This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
Chapter Thirteen: The Questions that Remain Unanswered
Introduction
This book reviews events from 1976 to 1996, spanning 20 years of recent history, and provides a unique overview of violence in KwaZulu/Natal over a period of 16 years.
Its approach is unique in that it provides a comprehensive perspective of the viewpoints of both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). It not only describes in full the theories put forward by each to explain the conflict, but also identifies the evidence which appears to support each theory.
The book does not attempt to judge the validity of either theory. It is for the reader to decide which theory seems the more credible, the more substantiated by the evidence of past events. The book leaves open the question whether one theory provides a complete explanation of events, leaving the other discredited and valueless as a basis for understanding the conflict. It also leaves open the question whether there are elements of truth in both the theories described and, if so, whether there is equal culpability for the conflict on both sides.
In short, the book raises more questions than it answers. The questions that could be asked are legion. Some of the possible queries are identified below, however, for the aid they may provide in assessing the validity of the rival theories put forward by the ANC and the IFP.
Questions Regarding the ANC Theory
In May 1990, after the lifting of the bans on the ANC and other organisations in February that year, the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, urged the Zulu nation to join with the former state president, Mr F W de Klerk, and make 'one huge block for democracy'. Was this not a reflection of what the ANC had long feared-the formation of a coalition between 5m whites and 7m Zulus, forming an effective power bloc against its 'vanguard' role in the liberation of South Africa? Did the ANC not realise the danger from early on, and take active steps to weaken and if possible destroy Inkatha so as to prevent this power bloc from forming?
Did Inkatha instigate the conflict in Natal, in its role as surrogate of the former South African state? Did the ANC act only in self-defence? If so, what accounts for the deaths of some 400 IFP leaders and office-bearers, not in the heat of battle, but in what appeared to be a series of carefully planned and executed assassinations?
Why were the IFP's warlords not prosecuted in the 1980s, after the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) had won interim interdicts against them? Was it merely because the police were partisan towards Inkatha? Was it rather because the evidence was not sufficient to warrant arrest and prosecution, or sustain conviction? Why did Cosatu agree to settle its case against Inkatha, following the alleged attack on Ashdown in February 1988? If Cosatu's evidence was as strong as it asserted, why did it not prosecute the case to a conclusion, and prove to the world Inkatha's culpability for the violence? Why were none of the other interim interdict applications brought by Cosatu pursued to the point of final hearing?
Was a 'third force' to blame for triggering the violence and giving it continuing momentum? If so, what is the strength of the evidence supporting this theory? Could a third force have set the violence in motion if conflict between the ANC and IFP had not initially been triggered in other ways, by other factors? Did a third force initiate the tension between Inkatha-supporting hostellers and militant youth at the Mzimhlophe Hostel in 1976, during the Soweto revolt? Or did the police force instead take advantage of the tension that had already arisen between the youth and the hostellers to increase the pressure on the 'radicals' it regarded as 'the enemy'?
Did Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed wing, play no role in the conflict, despite its evident capacity to do so? If it did become involved, was its role limited to training and assisting ANC 'self-defence units' (SDUs) whose mandate was to protect their communities against IFP aggression? Was the purpose of the SDUs purely defensive, or were they in fact conceived of and established as 'combat units', as articles in The African Communist, journal of the South African Communist Party (SACP), implied?
If Inkatha began the conflict because it feared the haemorraghing of its support to the United Democratic Front (UDF), and later the ANC, why did the IFP not only win the provincial election in April 1994 (albeit by a fractional majority) but also secure 20% more of the vote in KwaZulu/Natal than the ANC? Could this discrepancy in the support accorded the two rival parties have been the product of electoral fraud? If so, why did the Independent Electoral Commission-charged with certifying whether the election had been 'free and fair'-not nullify the results of the election in the province?
Was the former 'independent' homeland of Transkei indeed used as a springboard for attacks against the IFP in Natal in the 1990s? Did Umkhonto have bases in the Transkei, and did it obtain guns and ammunition from the Transkei Defence Force? If this was not the case, why did the government throw a 'ring of steel' around the Transkei in late 1992? Why did the massacres of IFP supporters appear to decline thereafter?
Was the violence that broke out on the Reef in July 1990 indeed the result of the IFP's attempt to establish a political presence in the area? Had Inkatha not had such a presence for many years, reflected, inter alia, in the mass rallies held by its president, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, at the Jabulani stadium in Soweto from the early 1970s? Was the violence not sparked instead by attacks on IFP members and their houses, as well as by the ANC's call for a Week of Action aimed at securing the disbandment of KwaZulu and the KwaZulu Police (KZP)-a call criticised by a UDF president, Mr Archie Gumede, as well as by the Pan-Africanist Congress? Why did the ANC demand the disbandment of KwaZulu and the KZP while seeking a rapprochement with the leaders of other homelands, both 'independent' and self-governing? Why were IFP members driven out of hostels in Sebokeng before and after the Inkatha rally on 26 July 1990, which was supposed to have marked the start of the violence? Why did the ANC's leader, Mr Nelson Mandela, endorse the view that Inkatha was not welcome in the Vaal Triangle?
Why have the Trust Feed killings in 1988 become notorious around the world, while the KwaShange massacre in 1987-in which two policemen were convicted of the murder of 13 Inkatha youths-has been forgotten? Why was the Boipatong massacre of some 50 people referred to the Security Council of the United Nations, but not the Battle of the Forest in the Richmond area in 1991-in which some 25 IFP supporters were ambushed and mowed down by gunfire and some 30 others thereafter executed in cold blood? Why was a group calling itself the Human Rights Commission (now the Human Rights Committee) and involved in monitoring the violence described in the press as an 'independent' agency when its director and most of its trustees had clear links with the UDF and, in time, the ANC?
Why did the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation (the Goldstone commission) not deal with the evidence put before it by the South African Police (SAP) in 1992, indicating that Umkhonto was involved in attacks on the IFP? Why did it not probe SAP evidence that police and army uniforms were being used by ANC and Umkhonto operatives-during attacks on IFP leaders and supporters-to cast suspicion on the security forces and strengthen 'third-force' allegations? Why did it not investigate the claims by the SAP that Umkhonto cadres were involved in smuggling some 22 000 tons of armaments into the country, and that much of this came via the Transkei and was conveyed from there into Natal? Was all this evidence immaterial? Was it false? Was the IFP correct in asserting that it was politically too 'incorrect' for the commission to raise these issues?
Why did the Goldstone commission investigate complaints against the SAP's Internal Stability Division (ISD) in Bruntville in the Midlands region in January 1993, but not the series of arson attacks against an IFP-supporting hostel in the township which had prompted the deployment of the ISD? Why did the commission decline to probe police evidence of the involvement of members of ANC SDUs in numerous acts of violence? Why did the commission move swiftly, by comparison, to investigate the attempted purchase by the KZP of firearms from Eskom?
Why, also, did the Goldstone commission fail to investigate the IFP's assertion that a secret SACP document revealed plans to destabilise KwaZulu in the run-up to the April 1994 election? Why did it not, as the IFP requested, subpoena Mr Pravin Gordhan, a prominent ANC and SACP leader, to investigate further his alleged knowledge of the contents of the document? Why did the Goldstone commission announce its bald conclusion-that in some 140 instances there was no evidence of Umkhonto involvement in the assassination of IFP leaders-without giving reasons for its finding, or explaining why it had discounted the evidence put before it by the police and the IFP? Was it not significant that in court proceedings in August 1995 an SACP member and Umkhonto cadre, Mr Hollingwood Mzwandile Gushu, was sentenced to a total of 235 years' imprisonment for the murder, in the early 1990s, of six IFP supporters-whom he had killed professionally and in cold blood and, by his own admission, 'because they were members of Inkatha'?
Why, in the period after the April 1994 election, did the assassination of IFP leaders continue? Could this have been the work of the 'third force'? Did it not instead reflect a continued determination on the part of the ANC to crush the IFP and wrest from it the control of KwaZulu/Natal? Why were IFP allegations that former Umkhonto cadres, now integrated into the new army, were responsible for harassing and attacking its members and officials, not investigated in public and in full? Why did the new police and army protect the ANC enclave at Shobashobane on the south coast, but not the IFP-supporting communities in the Izingolweni area allegedly under attack from the SDU established in the enclave? Why was the subsequent massacre at Shobashobane greeted with outrage, but not the numerous killings of IFP leaders and supporters-on the south coast and elsewhere-which had preceded it?
Why did the special investigation task units (ITUs) established to probe incidents of violence in the province focus primarily on attacks in which ANC supporters had been the victims? Why did they generally ignore the numerous assassinations of IFP leaders? Why, in the Malan trial, did the ITU responsible for gathering evidence apparently coach witnesses as to what they should say, and itself provide misleading testimony regarding security arrangements at Iscor where the AK-47 rifles allegedly used in the KwaMakhutha massacre in January 1987 were supposed to have been smelted down shortly after the attack?
Why were statements of fact reported in the press at the time of the KwaMakhutha massacre in January 1987 ignored during the trial? Why was it consistently reported in 1995 and 1996 that the house in question had belonged to Mr Victor Ntuli, a young UDF official, when press reports in January 1987 had stated that it belonged to his father, Mr Willie Ntuli, an Inkatha supporter? Why were the five or six attacks on Inkatha leaders and members in the three weeks preceding the KwaMakhutha massacre ignored? How feasible could it have been that Victor had been planning to hold a UDF meeting in his father's house, at a time when Inkatha was under attack from the UDF? Why did it not emerge during the trial that Victor had not been living at home for some three weeks-ever since the beginning of the clashes between Inkatha and the UDF? Why did the two Military Intelligence operatives who allegedly planned the attack say that it was motivated by the fact that the trainees were becoming restless and wanted to exercise their new-found skills, while a statement by Mr Daluxolo Luthuli (himself a trainee), gave the motive as revenge? The latter motive would have been consistent with the numerous attacks on Inkatha members which had occurred in early January 1987. But how could Mr Luthuli have expressed satisfaction at the outcome of a 'revenge' attack which had killed another Inkatha supporter, Mr Willie Ntuli, and various members of his family?
Why did the special investigation unit fail to follow the obvious leads pointing to ANC/UDF culpability for the massacre? Why did it instead seek to put the blame for the killings on the IFP's Caprivi trainees and on former senior security officers? Did it seek to do so by intimidating and then coaching witnesses as to the story they were to tell? Were the witnesses on which it relied not vulnerable to this kind of pressure, knowing that military careers in the new South Africa were likely to be closed to them and that a fresh start in a new country, aided by extensive financial support, would be the best option to pursue? Was this the reason the evidence put before the court in relation to the killings was so flawed and so untruthful? Was the state's failure to call corroboratory evidence not a reflection of the fact that no one else could be found to buttress the improbable story put forward by its three main witnesses?
Was the court, in short, deliberately being led in the wrong direction? Did Mr Justice Jan Hugo state that the massacre must have been committed by unknown Caprivi trainees-in an operation planned and implemented by Capt Opperman and Capt Cloete-because the special investigation unit had been assiduous in presenting to the prosecution and the court a misleading set of facts? Could the coaching of witnesses which emerged in the trial not have resulted in the 'broad correspondence' in their evidence which was the main factor underpinning this assessment, made by the court in passing before it proceeded to acquit all of the accused for lack of credible testimony?
Why, moreover, did the ANC block police investigation of the Shell House shootings-handing in more (but still not all) of the firearms in issue more than two years after the event-if it were true that the killings had been provoked by IFP leaders in league with elements within the police? Why did gunmen open fire in March 1994, from the roof of Shell House, on an essentially peaceful IFP protest march? Was it true that senior leaders of the ANC were among the snipers-and that police videos showed this to be the case? Why did Mr Mandela stop the police from searching Shell House-and why was this obstruction of justice allowed? Why, in addition, did the ANC subsequently block proposals by Dr Frank Mdlalose, premier of KwaZulu/Natal, to establish a commission of inquiry to probe the violence in full, rather than on the selective basis seemingly favoured by the ITUs in the province? Was the ANC's reluctance to allow a full investigation not prompted by its awareness of all it had to hide?
Questions Regarding the IFP Theory
Was it not, on the contrary, the emergence and growing strength of the UDF that prompted the outbreak of violence in KwaZulu and Natal in the mid-1980s? Did Inkatha not regard the region as its fiefdom, and was it not threatened by the popularity of the UDF, by the resurgence in support for the ANC? Did these factors not prompt Inkatha to resort to forced recruitment and violent attack to stop the UDF increasing its support in Pietermaritzburg and its environs?
Moreover, even if Inkatha was correct in accusing the ANC of pursuing a strategy of making South Africa ungovernable, was this not part of a just war against an apartheid system categorised by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a 'crime against humanity'? In addition, what evidence could Inkatha offer that this strategy had moved beyond attacking the apartheid state to embracing attacks on other black political organisations in the country? What rationale could the ANC-with its oft-reiterated commitment to multiparty democracy-have had for initiating a campaign of violence against Inkatha?
Did the former government-faced by a 'total onslaught' by the ANC in the 1980s-not have an interest in using Inkatha, as part of its 'total strategy', to attack and thus weaken the ANC alliance? Did the state not gain substantially from the violence in KwaZulu and Natal which, in that area at least, hindered the mobilisation and organisation of the people into ANC-supporting structures? Were the Trust Feed killings in 1988 not clear evidence of this agenda on the part of the former government? Could Trust Feed be dismissed as an isolated incident? Was the cover-up revealed in the trial in 1992 not indicative of police complicity in a strategy to weaken and destroy the UDF and promote Inkatha at its expense? Why did the government, following the trial, refuse to accede to requests for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry into the extensive police cover-up which had emerged? Was an inquiry in fact conducted by the retired regional court magistrate appointed by the government for this purpose? If so, why have its results not been widely publicised?
Why did emergency rule quell violence in other parts of South Africa in the mid-1980s but not in KwaZulu and Natal? Why did the police target the UDF for detention under emergency powers, but very few members of Inkatha? Why did the police not follow up clear prima facie evidence of Inkatha's culpability for violence, as reflected (for example) in an inquest finding that Inkatha supporters were responsible for the deaths of three trade unionists at Mpophomeni (Howick, Natal Midlands) in 1986? Why did the police not investigate further and why were those named as responsible not prosecuted?
Why did so many monitoring agencies identify Inkatha warlords and impis as responsible for the violence in Natal if this were not the case? Could all these agencies really, in practice, have been supporters of the UDF or ANC? Why did so many residents of areas affected by violence speak of police collusion with Inkatha if they had not witnessed this in fact?
Did the grant of interim interdicts against a number of Inkatha warlords not demonstrate the role that these and other Inkatha leaders had played in terrorising communities and thus compelling their allegiance to Inkatha? Why were these leaders not prosecuted thereafter? Was it not because the police had accorded them a special protection, and was unwilling to entertain the evidence against them?
Why did the former South African government provide secret funding for three IFP rallies and for the Inkatha-oriented United Workers' Union of South Africa? Did it intend that the IFP would use the money to buttress its support and intensify its vendetta against the ANC alliance? Why did the Seven Days' War begin two days after the government-funded Inkatha rally on 25 March 1990? Had Inkatha supporters in fact been encouraged to attack UDF areas surrounding Pietermaritzburg? Could there have been any element of truth in the allegation that the attacks-aimed at communities relatively far distant from the city-were provoked by the stoning of buses on the Edendale Road?
Why did the SADF train some 200 IFP supporters in the Caprivi strip in Namibia (then South West Africa) in 1986, and why were these men subsequently deployed as special constables in the KZP? Why did their training go beyond the limits of what was necessary for VIP protection? Why did so much secrecy appear to surround the operation? How many of these trainees were later used in hit-squad activities against the ANC? Was the purpose of Operation Marion-in terms of which the training had been provided-purely to defend Inkatha against attack by the ANC and the UDF? If so, why were there so many references in the documents regarding the operation to an 'offensive' element within it? Was the interpretation placed on this term by the court in the Malan trial-that it did necessarily denote aggression-inappropriately benign? Did the former government not have a clear interest in weakening the ANC alliance in the course of constitutional negotiations, and did it not continue to use the IFP-its tried and tested surrogate-for this purpose? Why did it not rein in its surrogate after it had concluded the Record of Understanding with the ANC in September 1992? Did it in fact intend that the IFP should continue with its task of weakening the ANC during key negotiations on a future constitution for the country? If so, why did it agree that hostels should be fenced and traditional weapons banned, when it must have known that this would limit the IFP's capacity to attack the ANC? Did it do so in the knowledge that this aspect of the agreement would never be enforced, as was indeed the case?
Did the former government not have an equal interest in using the IFP to attack and weaken the ANC in the run-up to the country's first non-racial election in April 1994? Was the NP not aware that it had little hope of returning to power at any time unless it could not only discredit the ANC but also make the costs of supporting it too high for people in the black community? Moreover, did elements within the party, knowing that the first election would spell the end of their parliamentary and other positions of power, not seek to delay through violence the transition to democracy-as the Goldstone commission indicated when it exposed the role of General Krappies Engelbrecht, General Johan le Roux and General Basie Smit in third-force activities a month before the April poll?
What, in addition, were the nature of the links between Military Intelligence (MI) and the IFP? Why did Mr de Klerk dismiss more than 20 senior army officers at the end of 1992, following a raid by the Goldstone commission on an MI organisation called the Directorate of Covert Collection? Why was the subsequent report of General Pierre Steyn regarding the role in violence of those dismissed never released to the public? Why were those dismissed not prosecuted for third-force crimes? Did this reflect a cover-up of their involvement in third-force violence?
Did the reports of the Goldstone commission and of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) not prove the validity of the ANC's perspective on the violence-that it had been fuelled by a sinister third force comprising elements in the security forces working together with the IFP? Did it not also establish the truth of another oft-repeated ANC allegation-that the KZP was partisan towards the IFP and operated hit squads against the ANC? Was this not further confirmed by the evidence in mitigation provided by Mr Romeo Mbambo, convicted in 1995 of a number of murders, including the killing of a KZP officer who had been too co-operative with the Goldstone commission? Was it not also significant that the Goldstone commission-having investigated the murders of some 140 IFP leaders for alleged Umkhonto involvement-found no evidence to substantiate the allegation that the ANC's armed wing had played a part in their deaths? Was the conviction of Mr Hollingwood Mzwandile Gushu not an isolated and irrelevant incident, rather than proof of a broader pattern?
Were the self-protection units (SPUs) established by the IFP for purposes of defence against ANC attack, as the IFP alleged, or to give the IFP the capacity to resist the transition to democracy? Were the Mlaba trainees not given to understand that their function would primarily be to attack the ANC, as one informant told the TEC in early 1994? Were the tons of weapons dispatched to the Mlaba camp by Col Eugene de Kock, former Vlakplaas commander and proven hit-squad operative, intended purely for defensive purposes? If so, why was so great a quantity of weaponry required?
Did the trial and conviction of Col de Kock not demonstrate the extensive links between the former government and the IFP, as well as the lengths to which the National Party (NP) had been prepared to go to perpetuate its rule? Did the evidence provided by the former Vlakplaas commander not prove the ruthlessness of the secret security apparatus established by the former state to target the ANC both within and outside the country? Did it not show, in addition, what the ANC had long stated to be the case-that the former government had falsely blamed the ANC for bomb attacks (such as the one on Khotso House in 1988)-to deflect attention from its own role in propagating and perpetrating acts of violence? And was this not confirmed not only by other third-force trials, but also by evidence put forward to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission detailing the singular brutality of the security forces during the apartheid era, as well as their determination to crush the progressive movement regardless of how many lives this cost?
Did violence not persist in KwaZulu/Natal in the post-1994 election period precisely because the sinister third-force network established by the former state was difficult to uncover and destroy? Did the continued conflict not represent an unchanged agenda on behalf of the IFP and elements within the security forces to attack and harass the ANC, and try to weaken it yet further in a province it had failed to win in the April 1994 election? Was the onslaught by some 600 IFP supporters on Shobashobane on Christmas Day in 1995 not designed to strike terror into a community which had dared to align itself with the ANC-and thus make clear the message that any attempt to weaken the IFP's hold on the population of Izingolweni would be ruthlessly suppressed?
Was it not significant, moreover, that the deployment of the ITU in the south coast area-in the aftermath of the Shobashobane killings-appeared to mark the end of political violence in the area? Did violence not decline with the arrest of prominent IFP warlords in the area, coupled with intensive investigation of the police role in the Shobashobane massacre? Did this not prove the accuracy of the ANC's perspective-that violence in the province had been fuelled by a 'culture of impunity', which had been fostered in its turn by the failure of the police and prosecuting authorities to clamp down firmly on the criminals responsible for violence?
Had the attorney general in KwaZulu/Natal, Mr Tim McNally, not shown a marked reluctance over many years to prosecute IFP warlords responsible for violence? Had he not turned a blind eye to the numerous allegations of the police role in the conflict? Was the acquittal of General Magnus Malan and other former senior security officers not a function of his failure to call the additional witnesses necessary to corroborate the accomplice evidence the court was duty-bound to view with caution? Did he not deliberately bungle the prosecution, because he had no wish to see Gen Malan and his co-accused imprisoned?
Why did Mr McNally refuse, in addition, to prosecute prominent IFP members and KZP officers identified in the trial of Mr Romeo Mbambo and others as having been founder members of a hit squad based at eSikhawini (near Empangeni on the north coast of KwaZulu/Natal) and responsible for targeting ANC and UDF activists? Why did the KwaZulu/Natal attorney general decide that there was no reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution, when the Investigation Task Board (to which the ITUs in the province reported) was satisfied that a successful prosecution could indeed by attained by 'a meticulous and coherent presentation of the state's case and proper examination of defence witnesses'? Why did Mr McNally say he had detected discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses for the state, when the board believed these were not clear?
Were the allegations made by the IFP against the ITUs not intended to deflect attention from the evidence they were uncovering of IFP responsibility for violence? Were the party's allegations against the new army-particularly as regards the alleged role of former Umkhonto cadres in 'harassing' its supporters-not intended to do the same? Was the IFP not singularly irresponsible in trying to whip up anger against the security-force clampdown in the province, when statistics made it clear that this was succeeding in reducing the toll of death and injury?
Were the attacks against the security forces witnessed in the province in the post-election period not the product of this IFP campaign? Was the attack on the family of King Goodwill Zwelithini in KwaMashu in 1996 not similarly the result of the IFP's vilification of the Zulu monarch for having dared to sever his ties with Chief Buthelezi and assert a new political independence? Was the IFP not determined, moreover, to retain a feudal system of government in rural areas because it knew the traditional authorities responsible for implementing it could be relied upon to maintain the rural hinterland as a massive 'no-go area' for the ANC? Was the IFP not indeed a petty provincial party, trying-through continued violence-to increase its stature to match that of the ANC?
Conclusion
There is much that remains to be explained about the violence that has racked KwaZulu/Natal for close on 20 years. One thing is, however, clear. No simplistic theory of the violence-in which one side is regarded as entirely innocent and the other as entirely to blame-can be accepted as the truth. Reality, as always, is more complex. It must also be remembered that the truth is likely to be the first casualty in any conflict, and that propaganda is often used by one or more of the protagonists to skew perceptions of the facts.
This account provides the backdrop against which informed assessment of the conflict can be made. It is proffered in the hope that it will help to dispel some of the myths that have arisen around the relevant issues-and to provide the background against which varying theories regarding the violence can be tested for their truth.
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Reports of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding Public Violence and Intimidation
(These reports are listed in date order.)
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Goldstone R J, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation regarding an investigation by the Commission's Natal Ivestigation Team into allegations of the presence of Renamo soldiers in KwaZulu, 15 December 1992
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Sithole M N S, Van Zyl L S and Roberts J S N, Report on the Illegal Importation, Distribtion and Use of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, 5 October 1993
Goldstone R J, Fourth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prvention of Public Violence and Intimidation, Cape Town, 6 December 1993
Wallis M J D, Geyser A J L and Zondo R M M, Second Interim Report of the Wallis Committee of the Goldstone Commission, 5 March 1994
Goldstone R J, Interim Report on Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom Party, 18 March 1994
Wallis M J D, Geyser A J L and Zondo R M M, Interim Report of the Wallis Committee of the Goldstone Commission, 18 March 1994
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Legislation (enacted or proposed)
Arms and Ammunitions Act no 75 of 1969
Bantu Affairs Administration Act no 45 of 1971
Bantu Authorities Act no 68 of 1951
Bantu Education Act no 47 of 1953
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act no 25 of 1945
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa no 200 of 1993
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act no 2 of 1994
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act no 44 of 1995
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Defence Act no 44 of 1957
Electoral Act no 202 of 1993
Group Areas Act no 41 of 1955
House of Traditional Leaders Act no 7 of 1994 (KwaZulu/Natal)
Human Rights Commission Bill
Internal Security Act no 74 of 1982
Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal Act no 80 of 1986
Local Government Transition Act Amendment Act no 61 of 1995
National Key Points Act no 102 of 1980
Peace Bill (KwaZulu/Natal)
Police Act no 7 of 1958
Population Registration Act no 30 of 1950
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act no 55 of 1949
Prohibition of Political Interference Act no 51 of 1968
Public Safety Act no 3 of 1953
Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Act no 29 of 1995
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act no 110 of 1983
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act no 49 of 1953
Security Forces Board of Inquiry Act no 95 of 1993
Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act no 64 of 1972
South African Police Service Act no 68 of 1995
Suppression of Communism Act no 44 of 1950
Unlawful Organisations Act no 34 of 1960
Judgments
State v Baleka and others, Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, case no 482/85, judgment delivered on 15 November 1988
State v De Kock, Transvaal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, case no 266/94, judgment delivered on 9 September 1996
State v Msane and others, in the Supreme Court of South Africa, Durban and Coast Local Division, case no CC1/96, judgment delivered on 10 October 1996
In the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, case no CCT 23/96, judgment delivered on 6 September 1996
In the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the matter between The Premier of KwaZulNatal and others, and The President of the Republic of South Africa and others, case no CCT 36/95, judgment delivered on 29 November 1995