This resource is hosted by the Nelson Mandela Foundation, but was compiled and authored by Padraig O’Malley. It is the product of almost two decades of research and includes analyses, chronologies, historical documents, and interviews from the apartheid and post-apartheid eras.
Karl Edwards: [NIS] In Depth Analysis of NIC with emphasis on ANC/ CP links
KARL EDWARDS: EXTRACT FROM "AN IN-DEPTH VIEW OF NIC AND ANC ACTIVITIES AND ACTIVISTS WITH EMPHASIS ON ANC/CP LINKS
1. Indian Passports and Visas vis-à-vis ANC/CP Communication
1.1. Factual evidence shows that the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), and Solidarity Front (SF) based in Johannesburg are being co-ordinated by the ANC/CP in Britain. Dr Yusuf Dadoo (chairman of the Central Committee of the SACP), Essop Pahad (ANC/CP), Aziz Pahad and others have recently (August 1979) had contact with the executive committee of the NIC in a series of clandestine London meetings. Similarly, Priscilla Yana (banned person in Johannesburg) has had direct contact with Yusuf Dadoo on behalf of the SF.
The main thrust of the above contact has led to a unity of action of leftist oriented Indians within the RSA to boycott the SAIC elections. The ANC/CP has achieved a good deal of success in manipulating Indian internal groups.
Secondly, the influence and activities of the intelligence department of the ANC/CP is particularly advanced amongst Indians who are playing prominent clandestine role in IRDD operations.
1.2. One of the central operational problems for the ANC/CP, namely communication, has been overcome. Good communication exists between the ANC/CP in London and the high profile political Indians within the RSA. Similarly, good communication exists between the external IRDD personnel in the neighbouring states and their agents within the RSA.
1.3. Good communication has been facilitated by the travel opportunities which are afforded to Indians on a national and international level. Over the past year an unusual number of banned, listed and high profile political Indians without travel documents have been applying for passports. Those already issued with passports have been making good use of them.
The reason for this phenomenon is to either establish, or maintain, contact with the ANC/CP which is pioneering a united front of opposition to the SA government.
1.4. A sharp stop should be brought to the above situation whereby the ANC/CP is able to manipulate and recruit Indians through travel opportunities afforded to SA politicals, and enhance ANC/CP communication through these same opportunities.
For this reason travel documents must be:
1.4.1. Withdrawn from those Indians who are abusing them;
1.4.2. Not issued to those who (upon reasonable suspicion) intend to abuse them.
In addition, the above process should be operated in conjunction with search and surveillance procedures discussed in the next section.
1.5. In order to clarify this issue of travel documents, it is suggested that Mrs Labuschagne of Section B screen passport applicants in the light of this report. With this in mind, two procedures can then be followed:
1.5.1. A list of individuals must be made whose passports must definitely be removed and refused, on the grounds of their present ANC/CP involvement.
1.5.2. A list of additional suspects, friends and relations must be prepared (through research and directives from Mrs Labuschagne to regional offices) for the purposes of search at border points (along the lines suggested below).
2. Loopholes in our System with Regard to the Control of ANC/CP Activities
2.1. Border Control
In the case of Black and White South Africans entering neighbouring states there is o record kept of cross-border travel, since no forms are completed and no car numbers are taken, unless on the instruction of SP, or NIS head office, or in the case of a traveler being listed.
Furthermore, customs officials at Jan Smuts disapprove of the search of travelers on South African passports or passport holders of the customs union countries.
The ANC/CP are using this loophole to good effect by using couriers which are "unknown" to the authorities. These couriers carry letters in envelopes to key politicals, pamphlets in false bottomed suitcases, etc. The extent of the courier activity is vast, and is in constant progress. The information carried is more often of a highly sensitive and revealing nature, and one only has to look at the "Schoon network" to realize the value of this information to an intelligence service.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVED CONTROL OF ANC/CP OPERATIVES USING OUR BORDERS
1.1. Computerization
Computer terminals should be installed at all border posts. A suspect list should be written into the computer, giving instructions on the manner in which the suspect should be searched, and what evidence the police, customs and intelligence service employees should look for.
1.2. Control of Couriers
In this report an analysis of Mac Maharaj, the IRDD and ANC/CP has been undertaken. It is clear that couriers are normally trusted individuals with the correct political attitudes. The are in the majority of cases from political families, and have relations who have been jailed, banned or detained.
A list of close personal friends (especially students who tend to travel during their vacations) can easily be drawn up from an analysis of the activities of the prime suspects mentioned in this report. These people must be placed on the computer and be subjected to scrutiny at border posts. (Some planning must be done with regard to search on entering or leaving.)
1.3. Control of Foreigners
1.3.1. In the first place, people who belong to the huge variety of Anti-South African organizations overseas should be placed on the black list. These names can, for a start, be drawn from the Operation Daisy files. No visas should be granted to such people as it has been adequately proven that they enter the RSA borders on ANC/CP, WCC, AAM, IDAF business, and that their presence in the RSA is of no value to this country at all. Individual exceptions can be made on the basis of a more detailed explanation of their activities, e.g. in the case of groups who are genuinely interested to assist with community development projects on a non-political level.
1.3.2. Foreigners are being used for ANC/CP activities, as in the case of a recent example quoted in this report. The only way to ensure control of these clandestine ANC/CP operatives is to run operations overseas, where observation/infiltration on key individuals is undertaken and/or information obtained from friendly intelligence services which provide us with the names of C.P. members who are consorting with the ANC/CP.
1.3.3. Some draft-dodgers now linked with COSAWR have access to foreign passports e.g. Barend Schuitema, Heinz Klug and others. These people have returned to the RSA on their foreign passports. Clarity should be gained on how to treat these people by either preventing entry or arresting them as draft-dodgers upon re-entry, and interrogating them on their external activities and the purpose of their travel back to the RSA.
1.4. Removal of Passports
Individuals who are known to abuse their passports by consorting with the ANC/CP and by involving themselves with anti-South African activities should have their passports withdrawn. Cases in point include the NIC people who consulted with the ANC/CP in London, the known couriers of Marius Schoon and Joe Gqabi in Botswana, known relations of Dadoo, Pahad, Maharaj, Timol and Indris Naidoo most of whom are working for a revolution in the RSA.
1.5. The Refusal of Passports
From an analysis of IRDD activity it is clear that many people from the RSA are requested to visit places outside the country for the purpose of recruitment, briefing and debriefing. Where we have reasonable suspicion that this process is about to take place, passports should be refused, e.g. in the case of Omar Badsha, the Cachalia's etc.
1.6. Training and Equipping Border Control Personnel
Training programmes should be run in order to teach personnel what to look for during their search operation, for example:
1.6.1. The use of false-bottomed suitcases for the transportation of pamphlets, explosives and messages (which were provided by the ANC/CP to operatives in Operation Daisy).
1.6.2. The concealment of messages in ordinary envelopes without stamps, the examination of mundane letters for secret writing (used during Operation Daisy by the ANC/CP).
1.6.3. The provision of the necessary technical equipment to fulfill these tasks.
4.. Indian Agents
4.1. At this stage this department is losing the professional battle against Indian dissidents in that we are failing to infiltrate, identify, sever or plug into the communication of, the activities of the ANC/CP within the South African Indian community. Although we have fairly good information on the older politicals, we have very little inside information on the new generation of politicals between the ages of 20-30, and this is a severe gap in our knowledge.
To underline this contention, a statement from Yusuf Cachalia, past member of thirty seven leftist organizations inside the RSA (including past (?) member of the central committee of the SACP), is appropriate. During October 1967 he said:
"The old Communist Party has been completely broken up, but a new, unknown and younger group are coming up, and will continue the work."
(With the above in mind, what better place to start looking than among Cachalia's own family, where we already have proof that his daughter Dilshad works for the ANC inside the RSA.)
4.2. Special attention should therefore be paid to the young members of the NIC, SF and various other organizations which have united against the SAIC. These young people are the workers of the solidarity movement in the Indian community. For this reason this group must be infiltrated, and its activities should be hampered at every turn. The consequences of allowing these activists to build up a united front in various Indian communities is obvious.
4.3. We can expect a growing number of Indian youths to become involved in leftist politics in the near future, and the NIS should be introducing Indian agents (full-time members of the Department) into the NIC, SF, DLA, ASC, JISWA, and other groupings with leftist inclinations. Also, we should concentrate on allowing such agents to study law and medicine and then for them to do articles in leftist law firms in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg (e.g. Navaretkem Pillay and Co in Durban) and study medicine at overseas institutions such as the Royal College of Surgeons in Dublin, Ireland.
From a behavioural and personality point of view, Indians show a surprising motivation in raising their status and standard of living, and this motivation could be well utilized with regard to agents (staff members) in the field.
In conclusion, we must also seek a solution to the question of why NIC people traveled to London for consultation with the ANC/CP when there are eminently reliable ANC members in neighbouring states who could have given suitable advice to the NIC representatives.
The answer seems to be twofold. Firstly, the ANC people in neighbouring states are largely attached to the top secret IRDD networks, and it would go against party security to entertain a large group of well known Indians from the NIC in the confines of the neighbouring states.
Secondly, it would appear that the general political work of the ANC is handled by a political section based in Lusaka and London. It is therefore quite likely that for security reasons, Yusuf Dadoo, Essop Pahad, Aziz Pahad and others insist on London or European meetings with high profile political figures (like NIC members). In this way, they preserve security and are able to direct development in the internal politics of the RSA.
Lastly, we must not ignore the role of the IRDD who certainly would cultivate one of two contacts within, or on the NIC. These agents would then be responsible for reporting back to Lusaka using some form of secret communication. Both Mac Maharaj and Aziz Pahad displayed an intimate knowledge of Indian politics in Natal prior to the NIC exodus in late 1979. We must conclude that there are already IRDD agents "in place" in the Durban/Pietermaritzburg region. Our task is to find them.