitimise the transfer of power from one party to another'. This transfer of power had already occurred, it said, and 'there was no point in delaying the coronation'.
The article stated that the ANC had 'earned the right to govern by having engineered an extraordinary revolution'. It was extraordinary in particular for the patience and skill with which it had been executed. Also remarkable had been the ANC's 'brilliant use of propaganda to ensure that virtually all the blame for the rough stuff would fall on shoulders other than its own'. Nor had the revolution been relatively bloodless, as some had argued. On the contrary, it had been 'very bloody indeed'. The jury was still out, moreover, on the question whether-contrary to most modern revolutions-it might yet result in liberal democracy.
As hopes increased that international mediation might offer a way out of the impasse in negotiations, speculation mounted that two of the mediators would be Mr Henry Kissinger (former United States' secretary of state) and Dr Paul Kevenhorster, professor of political science at Munster University in Germany. Both men had previously expressed support for federalism in divided countries, and seemed thus likely to endorse Chief Buthelezi's call for a federal system in South Africa. Dr Kevenhorster had previously said that the transitional constitution did not secure federalism and that particular attention should be paid to the constitutional rights of provinces. Dr Kissinger had said earlier (in 1988) that 'South Africa's problems were too complex for a simple parliamentary solution, and there was a need for the vote to be exercised through a system of checks and balances and other appropriate institutions in a federal or confederal system'. According to a senior IFP negotiator, moreover, it was clear from recent experience around the world that federalism served better than unitary systems of government in protecting the different elements in a heterogeneous society and in limiting the abuse of power by a dominant majority. Accordingly, if international mediation took place, it would probably provide significant endorsement for the IFP's perspective. Soon thereafter it was announced that Dr Kissinger and Lord Carrington, former foreign secretary in the United Kingdom, would be arriving shortly to mediate between the ANC and the IFP.
Also in early April, it was reported that two of the three generals implicated by the Goldstone commission in third force activities were due to return to work. The two-Gen Basie Smit and Gen Johan le Roux-had refused to accept Mr de Klerk's order placing them on compulsory leave. Both had instead taken ten days' voluntary leave, and had warned they would resume duties on 5 April if no new information justifying action against them had been placed before the commissioner of police by then. General van der Merwe said on 4 April that he had not yet received any information which would enable him legally to exercise his discretion under the Police Act of 1958 to remove the generals.
The following day the two generals said they had been instructed by the commissioner to return to work, as the latter had received no further information on the basis of which he could act against them. Moreover, they said, Mr de Klerk had promised that an investigative team would make recommendations to the government within 14 days, and this period had already elapsed.
Rapport later revealed that, only three days before Judge Goldstone had published his 'third force' report implicating the three generals, his commission had declined to investigate further a police dossier detailing the involvement of Umkhonto and SDUs in arms smuggling, train violence and taxi wars. The dossier, the commission had said, 'did not justify investigation'.
The dossier, continued Rapport, had been submitted to the commission in February 1994. It stated that, in 1992, SDUs had been involved in at least 177 cases of murder and armed robbery; 27 cases of attempted murder; and numerous incidents of vehicle theft, attacks on security force members, illegal possession of weapons, and unauthorised possession of police and army uniforms. Members of SDUs, under questioning from the police, had acknowledged that trains were being attacked to kill Zulus. (They had also mentioned an incident when six SDU members from Orlando (Soweto) had attacked the 'wrong' carriage and killed ANC members by mistake. Two of the attackers involved in that incident had been charged with murder.)
The police report also described the arms caches being kept by Umkhonto in South Africa and neighbouring states, and the routes used to smuggle weapons into the country. The police said that some 22 000 tons of Umkhonto weaponry was being moved systematically from Angola to Namibia and the Transkei. Weapons were also being smuggled through the Caprivi Strip (Namibia) to Tokoza on the east Rand. (A woman had been apprehended on this route, carrying four AK-47 rifles, four magazines and almost 100 bullets. Four men smuggling weapons to Tokoza from another part of Namibia had been caught with a considerable arsenal.)
Another arms smuggling route, the police stated, was from Mozambique. In February 1993 two Natal members of Umkhonto had been caught at Golela (north eastern Natal) with an arsenal which included RPG missiles, Stechkin and Makarov pistols, hand grenades and some 3 000 AK-47 rifle bullets. The police report continued: 'Many other Umkhonto members have been caught nearby border posts with weapons, ammunition and explosive material.' It offered to make further details available if required. (The commission, noted Rapport, had intended to investigate the Golela incident but had been requested not to by the attorney general of the Transvaal, Dr Jan d'Oliveira, on the basis that this could prejudice any criminal prosecution. No such prosecution had been brought, however.)
The police report also contained a number of allegations that Umkhonto members were involved in the murder of IFP leaders. This aspect of the SAP report was indeed being investigated, the commission's secretary, Mr G Cuthbertson, told Rapport. Some 110 such murders were being investigated by a joint SAP and KZP team. This team's report was being examined by the commission's investigation unit in Natal, which had also launched its own probe in August 1993. Hence, although no specific investigation into the SAP's allegations was envisaged, this 'did not mean that the commission had done nothing about the information received from the SAP'.
While refusing to investigate the police dossier about the involvement of Umkhonto and ANC-linked SDUs in arms smuggling, the Goldstone commission at the same time announced that it had decided to investigate an allegation made on television about gunrunning for the benefit of the IFP. On 17 April, in a TV programme Agenda, a Mr Lafras Luitingh-whose company provided South African mercenaries to the Angolan government-said that he had information about alleged gun-running to the IFP from Unita rebels in Angola. The Goldstone commission immediately sought to contact Mr Luitingh, and said that it intended following up the allegation.
In early April media controversy mounted around an attempt by the KZP to buy 1 000 rifles from Eskom. As a result, the sale was cancelled and the Goldstone commission decided to investigate the transaction. The commissioner of the KZP, Lieutenant General Roy During, said there was nothing sinister or clandestine about the contract. He said it was an 'ordinary, above-board business transaction', and had not involved any clandestine element at all. Gen During said the KZP had never attempted to conceal its identity as the buyer. He himself, in his official capacity, had signed a letter accompanying an application for a permit for the purchase. In addition, the agreement had been concluded through an 'authorised arms dealer'.
The commissioner of police, Gen van der Merwe, told the commission that 'the acquisition of firearms by a police force (including the KwaZulu police force) was not an uncommon event'. The KZP was 'regarded and treated in all aspects like any other police force'. The KZP was thus 'entitled to obtain arms in any legal way'. The commissioner's office had been consulted on the contract, to establish whether a cabinet decision on the sale of armaments to 'independent' homelands also encompassed KwaZulu. According to legal experts, the 'decision did not apply to self-governing territories' and no permit was required for the transaction.
Within KwaZulu and Natal, tension mounted further. A member of the ANC's national executive committee, Mr Peter Mokaba, threatened that the ANC would march into Ulundi and warned Chief Buthelezi 'that he should learn from the events of Bophuthatswana'. The ANC's Youth League said it would continue with plans to isolate the IFP leader and bring about the withdrawal of the KZP. Meanwhile troops in armoured vehicles, armed with 90mm cannons, assembled on the outskirts of Ladysmith (northern Natal) as the final arrangements for their deployment in the region were made.
Mr V A Volker, an NP-supporting member of the executive committee in Natal, said that the Zulus were right to distrust the ANC. He said that 'resistance by KwaZulu, and especially by the Zulu king, to the interim constitution should be understood in the context of their determination not to become a victim of the SACP-dominated ANC. It should be seen and understood as their determined effort to resist the dissolution and destruction of the centuries-old respect for the monarchy and traditional structures'. He added that the ANC, in order to buttress its support in KwaZulu and Natal, had deliberately exploited and radicalised large numbers of unemployed urbanised youth, who could find no place in the country's shrinking economy. Any recognition the ANC alliance might accord the Zulu king would be purely expedient and equally transitory. 'The whole history and fabric of Communist parties over the world,' he said, 'provides evidence that they have always shown contempt for monarchies and traditional rulers. Their very policy of "power to the masses" can only be implemented if traditional leadership and value systems are replaced.' He added that 'at least 28 out of the top 50 of ANC candidates on their national list are, or have been until recently, also members of the SACP. The two top candidates on the Natal list are well-known as either hardline Stalinists or for their involvement in ANC torture camps'.
Violence in the region continued to intensify, and the death toll rose to 124 in the first week of April. At Ntuzuma, north of Durban, a man was necklaced, while fatalities in rural areas continued to mount.
Integration of Umkhonto cadres into the SADF proceeded and, in early April, the first 400 Umkhonto cadres arrived at Wallmannsthal (northern Transvaal), one of three designated assembly points. The chief of staff of Umkhonto and co-chairman of the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC), Mr Siphiwe Nyanda, said there were about 20000 Umkhonto cadres who might want to be part of a new defence force, but that 'it was estimated that only 16000 would turn up'. Structures for the new national defence force were expected to be in place by 22 April, ready to start serving as soon as the new government took over. A number of cadres, stationed in Ugandan and Tanzanian camps, 'would be recalled, with their assets and equipment, only once the country and the facilities were ready for them'.
The number and function of these cadres-who were to be recalled only at an unspecified time-was not explained. The IFP feared, however, that this group would be able to revive the armed struggle at any time, should this be considered necessary by the ANC alliance. By keeping this group in reserve, accordingly, the ANC alliance was taking care to retain its coercive capacity as regards both the government and its other opponents within the country-especially the IFP.
In addition, the role and whereabouts of the 4 000 or more Umkhonto cadres in the country-who were not expected to arrive at assembly points before the election-was not explained. This group, according to information in the possession of the IFP, was likely to constitute Umkhonto's special operations unit-which had been assigned primary responsibility for destabilising areas regarded as possible sources of 'counter-revolution'. These areas were principally in those homeland territories considered hostile to the ANC alliance-Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu. This group would also be responsible for mounting a 'show of force' at the time of the election. 'All Umkhonto and SDU cadres would turn out fully uniformed and fully armed' and the intimidatory effect on the electorate would be profound. (For this purpose, said the IFP, the ANC and Umkhonto had-as early as September 1993-began to import military uniforms from Cuba.)
There were indications, moreover, that the ANC alliance had little intention of surrendering Umkhonto's arms to the JMCC before the election. A report in the Sunday Times indicated that the question of Umkhonto arms caches-containing RPG-7 rocket launchers and various types of other heavy weaponry-had not been resolved at all. According to Mr Nyanda, an audit of arms was under way, and 'negotiations on the control of arms held by nonstatutory armed forces were continuing'. A senior SADF officer said that the integration of Umkhonto and the SADF-which had been intended to begin in February-had been 'delayed by hard bargaining' on the part of Umkhonto and that 'a political agenda on the part of MK had prevented the SADF from implementing practical solutions'. Precious time had been wasted on the peripheral issue of the arms, if any, to be issued to Umkhonto cadres integrated into the SADF, and it had finally been agreed to issue them with small arms (rifles for troopers and pistols for officers).
The IFP, on a number of previous occasions, had accused elements within the SADF of bias towards the ANC.xii As an increasing number of troops moved into KwaZulu and Natal in implementation of emergency rule, the IFP charged that the SADF was using its powers to intervene in township violence in a partisan way. In particular, it accused troops in Lindelani (an IFP-supporting shack settlement near Durban) of having shot dead a 13-year-old youth, and injured another. An eyewitness to the shooting incident stated that members of the SADF had asked him and several others to leave a particular area in the settlement. As they were moving up a hill, the troops had opened fire. Police, the witness reported, had thereafter arrived on the scene and fired teargas at the soldiers, who had retreated.
Mr Thomas Shabalala of the IFP's central committee said that 'the shooting was part of an imminent broader pattern of political oppression and repression which was to be activated in KwaZulu/Natal'. He reiterated the IFP's view that the 'mass deployment of soldiers and heavy artillery in the province was perceived as an act of invasion'. Mr Shabalala added that the shooting proved that the state of emergency had 'nothing to do with security and everything to do with party political action'.
In keeping with the call by the ANC/SACP alliance for mass action by civil servants in the region, a wave of strikes and work stoppages swept through KwaZulu and Natal. Public health services were crippled by strike action by Natal Provincial Administration staff, while 'teachers and other civil servants in Umlazi stopped work demanding inter alia that the administration of KwaZulu be taken over by the government and the TEC'.
As tension within the country deepened, Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini met Mr Mandela and Mr de Klerk near Skukuza (in the Kruger National Park, Eastern Transvaal) on 8 April to try to find a solution to the growing impasse. The ANC sought to drive a wedge between the monarch and Chief Buthelezi by offering the former special recognition of his royal status, including coronation in a ceremony of his choice. The issue of provincial powers was not addressed. The IFP demanded the lifting of the state of emergency, the recognition of the Zulu monarchy, increased and entrenched provincial autonomy, and a binding agreement that the outcome of international mediation would be reflected in the constitution. Chief Buthelezi also urged that the election be postponed to facilitate the resolution of constitutional disputes and make possible wider participation in the poll.
The meeting-widely reported as a failure-gave rise to an agreement regarding international mediation. The ANC and IFP agreed to involve an 'international mediation panel' in their negotiations, and resolved that this panel should 'facilitate the process of negotiations between the parties' in relation to a number of specified and agreed issues.
The agreement was reflected in a document entitled Consolidated Terms of Reference. Key to the document was a section entitled 'The Issues', which listed areas of contention. Among these were:
Ø. the powers of provinces, and the power of central government to override these;
Ø. fiscal and financial autonomy for the provinces;
Ø. the preservation of provincial autonomy during future stages of constitutional development;
Ø. the adjudicatory role of the Constitutional Court with regard to national and provincial constitution making;
Ø. the entrenchment of provisions governing fundamental human rights, constitutional guarantees and provincial autonomy;
Ø. the process of rationalisation and empowerment of the new provincial governments, with specific reference to certainty in the transfer of existing functions and assets to the new provinces; and
Ø. citizenship and residence requirements for active and passive electoral rights.
The document also stated that mediation would address the issue of 'the restoration of the kingdom of KwaZulu with specific regard to the right of self-determination of people on a territorial basis'.
The agreement reflected in this document was concluded, on Sunday 10 April, by Dr Frank Mdlalose, the IFP's national chairman, and Mr Thabo Mbeki, chairman and deputy secretary general of the ANC. A copy of this document was sent by telefax to one of the international mediators, Dr Henry Kissinger, on the same day.
International mediation was scheduled to begin on Tuesday 12 April. On Monday 11 April, however, the ANC's secretary general, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, had sight of the document agreed upon by Dr Mdlalose and Mr Mbeki the previous day. His reaction, according to an article in the Sunday Times, was to 'hit the roof' and then to intervene. The reason was that the agreed terms of reference made no mention of the election date. (This left open the possibility that a protracted mediation process might generate pressures for the election to be postponed to enable its completion.) Mr Ramaphosa then insisted that the terms of reference be amended by the addition of a further clause, stating specifically that the election date would not be subject to mediation. (The list of issues, contained in a different clause, was left untouched.)
Chief Buthelezi rejected the proposed amendment, 'accusing the government and the ANC of sabotaging the mediation process and colluding to keep Inkatha out of the election'. He stated that the terms of reference previously agreed by the ANC and IFP should remain the guide for the mediation process.
The government was reported to be willing to drop the contested clause. The ANC, however, 'would not budge'. The envisaged mediation process collapsed on Thursday 14 April, Dr Kissinger stating that his seven-member team could not do its work without the parties agreeing to the terms of reference.
Chief Buthelezi said, in response to the breakdown of the initiative, that he was disappointed that the endeavour had failed. He added that 'the government and the ANC had never favoured it'. It was unfortunate, however, that both had 'wasted an opportunity by which the IFP could have returned to the electoral process and to the elections'. 'Claims that the IFP had spoilt the mediation effort were nonsense,' he continued. 'The election date might have come up in discussions at some stage,' he said, but the IFP had no hidden agenda in relation to the issue. An editorial in the Sunday Times attributed the failure of the mediation attempt to the 'ruthless demolition of the Kissinger mission by the ANC'.
Returning to England, Lord Carrington expressed pessimism regarding South Africa, warning that the ANC would have 'trouble controlling militants after the election'. Mr Ramaphosa warned that more troops would be deployed in KwaZulu and Natal, while the IFP's chief negotiator, Dr Ben Ngubane, spoke of the dangers of 'kragdadigheid' and said that the issues could not be resolved by 'war-talk' but only by 'an all-inclusive settlement'.
In Ulundi a state of siege prevailed. 'To most of the 10 000 people in this Inkatha stronghold the reasons were simple: The ANC wanted to smash KwaZulu, destroy its king and break forever the Zulu nation.' People spoke 'of their king being insulted by Mr Mandela and Mr de Klerk, of their legitimate grievances being ignored, of plans to foist an alien culture on their traditional ways, of an ANC government that would, in the ways of the rest of Africa, quickly turn to dictatorship'. 'It will be one vote once,' said Dr Dennis Madide, a senior KwaZulu minister and member of the IFP. Many said they feared that the state of emergency was 'a mask for plans to invade Ulundi'.
In mid-April tensions deepened as evidence began to emerge that the ANC was blocking police investigation into the Shell House shootings in Johannesburg on 28 March. An article in Rapport noted that the ANC had reneged on the undertaking-given by Mr Mandela to the police-that weapons in Shell House would be handed over for ballistic testing following the fatal shooting of at least eight Zulus outside the building. It queried whether arsenals of weapons were hidden in the ANC's headquarters. It questioned what had happened to the photographs taken on the day by 'eye-in-the-sky' cameras mounted on police helicopters, which would have shown precisely what had occurred 'on the roofs from which sharpshooters had opened fire on the Zulus'. It queried on whose authority Mr Mandela had 'persuaded' the regional commissioner of police for the Witwatersrand, General Koos Calitz, not to proceed with a planned search of Shell House, for which a warrant had already been issued. The article alleged that an instruction to Gen Calitz to call off the search had come from 'senior government circles', after Mr Mandela had telephoned Mr de Klerk. (According to a further source, Mr Mandela had told Mr de Klerk that the ANC would scupper the whole negotiating process if the search proceeded.) It was deeply disturbing, the article continued, that the police investigation had been hampered so severely that it was unlikely that the guilty would ever be brought to justice.
A group of security policemen-some retired, and some still in service-complained to Mr de Klerk that the Goldstone commission was busy hunting down senior police officers who had faithfully served their country for many years, while ANC members who had murdered and maimed women and children in cold blood were being allowed to escape scot-free. The latter, they said, had resulted from the termination of police investigations into a number of such charges against ANC and SACP members after 1990.
In mid-April the IFP announced-and then withdrew-plans to march through the centre of Johannesburg. The march was to have encompassed Shell House and the Library Gardens, where wreaths were to have been laid in tribute to the IFP members killed on 28 March. A spokesman for the IFP's Youth Brigade said the organisation had no intention of 'invading Shell House', as had been alleged. 'They wanted to lay wreaths where their people were killed in accordance with Zulu customs and traditions.' (The ANC said that the march was intended to 'destabilise the PWV [Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging] region'.)
By mid-April the death toll in political violence in KwaZulu and Natal had risen to 226 since the beginning of the month. In most instances, the political affiliations of victims and the circumstances of their deaths were not reported in the press.
As the election came closer the NP stated that 'intimidation of its supporters was being orchestrated from some level in the ANC throughout South Africa'. The NP was barred from operating openly in eastern and western Cape townships. It was prevented from campaigning in townships in Natal. In the Transkei, its election campaign was hindered by the territory's military ruler and ANC ally, Major General Bantu Holomisa. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State, its supporters were being threatened or attacked. The DP also suffered intimidation at the hands of the ANC, particularly in the eastern Cape, the Witwatersrand and Natal. Following one instance of intimidation, the IEC fined the ANC R10000 after finding the party responsible for disrupting an NP rally in Postmasburg (northern Cape), where Mr de Klerk was hit by a stone. These restrictions on free political activity failed, however, to engage the attention of the TEC.
Soon thereafter it was discovered that six men had been detained at the ANC's regional headquarters in Johannesburg. Four were members of the IFP, and all had been tortured and beaten. The ANC said the six men were being held by the organisation-prior to being handed over to the police-because they had tried to break into a vehicle. The ANC was unable, however, to explain why there was a makeshift detention cell-a metal cage built around one of the passenger lifts-in the basement of the building. The ANC's regional chairman, Mr Tokyo Sexwale, later said that 'the six had been detained by a single security guard who had been conducting a private investigation'. Police stated: 'We simply don't accept that there was only one person involved.' The SAP promised a thorough investigation into charges including unlawful detention and assault.
Towards the end of April the Goldstone commission began preliminary investigations into the Shell House shooting in which at least eight IFP supporters were killed and about 20 injured. The police gave evidence that IFP members taking part in the march past the ANC headquarters had been 'relatively disciplined'. About 12 ANC security guards, however, one of whom was armed with an AK-47 rifle and others with pistols and shotguns, had moved from the main entrance of Shell House to one corner of the building. When a policemen asked the guards to return to the main entrance, one 'pointed his 9mm pistol at the police sergeant's chest and ordered him out of the way. He also threatened to shoot the policeman'. 'As the vanguard of the march approached to within 50m to 70m of the guards,' the police evidence continued, 'the ANC guards opened fire. Shots were also fired from a Shell House balcony, and marchers then returned fire.' The police said 'security forces deployed at Shell House at no stage saw gunmen among the marchers'. The police added that 'there was no reason whatsoever for the ANC guards to shoot at the marchers'.
The Freedom Front, led by Gen Viljoen, said that six smaller parties, as well as the IFP and the Conservative Party (CP), supported a postponement of the election. He said 'the entire election process had become a propaganda exercise'. Problems were being brushed aside by the IEC. He warned that the 'freeness and fairness' of the election would be judged-not by the extent of the intimidation accompanying it-but on whether the ANC won majority support. Gen Viljoen also queried whether the IEC was ready to conduct the election. If it were not, he said, and 'its logistics had not been well-planned', then this was reason enough to postpone the election, apart from political considerations.
On 19 April the ANC finally reached an accommodation with the IFP. It was agreed that the transitional constitution would be amended prior to the election, so as to recognise the role and status of the Zulu monarchy. It was further agreed that 'any outstanding issues in respect of the king of the Zulus and the 1993 constitution as amended will be addressed by way of international mediation, which will commence as soon as possible after the elections'. An editorial in Business Day said that both parties had been forced to give ground. The IFP had not secured a federal constitution, nor any further recognition for the status of the Zulu monarch than had been offered at the Skukuza meeting on 8 April. The ANC, however, had agreed to post-election mediation, which was likely to involve 'individuals who would be no pushovers and at least of some of whom would be sympathetic to Inkatha's views on federalism'. The agreement also 'effectively removed from the ambit of the Constitutional Assembly that forum's powers in the most crucial constitutional sphere-regionalism'. The IFP said that it was willing to enter the electoral contest in these circumstances. The ANC refused to postpone the poll, however, leaving the IFP six days in which to conduct its campaign.
Organisational chaos accompanied the election, which began on 26 April with the casting of special votes. Some 9m additional ballot papers had to be printed at short notice, and in many instances a sticker enabling voters to select the IFP was missing from ballot papers. In these instances, voters were told that 'they could write in the name of the IFP at the bottom' and then make a cross against it. This, Chief Buthelezi said, was unacceptable. Not only would it undermine the secrecy of the ballot, but it would also be of little help to the 60% of voters in KwaZulu and Natal who were illiterate. (When the IFP had entered the election on 19 April, the IEC had said it was too late to print new ballot papers containing the IFP's name. Its solution was that a sticker with the IFP's details would be fixed to every ballot paper by IEC officials manning the polls. When ballot papers went missing during the election, however-causing long delays in voting-the IEC was able to have a further nine million ballot papers printed within 24 hours, this time including the IFP's name, and have these airlifted to polling stations.)
Reports of irregularities abounded, with shortages of invisible ink (intended to mark voters' hands and prevent their voting twice) reported from many polling stations, as well as the widespread failure to seal ballot boxes properly. The statutory requirement to reconcile ballots before starting to count votes was abandoned. Thousands of ANC supporters were ferried by bus, at a cost of some R10 000, from the Transkei to cast their votes in Natal instead. Delays in obtaining ballot papers and stickers necessitated a fourth polling day in many areas, including KwaZulu and Natal.
According to the IFP the organisation won a substantial majority of votes in Kwa-Zulu/Natal. The ANC, however, refused to accept the results of the poll. According to the IFP, the IEC then determined that the vote for the IFP in the province had been 51,5%-considerably less, the organisation believed, than it had in fact attained. The ANC was accorded 32% of the vote in KwaZulu/Natal. Smarting at its defeat, the ANC in the region refused to accept the IEC's ruling and threatened to take court action. It ultimately withdrew this threat, having been advised by Judge Kriegler that the results certified by the IEC were 'beyond review or appeal'.
On 10 May Mr Mandela was sworn in as president in a government of national unity. Chief Buthelezi was appointed minister of home affairs, and Dr Mdlalose was elected premier of KwaZulu/Natal.
Also on 10 May, the central government assumed the powers of the four former provinces as well as the homelands. The deputy minister for provincial affairs and constitutional development, Mr Mohammed Valli Moosa, said this meant in effect that 'the new provinces did not have any powers'. Powers would be allocated to the provinces once the provinces had established new administrations which were capable of administering such powers.
(It was not until the end of August that substantial progress was made in transferring powers to provinces, the central government stating that numerous technical problems had previously made this impossible. By September the administration of some 875 laws had been transferred to the provinces.)
An Unchanged Agenda in the Post-election Period
This period reflected, in the IFP's view, a continuing determination on the part of the ANC to make KwaZulu/Natal ungovernable and to wrest control of the province from the IFP.
Though there had been little violence during the election itself, conflict flared again in KwaZulu/Natal in early May when at least 30 people were killed. The area worst affected was Umlazi, where nine people were killed and seven injured in separate incidents. Reports of deaths were received from a number of other townships in different parts of the province. The political affiliations of the victims and the circumstances of their deaths were not stated.
In early May it was reported that 'a team of international investigators led by Transvaal attorney general Dr Jan d'Oliveira had failed to find "substantive evidence" to support the Goldstone commission's allegations' regarding third force activities on the part of three generals and other senior police officers. Dr d'Oliveira said that 'the initial phase of evaluating whether a criminal offence had been committed was almost complete and had been overtaken by criminal investigations'. He stated that, at the stage reached, it was 'invidious and unfair' to link names to the investigation. 'We are not able at this stage to say,' he stated, 'whether evidence exists to justify a prosecution.' He added that the evidence available did not enable full exoneration either. Generals Smit and Le Roux resumed normal duties, and 'sources said this constituted an implicit acquittal'. Gen Smit announced, however, that he would be retiring from the police force at the end of the month, while the third general named in the report, General Krappies Engelbrecht, had already retired on grounds of ill-health.
Gen Smit stated that he was retiring 'because his career had been destroyed by the vague allegations in the Goldstone report'. He said it was an open secret that he had been earmarked as the next commissioner of the SAP. The allegations that he had been involved in gun-running to the IFP had destroyed any chances of that happening, however. He said that he was still unable to instruct his legal team on how to handle the matter, because 'neither the Goldstone commission nor Dr d'Oliveira had been able to put specific charges to him. The best he could get from Dr d'Oliveira was that the allegations against him related to two incidents of which very little specifics or evidence were available'. Gen Smit had almost 40 years' service with the SAP, and had been awarded eight service medals. He had headed the police investigation into Operation Vula, a clandestine plot by the ANC alliance to promote insurrection in the event of the failure of negotiations.
Delivering its findings on the KZP's attempted purchase of guns from Eskom, the Goldstone commission acknowledged that the KwaZulu administration and KZP had 'acted openly in relation to the purchase'. Judge Goldstone said it was unfortunate that the commissioner of police, Gen van der Merwe, had not consulted the minister of law and order, Mr Hernus Kriel, before issuing an export licence. Referring to the contention that no expert permit had been necessary in any event-as KwaZulu had been a self-governing rather than an 'independent' homeland-Judge Goldstone ruled that it was 'not necessary to resolve that issue'.
At the same time, the Goldstone commission also concluded its preliminary inquiry into the Shell House massacre, in which at least eight Zulus had been gunned down outside the ANC's headquarters. The commission decided 'it would be premature to establish a committee to hear evidence on the shooting of people outside Shell House without terms of reference', which could only be determined 'when the commission knew what witnesses and what evidence were available'. (The commission's only substantive finding, accordingly, was that there was prima facie evidence that an IFP leader had contravened the Electoral Act of 1993 by telling IFP marchers that the election would not take place on the scheduled dates.)
Later in the month the IFP said that confidential telefaxes being sent to its Ulundi offices were being intercepted by the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Mr Arthur Konigkramer, the IFP's national campaign manager, said that the inaugural address to be delivered by the IFP's Dr Mdlalose, premier-designate of KwaZulu/Natal, had been faxed to him in Ulundi but intercepted to a number in Empangeni. 'We know the NIS has an office in Empangeni,' he said, 'and we're sure that they're intercepting the line to our Ulundi offices.' Mr Konigkramer said this was 'crass and improper' and that he had no doubt that 'it had been going on for some time'. (Ilanga later reported that 'the facsimile machine coupled to that of the KwaZulu/Natal premier, for intercepting his mail, was located in the warehouse of the Mondi pulp and paper mill at Richards Bay (northern Natal)'. Telkom told Ilanga that the owner of the machine had asked Telkom not to list the number, nor to reveal his identity. The management of the Mondi mill denied that the company would have asked that the number be kept secret and promised an internal investigation.)
By mid-May the death toll in violence in KwaZulu/Natal had risen to some 410 since the beginning of April. The Human Rights Committee (HRC)-formerly the Human Rights Commission-called for the state of emergency in KwaZulu/Natal to be lifted. The constitutional authority for its continuation, following the inception of the transitional constitution on 27 April, remained unclear. (In terms of the transitional constitution the state of emergency was to lapse 21 days after the government of national unity took office.)
Addressing an IFP victory rally in KwaZulu/Natal in mid-May, Chief Buthelezi called for peace and reconciliation in the province. 'Go out and break down the barriers that divide you from your political opponents,' he said. He warned that there would be no economic development in the region until peace was achieved. Chief Buthelezi also said that the media had 'demonised' him and the IFP in the run-up to the election. He said that 'journalists and editors had had a field day vilifying him both in South Africa and abroad'. Congratulating his supporters on their victory, Chief Buthelezi said, 'We had no money, we had the media against us, we had gurus at universities against us.' He decried the fact that the IFP had had only six days in which to campaign.
Also in May, an IFP leader was killed outside his home in Mvutshini Reserve, near Margate (Natal south coast). Mr Wilson Xolo was attacked and killed by a group of people as he left his home for work early one morning. The IFP expressed shock at the incident, and an IFP spokesman, Chief Calalakubo Khawula, 'appealed to all the people in the area to observe the principles of peace and tolerance'. Soon thereafter an induna (headman) was fatally shot near Port Shepstone. Mr Tillet said 'there were indications that the serial killing of IFP leaders had not abated'.
An editorial in Ilanga in early June called for the lifting of the state of emergency in KwaZulu/Natal. It said its continuation was not only unconstitutional but also 'poisoned the spirit of reconciliation amongst the major players in the region'. It added that emergency rule had been 'ineffective in suppressing violence, and was rightly perceived as little more than a club to beat KwaZulu and the IFP with, in the absence of an inclusive political settlement'. (The state of emergency was lifted at the end of August.)
The Ilanga editorial welcomed the ANC's decision to disband SDUs on the east Rand, and said this was 'a welcome admission that these structures were a Frankenstein monster, which lay at the heart of violence'. 'A good part of this violence,' it continued, 'emerged from the extensive ANC militarisation which followed its 1990 unbanning. ANC so-called self-defence units proliferated, and new recruits were sought for its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, in their thousands. This was directly linked to an upsurge in murders of KwaZulu government, traditional and IFP leaders both in KwaZulu/Natal and in the PWV region.' It added that SDUs and Umkhonto were 'little more than efficient instruments for the informal repression of political opponents'. They had also bred a predictable response-the formation of KwaZulu self-protection units. The IFP recognised, however, that the time for all this was past. 'In KwaZulu/Natal the training of self-protection units at KwaZulu Mlaba Camp had ended some time ago and would not continue.' The ANC's leaders in Natal, such as Mr Harry Gwala, needed to follow the example set on the east Rand and deal with their own SDUs.
Judgement was handed down in the trial of IFP supporters charged with having led and participated in the Boipatong (Vaal Triangle) massacre, in which some 50 people had been murdered in June 1992. The six leaders of the attack were each sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment, while seven other participants were each sentenced to 15 years and four youths to ten years each. Mr Justice J Smit said 'he had weighed up the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the matter and found the mitigating factors out-weighed the aggravation'. It followed that the death penalty was not appropriate. Describing the mitigating factors, Judge Smit said that all the accused, residents of a hostel outside Boipatong, 'had themselves been victims of cruel attacks and had been driven from the township by ANC self-defence units and comrades', and forced to live in KwaMadala Hostel. They had planned a revenge attack on their political opponents, but the attack 'had gone wrong and innocent women and children had been slaughtered'. (The defence applied for leave to appeal.)
In mid-June an ANC MP, Mr Peter Mokaba, stated that 'the ANC was determined to rule every part of the country and would use its national majority to break the IFP'. Another ANC MP, Dr Michael Sutcliffe, said it was 'unconstitutional and unilateral' for the IFP-which held the majority in KwaZulu/Natal-to decide on Ulundi as the capital of the province. The ANC resolved to boycott meetings of the provincial government held in Ulundi, and Mr Mokaba said: 'We are determined to march to Ulundi, but not as the capital.'
In a report to the government, Gen van der Merwe criticised the Goldstone commission and said that 'incalculable damage' had accompanied its allegations of police involvement in third force activities. 'No commission,' it said, 'had the capacity to repair the damage once false accusations had been made.' Gen van der Merwe questioned how many attacks on the police and on hostel and other residents were directly linked to the perceptions created by such allegations. (More than 270 policemen had been killed in 1993, 171 of whom were murdered while off-duty.) The Goldstone commission, Gen van der Merwe indicated, had conducted some 20 investigations against the police. In at least 14 cases, however, the 'allegations made by the commission could not be substantiated'. 'All these allegations,' he continued, 'had been widely publicised, in a sensational manner, in the media both local and foreign, and this had caused irreparable damage to the image of the police force and the morale of its members.'
Towards the end of June a young man was found necklaced in the Amouti area, about a kilometre from Bhambayi. He was believed to have been the victim of a 'people's court'. His forearm had been chopped up and his body was surrounded by bricks, presumably used to stone him prior to the burning. Police believed he had been killed in broad daylight, but could not find witnesses prepared to talk about the incident. Residents living in the area said they had seen and heard nothing.
In early July Mr Harry Gwala was suspended from the SACP amid allegations that he had targeted ANC and SACP leaders in KwaZulu/Natal for assassination. Those believed to be on his 'hit list' included the leader of the ANC in Natal, Mr Jacob Zuma; SACP national leader and ANC MP, Dr Blade Nzimande; and the SACP Midlands regional secretary, Mr Ben Martin. It appeared that 'tensions between Gwala and Nzimande had reached breaking point when the SACP regional leadership did not back Gwala in a threeway race for the ANC's nomination for premier of KwaZulu/Natal'.
The IFP called for Mr Gwala's immediate suspension from public office and a police investigation into the claims. 'The revelations cast a shadow,' it said, 'over his continued role in the provincial legislature. If Gwala is prepared to kill political rivals within his own ranks, the IFP shudders to think what he would be prepared to do to political opponents in the IFP.'
Also in early July, the ANC handed over 39 firearms to the police in connection with the Shell House massacre on 28 March. The weapons given to the police, however, 'did not include assault rifles which witnesses said had been used in the shootings'. Mr Cyril Ramaphosa explained the delay in handing over the weapons on the basis that the 'election had delayed the process'. 'The climate,' he stated, 'was now conducive to co-operation.' The handing over of the weapons followed questions in Parliament by acting DP leader, Mr Tony Leon, as to the progress of the police investigation.
The IFP's chairman in the Transvaal, Mr Themba Khoza, charged the ANC with 'handing over the weapons to divert attention from a cover-up'. He added that 'the failure of the police to search the building immediately after the shootings had destroyed public confidence in the investigation'. He called on the police force to explain its role in the 'obstruction of investigations by the IFP' and said that his party had been barred from attending the 90-minute meeting between the police and ANC which had culminated in the handing over of the weapons.
Mr Marthinus van Schalkwyk, spokesman for the NP, said that the fact that the ANC had handed over the weapons only after public pressure was shocking. 'The ANC's actions create the impression that there is something going on at Shell House which the ANC does not wish to disclose,' he said.
(The National Assembly subsequently established a select committee to investigate whether the minister of safety and security, Mr Sydney Mufamadi, had deliberately misled Parliament in answering Mr Leon's questions on the issue. Mr Mufamadi had said that police had been allowed 'unrestricted access' to Shell House to investigate the shootings. Mr Mufamadi had also said he was not aware of a memorandum from the police stating that they could not gain access to the building. Introducing the motion for parliamentary investigation, Mr Leon said that Mr Mufamadi had either misled Parliament or been misled by officials in his own department. Alternatively, he had 'confused his party-political responsibilities with his ministerial function', to the detriment of Parliament.)
Also in early July, a local IFP leader, Mr Mdaphune Xolo, and two other men were killed in an ambush outside Mr Xolo's home early one afternoon. Violence flared in the area (at Gcilima near Margate) and at least 30 houses were burnt in fighting which also affected adjoining Mvutshini. A member of the Port Shepstone peace committee said the problems in the area 'had become acute since the local chief fled in late 1993 after an attempt on his life'. The IFP chairman of nearby Izingolweni, Mr James Zulu, accused the ANC of a hidden agenda, implying that it was not being 'fair and faithful' in ostensibly pursuing peace. 'Five IFP leaders have been killed in the area,' he said, 'in the past month.' (The deaths brought the fatality toll in KwaZulu/Natal to 21 within the space of a week.)
The KwaZulu/Natal premier, Dr Mdlalose, and the ANC's leader in the province, Mr Zuma, issued a joint statement condemning recent violence, especially in the vicinity of Port Shepstone. They condemned senseless killings and destruction of property and urged their supporters to resolve problems through negotiations.
The HRC reported that 'ANC youth gangs had been terrorising communities on the south coast for some time' and that this trend was now spreading, 'particularly in the Durban and Maritzburg townships'. A researcher for the organisation, Ms Linda McLean, said that 'community grassroots structures had collapsed in many areas, leaving communities leaderless. This was giving rise to kangaroo courts, gangsterism and internal conflict-behaviour underpinned by high poverty, drug abuse among youth, unemployment and the psychological harm of a decade of civil war'. She said that renegade SDU gangs were terrorising people in Bhoboyi outside Port Shepstone as well as the Smero community in Edendale (outside Pietermaritzburg). The HRC said that 'a heavily armed group of Smero renegade SDUs terrorised the Edendale district for five months, killing five youths in June alone. Before the gang was neutralised by arrests, members used to stroll around in daylight disguised as women and change into combat camouflage uniforms at night'.
Towards the end of July a group of young gunmen 'forced their way into a hut in rural Ndwedwe [north of Durban] in KwaZulu/Natal and mercilessly gunned down a family of seven. The family were known members of the IFP and the attackers were alleged to be young ANC supporters known to the police'. A nine-month-old baby survived the attack, and was found lying next to its dead mother. Several spent AK-47 cartridges were found at the scene. Within a week, a total of 'fifteen people, all with links to Inkatha', had been killed in the Ndwedwe area.
In late July the IFP objected to the screening of a three-part television series, entitled The Line. This depicted the IFP as responsible for the pre-election train murders in which hundreds of people had been killed. It also implied that the IFP and the SAP were primarily responsible for political violence in the country. The IFP Youth Brigade demanded the scrapping of the mini-series, 'saying it was vitriolic in its bias against the IFP and Zulus'. (A portion of the script stated: 'Inkatha wants to kill me. Inkatha are dogs!') IFP supporters marched on the headquarters of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to demand that the television series be cancelled. IFP spokeswoman Ms Suzanne Vos said: 'It is not censorship we seek, but sensitivity.'
The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) berated the producers of the series, saying that they were ANC-aligned and had focused on IFP-instigated violence while 'conveniently ignoring other actors'. The PAC publicity director, Mr Siphiwe Sithole, said 'a clear distinction had to be drawn between freedom of expression and sheer slander'. The film, he said, blamed the IFP for atrocities and killings 'as if it had been proven beyond doubt that the IFP was solely responsible'. The PAC added that 'the film was not factual and should be withdrawn'. (The series was taken off the air, after the screening of the first episode, in response to objections by the IFP. It was, however, later screened in full on Saturday 31 July.)
In mid-August the deputy executive president from the minority party, Mr F W de Klerk, acknowledged that 23 military intelligence generals and senior officers had been placed on early retirement or compulsory leave in December 1992 on the basis of a verbal report by the chief-of-staff, General Pierre Steyn. (Gen Steyn had been instructed to investigate the 'third force' allegations made by the Goldstone commission against the Directorate of Covert Collection.) Three written reports had subsequently been compiled and referred to the Transvaal attorney general for a decision on whether to bring criminal charges against any of the officers. The attorney general had found 'there was insufficient evidence to support the allegations'. Mr de Klerk said that 'in some instances, there was reason to believe that some of the people had been involved in activities beyond the scope of their duties, in unauthorised activities and also in illegal activities'. He stated, however, that he was not aware of any hit squads, 'nor of any illegal actions by the previous government aimed at the killing of people'. 'As nothing could be proved,' he added, 'it would be indiscriminate to issue general information.' Mr Leon said Mr de Klerk's acknowledgement that senior military officers had been discharged on the strength of a verbal report 'was deeply disturbing, if not profoundly startling'.
Colonel Eugene de Kock-implicated by the Goldstone commission (together with three SAP generals) in gun-running to the IFP and arrested on charges of murder, attempted murder, weapons smuggling, and fraud-applied for bail in mid-August. In affidavits lodged with the court, Col de Kock said that 'retired SAP general Krappies Engelbrecht was the main target of the investigating team'. This had emerged when a member of the investigating team had sought to convince one of Col de Kock's co-accused, Lieutenant Wouter Mentz, to make a statement. This has been done on the basis that the team was not really interested in prosecuting him (Lt Mentz) but 'they wanted to get Krappies Engelbrecht'. Col de Kock said the investigating team had offered him indemnity if he testified against high-ranking police officers, while the Goldstone commission had made a similar offer, and promised to relocate him anywhere in the world. Col de Kock said his seven co-accused had all been offered bail soon after their arrests, while the state had strongly opposed his own release. 'The fact that he was the only one being refused bail,' he said, 'gave him the impression that his continued detention was being used to pressure him' to give the information desired. He added that 'three former Vlakplaas unit members, now turned state witnesses, had been offered "substantial amounts" of money to testify before the Goldstone commission about alleged police hit squads or third force activities'. At least two of them, moreover, had been in serious financial difficulties at the time. He said that one of the main witnesses against him, Captain Chappies Klopper, was involved in drug smuggling and also harboured a serious grudge against Col de Kock. This was because Col de Kock had caught him 'in a compromising sexual position' with a prostitute. Col de Kock denied that he had supplied arms to the IFP.
Responding to a decision by Mr Mufamadi to investigate 'hit squads' within the KZP, Chief Buthelezi said this was 'tantamount to adding salt to healing wounds'. He added that 'Umkhonto we Sizwe was no more than a conglomeration of hit squads and should also be investigated'. Addressing the IFP Youth Brigade in Ulundi, he said he was concerned at 'the inappropriateness of singling out the KZP amongst a total of 11 police forces for such investigation, as if it were the only nigger in the woodpile'. He stated that he 'would not mind if at the same time there were investigations into how many IFP people had been killed by cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe'.
Chief Buthelezi later disclosed the contents of a letter to Mr Mufamadi in which he warned that an inquiry into hit squad activity in the KZP could sour the IFP's relationship with the government of national unity and might necessitate his 'weighing up the value of his being in the government of national unity against the costs of being in it'. The letter stated:222
I want to say at the outset that I would never stand in the way of any criminal activity being investigated which would lead to the prosecution of any member of any police force who was involved in killings and murder. If there are specific allegations against specific members of the KZP, cases should be opened. Evidence to justify the investigation you are initiating must necessarily be evidence which could equally justify criminal proceedings. If criminal proceedings are not justified, then an inquiry is not justified.
Chief Buthelezi stated that the 'background to the inquiry was politically charged'. For years, he added, 'the ANC had sought to discredit the KwaZulu government. Following the political destruction of Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, Mr Joe Slovo [chairman of the SACP] had said "two down and one to go"'. His constituents, Chief Buthelezi warned, were 'asking how he could tolerate being in a government of national unity in the face of what they saw as a continuation of the ANC propaganda war' against himself, the IFP and KwaZulu. 'If the inquiry into the KZP is going to go ahead,' he stated, 'we will be facing serious questions about the value of the government of national unity in the political reconciliation and healing process.'
Towards the end of August violence intensified in KwaZulu/Natal and at least 30 people were killed in a weekend of conflict. 'The toll included three people who died after a hand grenade exploded in a packed beer hall in Umlazi's Glebelands Hostel complex.' Eight people were killed in other incidents of violence in the township. By the end of the week, the death toll in the province had risen to 47. Five youths, all under the age of 20, were killed during a pre-dawn attack on a house in Mvutshini, an IFP stronghold. The HRC claimed that the men were ANC supporters. It did not explain whether the youths had been living in the house-which seemed unlikely given the IFP affiliation of the area-or had been engaged in an attack on the house. According to the police, 'the attackers struck at about 4am and were armed with AK-47 rifles, shotguns, pistols and grenades'.
Also at the end of August, Chief Buthelezi urged the IFP to begin preparing for local government elections the following year. He said that the ANC had been 'a victim of its own political propaganda in the April election' and had been 'stung into bitter resentment' by the IFP's electoral success in KwaZulu/Natal. The ANC, he warned, 'was now trying to drive a wedge between himself and his nephew, King Goodwill Zwelithini'. 'All this,' he continued, 'was meant to split the Zulu nation.' He added that 'ANC leaders believed they would romp home to election victories in the province if they had Zwelithini in their back pocket'.
Chief Buthelezi said he was concerned that King Goodwill Zwelithini had invited Mr Mandela to attend a Shaka Day celebration on 24 September without first consulting the IFP leader, as had been done in the past. He said he did not think people in the province would appreciate the invitation to the president, because of the way in which it had been done. He added that 'some indunas from the Reef had visited his home to express their concern about the way President Mandela had been invited'.
As rumours continued of a rift between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini, the IFP leader said that he 'had no quarrel or squabble with the king'. 'The problems that have occurred as to whether there is any misunderstanding between us,' he added, 'have been created by the KwaZulu/Natal leaders of the ANC.' Chief Buthelezi added that no formal invitation had been issued by the king to Mr Mandela to attend the Shaka Day celebrations. 'There was no doubt, however, that some informal invitation was extended by the king to Mr Mandela.' Chief Buthelezi stated that he, as traditional prime minister, and KwaZulu/Natal premier, Dr Mdlalose, were entitled to know the invitation list, 'so that proper arrangements could be made and correct protocol could be adhered to'. King Goodwill Zwelithini later confirmed that he had not yet issued a formal invitation to Mr Mandela, indicating that he intended first to consult everybody concerned.
Also in early September, the IFP accused the ANC of breaking the April agreement which had brought the IFP into the election. At a meeting of the Constitutional Assembly, IFP speakers said that they were 'determined that international mediation on disputed elements of the transitional constitution should go ahead'. 'This,' they charged, 'was agreed upon in the historic April 19 deal.' To jeers from the ANC benches, an IFP senator, Mr Peter Smith, said 'the agreement was one of the most solemn ever entered into in the country', but it was now being regarded by the ANC as null and void. Mr Smith said it had been perfectly clear from the terms of the agreement that international mediation was to precede the work of the Constitutional Assembly. The assembly had begun its work, and the IFP had compromised by agreeing that this should go ahead. 'A place has now to be found for international mediation to go ahead, hand-in-hand with the work of the Constitutional Assembly,' he stated.
In mid-September the IFP accused King Goodwill Zwelithini of having joined forces with the ANC 'to satisfy his lust for power'. IFP officials said that the king had always wanted executive powers for himself, and had never been content with the role of constitutional monarch. A source in the IFP predicted that 'the king would try to split the party's tiny majority in the provincial legislature and prevent the establishment of the traditional house of leaders'. The source said the king 'would be a fool if he really believed the ANC would give him exclusive powers'. He added that the ANC had 'miscalculated in believing that the king had been responsible for the IFP's electoral success' in the province.
Chief Buthelezi said that relatives of the royal family were intent on vilifying the IFP and its leaders. He rejected allegations that the IFP was 'riding on the back of the king for political gain', and said this was one of the greatest ironies, since 'it was the IFP which had sacrificed so much for the position of the monarchy and the KwaZulu kingdom'. 'It is a fact,' he said, 'that had the IFP not fought for the monarchy and the kingdom of KwaZulu, until less than a week before the elections, it would certainly have won more seats, both in the KwaZulu/Natal provincial parliament and in the South African Parliament.'
He criticised members of the Zulu royal family who said he was not officially the king's traditional prime minister, saying 'he had served in that capacity long before the present king had taken over the throne'. An IFP official said that 'the ANC was trying to lure the king into its camp', and was making 'blatant overtures' to the monarch.
Traditional leaders in Natal requested Mr Mandela not to attend the Shaka Day celebrations. They said they had not been consulted regarding the invitation, and correct protocol had not been followed. 'This had a negative effect on the image of the king, the monarchy, and the meaning of Shaka Day.' They warned that violence in the province 'could be fanned by Mr Mandela's presence at the celebrations'.
King Goodwill Zwelithini postponed the date of the annual reed dance at Nongoma (northern KwaZulu/Natal) at short notice, making it impossible for Chief Buthelezi to attend as he was otherwise committed on the new date. 'The postponement came in the wake of reports that King Goodwill was poised to announce the installation of his half-brother, Prince Mcwayizeni Zulu, as his senior adviser.' Prince Mcwayizeni was an ANC MP who had left KwaZulu many years previously.
Following the stoning of Mr Mandela's helicopter during the president's visit to Nongoma, King Goodwill Zwelithini announced that he had cancelled Shaka Day celebrations. In response, Chief Buthelezi said that 'the issue of Shaka Day celebrations was not a personal matter. If the king wanted to make a decision he would have to call the amakhosi and the Zulu nation to inform them about this'. Chiefs from the Msinga area (Natal Midlands) stated that the king could not decide the matter unilaterally, and Dr Mdlalose declared that the celebrations would go ahead.
Chief Buthelezi said he was 'very upset' about the demonstration at the king's palace and denied reports of a rift between himself and the king. He said he 'had parted on good terms with the king the night after the meeting, at which Mr Mandela had announced that he had decided not to attend the Shaka Day celebrations because of security fears'. Plans for the celebrations went ahead, and the KwaZulu/Natal administration said it hoped the king would attend, and that elaborate security arrangements would ensure his safety. This followed a decision by the provincial cabinet that 'the king did not have the constitutional right to order the regional government to stop the celebrations from going ahead'.
Prince Sifiso Zulu-according to the IFP, a commoner with no claim to royal blood and part of the conspiracy to drive a wedge between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini-was interviewed by the SABC on a live Agenda television programme. The interview took place in Durban, at the same time as Chief Buthelezi was being interviewed elsewhere in the SABC complex. Reacting to Prince Sifiso's allegation that he (Chief Buthelezi) was no longer the king's traditional prime minister, the IFP leader entered the studio where the Agenda programme was in progress, and confronted Prince Sifiso. Chief Buthelezi said the prince drew a gun and tried to assassinate him. The prince was later arrested and charged with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. In June 1995 Prince Sifiso was convicted in the Durban regional magistrate's court of possession of a firearm and ammunition, and was fined R3 000. 'The magistrate said there was no doubt that the firearm had not been planted on the prince as claimed by him during the trial.'
Television footage of the incident, showing Chief Buthelezi entering the studio and confronting Prince Sifiso-but not the drawing of the gun-was subsequently screened a number of times by the SABC. The chief executive of the SABC, Mr Zwelakhe Sisulu, appeared on television and strongly condemned Chief Buthelezi for infringing the constitutional right to free expression. Chief Buthelezi said that the SABC's coverage had been biased and partisan, and brought a complaint before the Broadcasting Complaints Commission.
In early November the Broadcasting Complaints Commission gave its ruling on Chief Buthelezi's claim. The commission 'reprimanded the SABC for broadcasting a subtitled translation of Buthelezi's comments during the incident that was inaccurate and derogatory in the extreme'. 'The sensitivity of the situation,' it said, 'should have alerted the [SABC] to the need for extra caution in obtaining and verifying the translation.' The commission found, however, that the SABC had acted within its rights in broadcasting criticism of the incident by Mr Sisulu. It said the SABC's code of conduct was different from that pertaining to the British Broadcasting Corporation, which 'demanded impartiality from broadcasters'. The commission concluded that 'SABC coverage had taken fair and balanced coverage of Buthelezi's point of view'.
An editorial in The Citizen said it was clear that the rift between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelithini reflected 'an anti-Buthelezi intrigue in the royal household'. The aim of this, it stated, had been 'to break Chief Buthelezi's influence with the king and to put the ANC-supporting Prince Mcwayizeni Zulu in Chief Buthelezi's place'. While the prince-seemingly successfully installed as the king's senior adviser-gave the assurance that the monarch would 'remain free of any political ties', this was difficult to believe. The editorial said it might be in the narrow political interests of the ANC to undermine the power of Chief Buthelezi and divide the Zulu nation, but it was contrary to the interests of the country as a whole to risk 'a renewal of the KwaZulu/Natal civil war'.
Also in September, Col de Kock was denied bail by a magistrate's court in Pretoria, and appealed to the Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Pretoria. Counsel for Col de Kock said it should be accepted that 'the strength of the state's case against Col de Kock was the same as that against other policemen, who had been released on bail by agreement'. This showed that the strength of the state's case was a small factor in the state's opposition to bail for Col de Kock and 'that the real reason for the opposition should be sought elsewhere'. The bail application was again refused.
Later in the month, Chief Buthelezi said that a cabinet decision to divest him of key responsibility for the conduct of the local government election had deliberately been taken behind his back. Chief Buthelezi said the cabinet had ignored his proposals and had 'decided on the matter while he was out of the room meeting the Egyptian ambassador'. It had earlier been agreed that a national and provincial task group would oversee the election, and Chief Buthelezi had proposed that he recommend the appointment of the task group's chairman. Instead, the cabinet-in his absence-had decided that the chairman should be appointed by Mr Mandela, on the recommendation of Mr Roelf Meyer, minister of provincial affairs and constitutional development.
In mid-October the DP said that more than six months had passed since the shooting of IFP supporters outside Shell House, and that the police investigation had thus far yielded no results. Four months had passed before the ANC had agreed to co-operate with the police, and it had done so then 'only after huge pressures in Parliament and from the public'. The DP added that 'the fact that several people had been killed, allegedly by ANC security guards firing from within the building, seemed to be undisputed'. The key question, it said, was 'what the police had done about it'.
Also in mid-October, Chief Buthelezi warned that the IFP might boycott the local government election in 1995 if international mediation did not take place to 'secure the position of the king and the kingdom of KwaZulu' and other outstanding matters. He also warned that the role of traditional leaders should not be eliminated in local government restructuring. If traditional leaders did not remain charged with administration in rural areas, he stated, this would 'spell the death warrant' for traditional communities.
Soon thereafter, Chief Buthelezi again called for international mediation in terms of the agreement signed on 19 April. He said that he regarded both Mr Mandela and Mr de Klerk as 'men of integrity', and that he hoped that the agreement would therefore soon be honoured. He added that he had been discouraged by the attitude of ANC members in the Constitutional Assembly, who had shouted down IFP senators when they stated that international mediation had yet to take place.
As violence flared again on the KwaZulu/Natal south coast, the IFP denied that its supporters were responsible for the massacre of 13 people near Margate. The IFP said the ANC had launched an attack on an IFP stronghold in the area. IFP supporters had fought back, and 13 of the attackers had been killed in the process. The IFP said it was willing to co-operate in a police investigation into the deaths.
Towards the end of October the IFP said that the IEC had failed to record any votes in six districts in KwaZulu/Natal in the April election. The districts were Babanango, Ingwavuma, Kranskop, Mooi River, Msinga and Umvoti. The estimated number of voters within these districts totalled some 180 000. Mr Farouk Cassim, an IFP MP, said he had requested the IEC to explain the situation in August, but the commission had failed to do so. He said he had also asked for results in Lower Tugela and Maphumulo (both north of Durban), again to no avail.
In early November the NP tabled a motion before the National Assembly's select committee on justice, calling for Parliament to give the committee a mandate to probe allegations that the ANC had obstructed the police investigation into the Shell House killings. Introducing the motion, an NP MP, Mr Jacko Maree, said that the allegations had generated a 'crisis of grave proportions' and damaged the country's judicial reputation. The chairman of the committee, Mr Johnny de Lange, a member of the ANC, used his position as chairman to block discussion of the motion. He ruled that the issue should only be discussed after the committee had concluded its deliberations on the Human Rights Commission (HRC) Bill. The committee failed to complete this task, and the motion was not discussed. The NP urged that the committee prioritise the Shell House issue, but Mr de Lange again ruled that the issue could only be discussed after the HRC bill had been approved by the committee.
Mr Mandela expressed concern about the loyalty of unnamed policemen, saying: 'We cannot allow a police force to develop in opposition to the government.' He referred specifically to the lack of progress in investigations into the recent killing of 13 ANC supporters in the Mvutshini area near Port Shepstone. An editorial in The Star said that a more important issue remained unresolved-the ANC's alleged thwarting of the police investigation into the Shell House massacre. It noted that police 'had still not been able to question ANC officials at Shell House'. In addition, 'the situation was compounded by reports that MK men from Shell House had sought asylum at the Wallmannsthal assembly point only hours after the shooting'. The editorial concluded: 'As NP senator David Malatsi remarks, it is not a healthy situation if there appears to be one law for ANC members and another for the rest of the nation.'
The ANC responded by saying that the press, the police, the NP and the DP were conducting 'a deliberate disinformation campaign' over the Shell House killings in March. Mr Tony Leon said that the ANC's accusations 'failed to answer the question as to why the ANC had failed to carry out its undertaking to co-operate with the police investigation'. In alleging a conspiracy against it, the ANC was 'killing the messenger' in an attempt to avoid facing the facts. Mr Leon said the DP rejected the ANC statement. It was 'incontrovertible that seven months after the Shell House shootings, not a single witness's statement had been taken nor a single suspect arrested'. The police 'had made no fewer than ten separate approaches to various office-bearers in the ANC requesting co-operation, including access to buildings and witnesses'. The facts suggested that the ANC was 'clearly involved in a cover-up and a frustration of justice'.
Some 2 200 Umkhonto troops were dismissed from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) after leaving their military base without permission and ignoring instructions to return. The IFP said about 1 500 of these men were 'collecting arms in KwaZulu/ Natal, posing a threat to stability'. Most of them, the IFP stated, were in Umlazi, KwaMashu and other townships around Durban. 'Incited by militant regional leadership', they were 'collecting arms from self-defence units and criminal gangs'. The IFP appealed to Mr Mandela to find a solution to the problem.
Towards the end of November, three IFP members were shot dead in the KwaZulu/ Natal south coast area as they were returning, under police escort, from a rally at Ezingolweni addressed by Chief Buthelezi. Police said the buses carrying IFP supporters were fired at by unknown gunmen, and the IFP retaliated. In another incident in Impendle, near Durban, an IFP youth leader, Mr Thulani Ndlovu, was beaten and then shot dead. Five members of the SANDF were arrested in connection with his murder, and five R-4 rifles were confiscated.
An article in Ilanga said that a number of attacks on IFP leaders in KwaZulu/Natal required urgent police attention. These attacks included the killing of Mr Ndlovu by members of the SANDF, which had 'a particularly sorry record in the townships of the province, members of 121 Battalion having repeatedly been accused of politically motivated actions in the areas in which they were deployed'. 'The killing of Mr Ndlovu,' it said, 'has done a great deal to create further tensions between the SANDF and the communities in which it is based. This has been exacerbated by the influx of thousands of ANC activists into its ranks, who will presumably end up as "peace-keepers" in KwaZulu/Natal communities which do not support the ANC.'
Another IFP leader, the article added, had been hacked to death and shot in the head after being asked to attend a 'peace meeting' in Bhekuzulu township, near Estcourt (Natal Midlands). In the Port Shepstone area, an 'assassination-style attack had been directed against the car belonging to Mr Simon Mavundla, a prominent chief who was also a party leader in his area'. Though he had not been in the car at the time, its two occupants had been murdered with R-4 or R-5 rifles. It said that there had been 'on-going assassinations against IFP leaders in the Port Shepstone area for some time, and the number of leaders belonging to the IFP there had been systematically reduced'. Moreover, accounts by those who had survived attacks indicated that 'they had been followed, or fired upon by people waiting at their homes or along their well-known routes of travel'. This suggested 'a consistent and planned effort to "permanently remove" leaders from communities'.
Ilanga also noted the difference in treatment accorded Mr Ndlovu and Prince Sifiso Zulu. Mr Ndlovu had been 'beaten and then shot five times by a group of SANDF soldiers who openly said they supported the ANC'. They had threatened him earlier, saying that they would kill him 'within three days'. Protection had been requested from the police, but had not been forthcoming, and 'his body had been found, some time after he had been shot, by a patrol of the internal stability unit'. By contrast, 'in the safe, up-market white suburb of Glenwood in Durban', so much police protection was being accorded Prince Sifiso that 'it caused a disturbance in the neighbourhood'. Prince Sifiso, on the express orders of Mr Mufamadi himself, was surrounded by bodyguards, drawn from both the police VIP protection unit and the ranks of Umkhonto cadres. 'Surely all citizens of the new South Africa,' said Ilanga, 'should have equal rights? Instead some people are clearly more important than others. Unfortunately, Thulani Ndlovu, who faced real threats to his life, was not important enough to require special protection, and he is now dead.'
In mid-December Mr Konigkramer said that the ANC was orchestrating violence in rural areas of KwaZulu/Natal to destroy the power of the chiefs in the run-up to the local government election. The IFP continued to enjoy the support of the chiefs in KwaZulu/Natal and would press ahead with attempts to structure local government in the province so as to recognise traditional authorities. 'There is nothing inherently undemocratic,' he said, 'about traditional leadership. In rural areas the traditional form of government is perfectly able to act as the local government structure.' (Dr Michael Sutcliffe, ANC spokesman on local government, said that the IFP, in seeking to preserve traditional authorities, 'wanted to destabilise residents and deny them the final break with apartheid'.)
Towards the end of December, five IFP supporters and a child were killed in a weekend of violence in KwaZulu/Natal. Two men were shot dead in an attack on a bus on its way to an IFP rally near Loskop, near Estcourt. In addition, three people, as well as a child, were killed in an early Sunday morning attack at Bhambayi, and 11 houses were gutted.
Also in December Mr Mandela said the ANC would not breach its agreement with the IFP on international mediation. He said the ANC would arrange a meeting with Chief Buthelezi to discuss the mediation. (At the time of writing, however, international mediation had yet to take place, as further explained in Chapters Nine and Ten.)
During 1994, some 2 476 people were killed in political violence in South Africa as a whole. In KwaZulu/Natal, the death toll was 1 464. Fatalities increased rapidly in the first four months of the year and dropped significantly after the April election. Thereafter violence continued at a steady, albeit lower level.
Explaining Continued Violence after the April Election
The reasons-in the IFP's perspective-for the intensification of political violence in KwaZulu/Natal in the months before the general election have earlier been described. After the election, violence subsided for a period but then again began to increase. The reason for this, in the IFP's perspective, remained the ANC's determination to destroy its principal rival and political opponent-the IFP.
The ANC had been determined to win provincial elections in KwaZulu/Natal and was confident that the control it had asserted in many urban areas-achieved through mobilisation of the youth, accompanied by harsh intimidation-would enable it to do so. When the province was instead won by the IFP, it was unwilling to accept this. It insisted that the IEC reduce the number of votes the IFP had actually won, so that the IFP ultimately retained only a slender majority. This majority nevertheless entitled the IFP to assume control of the provincial government-and the ANC was forced to eat humble pie.
It found this distasteful for a number of reasons. First, it had frequently predicted that it would easily win the province in an election, and it was proved to be wrong. Secondly, it had long asserted that the violence was being fuelled by the IFP because it knew it had lost its support in KwaZulu/Natal and was therefore determined to subvert the democratic process. Again, the election results gave the lie to this. Thirdly, the IFP-with its principled support for federalism and its effective control of KwaZulu/Natal-posed a significant threat to the hegemony and strong centralised rule the ANC alliance sought to attain over the country as a whole.
Renewed intensification of political violence was intended by the ANC to serve a three-fold purpose. First, it would demonstrate that the IFP was incapable of bringing peace and stability to KwaZulu/Natal and, by implication, of governing the province. Secondly, it would prevent the IFP's proceeding with the planning and implementation of development projects and cost it crucial electoral support in any forthcoming election. Thirdly, it would provide a justification for the declaration of emergency rule, the deployment of the army, and the effective suspension of IFP governance in KwaZulu/Natal.
As the ANC's strategy took effect in the post-election months, so attacks on the homesteads of IFP supporters once again increased. The attacks, as in the past, were well-planned and well-organised. They took place at night, and the attackers, very often, came dressed in police and army uniforms (for greater ease of access) and heavily armed with automatic weapons and other guns. Again, the attacks were random, in the sense that they targeted the ordinary individual, with no overt connection with the IFP. They thus engendered renewed terror, for all those living in IFP strongholds-whether politically active or not-knew that they were vulnerable to armed attack.
Attacks on the leadership of the IFP also continued. Again, the pattern was the same. Attacks took the form of sophisticated ambushes, and occurred mainly at night, with attackers also using police and army uniforms.
The newly established SANDF quickly became a force especially to be feared. Previously the SADF had exhibited a bias against the IFP, which had requested that it be withdrawn from strife-torn areas in KwaZulu/Natal. Now the SANDF incorporated not onlythosesoldierswhohadpreviouslyshownabias against the IFP, but also thousands of Umkhonto cadres-loyal to the ANC and fanatical in their enmity towards the IFP. An IFP leader, Mr Thulani Ndlovu, was threatened with death by the SANDF. His pleas for protection were ignored, and three days later he was shot and killed in KwaMashuby members of the new army. Reports of harassment of the IFP by the SANDF abounded.
Most Umkhonto arms caches were not revealed to the new army. A small number of weapons were surrendered, but the bulk of the hidden arms-especially in KwaZulu/Natal-remained under effective ANC control. The ANC's SDUs were also not disbanded, particularly in areas (like Richmond) from which the IFP had not yet decisively been driven. Though many SDU members turned increasingly to crime, the units remained in place in ANC communities-ready to be mobilised for attack whenever needed.
As in the period before the election, violence remained also a multi-faceted phenomenon, incorporating a variety of different elements. Thus, in addition to the attacks orchestrated by the ANC as part of a deliberate strategy, the cycle of revenge continued to exact its toll. This intensified with the post-election return of refugees to their communities. 'People came back whose relatives or friends had been killed in the past-and revenge was taken in due course.' Moreover, in the Midlands area, men loyal to Mr Harry Gwala became embroiled in a 'war' with another faction forming part of the ANC alliance. Furthermore, when 2 100 Umkhonto cadres deserted the Wallmannsthal military base and returned to KwaZulu/ Natal, many became part of violent criminal gangs while others continued their attacks against the police, the army and the IFP.
The ANC's determination to emasculate and isolate the IFP was evident on the political plane as well. In the months after the election, the ANC made every effort to resist the successful operation of the new provincial government. It opposed the IFP's proposal to make Ulundi the provincial capital and threatened to boycott meetings of the provincial legislature and executive. It complained of the cabinet posts it was given in the provincial administration, and insisted that these be changed.
A critical element in the ANC's strategy had long been to drive a wedge between Chief Buthelezi and the Zulu monarch, in the hope that this would erode support for the IFP within the province. After the election, the ANC pursued this strategy with new vigour, and induced the king to come onto its side. The monarch's alleged invitation to Mr Mandela to attend Shaka Day celebrations enraged many IFP supporters, who saw the ANC leader as ultimately responsible for the deaths and devastation that had come to rack the province. The stoning of Mr Mandela's helicopter, during his visit to the king's palace at Nongoma, reflected a spontaneous outburst of anger, and was condemned by the IFP's leadership. (The incident was also exaggerated by the media, in that only one stone was thrown at the helicopter by the youths.)
Shaka Day celebrations continued, notwithstanding the king's attempt to bring them to an end, as the monarch had no authority to issue an instruction of this kind. Those attending the rallies, however, were attacked by the ANC as they went to the celebrations, or returned to their homes.
As transitional local government structures assumed office in the province, many of the top posts went to the IFP. Almost all mayoral positions, for example, were held by the IFP. The ANC become increasingly determined to put an end to this situation. Intimidation intensified and violence increased as the ANC attempted to ensure that it would win the local government election to be held at the end of 1995.
At the heart of the continued violence lay the ANC's determination to break the IFP-its only significant opposition in the new South Africa. It sought, as in the past, to destroy its leadership through premeditated attack. It sought, in addition, to raise the costs of belonging to the IFP so high that people would no longer dare to do so. It sought to block the IFP from governing effectively in the province, so that anger at unmet expectations would further erode Chief Buthelezi's support base. It sought, in further implementation of its strategy, to bring the Zulu monarch within its fold. It kept its arms caches hidden and its SDUs in place so as to facilitate continued attack on the IFP, and it put thousands of its cadres into the new army so that it could use the SANDF against the IFP when it judged the time was right.