About this site

This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.



From Carl for Norman and Kay : Report dictated to Sekwati

1.. Makgoto came at 7 a.m. and stayed until 8 a.m.

2.. At 7.45 p.m. on Monday evening the 9 October 1989 whilst he was watching TV they came and told him that Kobie Coetsee with another Cabinet Minister would come to see him at 9 a.m. on Tuesday.  They also told him that the Pollsmoor colleagues with Oscar Mpetha would arrive at 1 p.m.

They said that at 5 p.m. the other five would arrive.  They had earlier asked him who should come with Albertina Sisulu.  They had then asked what should happen if one or more of them should not be available, the answer was that they should decide.

3.. Makgoto arrived at 7 a.m. and stayed until 8 a.m.  He was supposed to have stayed for the whole day.  They telephoned Farida Omar and said to her that he could only stay for one hour.  Yesterday (Thursday 12 October 1989) Professors De Kock and Strauss from Tygerberg came.  They said that the operation had gone very well.  He has to see him again on the 11 December 1989 and you have to make the arrangements.  He will visit NM on the 10 December 1989.

4.. A little after 9 a.m. Kobie Coetsee and Gerrit Viljoen arrived.  They were there for a while and then were joined by General Willemse and Fanie van der Merwe, advisor to the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.  He used to be Director General of Justice and started as Public Prosecutor at the Johannesburg Magistrates Court.

I have been discussing with the government the release of my colleagues.  On the 18 September 1989 I met with Kobie Coetsee at my request and I reminded him of the release of my colleagues and was no longer concentrating on the release of Walter but on all the colleagues and Mpetha and Masemola and two others from the time of Robben Island, that is Mathew Meyewe and Zakhela Mdlalose.  I said that all must be handled as one package.  I said that I would expect the new State President in his first major policy statement to highlight the release of the political prisoners.  I included Mathew and Zakhela because in the later 1960s and early 70s they had done 8 years for terrorism.  Then in 1978 they came back, doing life with Gwala and now had already done 11 years of their life sentences.  I pointed out to Kobie Coetsee that if you add 8 years to the eleven they had already served 19 years and their's must be treated as a special case.  I had also, after discussing the matter with Kobie h discussed the matter with General Willemse.  He then made the statement that they had no difficulty at all with the releases except these two.  This raised my hopes.  He gave us their reasons for not releasing Mathew and Zakhele that they had done 11 years of their life sentences only and it was not enough in terms of the rules for people doing life.  I still pressed him and said these were not normal rules for prisoners doing life but required as a special case.  He said that he would go into the matter.

5.. On Tuesday morning the two Ministers said that our approach is identical with yours.  The Government has decided to release these eight and they repeated that the General had said about the other two.  I urged them to take the matter up with the State President and to indicate to him that I would be a lot happier if the request was to be granted in respect of these two prisoners as well and I went to great lengths to support my case.  They said that they would go into it but then, later, during the day, the General and van der Merwe came back to me and showed me a statement that they were going to make that night and wanted me to approve it.  This is what normally happened in the past.  I approved the statement.  This was already when Albertina and the others were here.  I altered some of it.  I thought that it would not be tactful for me to make a statement without my having consulted.  I was not arguing about the correctness of the statement but I wanted to consult first.  Yesterday I signed the corrected statement after it had been typed.

6.. One thing I was expected to raise and that is the impression the government is giving that there is a difference between the Organisation and myself on the question of working for peace in the country.  I pointed out to them that this is very dangerous and in conflict with the spirit which characterizes the discussions which we have had, but I was very warm in thanking them for the decision to release the colleagues and the two ministers who must have been very strong in deciding that this release must be accepted.

7.. As far as Mr Coetsee is concerned, I have given you my assessment of him.  He has, throughout projected himself as a man of integrity.  He is a member of the National Party and is bound to carry out its policy, but subject to that, he is a man with whom you would like to discuss problems.  He makes it easy to discuss sensitive problems without tension.  He pointed out that he had brought along Dr Viljoen so that I could make his acquaintance, as the man who would handle negotiations.  My first impression of Viljoen was also a positive one.  He appeared confident and relaxed.  And apart from the fact that he is handling a difficult department he is the best qualified person.

8.. They are having difficulties amongst themselves.  Like Walter.  When they came in March to tell me that he was being released, I asked when – weeks, months.  No, they said, within days.  Months passed and nothing happened.  I raised it with them and they said that the government had decided not to release him.  I was shocked, I raised it with the State President when we met.  He said, as soon as we have the green light we will release him.  That did not help.

9.. At 1 p.m. I saw Walter and the others.

10.. On the next day, Wednesday, I went past all the journalists who were gathered outside Pollsmoor.  They looked and did not recognize me.  The General said to me after my meeting with PW that the journalists had made life very difficult for him after Winnie said that I would be making my own statement.

11.. I explained to the colleagues my whole position.  They were very constructive.  To be released without conditions is very important.  They must be aware that if they are not careful the government will simply clamp down on them and we will not gain anything.

12.. I don't think they should be involved.  There are another five chaps to be released before Christmas from Natal.  If our own chaps are not involved in whipping up the level of agitation.  I know that we are involved in a campaign for the release of all political prisoners.  We on the inside are doing our best to get all long term colleagues out.  With regard to these two, Gwala said that please include them.  I hope leadership will cooperate.  They must make it easy for the released colleagues.  We discussed it in full.  They were very constructive.

13.. Then they left at about 5 p.m.

14.. At about 6 p.m. Albertina Sisulu, Cyril Ramaphosa, Murphy Morobe and Cas Saloojee came and stayed until 11 p.m.

15.. He looked at TA's notes on the Ramaphosa discussion and confirmed that this was correct.

NB from Carl.  What follows is a copy of what appears to be the CR notes referred to.  Sekwati says he gave CR a copy of the above report.

1.. Sisulu must be seen with the others was his insistence.

2.. Mbeki and Gwala conduct after release.

3.. De Klerk speech 18/9.  He made reps for 10.  Mdlalose and Mayewa but forgot 5 others.  They agreed.

4.. The 8 said they were resp leaders they would have to re to ANC.  He was happy.

5.. Then asked each of group.  They said some restraint but could not hold back masses spontaneous meetings not a problem.  Govt not [sic] worried abut mass meetings of 100's of thousands.  Said marches and demos diff to hold back.  Will rep to org.

6.. He would like org to discuss the matter and fears and concerns of govt.

7.. He called General then came back said Stm would be made.  They wanted him to say that he thought FW was on way to reform.  He refused, but agreed his own release not issue.

8.. He has prepared document which has not been shown to anyone.  14 pages long.

9.. 2 phases – pre conditions then negotiating process.

10.. ANC against proposal of pre cond.

11.. Defiance campaign, peoples assembly.

12.. Look at creating ideas.

13.. Graduation ceremony at request of UNISA.

14.. House in Umtata for children and grandchildren.

15.. Holomisa S/M is correct he cannot move to Transkei.

16.. CR will go to Lusaka on 13/14 – 10.  Need to receive the leaders.  Will have to hold meetings and rallies.  We need to raise the centrality of the ANC and it is the pressure that has led to release.  End notes.

I had app. with CR to, among other things, clarify some aspects of this report.  He failed to show up.  But I still hope to see him before I leave this area.  End Sipho report.  Next is last.


Ch1 Vula report.

1.1. Since the departure of comrade Theo, there have been no significant developments infrastructurally.  The arrest of Comrade July has been the major mishap.  June has not yet received response from the Engineering Department on his application to extend his house.  We would not proceed, in any case, until July's case is out of the way.

1.2. F., on whom I am relying to help with our documents and computer, has indicated she cannot cope with the kind of work she has been given.  She says she would do better working at the open mass structures then get holed up all day long, often alone, working with computer files.  I think, however, that it has more to do with a feeling of a degree of inadequacy on her part, or rather that I perceive her as such.

1.2 (i). I have tried to reassure her that this is not so, that if I have any misgivings about her they are that she is not applying herself enough o understand her work and increase her competence.  I do not have the time to be watching over her all the time.  Nor does the situation require that I give her specific tasks every day.  But this does not mean that she has nothing to do.  There is a lot of practice and study that she has to do to improve herself, and a wealth of material for it.  But it does not seem she does.  The result is that I get a little exasperated when there is work which should be in her realm of knowledge to do but she cannot perform.  She has asked to be relieved of her tasks.

1.2 (ii). Initially, I had told her that she should equip herself in such a way that she should be able to pass her knowledge to someone.  She understands that before this is done she has to soldier on.

3.. None of the places we had has been given up, but the logistics of maintaining all these places is taxing without the personnel.  Our ordnance place is the one that gives me particular worry.  Ch2 next.

Ch2 Vula.  The Doctor spends very little time at the base and if the discovery of the other two places so far is anything to go by, both had the element that they were not occupied.  I have spoken to him about this and he has begun addressing this problem.  The yard was also in disrepair, but he got someone to clean it after I had urged him to.  But the hardware remains in the locked bedroom concealed only in a heap of suitcases.  I have been trying to get a carpenter connection to build a bedroom suite with concealment space but I have no time to follow up on him.  We had originally thought we would use the basement cellar for the hardware, but I have concluded it is not a good place unless it also underwent major and very professional adjustments.  It would also be the first target of suspicion for anybody searching the premises.  The idea of furniture is to make the bedroom "accessible", while denying the chance of accidental discovery of a find through a cursory search by the cops, whose modus operandi seems to be to stage a break-in when they are suspicious and conduct a search.  The likelihood if we have good concealment in furniture is that they may hit a blank, since they are only acting on suspicion anyway, and their search is bound to be superficial.  But it would be a different thing if they were to break in now.  I have worries about the other bases as well, though not that much.  I worry especially now in the light of the fact that I must give up Theo's car.  With it at least I had begun stabilizing in the eyes of neighbours etc.  Now I must resort to hired cars again, which have to be changed from time to time, and all the attention that this draws with it.  It would have been so much better if Jabu were here.  At least another face can explain another car.  But more of this later.  Brenda has been helping cover for one base, but she is now being deployed in one of the townships and is going to stay there.  Infrastructurally, therefore, the main problems relate to personnel rather than material things like accommodation and transport.  Comrade Theo knows that the internal structures have been unable for the most part to provide us with the…….. (document incomplete).

Ch3 Vula

4.5. Comrade Theo knows that the internal machineries have been unable for the most part to provide us with cover that is necessary for some of our places.  But if the possibilities we have managed to create can be utilized for personnel from outside we should by all means do so.

4.6. The best thing that I think should happen with respect to our ordnance place, for instance, is to get a well trained, unassuming, ordinary looking, disciplined and well-motivated female African comrade to act as the Doctor's maid (perhaps live-in) as well as chief of our ordnance store etc.  She would survive for a century and guarantee safety of our store.  Although I am very serious about the proposition and would have liked to put it as a request, I refrain from doing so because I am just about losing all confidence that you can respond timeously or at all to such requests.  I am merely mentioning it so that you decide what suits you.

4.7. My communications person is doing very well although we seem to be confronted by the increasing frustration of the incidence of inoperative card phones.  Many a time now have had to resort to sneaking into some "safe" private phone to make our calls to John.  This is not without its risks but it so happens that this becomes the only way we can communicate sometimes.

5.. Masha, the Nat man, Clive and myself have constituted ourselves into a security committee.  We meet regularly to evaluate the security situation and whenever there are security developments worth analyzing.  In the current uncertainty of the July case we have met almost daily.

5.1. The Owl has proved a valuable source.

6.. Brenda has also been useful to me while awaiting APC deployment as per our decision while Theo was around.  She has assisted in the training of:

1.. Two MC members;

2,. One MK unit;

3.. F;

4.. My comms person;

5.. PC sec officer

6.. One activist.

3, 4 and 5 received thorough training in secret work, the others that plus combat training.  This part of the training is still inadequate, however, because we lacked most of the material until lately.

Ch4 Vula

7.. Organisationally, the rate of growth of the PC structures has slowed down.  This is the logical result of the necessity to devote more time to the development of existing sub-structures, as well as the increased activity at the mass level, in which most of our RPC members are key.

7.1. The targets set in the last report have therefore not been met.  As can be deduced from the APC reports, however, there is a better grasp in these structures of the tasks that confront them, and they are beginning to deal with them more purposefully.

7.2. The RPC also convened special sessions to discuss the APC reports and prepare well-considered feedback.  This was appreciated by the APCs andis something we'd like to see from the PMC concerning reports from the RPC.

8.. The major problem which has come about is the virtual reduction of the PC team to five men.  Sipho, the propaganda head, has said he thinks he cannot cope with the pressures of his responsibilities in the RPC as well as the other tasks he has at the open level.  The report of the structure will have more detail about this.

8.1. He expressed these feelings just at a point where Masha and I had been asked by the PC to talk to the comrade because it was felt he was not giving serious attention to his work and only gave excuses about his involvement at the mass level and in the township, whereas there were complaints from these sectors as well about his performance.

8.2. The comrade had failed to convene a single working meeting of either the editorial or education sub-committee since.  Even the large volume of propaganda produced by the PC was organized by the secretariat without his input.  He was absent from virtually all meetings of the PC.  He was becoming a liability to the structure.  He is willing to work in other capacities, however.  We are considering a replacement for him.

Ch5 Vula

8.3. The departure of comrade Sipho from the RPC will not affect the progress of the work that adversely.  His erratic presence, rather, was becoming more of an impediment than anything else.  He will be fitted in some role that will suit his personal circumstances.  Masha and I still have to talk to him, however, to settle the security implications of the whole move.

9.. All the departments save the one responsible for CW seem to be regiswtgering marked progress.  That is why the Rexel report has come like a bolt from the vlue.

9.1. The head of CW is still part time and therefore cannot devote much time to his work.  He is also not resident in the area, and comes only on weekends, which makes it worse.

9.2. The MC is also not working as a full team and is still technically ill-equipped.  The need for instructors was raised with you long ago.  There is no point in strengthyening and constituting proper MC in the absence of trained personnel to ensure their training and development.

10.. I am really giving up trying to assume we are one in thinking about the development of the combat capacity on the ground.  From all that is not going on one has to assume that there is a plan one is not aware of and had better stop thinking or communicating his thoughts and just wait for the grand plan of which he may be part to be unfolded to him.

10.1. I would be folding my arms and waiting were it not very very frustrating and really eating up my constitution.  Every time there is music from John I hasten to collect in anticipation of news about the personnel due since May.  I think it's terrible that I sometimes feel a certain bitterness when I realize it's propaganda leaflet.

10.2. I cannot be expected to be efficient if I do not have assistance, and in the combat sphere I need professional assistance.  Jabu became part of this mission in 1987.  There is no reason why there should be delays on technical matters around his dispatch as we approach 1990.

Ch6 Vula

11.. At Jessy have asked Stan and Kgalima to trace most of the good MK comrades they were with on RI with the view of drawing them into structures as a prelude to other involvement.  Most of the MK ex-Islanders are, in any event working within mass organizations.  There is more MK leadership potential in the Reef than in Durban because of this greater element of younger MK cadres released from prison.

End Vula.

Carl to Theo

Please advise who Iyaloo Naidoo the person is.  It is the name under whom your Cressida is registered.

Carl to Pete

Checked through all Nat files of Boris.  The only mention of Solomon Molefe (I think that's his real name?) is in connection with a report in which Col. Loots surmised that the description of unknown person who received money from Zuma and comrade A was Solomon Molefe, who according to Loots, was operating underground in the rural areas.  There is no report that in any way points to him suspiciously.  I am even supposing about the name.  I cannot help you further.

1.. In view of the expected delay of the couriers, shouldn't I send parts of some of the reports via the fast line?

Carl to John

What is the point of giving the lady a name when she'll still say the message comes from Carl?  Or shouldn't she?  Anyway you can give her a name if it worries you.  You used to call me Isabella without a bother.



Please get the following safely to Xhamela via safe person who is in grouping we originally tried to set up when there was talk of Madiba's release, viz., Cyril, Sydney, Smangi, Frank.  In this case we'd suggest Sydney or Smangi.  Whoever we use should be seen as possible link to convey and bring messages from Xhamela on a disciplined basis.

(NB:  Norman = Nzo.  Names are our codes, please uncode for Xhamela.)

The message is as follows from Kay/Norman:

Ø. Your release is a great spur to us to redouble our efforts.  We welcome you all with warmest embrace.

Ø. In the meantime it is urgent we establish safe, secure and speedy lines of communications.

Ø. A few years ago the NEC mandated Sipho and Kay to take charge of settling senior comrades into the country without revealing details and identities of those involved in this process.  Sipho's illness is a severe blow to us even in this regard.   However it has been decided that for the immediate period, supervision and control of this process should be entrusted to Kay and Norman.  It is on this basis that this message comes to you.  All matters of political and policy nature coming from you will be placed before relevant organizations.

Ø. Some progress has been made in this regard.  This has included establishing the above type of communications system, which is not known even to NEC and which has been functioning for more than a year.

Ø. This message is coming to you via this system, though the comrade delivering the message has no idea how the system works.  Please give him anything you wish to send to us as we need to begin speedy exchange of views with you all.

Ø. Attached is another message covering other aspects.  Look forward to speedy acknowledgement and establishment of reliable line of communications with you.  Warmest love to all the others and yourself.

Ø. Communication to Xhamela from Kay

Ø. We hope you received our message on the day of your release.  Let us once again express our unbridled joy that at last you are back where you should be – among those at the helm of our march to victory.  We wish you the best of health.  Even the little we have seen of you on the media we have every confidence that you are the Xhamela we knew and loved so much.  We welcome you back as a brother and a comrade.  We ask you to convey these sentiments to the others.


Message from J.S. and A.N.

Ø. Your release is a great spur to us to redouble our efforts.  We welcome you all with warmest embrace.

Ø. In the meantime it is urgent we establish safe, secure and speedy lines of communications.

Ø. A few years ago the NEC mandated OR and JS to take charge of settling senior comrades into the country without revealing details and identities of those involved in this process.  OR's illness is a severe blow to us even in this regard.  However, it has been decided that for the immediate period supervision and control of this process should be entrusted to JS and Nzo (Kay and Norman).  It is on this basis that this message comes to you.  All matters of political and policy nature coming from you will be placed before relevant organizations.

Ø. Some progress has been made in this regard.  This has included establishing the above type of comms system, which is not known even to NEC and which has been functioning for more than a year.

Ø. This message is coming to you via this system, though the cde delivering the message has no idea how the system works.  Please give him anything you wish to send to us as we need to begin speedy exchange of views with you all.

Ø. Attached is another message covering other aspects.  Look forward to speedy acknowledgement and establishment of reliable line of comms with you.  Warmest love to all the others and yourself.

Communication to Xhamela from Kay

Ø. We hope you received our message on the day of your release.  Let us once again express our unbridled joy that at last you are back where you should be – among those at the helm of our march to victory.  We wish you the best of health.  Even the little we have seen of you on the media we have every confidence that you are the Xhamela we knew and loved so much.  We welcome you back as a brother and a comrade.  We ask you to convey these sentiments to the others.


coming in 6 parts.  This = 1st:

1. From Kay to Carl

1.. Further to your thoughtful remarks on the C.D.F. & Natal Peace process, we inform you as follows:

Both issues will be considered at a plenary session of the NEC which has been called for next week to consider the new developments in the whole situation.  Towards the end of next week, we are expecting a delegation from the M.D.M., when these issues will be further discussed.  We will keep you informed of the outcome.

1.1. In passing, the PB wishes to say that we've the impression that Jay Naidoo (COSATU) has come a long way politically in the last year and that we cannot characterize him simply as an "opportunist".  He's a complex (and extremely important) figure, who has to be brought closer.  We're encouraged by his recent public remarks on the role of the SACP.  We were also informed by Marsha and Theo that he (Jay) responded positively to their initiative.

2.. We fully understand some of the frustrations and even bitterness you express about the project.  We don't in any way want to inhibit your critical reflections which undoubtedly helps to keep us on our toes and to examine our style of work.  But we wish to emphasize some of the objective complexities of the project and the problems which have dogged us, especially in the first phase.  The manner in which we were ordered to proceed placed enormous limitations and more especially on our capacity to provide timeously the all-round human resources which the project certainly merits.

3.. We should remind ourselves of some of the key realities which have a bearing on this issue.

3.1. For reasons of which you are aware, knowledge of the project was restricted to a handful of cadres.  This brought with it the following (sometimes unavoidable) obstacles:

(a). The two people in charge at the top has enormous all-round national responsibilities.  The allocation of personnel and resources could only be effected through the intervention of the President who, apart from other burdens, was often away.

Done one; new is two.

Begin 2/6

(b). The process of 'negotiating' for a cadre was a complex one.  It involved a certain amount of resistance from their old structures and a period of phasing out.  The whole process was made even more complex by the fact that the structures could not, for obvious reasons, be told the true reason why they were being deprived of key comrades.  An "order" that they were required for the President's project would automatically destroy the legend.

(c). The actual day to day implementation has been in the hands of a small group under Pete.  In addition to a multitude of other tasks, Pete's had to spend a considerable part of his time traveling to the forward areas.  The search for foreign auxiliaries to assist us has also involved traveling.  Moreover, we've not succeeded yet in finding suitable cadres to augment Pete.  Ron, as you know, is restricted from directly handling internal work.

(d). For security reasons, the President decided to make no reports to the NEC on the progress of the project.  It was only six weeks ago that it was judged timeous to make such a report in general terms.  This unavoidable delay infected the responses of key individuals to our needs.  At the NEC meeting, Kay made the point that the process of getting help was like drawing teeth.  We're hopeful that this aspect will now improve.  But, as you know, narrow competitiveness in the politics of exile structures, doesn't lose its tenacity overnight.

(e). Even when we've managed to obtain the transfers of the suitable cadres, the process of preparing them takes time because of need for thoroughness and security.

(f). In addition, simultaneously with the Vula mission, we've also been attempting to locate cadres in the W Cape.  Two trained cadres are already based there.  We have, however, decided that this mission will in future all fall under Vula.

4.. Some of the above helps explain the slow pace of implementation.  It would not be fair to attribute our failures to willful neglect as the overriding cause; if this were so you'd be justified in feeling bitter.  Leaving aside generalities, let's look at our practical experiences.

Two thru; three to be.

Now 3 of 6

4.1. We planned initially to get Theo in within 6 months.  In fact it took close to 2 years for reasons which can be described as "technical".  You'll recall too the delayed process of your own preparation and infiltration.  Let us not proceed to the present.

4.2. JABU:  You're aware that at the time, you and Theo were proceeding to Lobby.  Jabu was in Govan.  After the attack on him, he was jailed.  He only returned to HQ in January 1989.  He was undergoing treatment at UTH.  That was not satisfactory.  Thereafter we sent him to Sydney for medical treatment.  We then sent him to Lucy for disguises and a further medical check.  This trip had to be delayed to suit the availability of Lucy and her team.  He has recently returned to HQ.  He prefers to enter via the Green border.  For personal reasons, he can only leave HQ in mid-Nov.  We think that would bring the crossing dates too close to the dangerous period.  Therefore we see his infiltration as follows:

i.. Date of arrival in Govan + 8/1/90

ii.. The team arrives in Govan + 1/1/90

iii.. Team has face to face meeting with your person to ensure that everything works smoothly – approx 13/14 Jan 1990.

Reconnaisance undertaken in Sept indicates same pattern continues:  soldiers leave the fence for +3 days at end of each month.  However, crossing can take place even when soldiers are on patrol.

4.3. CHARLES:  He was only cleared by Nat in +June 1989.  Only last week did we succeed in getting a reluctant PMC to assign him to us.  We propose the following:  We skip the Lucy stage.  We infiltrate Charles a week or so after Jabu using the same forward area.

4.4. JANE:  We're awaiting a travel document for her.  She's ready to leave at any moment.

4.5. LJ:  has been allocated to the President's project.  He's earmarked for the W Cape and will be there in Jan 1990.  Theo has agreed that we proceed with the arrangement for the present.

4.6. The Flea:  Your request for him has at last been OK'd.  It was complicated by the fact that at the time of your request, he'd just been appointed to head the IPC underground.  He's set to join you by Feb 1990.

Three free;  4 in store.

Read 4/6

4.7. We've also reached the 1st stage of obtaining the other senior member you recommended.  The President, before his illness, had agreed.  What remains, is to concretize his release, legend, and preparation for entry.  Theo has already begun decisions with both 4.6 and 4.7.

4.8. Theo should be with you in early Dec 1989.

4.9. You can also expect at least three persons (internationalists) to help in your support network.  They'll be in place by early next year.

5.. We've set out the above without intending to inhibit your criticisms.  We're conscious that we have to meet your needs with the efficiency and urgency they demand.  Your achievements are immense and we hope to measure up to them.

Amandla,  Kay.

Carl from Pete

1.. Kay preparing points for Xhamela.  Will send on Wed 25th.

2.. Clarification of coding.  Theo will use to give his number to Phillip.  He'll subtract 1 from each digit of the international codes etc.  He'll subtract 1 from each of the last 3 digits of the telephone number itself.  No carry over.

3.. Regarding link to Xhamela:  Vula's concern and one with which we had agreed was that the links must understand that they're "official" links and not abuse their role as some "passportables" do, for their own ends.  We assume that you've taken above into consideration and will be guided by you.  Isn't Khalima also part of Rachel collective.  Won't that complicate matters?

4.. Re:  Retailer report of 15/10/89:

4.1. On Abdul's relationship with Marsha and yourself:  do you need our intervention or will you handle?

4.2. He has not informed us of person he wants.  Please clarify.

4.3. On printing project:  what happened to Poo who agreed to be full time?

5.. We look forward to receiving further retailer reports.  According to John courier will be with you soon.

Done 4; run 5/

Look at 5/6

Pete to Carl

These were requested from Cubans by Marsha.


Substance.   Name of formula

1R-1. R-2. R-3. R-4. R-5

Ammonium Nitrate. 85%. 82%. 80%. 85%. 80%

Sawdust. 10%

Aluminium Powder. 5%. 13%. 15%

Asphalt or Rubber. 10%

Petrol. 5%

TNT. 20%

In all cases ammonium nitrate must have more than 32%of nitrogen.

1 Incendiaries:

Substance. Name of formula

F-1. F-2. F-3

Potassium Nitrate. 60%. 60%

Asphalt. 20%

Sulphur. 20%. 20%

Sawdust. 20%

Iron Trioxide. 76%

Aluminium Powder. 24%

If impossible to obtain potassium you can use soap, kerosene, benzene.

Pete to Carl

MHQ is holding a seminar in Dec.  Below are the proposed topics.



1.. The current strategy of the ANC.  An evaluation of the relationship between the political and military struggles: Theory and Practice.  (Paper by Joe Slovo).

2.. Factors currently influencing the struggle for power.  The role of negotiations.  Regional and international influences.  (Paper by Thabo Mbeki).


1.. The current strategy of MK.

2.. The role of MK in building the underground and creating the People's Army.

3.. A strategic and tactical analysis of MK actions over the past decade.

4.. The issues involved in target selection.

5.. Guerilla warfare: The relationship between rural and urban warfare.

6.. The role of armed struggle in the seizure of power: an assessment of the military dimensions of insurrection.

5 is past; 6 is last.

This is last – 6/6


1.. Training policy and strategy in MK.

2.. An evaluation of the relationship between MK training and the skills required by cadres in the field.

3.. The political preparation of MK cadres.

4.. MK cadre policy: at HQ, in the rear and at the front.

5.. Welfare issues within MK.

6.. Cadre selection for training and deployment: An evaluation of the ulitization of cadres within MK.

7.. Morale.

8.. The future South African Army.


1.. The relationship between the NEC, PMC, MHQ, IPC and NAT.  (Paper by PMC).

2.. The place and role of the underground in the struggle for power.  Organizational aspects of building the underground and the People's Army.  (Paper by Ronnie Kasrils.)


1.. Opening and closing addresses.  (NEC)

2.. Introductory remarks.  (Army Commander)

3.. The role of workers in the strengthening of the People's Army and the creation of factory based combat units.  (Paper by Martin Sere)

4.. An assessment of the internal situation:  the MDM; prospects for a broader united front; the crisis within the enemy's ranks.  (Paper by Steve Tshwete)

5.. Practical measures to increase the participation of women in the armed struggle.  (Paper by Jackie Molefe)

6.. Legal rights of captured MK cadres.  (Paper by Zola Skweyiya)

7.. Enemy strategy in infiltrating internal democratic political organizations, combat structures of the movement and techniques of interrogation.  (Paper by NAT)

John here:

Pete asked if you'd resend point 3 of your recent retailer report.  It got partly corrupted during transfer.  Section starting: "3.  With respect to the Jessy CC…" and ending "…..He certainly is one of the key figures around which any contemplated PC there should be built.  Fin"

No more, finished, all out.


Carl to Kay:

1. Thanks for your response to my comm. and for the clarification it gave on some of things I raised. I do not ask to be spoiled with constant explanation of some of the problems which I am aware you are experiencing because of the special compexities of Vula. But I am certain you appreciate to a degree the exasperation one can feel in these circumstances to a perceived lack of continual appraisal about the problems that affect the mission. This especially so when certain indications have been given but do not materialise – like the projected resolution of the Jane document problem by "September 23". One understands that it was not an undertaking, but still, an explanation of the inability to fulfill the task was warranted by our expectations. This could have prevented the need to complain.

1.1. Can you give us an idea when we hope this travel document will finally be obtained?

2. Bearing in mind all that I have said in my earlier comm on Vula, I think January is not a reasonable proposition for Jabu's infiltration. We should not unmindful of the comrade's personal circumstances, but the mission and the legends built around it should assume priority consideration. If there is no alternative to late November because of these personal reasons, then let the infiltration take place in late November. January may be safer for his personal infiltration. But it adds more danger to the survival of Carl. Has this point been taken?

3. I wished otherwise as soon as I sent the comm which spoke of "bitterness" about certain aspects of the mission. It certainly was for want of words that I uttered what I never intended. Agitation yes. Bitterness by no means. I think I am aware that as much as we may sometimes get anxious at perceived lack of support for Vula from our side (unfair though this may be) – this is an important project of the movement and is regarded as such by the all who know about it, and will be recognized thus in due course by all organs of the movement. One is therefore justly proud to belong to such a project. Our criticism/observations should seen in this light. I say "our" because Masha was also drawn into the observations I made in my report.

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